Admiral Beez
Captain
Was there really a risk of the Japanese basing forces in Madagascar?
Was Operation Ironclad necessary?
- Thread starter Admiral Beez
- Start date
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Thumpalumpacus
Captain
The Japanese already had their hands full by May of 1942. Better for the Allies to defend Africa from Ceylon , Capetown, and Aden, imo.
The Allies feared the loss of Ceylon and needed Madagascar as a base to secure the shipping routes to the Middle East.
If Vichy France decided to join the Axis, then, by definition, IJN ships and subs could have used Madagascar as a base and/or for refuelling.
Firstly, it is worth reminding ourselves of the geography of the huge Indian Ocean area. And of the various colonies then in existence.
Mozambique = Portugese (ostensibly neutral despite capture of territory in Timor in 1942)
Madagascar, Reunion & various other islands = Vichy French
Tanzania, Kenya, Maldives, British Indian Ocean Territory, Cocos Is = British
Christmas Is = British but occupied by Japanese on 31 March 1942
The East African Campaign to recover British colonies in the Horn of Africa and eliminate the Italian forces in what is now Somalia & Ethiopia went on until Nov 1941.
Durban had the only battleship sized dry dock in the Indian Ocean area in WW2 after Singapore was lost. Mombasa / Kilindini in Kenya was the port to which the Eastern Fleet withdrew in April 1942. Addu Atoll is at the southern end of the Maldive chain.
The main convoy routes to the Middle East, India & the Persian Gulf ran through the Mozambique Channel. And, following the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran in Aug 1941, that route to southern USSR became of increasing importance to the delivery of Lend Lease supplies starting in 1942. An Axis (either German or Japanese) presence in Madagascar would force those convoys out into the Indian Ocean, forcing longer journeys and thereby increasing the amount of shipping required. They would also require much heavier escort, and, with an increased submarine threat, a different type of escort adding further to the burden of fighting the AS war in the Atlantic by drawing off AS escorts that were still in short supply.
As for Madagascar itself, Britain had concerns about it right from the French surrender in June 1940. While the Governor at that time sent mixed signals about whether he was supporting Petain or De Gaulle, he was quickly replaced by a pro-Vichy Governor and his successor in April 1941 was also very pro Vichy. British concerns were heightened by the Japanese strongarming French Indochina in mid-1940 to cut off supplies to China before invading the northern part in Sept 1940. Matters then became worse in July 1941 following the Japanese occupation of southern Indochina. At that point the worry wasn't direct offensive action by the Japanese against Madagascar. The concern was that Vichy might be "persuaded" to allow the Japanese a base in Madagascar right on Britain's main artery to the Middle and Far East. That would give Britain a major headache in the event of war with Japan. Those were concerns that only increased further after the outbreak of war with Japan.
Problem was that in 1940/41 Britain could not spare the resources to take the island forcibly when there were much more immediate and competing interests elsewhere.
So Britain established an SOE presence on Madagascar in 1940/41 to gather intelligence. One result of that was in Oct 1941 when information was provided that led to the capture of a convoy of 5 Vichy merchant ships by the RN (but could that have made matters worse?). They were also able to assist the invasion when it finally happened in May 1942.
The Japanese threat was seen as increasing in the latter part of 1941, with the result that in Nov 1941 the Joint Planning Staff were instructed by the Cabinet to draw up plans to take the northern part of Madagascar including the large natural harbour at Diego Suarez. Note that this is BEFORE the outbreak of war with Japan. Plans for an "Operation Bonus" were drawn up but dropped at the end of Jan 1942 when it was felt the resources could be better used elsewhere in places like Ceylon.
Pressure to do something also came from other quarters. The US Chiefs of Staff were also keen to deny the Japanese a presence in Diego Suarez. De Gaulle in Feb 1942, obviously, but he was largely ignored given the experiences of what had happened in mid-1940 in West Africa. Also Smuts from Souh Africa, who wrote to Churchill:-
"I look upon Madagascar as the key to the safety of the Indian Ocean, and it may play the same important part in endangering our security there that Indochina has played in Vichy and Japanese hands. All our communications with our war fronts and the Empire in the East may be involved."
