Was the Sea Hurricane a superior naval fighter than the F4F? (1 Viewer)

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

I'd say it's ok for the 'second tier' defense, against basically flying boats and real long range types, though the speed is a valid point. Even Fulmar is better in this sense. Folding wing Martlet probably best.
Skua was supposed to go into service at the end of 1937, they made into service at the end of 1938,
The Fulmar I made it into service in May of 1940, (around 255mph ?). The Mk II started showing up in March 1941.
The folding wing Martlet (90 built) didn't leave the factory (on Long Island ) until the fall of 1941.
The Martlet IV with folding wings didn't leave the factory until July of 1942. 220 built. Didn't go into action until very early 1943.
The Martlet/Wildcat V (two stage engines) started coming out the door in Dec 1942.

Actual carrier use of the Gladiators seems to have been minimal?
Please note that the Skuas were pretty much gone before the fixed wing Martlets showed up.
Deliveries at the factory in the US have to sent to Britian, uncrated, assembled, fitted with British radios, oxygen equipment and other bits a pieces and tested before issuing to squadrons for training let alone service squadrons.
No 800 squadron was turning in their Skuas for Fulmar Is in March of 1941 after coming back from the Med.
No 806 squadron traded in their eight Skuas and six Rocs for Fulmar Is.
No 803 squadron got Sea Hurricanes in April of 1941 and 801 got Sea Hurricanes in Aug 1941.
 
Last edited:
I'd say it's ok for the 'second tier' defense, against basically flying boats and real long range types, though the speed is a valid point. Even Fulmar is better in this sense. Folding wing Martlet probably best.

Given that the context of my reply was a good CAG for Hermes, putting Skuas aboard as the fighter/DB complement relegates the carriers itself to "second-tier" as if it wasn't already, given its slow speed-- not worth putting 500 or so seamen at risk in a ship which can't defend itself against first-tier air attacks, nor surface attacks.

I agree with S Shortround6 , ferrying and training are the obvious uses for an obsolete hull such as this. In that context Skuas might be useful. Escort carrier flying Stringbags to guard convoys against U-boats might be a workable idea too.

I think by the time of her loss the Brits had already realized these points, even if events forced them to risk her in an active war zone.
 
I kind of agree with this. Skua has the tempting trait of wearing two hats (three if you count recon). Range is about the same as a Fulmar.
After they were retired from front line service in 1941, I would have sent every Skua to Malaya and Ceylon. Though aircrew would have been an issue, theirs having moved to Fulmars and TSRs, and the RAF having little experience on dive bombers.. But as they said on Tales of the Riverbank, that's another story.

Back on topic. If we could place three land based FAA fighter squadrons at RNAS Sembawang in summer 1941, do we prefer Sea Hurricanes or non-folding Martlets? Which is the best for taking on the Oscars and Claudes and chasing down the Bettys and Nells? This site says the Sea Hurricane could carry bombs - was this feasible in summer 1941?

Presumably when HMS Indomitable passes nearby in Jan 1942 any surviving fighters will fly out to the carrier to make their escape to fight on at Ceylon in March/April - either fighter will fit down Indomitable's wider lift.
 
Last edited:
Only when lightly loaded and into a good bit of wind.
The North Atlantic could always be assured of the latter.

8ae7c988ab72cc415cbbf49a767ae797.jpg
 
When there is enough wind I should imagine there would be no restrictions on payload weight for the Avenger?
One problem is that wind is variable and you need it for TO, but also for safe landing on; it was landing on in light wind that was the bane of the Seafire off Salerno, whilst they operated from CVEs.

The Skipper of USS Bogue had this to say:

Interestingly, in his comments on the new
aircraft composition, Captain Short (of USS Bogue) suggested that four
slower type aircraft, such as the Swordfish, be
substituted for three 'TBF-is: "The Swordfish, for
instance, can be operated in weather which precludes
the landing and take-off (except by catapult) of the
TBF. They could be used for night operations and
rough water work when the employment of the heavy
and faster TBF would be unduly hazardous in this class
of vessel. Further, a slow aircraft at night would prove
more effective in spotting submarines than a fast
one''(76) The suggestion was not followed. (Gannon, Black May)

Sometime back I found Bogue's Action Report for that timeframe and it stated that TBF operations had to cease when their Catapult failed, but fortunately that was just at the end of that deployment.
 
I'm always surprised that people are surprised about the TBF/TBM Avengers take of abilities.

Firstly some data.
A Bogue class CVE was capable of about 18 knots and a Casablanca 19 knots.

A Bogue class flight deck was 436ft long (British ships had this extended to 440-450ft) and a Casablanca 474ft.

The BuAer figures for a fully loaded Avenger (16,412 lb gross weight) show the effects of wind speed on take off distance.

Nil wind (Calm) - 1,071ft
15 knots - 650 ft
25 knots - 435ft.

