Was Operation Pedestal a greater Axis air attack than any faced by the USN in 1942?

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I've been trying to be polite, and to be as clear as I can about what my position is, while trying to understand yours. But I'm pretty sick of all the little barbs and baseless aspersions against my character etc. I can chalk it up to the usual childish reasons, because it's pretty transparent, but it's also pretty f***n tiresome. Meanwhile you can feel free to believe whatever the hell you want. You don't like me, well the feeling is mutual.

And everyone else can read their own history books and decide if idiot or delusional senior military officers are really all that rare at any point in history, and in any nation's armed forces.

 

[buffnut453]

I've been trying to be polite, and to be as clear as I can about what my position is, while trying to understand yours. But I'm pretty sick of all the little barbs and baseless aspersions against my character etc. I can chalk it up to the usual childish reasons, because it's pretty transparent, but it's also pretty f***n tiresome. Meanwhile you can feel free to believe whatever the hell you want. You don't like me, well the feeling is mutual.

And everyone else can read their own history books and decide if idiot or delusional senior military officers are really all that rare at any point in history, and in any nation's armed forces.

And your comment about my "point of view" wasn't a barb or a baseless aspersion? I agree, entirely tiresome and childish. I actually have no antipathy to you. You clearly want to be selective in your "evidence" for your assertions. So be it.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I thought that is what you were saying, I'm past caring now.

 

[buffnut453]

Me too.

 

[Greg Boeser]

Get a room.

 

[PAT303]

I've been trying to be polite, and to be as clear as I can about what my position is, while trying to understand yours. But I'm pretty sick of all the little barbs and baseless aspersions against my character etc. I can chalk it up to the usual childish reasons, because it's pretty transparent, but it's also pretty f***n tiresome. Meanwhile you can feel free to believe whatever the hell you want. You don't like me, well the feeling is mutual.

And everyone else can read their own history books and decide if idiot or delusional senior military officers are really all that rare at any point in history, and in any nation's armed forces.

And your comment about my "point of view" wasn't a barb or a baseless aspersion? I agree, entirely tiresome and childish. I actually have no antipathy to you. You clearly want to be selective in your "evidence" for your assertions. So be it.

All I will say is the best threads we have ever had on this forum, well since I've been on here have been between members who have very different understanding or opinions on the thread subject. As each side tries to outdo the other, more facts come to the fore as members dig deeper into research trying to push their argument to the front and the information posted becomes eye opening and educational, the best example was and always will be the P39 thread, that single thread is most likely one of the most factual informed pieces of writing full of peer reviewed information on any online forum, all because one member stubbornly believe the P39 wasn't a piece of crap, absolutely brilliant thread.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I appreciate that, and though I missed the infamous P-39 thread, I have seen a lot of good data emerge from these discussions, even the very contentious ones (including several I've been involved in). But I personally don't like the pointless arguments, especially when people are talking past each other, or are arguing because of something other than the actual topic.

And having done a fair amount of professional historical research on another era and subject, I'm here to tell you that it isn't necessary. That part isn't really necessary and doesn't really help, because among other reasons, it tends to encourage people to conceal, distort, or misrepresent data, to knowingly spread misleading or erroneous data, to re-inflate old legends and construct new ones. All that is a waste of time.

You can share, present data, and explore new ideas and interpretations, without making into a juvenile contest. You can do this in a collaborative manner, rather than a proxy war for some kind of nationalist identity or emotional connection to a P-39 or some other aircraft. Ultimately, it's fun to learn about all this stuff. It really doesn't need to be a schoolyard fight. There are some really knowledgeable people in here. Rather than bickering over which country had the best planes, propellers, or landing gear, we could be taking all this further. Helping to write books and articles. Attending conferences in really nice parts of the world that are worth a visit. That is what we do in the other field I'm part of.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Wild_Bill_Kelso , your own advice might be useful to yourself as well. Your posts strike me partial as well to your own interests.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

It's a fine line between conclusions vs "interests". When it comes to WW2, I don't have any interests or agendas. I do often disagree with some very popular and sometimes entrenched ideas, and I get a lot of pushback on that, including from you. When I see accurate critiques or data that challenge my conclusions, I modify them accordingly and add the data to my collection.