So the matter was revisited and a decision made on 12 March 1942 to pursue "Operation Ironclad" and Smuts was informed on 24 March 1942. That coincided with Geman/Japanese discussions and a report back to Japan that was intercepted and decoded by the US that the Germans were pushing for the Japanese to establish a base on Madagascar. Subsequent Japanese activity in the Indian Ocean in March / April 1942 added to the perception of the risk of the Japanese doing something with Madagascar.
As finally organised, at short notice, Ironclad used a lot of resources that were already earmarked for the Far East e.g. the carrier Illustrious and the two brigades of the 5th Infanrtry Division (the plan was for the 5th Div to go to Ceylon and one effect was the diversion of two brigades from 6th Australian Div temporarily in their place). The other Brigade, the 29th, had been undertaking amphibious exercises in Scotland when sent east, without being told its destination. The first convoys with troops and equipment of 17th Brigade, 5th Div sailed on the 13 March and the rest of Force 121 (as the invasion force was known as) on the 23rd March. At that point however there was no final commitment that Ironclad should actually take place.
Even at that point opinions within the british High Command differed as to whether the invasion of Madagascar was in fact necessary. The RN changed its position more than once while the force was en route. On 21st April they stated Kilindini, Ceylon & Zanzibar would suffice to control the IO and that the IJN could operate across the IO from the DEI. The War Office view seems to have been against it, provided Ceylon could be held. The latter also feared that the Vichy Govt might then offer bases in places like Dakar (West Africa) and Bizerta (Tunisia) to Germany and Italy and might even bomb or bombard Gibraltar in retaliation. Further high level meetings took place on 24th April, 27th April & 3rd May with opinion gradually moving in favour of carrying out the Operation before the final decision was taken on 3rd May, just 2 days before it took place. But it was agreed to limit initial operations to the northern part of the island to allow the early release of 5th Div for India.
Note that the Vichy French on Madagascar did not simply roll over and surrender following the invasion of the northern part of the island. Those 2 Brigades of 5th Div were moved on to India from May 1942 once other troops from South Africa, Rhodesia & East Africa could be found to replace them. It was the 29th Brigade and these new troops that went on to capture the rest of Madagascar in a campaign in Sept/Oct 1942.
Axis position
So were the fears of Britain and its Allies about Axis use of Madagascar without foundation? It seems to me that it is only if those fears were without foundation that you can say, with hindsight, that Ironclad was a waste of resources that could have been used elsewhere.
In Dec 1941 the Japanese Ambassador delivered a draft proposal to the German Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop, which considered the IO the nucleus of Axis co-operation. The Japanese advance over the coming months made the Germans sit up and take notice and thoughts turned to the great idea of a German / Japanese link up in the MIddle East. Far fetched though this might seem now, it was being considered.
In March 1942 Admiral Raeder wrote to Hitler that "the Japanese have recognised the great strategic importance of Madagascar for naval warfare....thay are planning to establish bases there in addition to Ceylon, in order to cripple sea traffic in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea", although Hitler considered that the French were unlikely to agree to voluntarily giving some form of basing rights. Germany wanted to deploy both raiders and submarines to the theatre. In fact they had raiders already there and submarines were to follow later in 1942, with sinkings arounnd South Africa from Oct 1942. But those operations could not be maintained at that time due to a lack of support facilities. Madagascar could have provided those and sea links between the two powers allowing Germany to obtain vital raw materials.
The problem on the Axis side is that there seems to be a disjoint between the discussions going on in Berlin with the Japanese Ambassador & Naval Attache, who were actively promoting co-operation, and some of whose signal traffic was being read by the Allies, and the decsions being made by the Japanese high commands of the IJA and IJN back in Japan.
A quote from Wilmott "The War With Japan: The Period of Balance, May 1942 -October 1943:-
"Planning was sufficiently advanced by the first week of February for representatives of both services' staffs to be invited to [Admiral Isoruko] Yamamoto's flagship for three days of discussions and war games [including plans for the invasion of Ceylon] that began on 20 February, two days after the German naval attache in Tokyo reported to Berlin that the Japanese had made enquiries about a joint German-Japanese move to secure Madagascar."
He then continued:-
"In the course of Japanese staff discussions one more consideration emerged. With the Combined Fleet planners thinking in terms of using two divisions to secure Ceylon and to take the an outpost in the Chagos Archipeligo, the possibility of shattering British prestige and authority in India na dthroughout the Indian Ocean seemed a likely outcome of a Japanese offensive."