So it doesn't take very much natural wind to make fully loaded Avenger operations possible without a catapult.

And around the world, outwith the Doldrums (the Intertropical Convergence Zone) there are very few days when there is no wind at all. A carrier captain might however have to work a bit to find it in more tropical areas. But in more temperate areas it didn't often prove to be much of a problem. After all we are not talking about having to range large numbers of these aircraft on the flight deck at the same time as in a fleet carrier.

And as I've noted previously, even fleet carrier operating speeds were generally only in the region of 15-25knots.
 
One problem is that wind is variable and you need it for TO, but also for safe landing on; it was landing on in light wind that was the bane of the Seafire off Salerno, whilst they operated from CVEs.

The Skipper of USS Bogue had this to say:



Sometime back I found Bogue's Action Report for that timeframe and it stated that TBF operations had to cease when their Catapult failed, but fortunately that was just at the end of that deployment.
there may well have been times when the Swordfish might have been a better solution for anti-submarine operations - when the wind was non-existent - or when the wind was far too strong, but the Avenger was certainly the better anti-submarine aircraft, for the USN at least. The Bogues captain was suggesting replacing just some of the Avengers with Swordfish, not all of them. In any case the Grumman TBF Avenger was responsible for the sinking of far more U-boats than the Swordfish in the Atlantic.
 
there may well have been times when the Swordfish might have been a better solution for anti-submarine operations - when the wind was non-existent - or when the wind was far too strong, but the Avenger was certainly the better anti-submarine aircraft, for the USN at least. The Bogues captain was suggesting replacing just some of the Avengers with Swordfish, not all of them. In any case the Grumman TBF Avenger was responsible for the sinking of far more U-boats than the Swordfish in the Atlantic.
AIUI, almost all TBF CVE operations involved the use of catapults. Swordfish were primarily used on CVEs that didn't have catapults.
 
I'm always surprised that people are surprised about the TBF/TBM Avengers take of abilities.

Firstly some data.
A Bogue class CVE was capable of about 18 knots and a Casablanca 19 knots.

A Bogue class flight deck was 436ft long (British ships had this extended to 440-450ft) and a Casablanca 474ft.

The BuAer figures for a fully loaded Avenger (16,412 lb gross weight) show the effects of wind speed on take off distance.

Nil wind (Calm) - 1,071ft
15 knots - 650 ft
25 knots - 435ft.

So it doesn't take very much natural wind to make fully loaded Avenger operations possible without a catapult.

And around the world, outwith the Doldrums (the Intertropical Convergence Zone) there are very few days when there is no wind at all. A carrier captain might however have to work a bit to find it in more tropical areas. But in more temperate areas it didn't often prove to be much of a problem. After all we are not talking about having to range large numbers of these aircraft on the flight deck at the same time as in a fleet carrier.

And as I've noted previously, even fleet carrier operating speeds were generally only in the region of 15-25knots.

In any case the Avenger doesn't have to take off at maximum weights - it can still carry out combat sorties reasonably effectively with reduced weights as well.
 
I'm always surprised that people are surprised about the TBF/TBM Avengers take of abilities.

Firstly some data.
A Bogue class CVE was capable of about 18 knots and a Casablanca 19 knots.

A Bogue class flight deck was 436ft long (British ships had this extended to 440-450ft) and a Casablanca 474ft.

The BuAer figures for a fully loaded Avenger (16,412 lb gross weight) show the effects of wind speed on take off distance.

Nil wind (Calm) - 1,071ft
15 knots - 650 ft
25 knots - 435ft.

So it doesn't take very much natural wind to make fully loaded Avenger operations possible without a catapult.

And around the world, outwith the Doldrums (the Intertropical Convergence Zone) there are very few days when there is no wind at all. A carrier captain might however have to work a bit to find it in more tropical areas. But in more temperate areas it didn't often prove to be much of a problem. After all we are not talking about having to range large numbers of these aircraft on the flight deck at the same time as in a fleet carrier.

And as I've noted previously, even fleet carrier operating speeds were generally only in the region of 15-25knots.
I found this in the Somerville Papers:

3. RAA reports that Shah cannot obtain requisite wind over deck for landing training owing to the low airs at present experienced in these parts; he suggested she should be sent to the Cape but with this I cannot agree as it would take her off the Station far too long. Saratoga states they consider 30 knots over the deck is necessary for the training of Avengers in escort carriers and 28 knots is necessary for operations; if this is correct it would appear that during quite a considerable part of the year the escort carriers armed with Avengers would be unable to operate. (p.539)

We have to remember that aircrew cannot be expected to fly daily operations when they have a fairly high probability of crashing upon TO, not just due to the human cost but also because even a small loss rate had a large impact on a CVE's ability to maintain an acceptable sortie rate. However, most, if not all USN CVEs had catapults and they used them constantly.
 

Users who are viewing this thread

Back