I think the main difference between the community here and the other one I'm involved in, is the latter is mostly focused on historical data - data that wasn't well known until fairly recently, and everyone is pretty enthusiastic about the primary sources with a shared interest in finding more and more. The data has a lot of real world applications which can be tested. There are lots of controversies, but mostly among the people newer to the field.

Here it's different because so many of us, myself included, have grown up with a lot of these tropes and legends about WW2, which some people are very fond of. And there are national pride involved. I have learned that many of the old legends do not hold up. When I point that out here, two things happen - first, I get accused of being a jerk, a liar, a manipulator of truth (all of which as I said, I'm really tired of) and second, some people post useful information which either supports, refutes, or mutates the theory into something else unexpected. That is always welcome, and useful. I've built up quite an archive of data since finding this forum.

And sometimes, people make assertions I don't believe are true, but which I haven't thoroughly researched yet. I go and find what i can, and report back here, honestly. Some people get mad about that too. Some people probably do as I've done and learn from it.

For me, conclusions are always provisional. I try to fit the theory to the data, not the other way around.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Jeez Ewen, lighten up. That too is from Shores, mentioned several times, and discussed previously by others in the same threads you have been participating in.

As just one example, super RAF and Hurricane patriot RCAFson posted the following excerpt here, from Shores. This was from May 1943. I will quote the relevant passage (bold by me):

"There is no doubt that the Hurricane is not up to the job." His original text added: "… and we must have Spitfires." While accepting the report, before it was circulated Williams deleted these latter words, explaining: "That's true, and both you and I know it, but we must never let the boys suspect it – it would destroy morale." He did not seem to credit the pilots with the wit to have worked this out for themselves. Richey however, later learned that the AOC-in-C, India, Sir Richard Peirse, had refused Spitfires on the grounds that the Hurricane was better for the job – apparently because its stronger and wider undercarriage was better for jungle strips. Richey suspected that the advice for this view could well have come from Williams originally. "

The rest of this same passage, which gets into the dog-fighting vs hit and run tactics, makes it abundantly clear that the Hurricane pilots unit leaders did know about proper strategy, eg: "We won't dog-fight. We will only attack from above, diving and firing a short burst before climbing again. If we are caught out and are below the Japs or at their level we will immediately take steps to reverse this situation by diving away and climbing up again before attacking. We will defeat the Japs by cleverness."

I don't think you can say there is a marked improvement of outcomes in Hurricane vs Ki-43 (or other IJN fighters) encounters from that point onward though. In fact I'll dig up some examples and post them later.

I just ran across a passage in Shores Bloody Shambles III from April 1943 in which the JAAF squadron leader complained about Hurricane IIs "attacking from above and diving away" as being a problem for their Ki-43-IIs. This on a day after they shot down two Hurricane IIs for no loss, which Shores points out undermines their complaint. But that is more direct evidence that the RAF was using hit and run tactics by this point, at least when they could.

 

[ThomasP]

The RAF as an institution had learned the benefit of boom-and-zoom and altitude advantage by the end of the BoB. There is no question of this as it is mentioned in tactical memoranda and pilot accounts of the period. The RAAF also mention it in their memoranda and pilot accounts.

The problem with using boom-and-zoom and the advantages conferred by altitude is that you have to get into a position to do so. When you are the attacker you can usually have the altitude advantage. When you are the defender you often will not have time to gain enough altitude.

This basic truism was demonstrated in the BoB (where the Germans usually had the initial altitude advantage) and in the Commonwealth air forces defensive actions of the PTO/CBI (where the incoming Japanese fighter escorts usually had the altitude advantage).