Of course what then happened in the first week of March 1942 was that the IJA refused to provide the troops for an IO strategy or an invasion of Australia, leaving the IJN with the fall back position of Operation C, a carrier raid into the IO to strike Ceylon itself and shipping in the Bay of Bengal.
Conclusion
So it seems to me that Britain considered the threat of Japan gaining bases in Madagascar, whether with or without Vichy French co-operation, a real one. The question then became one of what to do about it. Could the threat have been controlled without Madagascar? The vacillations of the RN means that was uncertain. Having it removed a risk and reduced the shipping needs.
From the Axis side it seems to have been under consideration until the IJA withdrew its co-operation in the first week of March 1942. But I think the threat is then more from the Kriegsmarine than the IJN using those bases. And German U-boats were far more effective than Japanese submarines ever were in the IO. In 1943 the Germans were able to establish a U-boat base at Penang in Malaya to support their operations in the IO along with a number of supply ships.
Mozambique = Portugese (ostensibly neutral despite capture of territory in Timor in 1942)
Madagascar, Reunion & various other islands = Vichy French
Tanzania, Kenya, Maldives, British Indian Ocean Territory, Cocos Is = British
Christmas Is = British but occupied by Japanese on 31 March 1942
The East African Campaign to recover British colonies in the Horn of Africa and eliminate the Italian forces in what is now Somalia & Ethiopia went on until Nov 1941.
Durban had the only battleship sized dry dock in the Indian Ocean area in WW2 after Singapore was lost. Mombasa / Kilindini in Kenya was the port to which the Eastern Fleet withdrew in April 1942. Addu Atoll is at the southern end of the Maldive chain.
The main convoy routes to the Middle East, India & the Persian Gulf ran through the Mozambique Channel. And, following the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran in Aug 1941, that route to southern USSR became of increasing importance to the delivery of Lend Lease supplies starting in 1942. An Axis (either German or Japanese) presence in Madagascar would force those convoys out into the Indian Ocean, forcing longer journeys and thereby increasing the amount of shipping required. They would also require much heavier escort, and, with an increased submarine threat, a different type of escort adding further to the burden of fighting the AS war in the Atlantic by drawing off AS escorts that were still in short supply.
As for Madagascar itself, Britain had concerns about it right from the French surrender in June 1940. While the Governor at that time sent mixed signals about whether he was supporting Petain or De Gaulle, he was quickly replaced by a pro-Vichy Governor and his successor in April 1941 was also very pro Vichy. British concerns were heightened by the Japanese strongarming French Indochina in mid-1940 to cut off supplies to China before invading the northern part in Sept 1940. Matters then became worse in July 1941 following the Japanese occupation of southern Indochina. At that point the worry wasn't direct offensive action by the Japanese against Madagascar. The concern was that Vichy might be "persuaded" to allow the Japanese a base in Madagascar right on Britain's main artery to the Middle and Far East. That would give Britain a major headache in the event of war with Japan. Those were concerns that only increased further after the outbreak of war with Japan.
Problem was that in 1940/41 Britain could not spare the resources to take the island forcibly when there were much more immediate and competing interests elsewhere.
So Britain established an SOE presence on Madagascar in 1940/41 to gather intelligence. One result of that was in Oct 1941 when information was provided that led to the capture of a convoy of 5 Vichy merchant ships by the RN (but could that have made matters worse?). They were also able to assist the invasion when it finally happened in May 1942.
The Japanese threat was seen as increasing in the latter part of 1941, with the result that in Nov 1941 the Joint Planning Staff were instructed by the Cabinet to draw up plans to take the northern part of Madagascar including the large natural harbour at Diego Suarez. Note that this is BEFORE the outbreak of war with Japan. Plans for an "Operation Bonus" were drawn up but dropped at the end of Jan 1942 when it was felt the resources could be better used elsewhere in places like Ceylon.
Pressure to do something also came from other quarters. The US Chiefs of Staff were also keen to deny the Japanese a presence in Diego Suarez. De Gaulle in Feb 1942, obviously, but he was largely ignored given the experiences of what had happened in mid-1940 in West Africa. Also Smuts from Souh Africa, who wrote to Churchill:-
"I look upon Madagascar as the key to the safety of the Indian Ocean, and it may play the same important part in endangering our security there that Indochina has played in Vichy and Japanese hands. All our communications with our war fronts and the Empire in the East may be involved."
