Was a competitive pre-Hercules Bristol-powered single-seat monoplane fighter feasible?

[Kevin J]

My vote is to go from Gauntlet to F5/34, call the latter the Gladiator instead of another biplane. There's nothing cutting edge in 1934-5 on the F5/34 that couldn't be done by Gloster Instead of the Gladiator.

Of course they were busy making Spitfires for Vickers and other aircraft, but it's a funny thing that Glosters went from biplane fighter to jet fighter with nothing of their own namesake in between. Akin to the Royal Small Arms Factory producing the Mk. IV SMLE in 1937 and the SA80 in 1943.

The other option is to go from the 1930 Vickers Jockey to a 1933 Vickers Venom powered by a Mercury as a competitor to the Polikarpov I-16. Keep the biplane Gauntlet and Gladiator but solely for the FAA. Upgrade both to take the 2 speed Pegasus for 1939 service entry. The Pegasus powered retractable undercarriage Gladiator is competitive with the A5M4, the similarly powered Venom competitive with the Ki-27 even Ki-43-1. No US made planes required.

 

[MikeMeech]

My vote is to go from Gauntlet to F5/34, call the latter the Gladiator instead of another biplane. There's nothing cutting edge in 1934-5 on the F5/34 that couldn't be done by Gloster Instead of the Gladiator.

Of course they were busy making Spitfires for Vickers and other aircraft, but it's a funny thing that Glosters went from biplane fighter to jet fighter with nothing of their own namesake in between. Akin to the Royal Small Arms Factory producing the Mk. IV SMLE in 1937 and the SA80 in 1943.

Hi

Glosters was taken over by Hawkers in 1934 (Supermarine was taken over by Vickers in 1928) and started building Hawker designs Hardy/Audax/Hart/Hartbees/Henley/Hurricane/Typhoon these are what kept their factory in work. 'Gloster designs' did overlap with this 'Hawker production', Gauntlet/Gladiator and from 1944 the Meteor. They also produced various design prototypes, none of which appear to have been significantly better than alternative products already in development, but it did give work to the design department who were then available to work on the Meteor design and prior to that the jet E.28/39. I doubt if building more of their own designs would have improved matters for the RAF during WW2.

Mike

 

[Admiral Beez]

Glosters was taken over by Hawkers in 1934 and started building Hawker designs....these are what kept their factory in work.
Mike

Then this is where our point of departure needs to be, get the F.5/34 ordered and into the beginnings of production by the Air Ministry before Hawker takes over - obviously requiring an acquisition date of 1935 or 1936 instead of '34. This is the What'If forum, after all.

I wonder if Hawker's acquisition of Glosters was the reason it took so long to get the Gladiator into service. First flight 1934 of this very basic aircraft, enters service in 1937.

 

[Kevin J]

Then this is where our point of departure needs to be, get the F.5/34 ordered and into the beginnings of production by the Air Ministry before Hawker takes over - obviously requiring an acquisition date of 1935 or 1936 instead of '34. This is the What'If forum, after all.

I wonder if Hawker's acqwisition of Glosters was the reason it took so long to get the Gladiator into service. First flight 1934 of this very basic aircraft, enters service in 1937.

Personally, I quite like the Gladiator, but FAA version only and in service date of 1937 for it. Put in the Pegasus later and all versions are as good as the A5M.

 

[ThomasP]

Hey Admiral Beez,

re:"I wonder if Hawker's acqwisition of Glosters was the reason it took so long to get the Gladiator into service. First flight 1934 of this very basic aircraft, enters service in 1937."

Prototype first flight September 1934, first order placed June 1935, first deliveries July 1936, first unit operational January 1937. From what I have read, the reason for the somewhat long gestation period was an initial lack of urgency (on the part of the Air Ministry) relative to selecting a winner for the F.7/30 specification. Also, Gloster did not initially offer a design for the competition, and did so only after it was clear that the other entrants were not likely to satisfy the Air Ministry. The somewhat slow production of the initial batch was mostly due to Gloster's use of low rate production methods.

