Was the Norden bombsight really that crap? (3 Viewers)

OK, we just have a different definition of precision. I was thinking of a single ship or particular building. Railyards and oil facilities I would have described as small areas.

Area target - target an area of a city.
Precision target - target specific facility, building or complex.

For both the RAF and Eight AF heavy bombers flying at altitude, aiming at a single building ends up with damage to an area (hopefully) around the target.

If the aim is to only hit a single building, attck during the day with Mosquitoes, or similar aircraft, and use visual aiming.

Hitting manoeuvring ships at sea is a more difficult proposition.
 
Here's a question re: Norden some of you may know the answer to:

I was watching "Masters of the Air" on AppleTV last year and there is at least one scene where aircrew take time to destroy the Norden before bailing out of a stricken aircraft.

I'm assuming that at least at some point in the war this was an actual standing direction to aircrew. And I couldn't help but wonder if/how many airmen were killed while trying to dispose of the "top secret" bombsight when they could have egressed their planes.

Because there's a particular tragedy to the idea of a man going down with his plane to preserve a state secret that A) isn't a secret and B) is of minimal value anyway.

I know that USAAF figured out pretty quickly that real world accuracy from high altitude was fairly low, even with the Norden, but I'm wondering to what extent they (i.e. intelligence and brass) actually believed as the war went on that Norden represented a genuinely significant qualitative edge over comparable enemy equipment. The kind of technological secret you'd want your trained men to risk their lives to protect.

Also to what extent this sort of policy would have been partly a question of keeping up morale: "We've got this high-tech superweapon the enemy doesn't know about!"

I'm sure I'll read more about it as time goes on, but I figured based on the depth and breadth of knowledge so many folks here have, you might be able to fill in those blanks a bit.

Thanks!
 
Hitting manoeuvring ships at sea is a more difficult proposition.
A lot more challenging with no way to anticipate the motion of the target after bomb release. One solution was a low level attack allowing the minimum time for ship travel. The Mk III bombsight could be used for 50' to around 600'. (Sometimes claims of up to 1,000' are made). The Mk XIV was used at 1,000/1,200' particularly by Coastal Halifaxes. The other option was the LAB when the ship might not even be aware of a pending attack until the bombs exploded. There would be no need to approach at speed so they were hard to hear.
 
A lot more challenging with no way to anticipate the motion of the target after bomb release. One solution was a low level attack allowing the minimum time for ship travel. The Mk III bombsight could be used for 50' to around 600'. (Sometimes claims of up to 1,000' are made). The Mk XIV was used at 1,000/1,200' particularly by Coastal Halifaxes. The other option was the LAB when the ship might not even be aware of a pending attack until the bombs exploded. There would be no need to approach at speed so they were hard to hear.
A much better solution was the remotely steerable FritzX.
 
Here's a question re: Norden some of you may know the answer to:

I was watching "Masters of the Air" on AppleTV last year and there is at least one scene where aircrew take time to destroy the Norden before bailing out of a stricken aircraft.

I'm assuming that at least at some point in the war this was an actual standing direction to aircrew. And I couldn't help but wonder if/how many airmen were killed while trying to dispose of the "top secret" bombsight when they could have egressed their planes.

Because there's a particular tragedy to the idea of a man going down with his plane to preserve a state secret that A) isn't a secret and B) is of minimal value anyway.

I know that USAAF figured out pretty quickly that real world accuracy from high altitude was fairly low, even with the Norden, but I'm wondering to what extent they (i.e. intelligence and brass) actually believed as the war went on that Norden represented a genuinely significant qualitative edge over comparable enemy equipment. The kind of technological secret you'd want your trained men to risk their lives to protect.

Also to what extent this sort of policy would have been partly a question of keeping up morale: "We've got this high-tech superweapon the enemy doesn't know about!"

I'm sure I'll read more about it as time goes on, but I figured based on the depth and breadth of knowledge so many folks here have, you might be able to fill in those blanks a bit.

Thanks!
If the plane was damaged in flight and started going down, the crew would leave it and bale out. The bombsight was not expected to survive.

If the pilot was able to safely bring the bomber down relatively intact, then yes, destroy the bombsight.

I don't recall reading where the bombardier was expected to destroy the bombsight while the bomber was plummeting to earth.
 
I don't recall any comparative trials between the Mk XIV and the Norden by the British. After initially being desperate for it enthusiasm waned. For both at any given height the big issue was wind drift. I agree with you, any difference was lost in the rush. The RAF regarded the upsides of the Mk XIV as preferable. More work was done on the various Sperrys which were seen as similar to the Norden with the same issues of steady run-up which was not ideal with radar flak and night fighters. The Sperry was used on an interim basis (and passed on overseas commands) until Mk XIV and SABS II supplies were adequate.

I forget which but an RAE or A&AEE report did say the Norden was not suitable for night work. But in reasonable moonlight if the target could be seen at an adequate distance for the minimum run-up it could be used as you say.