So the matter was revisited and a decision made on 12 March 1942 to pursue "Operation Ironclad" and Smuts was informed on 24 March 1942. That coincided with Geman/Japanese discussions and a report back to Japan that was intercepted and decoded by the US that the Germans were pushing for the Japanese to establish a base on Madagascar. Subsequent Japanese activity in the Indian Ocean in March / April 1942 added to the perception of the risk of the Japanese doing something with Madagascar.
As finally organised, at short notice, Ironclad used a lot of resources that were already earmarked for the Far East e.g. the carrier Illustrious and the two brigades of the 5th Infanrtry Division (the plan was for the 5th Div to go to Ceylon and one effect was the diversion of two brigades from 6th Australian Div temporarily in their place). The other Brigade, the 29th, had been undertaking amphibious exercises in Scotland when sent east, without being told its destination. The first convoys with troops and equipment of 17th Brigade, 5th Div sailed on the 13 March and the rest of Force 121 (as the invasion force was known as) on the 23rd March. At that point however there was no final commitment that Ironclad should actually take place.
Even at that point opinions within the british High Command differed as to whether the invasion of Madagascar was in fact necessary. The RN changed its position more than once while the force was en route. On 21st April they stated Kilindini, Ceylon & Zanzibar would suffice to control the IO and that the IJN could operate across the IO from the DEI. The War Office view seems to have been against it, provided Ceylon could be held. The latter also feared that the Vichy Govt might then offer bases in places like Dakar (West Africa) and Bizerta (Tunisia) to Germany and Italy and might even bomb or bombard Gibraltar in retaliation. Further high level meetings took place on 24th April, 27th April & 3rd May with opinion gradually moving in favour of carrying out the Operation before the final decision was taken on 3rd May, just 2 days before it took place. But it was agreed to limit initial operations to the northern part of the island to allow the early release of 5th Div for India.
Note that the Vichy French on Madagascar did not simply roll over and surrender following the invasion of the northern part of the island. Those 2 Brigades of 5th Div were moved on to India from May 1942 once other troops from South Africa, Rhodesia & East Africa could be found to replace them. It was the 29th Brigade and these new troops that went on to capture the rest of Madagascar in a campaign in Sept/Oct 1942.
Axis position
So were the fears of Britain and its Allies about Axis use of Madagascar without foundation? It seems to me that it is only if those fears were without foundation that you can say, with hindsight, that Ironclad was a waste of resources that could have been used elsewhere.
In Dec 1941 the Japanese Ambassador delivered a draft proposal to the German Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop, which considered the IO the nucleus of Axis co-operation. The Japanese advance over the coming months made the Germans sit up and take notice and thoughts turned to the great idea of a German / Japanese link up in the MIddle East. Far fetched though this might seem now, it was being considered.
In March 1942 Admiral Raeder wrote to Hitler that "the Japanese have recognised the great strategic importance of Madagascar for naval warfare....thay are planning to establish bases there in addition to Ceylon, in order to cripple sea traffic in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea", although Hitler considered that the French were unlikely to agree to voluntarily giving some form of basing rights. Germany wanted to deploy both raiders and submarines to the theatre. In fact they had raiders already there and submarines were to follow later in 1942, with sinkings arounnd South Africa from Oct 1942. But those operations could not be maintained at that time due to a lack of support facilities. Madagascar could have provided those and sea links between the two powers allowing Germany to obtain vital raw materials.
The problem on the Axis side is that there seems to be a disjoint between the discussions going on in Berlin with the Japanese Ambassador & Naval Attache, who were actively promoting co-operation, and some of whose signal traffic was being read by the Allies, and the decsions being made by the Japanese high commands of the IJA and IJN back in Japan.
A quote from Wilmott "The War With Japan: The Period of Balance, May 1942 -October 1943:-
"Planning was sufficiently advanced by the first week of February for representatives of both services' staffs to be invited to [Admiral Isoruko] Yamamoto's flagship for three days of discussions and war games [including plans for the invasion of Ceylon] that began on 20 February, two days after the German naval attache in Tokyo reported to Berlin that the Japanese had made enquiries about a joint German-Japanese move to secure Madagascar."