 

[Admiral Beez]

The somewhat slow production of the initial batch was mostly due to Gloster's use of low rate production methods.

Hmm... that doesn't bode well then for getting the F5/34 into production before Hawker's takeover, even if we delay the merger by a couple of years.

 

[nuuumannn]

Hmm... that doesn't bode well then for getting the F5/34 into production before Hawker's takeover, even if we delay the merger by a couple of years.

I agree. part of the issue with Gloster was that it was a small company and its aircraft production line wasn't anything like what we'd imagine such a thing to be today. It, like most other British manufacturers were building its aircraft to a high standard for what they were, but not at any great degree of haste.

The thing with the Hurricane production was that it was about to change Gloster's attitue to manufacturing, not so much in the materials, but in pace. The first order for the Hurricane was placed in June 1936 for 600 aircraft - at that time the largest order for a single type in one go in British aviation history. The first production aircraft first flew in October 1937 and by February the next year, the type had officially entered service with Treble One Sqn. Slightly more pacey than with the previous generation of fighters.

When Hawker took over Gloster, the firm was in financial trouble, having built a number of types as prototypes only or in limited production and once the take over happened in 1934, Gloster started building Harts and Audaxes in small numbers. Following that the firm's resources were taken up with Gladiator and Gauntlet production, as well as a number of prototypes that again failed to get a production order, and Schneider Trophy seaplanes. For a small firm, the company was busy, even if what they were doing didn't bear fruit; Hucclecote, where it began building Hurricanes did not begin use until late 1938, early 1939.

 

[Admiral Beez]

I agree. part of the issue with Gloster was that it was a small company and its aircraft production line wasn't anything like what we'd imagine such a thing to be today. It, like most other British manufacturers were building its aircraft to a high standard for what they were, but not at any great degree of haste.

Best route for the F5/34 is to make it elsewhere. Have Gloster's new overseers Hawker instruct the prototype, plans and tooling for the F5/34 be shipped to CC&F in Canada. Then Glosters can focus on making Hawker designs. CC&F was soon to begin producing the Grumman FF, so make the Gloster instead or beforehand.

 

[Shortround6]

The whole CC&F making Grumman FFs was a scam to get around US laws about exporting war material to either side in the Spanish civil war. It had nothing to do with improving Canadian defenses or providing the Commonwealth with more aircraft, There is a reason some of them were still available in crates in 1940, The deal fell through or was discovered and the aircraft embargoed/impounded.
Trying to substitute F5/34 in this arms deal sounds pretty far fetched.
Please note that CC&F was just the assembly shop of record. They assembled aircraft from parts kits supplied by US manufacturers. Grumman built the fuselages, Brewster built the wings and tail surfaces and the engines, landing gear and other equipment/components supplied by US companies. CC&F latter did very fine work making all kinds of stuff for the war effort but handing them a set of plans for the F.5/34 and some money wasn't going to get you very far.

BTW with only two prototypes there is no tooling.

You might also want to check your time line. CC&F started work (or the arms dealers did) in late 1936 and into early 1937. About the time the Gloster F.5/34 made it's first flight.
Spanish agents had placed two orders, one for 40 aircraft and one for 10 aircraft. 34 planes made it to France and then Spain with the other 16 embargoed in June of 1938. One was sold to Mexico and other 15 were eventually taken into Canadian service in the fall of 1940 (end of the BoB)

 

[kool kitty89]

Neither of the listed sported any armor or s-s tanks.
Another option might be the fuselage of Gladiator with a single 'modern' wing.

This is something I've thought of several times: take the Gladiator fuselage largely unchanged, possibly strengthening the tail unit (to delete the bracing wires), and use an updated cowling and variable-pitch propeller like the F.5/34 used. This would be particularly good if Gloster stuck to the preference of using frise ailerons in such a wing (as on the F.5/34 prototypes) given the better roll-rate those provide, especially at high speeds (those type of ailerons appear to be the main reason most US fighters had better roll rates than most European fighters and also had much better aileron control at high speed). Granted, Gloster could've experimented that on the Hurricane, but for whatever reason they didn't and probably would've had more control over modifying an entirely in-house design.

