Was the Norden bombsight really that crap? (5 Viewers)

[wuzak]

OK, we just have a different definition of precision. I was thinking of a single ship or particular building. Railyards and oil facilities I would have described as small areas.

Area target - target an area of a city.
Precision target - target specific facility, building or complex.

For both the RAF and Eight AF heavy bombers flying at altitude, aiming at a single building ends up with damage to an area (hopefully) around the target.

If the aim is to only hit a single building, attck during the day with Mosquitoes, or similar aircraft, and use visual aiming.

Hitting manoeuvring ships at sea is a more difficult proposition.

 

[andrewgeorge]

Here's a question re: Norden some of you may know the answer to:

I was watching "Masters of the Air" on AppleTV last year and there is at least one scene where aircrew take time to destroy the Norden before bailing out of a stricken aircraft.

I'm assuming that at least at some point in the war this was an actual standing direction to aircrew. And I couldn't help but wonder if/how many airmen were killed while trying to dispose of the "top secret" bombsight when they could have egressed their planes.

Because there's a particular tragedy to the idea of a man going down with his plane to preserve a state secret that A) isn't a secret and B) is of minimal value anyway.

I know that USAAF figured out pretty quickly that real world accuracy from high altitude was fairly low, even with the Norden, but I'm wondering to what extent they (i.e. intelligence and brass) actually believed as the war went on that Norden represented a genuinely significant qualitative edge over comparable enemy equipment. The kind of technological secret you'd want your trained men to risk their lives to protect.

Also to what extent this sort of policy would have been partly a question of keeping up morale: "We've got this high-tech superweapon the enemy doesn't know about!"

I'm sure I'll read more about it as time goes on, but I figured based on the depth and breadth of knowledge so many folks here have, you might be able to fill in those blanks a bit.

Thanks!

 

[WATU]

Hitting manoeuvring ships at sea is a more difficult proposition.

A lot more challenging with no way to anticipate the motion of the target after bomb release. One solution was a low level attack allowing the minimum time for ship travel. The Mk III bombsight could be used for 50' to around 600'. (Sometimes claims of up to 1,000' are made). The Mk XIV was used at 1,000/1,200' particularly by Coastal Halifaxes. The other option was the LAB when the ship might not even be aware of a pending attack until the bombs exploded. There would be no need to approach at speed so they were hard to hear.

 

[Howard Gibson]

A lot more challenging with no way to anticipate the motion of the target after bomb release. One solution was a low level attack allowing the minimum time for ship travel. The Mk III bombsight could be used for 50' to around 600'. (Sometimes claims of up to 1,000' are made). The Mk XIV was used at 1,000/1,200' particularly by Coastal Halifaxes. The other option was the LAB when the ship might not even be aware of a pending attack until the bombs exploded. There would be no need to approach at speed so they were hard to hear.

A much better solution was the remotely steerable FritzX.

 

[WATU]

A much better solution was the remotely steerable FritzX.

I thought the Allies worked out pretty effective countermeasures? Also limited to good visibility. But certainly innovative and a sign of things to come.

 

[GrauGeist]

Here's a question re: Norden some of you may know the answer to:

I was watching "Masters of the Air" on AppleTV last year and there is at least one scene where aircrew take time to destroy the Norden before bailing out of a stricken aircraft.

I'm assuming that at least at some point in the war this was an actual standing direction to aircrew. And I couldn't help but wonder if/how many airmen were killed while trying to dispose of the "top secret" bombsight when they could have egressed their planes.

Because there's a particular tragedy to the idea of a man going down with his plane to preserve a state secret that A) isn't a secret and B) is of minimal value anyway.

I know that USAAF figured out pretty quickly that real world accuracy from high altitude was fairly low, even with the Norden, but I'm wondering to what extent they (i.e. intelligence and brass) actually believed as the war went on that Norden represented a genuinely significant qualitative edge over comparable enemy equipment. The kind of technological secret you'd want your trained men to risk their lives to protect.

Also to what extent this sort of policy would have been partly a question of keeping up morale: "We've got this high-tech superweapon the enemy doesn't know about!"

I'm sure I'll read more about it as time goes on, but I figured based on the depth and breadth of knowledge so many folks here have, you might be able to fill in those blanks a bit.

Thanks!

If the plane was damaged in flight and started going down, the crew would leave it and bale out. The bombsight was not expected to survive.

If the pilot was able to safely bring the bomber down relatively intact, then yes, destroy the bombsight.

I don't recall reading where the bombardier was expected to destroy the bombsight while the bomber was plummeting to earth.

 

[wuzak]

I don't recall any comparative trials between the Mk XIV and the Norden by the British. After initially being desperate for it enthusiasm waned. For both at any given height the big issue was wind drift. I agree with you, any difference was lost in the rush. The RAF regarded the upsides of the Mk XIV as preferable. More work was done on the various Sperrys which were seen as similar to the Norden with the same issues of steady run-up which was not ideal with radar flak and night fighters. The Sperry was used on an interim basis (and passed on overseas commands) until Mk XIV and SABS II supplies were adequate.

I forget which but an RAE or A&AEE report did say the Norden was not suitable for night work. But in reasonable moonlight if the target could be seen at an adequate distance for the minimum run-up it could be used as you say.

Here are the results of a quick search on the UK National Archives website:

AIR 14/875: Norden bombsight: trials
PREM 4/25/1: Norden bombsight
AVIA 38/101: Sperry and Norden bombsights: release to the UK
AIR 14/1534: Bomber Development Unit : trials of Norden bombsight
AVIA 6/12561: Norden automatic controls in Fortress II B 25 B and B 25 C aircraft: inspection of installation
AIR 14/4520: Bombing Development Unit: Trials of Norden bombsight in Mosquito aircraft

I have the last one:

Not suitable for use in the Mosquito, due to the Mosquito's instability.

 

[Howard Gibson]

I thought the Allies worked out pretty effective countermeasures? Also limited to good visibility. But certainly innovative and a sign of things to come.

Bombsights are limited to good visibility also.,