He then continued:-
"In the course of Japanese staff discussions one more consideration emerged. With the Combined Fleet planners thinking in terms of using two divisions to secure Ceylon and to take the an outpost in the Chagos Archipeligo, the possibility of shattering British prestige and authority in India na dthroughout the Indian Ocean seemed a likely outcome of a Japanese offensive."
Of course what then happened in the first week of March 1942 was that the IJA refused to provide the troops for an IO strategy or an invasion of Australia, leaving the IJN with the fall back position of Operation C, a carrier raid into the IO to strike Ceylon itself and shipping in the Bay of Bengal.
Conclusion
So it seems to me that Britain considered the threat of Japan gaining bases in Madagascar, whether with or without Vichy French co-operation, a real one. The question then became one of what to do about it. Could the threat have been controlled without Madagascar? The vacillations of the RN means that was uncertain. Having it removed a risk and reduced the shipping needs.
From the Axis side it seems to have been under consideration until the IJA withdrew its co-operation in the first week of March 1942. But I think the threat is then more from the Kriegsmarine than the IJN using those bases. And German U-boats were far more effective than Japanese submarines ever were in the IO. In 1943 the Germans were able to establish a U-boat base at Penang in Malaya to support their operations in the IO along with a number of supply ships.
Thumpalumpacus
Captain
Those submarines will need torpedoes. That base is far away from all Axis nations, and ships carrying those torpedoes will have to come past Ceylon, or Gibraltar if they're German and Italian subs.
Remember too that Japan is planning drives into both the South and Central Pacific, which is probably going to put cargo shipping at a premium, as well as stretch ground troops very thin.
Remember too that Japan is planning drives into both the South and Central Pacific, which is probably going to put cargo shipping at a premium, as well as stretch ground troops very thin.
- Thread starter
- #6
Admiral Beez
Captain
Or send Sommerville's two fast carriers plus some cruisers and destroyers at Ceylon in mid April (when the IJN was going for Coral Sea, not Ceylon) to join Crace's Task Force 44.
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In 1941/42 German supply ships were able to operate in the South Atlantic and IO areas successfully, supplying the various raiders that operated there. And the tankers, after filling their tanks from Japanese refineries then successfully supplied U boats in the IO in 1943/44. See the operations of the Monsun Group.
Supplying torpedoes was an issue recognised by the Germans. That is why in 1941 the KM developed the Type VIIF U-boat specifically to carry cargoes of spare torpedoes (they were given a large compartment aft of the conning tower to hold 25 in addition to the normal complement of 14). In the transport role they could carry 39 torpedoes. 4 built completing May-Aug 1943. 2 were dispatched to the Far East in early 1944. One made it through to be sunk on its return journey in Sept.
The Japanese had 4 strategies to choose from in early 1942:-
1. Attack in SWPA to cut off Australia from the US
2. Invade Australia
3. The IO including possible invasions of places like Madagascar & Ceylon and into India
4. Operations in the central Pacific towards Midway & Johnston Islands
As I noted in the first week of March 1942 the IJA ruled out 2 & 3. That left the IJA with the resources to pursue the SWPA and the IJN to pursue the central Pacific routes.
Thumpalumpacus
Captain
One thing being ignored here is that Japanese doctrine with submarines generally dismissed merchant warfare, preferring instead to maintain them as part of Kantai Kessen's whittling force. Putting them 8000 miles or so from where they presumed that would occur was probably not in the cards.
This is, of course, hindsight, as the Allies could not be expected to know the firm Japanee adherence to KK doctrine.
This is, of course, hindsight, as the Allies could not be expected to know the firm Japanee adherence to KK doctrine.
Hi
However, Japanese submarines did operate during the operation, the I-10, I-16 and I-20 arrived on 29th May. The I-10 launched its aircraft which flew over the harbour of Diego-Suarez, this aircraft was spotted by the British, HMS Ramillies actually changed its berth because of the flight. The other two submarines launched midget submarines that made an attack on the ships in harbour and , while under depth charge attack, managed to hit and damage Ramillies and sink (later refloated) the tanker British Loyalty. One midget was sunk, one of the crew's bodies washed up ashore later, the other midget M-20b was beached and the two crew got ashore. These two, Lt. Saburo Akieda and Petty Officer Masami Takemato, were later both killed in a fire fight with Royal Marines when they refused to surrender, one marine was also killed.
Mike
Thumpalumpacus
Captain
Sure, and they also bombarded Santa Barbara. But the doesn't signal long-term intent, which was the point of my post you quoted.