Presumably, with the construction methods for the Gladiator and Hurricane fuselage being similar mechanically fastened/riveted steel frame with mixed fabric and aluminum skinning, the factory capacity would be similar to what the Hurricane ended up using, or perhaps better due to using tooling and components common to existing Gladiator production.

Given the landing gear arrangement in the F.5/34 wing, something similar should've been a good match for the Gladiator itself (gear entirely self-contained in the wing and not overlapping with the fuselage when retracted). Those were only semi-retractable gear, but seem to be a good enough compromise to reduce drag and much closer to fully retracting than other examples of simple rearward-folding landing gear (or the added complexity of rotating gear like the P-36/P-40 used). Had Gloster been planning ahead, they could've specifically designed the F.5/34's wing for use in both an all-new fuselage and a modified Gladiator fuselage.

Ideally, they'd also have other engine installations in mind and at least considerations for strengthening the engine mounts for alternate, heavier engine installations (namely the Merlin or Hercules), but short of that it likely could've accepting the Taurus or perhaps R-1830 without too much trouble. (for whatever reason imported or license-built R-1830s were used, maybe if Australia took interest in license-building the Gloster fighter instead of building Boomerangs, plus it used a pressure injection carburator like most American engines, so no negative-G problems, and potentially also not requiring a sand filter for tropical use)

It would at least be of interest as a pre-war fighter for both the RAF and FAA (for the FAA competing with the Sea Gladiator, Sea Hurricane, and Wildcat/Martlet, or hypothetically orders of carrier-capable Buffalos closer to complete F2A-2s rather than the Buffalo Mk.I). The Seafire's deck handling was less than ideal, so something better than a Sea Hurricane in performance and equal or better in deck handling would've been desired there. That said, Boulton Paul may have been better suited to filling that role with the Defiant's wide-track landing gear and wing area, but lower drag (sans the turret) seems appealing provided it could be hardened for carrier deck landings. (the potential for a second crewman/observer/radio operator might have also been appealing as a competitor to the Fulmar, but a single-seat fighter would obviously offer better performance) The Hercules also should've been viable on the Defiant airframe, but I doubt performance or range would improve, and the FAA didn't have the insistence on radial engines that the US Navy had, so there's less need for that unless Merlin production came up short.

The fully supercharged models of Perseus (like the Mk.X, with 880 HP at 15000 ft) should've been slightly better than the Mercury and if Perseus production had been prioritized more for that over something relatively useless like the Lysander, you could have a fair few diverted to Gloster production. (additionally, Lysander production capacity likely would've been better put towards building more hurricanes or maybe even Gloster fighter components given the similar construction: assuming the same factory floor space and materials would be best used for similar aircraft construction types).

The Pegasus should've given a better rate of climb, but might not have helped much for top speed and should have reduced range on the same fuel load. (probably less advantage than the P-36/Hawk-75 with 2-speed R-1820 over single-speed R-1830 given the higher full-throttle height of the Mercury) Plus, you'd need a different engine cowling design where the Perseus and Mercury would be more interchangeable. Besides that, installing a 2-speed supercharger on the Perseus (or Mercury) would have made more sense all-around for a fighter, including directly adapting the Pegasus's larger supercharger with aims at higher full throttle heights for both the MS and FS gears than existing MS and FS Perseus and Mercury engines. (if the Mercury stayed in production, it also likely would've benefitted more from 100 octane fuel up-ratings than the sleeve valve engines)

