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Wild_Bill_Kelso
Senior Master Sergeant
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- Mar 18, 2022
It was, we saw it happen with G4M Betty's
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Op Pedestal?
Tested the pre war armoured carrier fantasy to near destruction.
The Fulmar and Sea Hurricane were poor, and were not carried in big enough numbers to break up enemy attacks by bombers.
Sending strikes by axis bombers against a USN Carrier would have ben 'interesting'.
Would you rather die of cancer, or a gunshot to the head? Which is worse, a stab wound or a toothache?
I'm not sure these battles in the two theaters are really comparable.
I've mentioned that constantly and I also commented that the USN was willing to reduce the performance of the F4F-4 vs the -3 to get folding wings. OTOH, for example, on HMS Avenger, I doubt that a fully loaded F4F-4 could TO, reliably, unless the fuel and ammo load was reduced to SH1B levels.The ability to carry more Wildcats when compared to the Hurricane was a significant advantage and one, whilst mentioned almost in passing doesn't do it justice. When HMS Victorious served with the USN as the 'Robin' I think she carried 60+ Wildcats. This is simply beyond the realms of Fantasy had she been carrying Hurricanes.
In which case I apologiseI've mentioned that constantly and I also commented that the USN was willing to reduce the performance of the F4F-4 vs the -3 to get folding wings. OTOH, for example, on HMS Avenger, I doubt that a fully loaded F4F-4 could TO, reliably, unless the fuel and ammo load was reduced to SH1B levels.
No need for thatIn which case I apologise
Well you can argue it either way, but in this case the 'toothache' was very similar - the same Allied or very similar aircraft and some of the same ships operated in both Theaters, so we can compare what happened.
Well, I see the Wildcat as very different from the Sea Hurricanes, SBDs pretty different from the British carrier bombers too. Not to mention the British design choice to sacrifice air-group capacity for armored decks vs the American and Japanese choice to sacrifice robustness to larger air-groups, as well.
But in essence, although Pacific carrier battles often lasted a few days, just as Pedestal did, the attacks themselves did not -- they came in and were done with in 20 minutes if not less, usually. Note that where the Americans had ground-based air power, they too practiced the same tactics as the Axis in the Med, of continual harassment rather than massed strikes.
So there's similarities and differences, but I think the similarities out far outweighed by the differences, which to me makes this comparison not terribly useful, even if it is interesting.
The other thing I see here is a lurking nationalistic bias in some posts, which lends this otherwise cool thread an unsavory overtone. Maybe that's just me. But I think everyone in the -- war, Allied, Axis, American, Brit, Atlantic, Pacific -- got the shit end on the stick.
I have to ask, did you read through this topic, especially the post that covers the difference in fighter control?Op Pedestal?
Tested the pre war armoured carrier fantasy to near destruction.
The Fulmar and Sea Hurricane were poor, and were not carried in big enough numbers to break up enemy attacks by bombers.
Sending strikes by axis bombers against a USN Carrier would have ben 'interesting'.
That's kind of what they did at Midway, but are you sure that was the consistent pattern? Cactus air force did some coordinated strikes. The big example I can think of would be the Battle of the Bismarck Sea (March 1943) which was highly coordinated (and extremely effective) attack against a Japanese invasion fleet with land based aircraft on both sides.
I disagree 100%, but I would invite you to avoid the thread if you find it useless. To me looking at WW2 air combat is usually pretty useful to understanding the war and the aircraft, which I like to try to do.
I think it's actually very helpful to compare the Theaters of operation and look at the relative capabilities of the aircraft (which again, were often used in both Theaters), the tactics, the strategic goals, the mistakes and the triumphs, the similarities and differences.
From my perspective WW2 air power discussions often focus far too much on the later war Strategic bombing campaign. This was important and interesting, but it's easy to find the details, they are covered again and again and again. There are still things to learn. But I'd say two things in favor of the Mediterranean and South Pacific. The first is that these two Theaters are among the three places where the balance of power in the war pivoted in the mid-war, from the Axis being dominant in early 1942 and the Allies scrambling to survive, to the Axis being on their back heels and the Allies resurgent in late 1942 (the other place was the Eastern front Soviet-German war, pivoting at Stalingrad). On the other hand, by the time the Strategic bombing campaign really ramps up in 1944 (both against Germany and Japan), the balance of the war has shifted. The Axis are fighting for their lives. They still have a lot of fight left in them, but the outcome is already fairly clear.
The Mediterranean, certainly one of the three major hinge points of the war, is relatively little known even in Aviation fanatic spaces like this forum. Aside from Midway and Pearl Harbor, the South Pacific Air War has been somewhat neglected. Battles like at Milne Bay, Coral Sea, Eastern Solomons and Guadalcanal were also of epic and pivotal significance. But it's fairly hard to find out a lot about the air war, beyond the press releases and memoirs of the 50's and 60's that many of us heard growing up. But today a lot of new data is emerging which can tell us exactly what happened in the air war on a day by day basis. Claringbould's South Pacific Air War series and Eagles of the Southern Sky, Shores Mediterranean Air War, First Team and and now some others emerging can cut through the haze of propaganda and give us a clear picture of what really went on. I find it fascinating.