Attacking merchant shipping might not have been doctrine but following the operation against Diego Suarez the Japanese subs undertook a campaign, albeit a not very successful one, against Allied merchant shipping from the Mozambique Channel, up the African coast to the Gulf of Aden, across to the Bay of Bengal and down to Australian waters. They also undertook recce operations, bombardments and dropping personnel of the Indian National Army.
Starting with those involved in the Diego Suarez attack.
I-10 - sank 8 ships in and around the Mozambique Channel in June / July 1942 and successfully refuelled from Japanese AMCs on 17 June. returned to Penang on 31 July.
I-16 - sank 4 ships before heading for base at Penang where she arrived on 10 Aug.
I-20 - sank 7 ships. Again refuelled by a Japanese AMC on 19 June before heading for the Gulf of Aden. Returned to Penang on 5 Aug.
In addition to those 3 the following also operated against merchant shipping in the IO in 1942:-
I-29 - Aug 1942 - Aug 1943 operated largely off African coast with 7 sinkings to her credit
I-165 - 3 patrols between Aug & Nov 1942. 1 confirmed sinking & others claimed
I-162 - Aug 1942-Feb 1943 2 sunk & 1 damaged
I-166 - Aug-Dec 1942 1 confirmed sinking plus other claims.
Japanese surface ships also operated against Allied merchant shipping in the IO, most notably in the Bay of Bengal in March / April 1942. They also operated 2 AMCs against merchant shipping in the IO in 1942/43, losing one to a lucky hit from the gun on the tanker MV Ondina. Their final sortie against Allied merchant shipping was carried out by the 3 cruisers Aoba, Tone & Chikuma in March 1944 but they only managed a single sinking.
yulzari
Staff Sergeant
Overall, on the risk v hazard matter the hazard was great, should the Japanese be based in Madagascar. The risk of it happening was real, if far from certain. The risk of committing resources to take Madagascar was small in the overall scheme of things and the front line elements could soon be replaced by garrison troops.
If one has to point a finger it would have to be at France for showing a willingness to be dictated to by Japan and fighting the Commonwealth forces. The list of Anglo French battles in WW2 is quite long and sometimes hard fought. Dakar, Gibraltar, Morocco, Algeria, Madagascar and Syria for example.
If one has to point a finger it would have to be at France for showing a willingness to be dictated to by Japan and fighting the Commonwealth forces. The list of Anglo French battles in WW2 is quite long and sometimes hard fought. Dakar, Gibraltar, Morocco, Algeria, Madagascar and Syria for example.
Thumpalumpacus
Captain
68 fleet subs in 1941, and they devote seven to IO merchant-shipping operations over the course of 14 months. That rather supports my point, no?
- Thread starter
- #14
Admiral Beez
Captain
With no means of resupply, wouldn't a regiment or division of Japanese troops and any aircraft be left isolated and starving on Madagascar? If the Japanese couldn't but scratch Ceylon in March 1942, what was expected against Madagascar? I'd think the IJN and IJA would first need to take Ceylon.
It's always best to forestall your opponent's potential moves.
As has been pointed out, the Allies couldn't know with certainty the IJA/IJNs plans:
The loss of Madagascar, even for a few months would mean a near complete severing of the Allied supply lines to the Commonwealth Armies in the Middle East and to the USSR (via Iran).
The IJN/IJA could have potentially won the war in alliance with the European Axis powers by concentrating their efforts in the Indian Ocean.
- Thread starter
- #16
Admiral Beez
Captain
Had Italy held onto its Horn colonies into 1942 I expect the Japanese might have sent something there.
Probably unlikely. The linking up of the Axis in the Middle East was more of a grand German scheme than that of the Japanese.
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
Yup. I actually did read about other theaters. Please don't let anyone know.
Thumpalumpacus
Captain
I'd change "would" to "could" in this sentence. By 1942 the UK had plenty of ASW experience, and while another front in that war would strain resources, I don't think the Brits would sacrifice the link to India easily.
That's what IRONCLAD was all about. The problem being that the RN had to try and hold Malta and the shipping routes through the Indian Ocean. Operation HARPOON was the result of 3 RN fleet carriers being tied up in the Indian Ocean, and Operation PEDESTAL, which prevented the surrender of Malta, was only possible because Indomitable could be spared from the IO.