Then the Taurus, which is significantly narrower, a bit heavier, and more powerful, but also had reliability problems. The fully supercharged Taurus III would be the one of interest, but it was also one of the more (if not the most) problematic model. The Taurus II (or a later revision of the Taurus II) was found to be more satisfactory in Australian service on the Beaufort, but I'm not entirely sure if that's just due to the III being that problematic, or particularly poorly matched to use in that bomber. (for example, being worked very hard and pushed to the edge of its take-off rating vs the Taurus II achieving more power for take-off with much less stress on the engine, plus any case where warm climate exacerbated the overheating problems would've been worst down-low at take-off) It's possible Gloster could've worked around some of those issues differently than was the case with the Beaufort, but if reliability was poor enough, the performance gain wouldn't be worth the upgrade compared to the Mercury or Perseus (let alone a 2-speed supercharged Mercury or Perseus, though a 2-speed Taurus would obviously have been interesting) Plus on the FAA end, over-water reliability would be even higher than with the RAF, plus the lower weight of the Mercury and Perseus would make for lower stall speeds and softer deck landings.

That said, if restricting power settings on the Taurus III worked well enough, that might have been tolerable for a fighter where sub-900 HP at take-off was acceptable and the smaller diameter and better altitude performance were still more important. (even if emergency power was de-rated and 3300 RPM operation was restricted, the latter still may have been useful above nominal FTH to improve altitude performance without exceeding the reliable power envelope: like how some models of DB-601 were allowed to run at high RPM above FTH)


Also, on the matter of the Australian Beaufort, see here, and note it makes specific reference to fully supercharged and moderately supercharged engines and points to overheating problems being the primary problem with the Taurus:
[link]all-aero

During August 1938 the first Beaufort (L4441), stressed to 17,0001b, underwent ground-running trials that revealed the serious overheating problems that would dog the Taurus throughout its life. Solutions were attempted and on October 15 Bristol's chief test pilot, Capt Cyril Uwins, taxied L4441 for 10min and then took off for a first flight. This still revealed overheating and was cut short to 15min by severe tailplane vibration.

The next two short flights tested attempts to cure the tailplane and cooling problems and revealed that the latter were due to the inadequate airflow through the low-drag cowlings with their thrust- producing vertical cooling-air exit slots. Cooling was helped by fitting Blenheim-type cowlings with circumferential gills and by replacing the 7.5in oil coolers with 10.5in-diameter units, moved inboard by one rib space. Fuel jettison pipes for the outer tanks were also fitted.

Temporary tailplane bracing struts did not cure the vibration, but stiffer cockpit side windows did. A third problem involved handling difficulties when operating the undercarriage, owing to asymmetric drag caused by the aprons that closed the nacelles once the wheels were up. As the two oleos could not be made to raise or lower simultaneously a severe yaw developed. The aprons were removed to improve handling, but the now-open nacelles created considerable drag. Despite this, L4441 achieved 304 m.p.h. at 15,000ft during trials at the Aeroplane and Armament Experimental Establishment (A&AEE) at Martlesham Heath in April and May 1939 with fully supercharged Taurus III engines producing 1,060 h.p. at 3,300 r.p.m. using 87-octane petrol. Side~hinged undercarriage doors were fitted later, and the fuel jettison pipes were moved outboard, to be in line with the oil coolers.
...


The third prototype, L4443, was shipped to Karachi for tropical trials which ran from February to May 1940 and involved cylinder and oil temperature checks with Taurus III and then Mk II engines. There were no overheating problem and the tests were concluded on May 21. It then flew home, reaching Filton on the 29th. To improve handling L4443 featured a revised rudder trim tab with the chord increased by 4in, increasing its area from 0.8 sq.ft to 1.25 sq.ft. This change was incorporated on all Beauforts.
...
When all Beauforts were grounded during the late summer of 1940 in order to replace the troublesome Taurus III engines with a modified version of the moderately supercharged Taurus II using 100-octane fuel and now producing 1,130 h.p., the opportunity was taken to make all five fuel tanks self-sealing and to fit armour to the rear spar to protect the four fixed tanks. Frequent schemes for more armour, which offered some protection from fighters but little against flak, had always to be set against the need for new operational equipment, both exacerbating the type's weight problems.
...
Problems with the early Taurus engines, and Bristol's desire to concentrate on the larger Hercules, led to the American Pratt & Whitney (P&W) Twin Wasp S3C4-G being adopted as an alternative. This was a two-stage engine producing 1,200 h.p. at 2,700 r.p.m., with the exhaust collected at the rear of the engine and emerging aft of the cooling gills. Propellers were 11 ft 6in fully feathering Curtiss Electrics. Beaufort Mk 1 N1110 was converted and flew as a prototype in November 1940.
...