Here are the results of a quick search on the UK National Archives website:

AIR 14/875: Norden bombsight: trials
PREM 4/25/1: Norden bombsight
AVIA 38/101: Sperry and Norden bombsights: release to the UK
AIR 14/1534: Bomber Development Unit : trials of Norden bombsight
AVIA 6/12561: Norden automatic controls in Fortress II B 25 B and B 25 C aircraft: inspection of installation
AIR 14/4520: Bombing Development Unit: Trials of Norden bombsight in Mosquito aircraft

I have the last one:
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1794308905601.png

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Not suitable for use in the Mosquito, due to the Mosquito's instability.
 
I thought the Allies worked out pretty effective countermeasures? Also limited to good visibility. But certainly innovative and a sign of things to come.
Bombsights are limited to good visibility also.,
 
Bombsights are limited to good visibility also.,
There were Allied radar bombsights that did not require sight of the target. The British had developed a fully blind bombsight during the war. The US used the LAB AN/APQ-5 blind bombsight extensively at night on anti-shipping missions and Coastal Command used it for a couple of months at the end of the war in Europe.
 
Here are the results of a quick search on the UK National Archives website:

AIR 14/875: Norden bombsight: trials
PREM 4/25/1: Norden bombsight
AVIA 38/101: Sperry and Norden bombsights: release to the UK
AIR 14/1534: Bomber Development Unit : trials of Norden bombsight
AVIA 6/12561: Norden automatic controls in Fortress II B 25 B and B 25 C aircraft: inspection of installation
AIR 14/4520: Bombing Development Unit: Trials of Norden bombsight in Mosquito aircraft

I have the last one:
View attachment 902561

View attachment 902562
View attachment 902563

Not suitable for use in the Mosquito, due to the Mosquito's instability.
The British did look at the Norden, as you evidence, but my point was that I did not recall any comparison with the British Mk XIV. That would have been interesting.
 
The Germans probably did, too. After all, they had the plans before US entry into WWII due to at least one spy at Norden.
Maybe the Germans disregarded the Norden because they assumed dive bombing was so superior.

However this only made sense for smaller aircraft like the Ju87, as the dive bombing requirements ruined aircraft like the Ju88 and the He177.

So Germany dismissing the Norden might not be a black mark against the Norden, but might point more to German incompetence.
 
Maybe the Germans disregarded the Norden because they assumed dive bombing was so superior.

However this only made sense for smaller aircraft like the Ju87, as the dive bombing requirements ruined aircraft like the Ju88 and the He177.

So Germany dismissing the Norden might not be a black mark against the Norden, but might point more to German incompetence.

I've read about the problems with the He-177's dive bombing requirement, but did dive bombing really ruin the Ju-88? I always read the Junkers 88 was one of the more successful and effective combat airframes of the war.
 
I've read about the problems with the He-177's dive bombing requirement, but did dive bombing really ruin the Ju-88? I always read the Junkers 88 was one of the more successful and effective combat airframes of the war.
The Ju88 was actually a good dive-bombing platform and was really successful during the Battle of France as well as sinking the HMS Lancastria, bit it was really hard on the airframe.

The RLM's insistence that everything be dive-bomb capable instead of focusing on a dedicated dive-bomber was a curse to the Luftwaffe and a blessing to the Allies.
 
It seems to me that over land dive bombers like the Ju87, once successful, were replaced by Fighter Bombers though this never happened over the sea despite decent AA and carrier escort fighters.
 
It seems to me that over land dive bombers like the Ju87, once successful, were replaced by Fighter Bombers though this never happened over the sea despite decent AA and carrier escort fighters.
I would say yes and no and maybe a bit later than you think.

The Ju 87 remained viable as a weapon delivery system so long as air opposition was limited until the end of 1943. Probably its last successes were in the Dodecanese campaign between Sept and Nov 1943 against both land and sea targets.

In Burma it took until July 1944 for the RAF & IAF Vultee Vengeance squadron dive bombers to cease operations. The RAAF stopped using them for dive bomber operations around the same time.

USMC dive bomber units continued to operate to the end of WW2 against land targets.
MAG-24 - 2 x SBD squadrons decommissioned on 18th July 1945 after concluding operations in the southern Philippines but VMSB-244, which had traded its SBD for SB2C in May continued to operate
MAG-32 - 4 x SBD squadrons ended their tactical operatios in the southern Philippines on 1st Aug and a fortnight later were returning to the USA.

These final operations in 1945 were in support of various amphibious landings by US Army divisions to clear the Japanese forces from Luzon & Mindanao and surrounding islands.

Aboard the USN CVs in the Pacific dive and torpedo bomber numbers were reduced at the end of 1944 to allow the carrying of more fighters to combat the kamikaze menace. The fighters being carried however fulfilled both fighter & fighter bomber roles with the distinction between VF (fighter) and VFB (fighter bomber) becoming non-existent during 1945. But by Aug 1945 it had been decided that the dive bomber numbers needed to be increased again to improve offensive punch. By that time virtually all the remaining worthwhile Japanese targets were on land. In the BPF Barracuda crews in 11ACS were told to give up torpedo training and concentrate on dive bombing, again with Japanese land targets in mind.

Note dive bombers were eliminated from the air groups of the CVL and Sangamon Class CVE in the early part of 1943 to simplify logistics aboard ships with relatively small air groups.

Even when the emphasis changed to fighter-bombers dive bombing tactics were still being employed. We have had a rent thread about this on here.
 

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