And even being on the offensive did not always guarantee the initial altitude advantage, particularly if you were escorting attack aircraft since you had to keep them in sight and not be flying so far away (horizontally or vertically) that you had no chance of spotting/intercepting the enemy fighters in time.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The RAF as an institution had learned the benefit of boom-and-zoom and altitude advantage by the end of the BoB. There is no question of this as it is mentioned in tactical memoranda and pilot accounts of the period. The RAAF also mention it in their memoranda and pilot accounts.

The problem with using boom-and-zoom and the advantages conferred by altitude is that you have to get into a position to do so. When you are the attacker you can usually have the altitude advantage. When you are the defender you often will not have time to gain enough altitude.

This basic truism was demonstrated in the BoB (where the Germans usually had the initial altitude advantage) and in the Commonwealth air forces defensive actions of the PTO/CBI (where the incoming Japanese fighter escorts usually had the altitude advantage).

And even being on the offensive did not always guarantee the initial altitude advantage, particularly if you were escorting attack aircraft since you had to keep them in sight and not be flying so far away (horizontally or vertically) that you had no chance of spotting/intercepting the enemy fighters in time.

I mostly agree with this, but a couple of points.

First, I was bringing up evidence of "boom and zoom" tactics in the CBI specifically, because when discussing why the Hurricane had such poor outcomes in that Theater, I was told by some people that you can't determine effectiveness of an aircraft from operational history, and that maybe / probably, the Hurricane and RAF units were not using the same tactics as the US units were.

I agree with you that they probably did use "boom and zoom" tactics against the JAAF in Burma and India, but in defense of that faction who suggest they may not have done, I will point out something rather surprising that I've already noted in the Mediterranean Theater. Hard won tactical lessons well learned in England did not always quickly make it to the colonial regions. In the MTO for example, British fighter units were not using 'finger-four' tactics until some time in 1942. "Boom and Zoom" was specifically a big controversy in the RAAF in New Guinea, resulting in the death of one beloved squadron leader as the result of the debate, also in mid 1942.

I do not expect that such basic things took much longer than that to reach the secondary and tertiary theaters though, and I expect that they were using "boom and zoom" by the third quarter of 1942 at the latest. I can't say I know that for sure though.

A more nuanced point is that our concept of "boom and zoom" tends to be oversimplified. Air combat tactics are a fusion of pilot training, tactical theory, unit leadership, and the characteristics of the aircraft involved - on both sides. The Thach Weave was viable for the USN in part because USN fighter pilots had a lot of gunnery training. The AVG made early adoption of "boom and zoom" tactics because Claire Chennault was a very charismatic and assertive leader, who had learned this lesson the hard way himself, and pushed it very hard on his pilots.

"Boom and zoom" specifically had many variations, and how it was exactly implemented depended in part on the aircraft and what it's traits were. US and ANZAC fighter units in the CBI and South Pacific learned to push the limits. US fighter units in P-40s, P-51As and P-39s often could not rely on being able to get above Japanese fighters and couldn't refuse combat any time they were in a disadvantage. They learned to use nose-down turns (like what in modern terms is called "low yo-yo"), special 'escape maneuvers', dive and extend, and zoom climbing to come back into the fray ... assuming they still had enough fuel and ammunition and still were still feeling aggressive enough.

This is what Robert De Haven, 10 victory ace with 49th FG (Darwin / New Guinea / Solomons) who flew both P-40s and P-38s. Here he is talking about fighting with the P-40:

"[Y]ou could fight a Jap on even terms, but you had to make him fight your way. He could outturn you at slow speed. You could outturn him at high speed. When you got into a turning fight with him, you dropped your nose down so you kept your airspeed up, you could outturn him. At low speed he could outroll you because of those big ailerons ... on the Zero. If your speed was up over 275, you could outroll [a Zero]. His big ailerons didn't have the strength to make high speed rolls... You could push things, too. Because ... f you decided to go home, you could go home. He couldn't because you could outrun him. [...] That left you in control of the fight."