And comparing the two Theaters is a very helpful way of drawing out what happened in finer detail, and from a new perspective. I have already learned things from reading posts in this thread.
I don't want to put words in your mouth but I suspect this is the real objection.
There is no nationalistic bias on my part.
If anything I am reacting to a kind of unwritten rule that you run into sometimes where you aren't allowed to discuss certain things honestly, like whether the Sea Hurricane was an ideal naval fighter or not, without tripping over some kind of nationalistic mine field. I think we should be free to be honest about what the data says. The TBD Devastator was a poor design even for it's age, and had very disappointing outcomes in battle in the Pacific. So was the Buffalo, at least the Pacific version. The American Torpedo didn't actually work for the first half of the war, costing many, many lives. These mistakes are just as interesting as the triumphs. The RN Armored carriers had some merits over the American or Japanese type. The FAA had particularly good fighter control and better radar. The British had the best land based interceptor of the war in the Spitfire, the best bomber in the Mosquito, and probably the best 'heavy fighter' of the war in the Beaufighter (which was extremely useful in both the Pacific and the Med).
They also clearly, obviously had a problem with procurement or their designs (I suspect it was mainly procurement) that left the FAA with a two man, 270 mph fighter, a pair of biplane strike aircraft and a slightly bizarre dive bomber (won't even discuss the turret fighter version), none of which were actually adequate to carrier warfare, resulting in their needing to use US planes instead.
I don't see any reason to pretend this wasn't the case. Some people dig in their heels and insist all of these were ideal, and compared well to every other type in use around the world - in direct contradiction to RN and FAA officers who actually fought the war with the various types of kit. I think it's helpful to determine if that is actually true.
The TBD wasn't a poor design at all for it's age. It was a breakthrough. Unfortunately, it's "age" was a very short time.
There's a difference between "not terribly useful" and "useless", so while I appreciate your invitation I'll read and comment where and how I see fit, thanks.
I'm in general agreement with this broad swathe of points. I just received First Team and will start it today, but I've done plenty of reading about SoPac/SoWePac and Med air ops over the years. I'm not a nuts-and-bolts guy like you are, so I don't remember tail numbers or subtypes assigned to which squadrons, but I feel like my grasp of the general issues is solid.
Somebody on the dive bomber thread, actually i think two people, referenced this new book confusingly (because it's the same name as Shores magisterial series) called The Mediterranean Air War by Robert Ehlers, and I bought a copy. I haven't finished it yet but I'm already finding it quite good on understanding the MTO. It's relatively short (especially compared to Shores massive five volumes) but he knows when to drill down and give you some sharp details and hard numbers. I have already learned a lot from it.
I'll check it out. I got The First Team in the mail yesterday and will be starting it today. Only the second book from Lundstrom I own, but I suspect I'll be going on a binge, if this is anything as good TFSPC.
The TBD wasn't a poor design at all for it's age. It was a breakthrough. Unfortunately, it's "age" was a very short time.
I can second that heartily, it's the first in a trilogy on the Pacific War by the (unfortunately) now deceased James D. Hornfischer, he has a bit of flowery prose at times but his books are/were very good.*SNIP* I would also highly recommend Neptune's Inferno if you are in any way interested in the naval war. Hard core!
The best single volume on the Pacific carrier war in 1942, IMHO, is Lundstrom's Black Shoe Carrier Admiral. Unfortunately it misses Santa Cruz, as it basically documents Fletcher's time in command. First Team vol2 will fill in the details on Santa Cruz.I can second that heartily, it's the first in a trilogy on the Pacific War by the (unfortunately) now deceased James D. Hornfischer, he has a bit of flowery prose at times but his books are/were very good.
I also ran through Ian Toll's three books on the Pacific, and while not quite as good IMHO, still darn good reads.
The problem was the homing beacon system on RN carriers, which necessitated a two-man crew.They also clearly, obviously had a problem with procurement or their designs (I suspect it was mainly procurement) that left the FAA with a two man, 270 mph fighter
Procured because of a requirement that the torpedo planes had to be launchable from catapults on battleships (and cruisers, IIRC). Yes, while carrying a torpedo. The RN feared that they simply couldn't launch enough TBs from the decks of their carriers.a pair of biplane strike aircraft
The Skua was introduced at the end of 1938, at which time it was the most advanced carrier dive bomber in the world. A few D3As conducted combat operations in December 1939, before it was officially accepted by the IJN. These may have been pre-series aircraft. I believe the SBD didn't really go into service until mid- or late-1940, depending on how you count it.and a slightly bizarre dive bomber (won't even discuss the turret fighter version)
More or less agreed. However, the Martlets imposed some real operational restrictions until the RN carriers were retrofitted with USN homing beacons.none of which were actually adequate to carrier warfare, resulting in their needing to use US planes instead.