A planned twin-float Beaufort for Australia and Canada was not built; neither were the projected Mk III with Rolls-Royce Merlin engines, nor the Mk IV with improved Taurus XX engines, in both cases because the engines were not available. The M1k III was originally to have had the Merlin XX, but it was quickly appreciated that the Mk 30 was more suitable. However, Rolls-Royce had not developed a twin installation version and the whole scheme lapsed. The Taurus XX engine, with two-speed blowers and fully-feathering propellers, was flight tested in AW372, which featured an Australian-style enlarged fin. This was not a true prototype Mk IV, however, as it lacked the intended B.15 four-gun turret, eventually flight tested in EK997. It was intended that the final 500 Beauforts would be Mk IVs, but Bristol lacked the capacity to produce the Taurus XX engines. An enlarged fin was also fitted to AW304, a widely-used trials machine.

That said, with the amount of trouble the Taurus gave, it's somewhat surprising the Pegasus wasn't more heavily used as a substutute, especially with the 100 octane performance. Given the size and/or drag profile of the Beaufort and Albacore, the added drag of Pegasus engines doesn't seem like that big of a deal, plus it's around 200 pounds lighter than the Taurus or single-stage R-1830. (though the take-off power of the 1830 or Taurus II are still notably better)

See 100 octane performance Shortround referred to here:

However on 87 octane fuel a Pegasus XVIII was rated at 965hp for take-off ((+5.5lbs boost) and 1,000hp at 3,000ft in low gear and 885hp at 15,500ft in high gear.
When using 100 octane fuel the Pegasus XVIII was rated at 1050hp for take-off (+6.75lbs boost) and 1065hp at 1,000ft in low gear and 965hp at 13,000ft in high gear.
The Pegasus was larger in diameter and heavier.

The Bolded part is debatable. The Gloster F.9/37 flew briefly with a high altitude (OK, a 14-15,000ft engine) but there were cooling problems and that engine disappeared, rarely to be heard from again. All but one subsequent versions were low altitude engines. The Taurus II having 1,060hp for take-off and 1,110hp at 4,000ft. The Taurus III was rated at 935hp for take-off and 1,060hp at 14,500ft. It was used in some Australian Beauforts? The Taurus VI and later versions on 100/130 fuel were pretty much around 1085-1090hp for take-off and 1130hp at 3,100ft. The Taurus was plagued with overheating problems for most of it's life. Since the air at 14,000ft has about 73% of the mass (weight) per cubic ft as air at 4,000ft we can see that unless there was a major rework of the Taurus it had little future as anything but a low altitude engine.

I personally suspect the Gloster F.9/37 was initially tested with Taurus III equivalents and the replacement engines were MS geared Taurus II equivalents, which would explain the reduced top speed (though the speed given is usually similar to that of the Kestrel installation). 360 MPH at 15,000 ft with the Taurus III seems plausible, and the Taurus III (or Taurus in general) had overheating issues, especially when experimental tight cowlings were used on the Beaufort, so it might not have been anything special for the initial Taurus T-S(a) engines.

It's possibly any of a number of authors or editors misinterpreted data at some point, especially if a faster speed was tied to an engine rated at lower power (ie if only take-off ratings were cited, the III would appear much less powerful than the II). The II apparently had fewer problems than the III so there might have been some logic to fitting it even with its low altitude rating for a fighter, or it could've been what was available. There could also be something else we're missing, like resorting to larger engine cowlings with more drag (like the Blenheim cowlings fitted to the Beaufort prototype to address cooling issues). Though in the latter case, the Gloster F.5/34 already used a larger cowling for its Mercury engine, so adapting that may have similarly avoided overheating issues (but not other Taurus reliability issues).