P-40 had fast dive acceleration and roll at high speed. So with those aircraft, "boom and zoom' often meant just keeping speed up and diving away when you got in trouble. Allison engined P-40s, as we were noting in some other threads, struggled above somewhere between 16-20,000 feet depending on the exact variant, and depending on loadout etc., often had a fairly shitty rate of climb. So they sometimes had to dive away even when enemy aircraft were above them, extend and come back at speed.

IMO pilots flying each aircraft type, and to some extent every unit and even individual pilot, had their own version of these tactics. What "boom and zoom' actually meant was probably different between a P-38, Mustang, Spit VIII, Spit V or a Mohawk IV or a Hurricane II.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

JAAF pilots specifically noted that Spitfires were easily able to climb above them. This seems to have particularly been the case once the Spit VIII arrived. I have recently learned (I think? still not 100% certain about all this) that the Spit VIII did not use the Vokes type filter, but had another type with a cut-out (bypass) which was much less restrictive of performance. If true, this would translate into a much better rate of climb I think.

Hurricanes rate of climb was theoretically good, and they had good altitude performance up to ~30,000 feet, so i would expect with enough warning they could get above JAAF fighters and do something much more like true BnZ than the P-40 units seem to have done most of the time. How often they actually did this is another question.

One big open question to me is how much did the Vokes filter affect rate of climb for Hurricanes and Spit Vs. Spit V had such a good rate of climb it may have still been good even with the Vokes filter.

 

[ThomasP]

The basic concept was the same, the only question was how well you could exploit the initial or subsequent dives. As you state to in your post above, different aircraft had different strengths.

re Ki-43s/A6Ms vs Hurricanes/P-36/F2A and similar

An airframe with similar performance in terms of speed could make one diving pass, then either had to keep on diving away or climb - losing its speed advantage in the process.

If you are defending something you cannot just continue running away. In other words, after the boom you either begin a maneuvering fight or leave the target(s) to the enemy's mercy.

If you are supposed to defend attacking bombers, DBs, or TBs, and the enemy concentrates on the attackers, you will not have the choice of regaining altitude advantage.

As the WWII war-in-the-air demonstrated, a speed advantage based on altitude advantage or a significantly faster airframe was a major advantage. But it had to be a speed advantage. Just being fast was not an advantage if the enemy aircraft was just as fast - as was shown in the ETO bombing campaign.

The Hurricane had a few problems at higher speeds (at least in the Mk I version with cloth covered wings) and only had 2 advantages in the metal covered wing Mk I and II (as far as I know no cloth wing Mk Is ever saw combat in the PTO/CBI?). Hurricanes in the PTO/CBI could roll better at high (ie diving) speeds and roll a little better at high level speeds. In general the Ki-43/A6M could climb better (except at altitudes above about 25,000 ft vs the Hurricane Mk II), turn better, and roll better at low to medium speeds. Level and diving* speeds were about even depending on the Marks of both airframes and the time period. The later Ki-43-III and A6M5 were significantly faster on the level than the Hurricane Mk II with Vokes filter, but did they ever meet in combat?

So basically the Hurricane would only have the advantage (sometimes) in the initial attack when escorting strike aircraft, or when standing high altitude CAP over the ground/ship targets they are defending.

I may be wrong, but I think pretty much all of the aircraft engineering, combat tactical theory, and combat reports bear this out.

Obviously, disparities in pilot training and experience could increase or reduce the efficacy of the tactic to a degree.

* The Vokes filter cost diving speed as well as level speed. However, the Hurricane Mk II without Vokes filter could easily dive at over 400 mph indicated and still roll (pilot reports often mentioned 450 mphASI in dives when chasing or escaping in the ETO).

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Do you have any stats on Hurricane roll rates? From what I've seen in the past, roll was pretty bad at higher speeds. I know it's complicated because it depends on things like stick pressure and roll acceleration etc.

The A6M had a trait of "locking up" in a dive, but Ki-43s did not have this problem. So BnZ was actually harder against the Ki-43s.

 

[ThomasP]

Apparently, for the average pilot strength (50 lbs side force on the stick for 3 seconds) the Hurricane could roll at ~30°/sec at 400 mph IAS. It took about 80 lbs side force to reach the maximum Hurricane roll rate of 80-90°/sec at 200-250 mph IAS and 35°/sec at 400 mph IAS. Most pilots had difficulty achieving this side force except in a sudden slam which would cause a 'flick' or 'snap' roll, a maneuver which was not normally allowed due the possible departure from controlled flight and/or over-stressing of the airframe. Despite the prohibition against 'flick' maneuvers mentioned in the pilot's notes, I have run across several pilot accounts of the use of 'flick' rolls at moderate speeds during combat - with no apparent problems - but I have also run across a couple where the aircraft entered a snap roll opposite of the intended turn and subsequent 1 1/2 to 2 turn spin before recovery.

FWIW the Hurricane and Bf109G were considered (by pilots that flew both) to have about the same roll rates at the same stick forces, but the Hurricane's maximum roll rate occurred at about 30 mph IAS less than the Bf109G's.

The data I have say the A6M2 was considered to have a roll rate of less than 10°/sec at speeds over 380 mph IAS with 50 lbs stick force, while the A6M3 and A6M5 could do 15-20°/sec at 400 mph IAS (stick forces unknown but probably about 50 lbs). In some cases the A6M2 ailerons may have been jamming due to warping of the wing structure causing binding of the pivot points or control runs.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Apparently, for the average pilot strength (50 lbs side force on the stick for 3 seconds) the Hurricane could roll at ~30°/sec at 400 mph indicated. It took about 80 lbs side force to reach the maximum Hurricane roll rate of 80-90°/sec at 200-250 mphIAS and 35°/sec at 400 mhIAS. Most pilots had difficulty achieving this side force except in a sudden slam which would cause a 'flick' or 'snap' roll, a maneuver which was not normally allowed due the possible departure from controlled flight and/or over-stressing of the airframe. Despite the prohibition against 'flick' maneuvers mentioned in the pilot's notes, I have run across several pilot accounts of the use of 'flick' rolls at moderate speeds during combat - with no apparent problems - but I have also run across a couple where the aircraft entered a snap roll opposite of the intended turn and subsequent 1 1/2 to 2 turn spin before recovery.

FWIW the Hurricane and Bf109G were considered (by pilots that flew both) to have about the same roll rates at the same stick forces, but the Hurricane's maximum roll rate occurred at about 30 mphIAS less than the Bf109G's.

The data I have say the A6M2 was considered to have a roll rate of less than 10°/sec at speeds over 380 mphIAS with 50 lbs stick force, while the A6M3 and A6M5 could do 15-20°/sec at 400 mphIAS (stick forces unknown but probably about 50 lbs). In some cases the A6M2 ailerons may have been jamming due to warping of the wing structure causing binding of the pivot points or control runs.

So for context, we have this (from a British test)

And this from NACA

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Ah, and this from the RAAF. You can see the improvement of Mustang III vs Mustang I

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

As you can see, the P-40 comes out near the top on roll, especially at higher speed. Late model Mustang and FW 190 have the best high-speed roll. The strait line indicates full control column displacement at less than 30 lbs load, meaning rolling is easy up to the speed where the line turns.

The Hamp (A6M) has the best roll at very low speed, followed by the P-36 and the Spitfire with metal ailerons. Not sure which versions had the metal ailerons.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Found one of the original test documents: Comparison of Aileron Control Characteristics as Determined in Flight Tests of P-36, P-40, Spitfire, and Hurricane Pursuit Airplanes - NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

https://ntrs.nasa.gov/api/citations/20150015694/downloads/20150015694.pdf

The Hurricane and Spitfire actually roll better at low deflection (5 lbs)

The difference between the P-36 (roll well at low speed) and P-40 (roll well at high speed) was just increase in 'stick travel'