Westland Whirlwind alternative engines?

[wuzak]

What benefits, if any, would be achieved by mating with Peregrine and superchargers from Merlin X, or XX? Something akin what was done for Merlin (from Vulture?) or for DB-605 (from 603)?

The Merlin superchargers have greater capacity....so would potentially give more power.

And, from the XX's supercharger on, you would get better efficiency.

The V-1710 was fitted with a Merlin 61 supercharger by Allison for a test - and they found it gave almost exactly the same power. Suggesting to me that the supercharger was a key determining factor in power output.

 

[tomo pauk]

Thanks.
What kind of power levels could we expect from XX's supercharger mounted on Peregrine, theoretically?

 

[Edgar Brooks]

This is part of what I mean about a smoke screen, in your post #24 you talked about the lack of high altitude performance in the fall winter of 1940/41 and the Whirlwinds inability to combat the 109F at 22,000ft and above, no you are saying it was viewed as an anti-tank aircraft and altitude performance was needed just a few months before that. Which is it? .

Don't put words into my mouth, I said no such thing. For fighter v fighter Dowding was unimpressed, but was quite happy to have it for use against tanks; now, as far as I know, no German tanks were ever encountered at altitude.

Actually, it sounds a lot rude.

Sorry about that, but neither you, nor I, know what R-R were capable of, in 1940, so implying that they were incompetent/lying is going a bit far.

It does speak to the capacity of Rolls-Royce in manufacturing terms.

Precisely what I said; they didn't have the capacity (and said so,) so something(s) had to go.

The Whirlwinds airframe was obsolete when? In 1940? In 1941?

I said obsolescent, which is not the same thing.

Care to give a source for this? In Victor Bingham's book on the Whirlwind he copies what I believe are the pilots notes and part of the take of procedure is to run each engine (one at a time) up to 2950/3000rpm and 9lbs of boost to check the supercharger boost limit. If the engine was damaged in in seconds doing this it seems it would be a very foolish thing to do before each and every flight? perhaps the procedure was changed at a later date?

In an inter-departmental note, an Air Ministry mandarin states,".....while the Peregrine is being cleared for 12 (not 9) lb boost and 100 octane fuel for emergency use, the development of the engine for full 100 octane rating is quite a different business, and would take a considerable time."
Emergency use in a Merlin was always seen as a last resort, and the amount of time had to be carefully registered; I see no reason why the Peregrine should have been treated any differently.

I don't think there was a conspiracy, more like a comedy of errors which some people then tried to sweep under the rug.

And your evidence for this is..........?

The Bombs were not added until 1942 and then, as the story goes, at the instigation of the using squadron/s.

AOC-in-C Fighter Command, in fact.

In any case keeping 2 squadrons around for over a year before getting around to putting the bombs on them certainly doesn't sound like no use.

One squadron, actually, since 137 Squadron didn't exist, as a Whirlwind squadron, before 20-9-41, and flew its first operation 20-11-41.

As I said before, stopping the program was the right decision, it is just that too many of the excuses don't hold water

Excuses? I didn't realise that a national government needed excuses; as far as I'm aware they made decisions based on the facts given to them by the companies involved.

 

[Edgar Brooks]

I said nothing about the airframe. Just wondering if the Merlin 61 supercharger could have worked on the Peregrine. .

Since this thread concerns the Whirlwind, I rather assumed that the theory would be applied to that airframe.

If RR were going to adapt the Merlin 61 supercharger to the Peregrine I dare say t is because they had more roles for it than just the Whirlwind.

Which brings us back to the point that R-R had no such plans.

 

[Shortround6]

Don't put words into my mouth, I said no such thing. For fighter v fighter Dowding was unimpressed, but was quite happy to have it for use against tanks; now, as far as I know, no German tanks were ever encountered at altitude.

Lets try to straighten out a few things. Dowding may have been unimpressed with it's fighter v fighter capability but wasn't he just as happy to have it in order to attack bombers as they became less vulnerable to rifle caliber machine guns as he was to have to attack tanks with? Letter from July 1st 1940.
He is supposed to have thought it was a extravagant design as it use two engines to lift 4 cannon whereas the "new" Hawker fighter would lift six cannon using one engine. Of course the "new" Hawker fighter (Typhoon/Tornado) use a single 24 cylinder engine instead of two 12s and never got six cannon. I know you can't build two 12s for the "cost" of one 24, especially installed but the actually difference is not the 2 to 1 that is implied.
The Whirlwind did suffer at the higher altitudes but then so did the Hurricane. Just not as bad. That is why the Hurricane got the Merlin XX engines. An attempt to extend it's useful life as a fighter aircraft.

Sorry about that, but neither you, nor I, know what R-R were capable of, in 1940, so implying that they were incompetent/lying is going a bit far.

Talk about putting words in someone's mouth. I have tried (twice) to offer an explanation as to WHY Rolls-Royce may have felt that one Peregrine would produced would equal the loss of two Merlins and you say that I am implying that they were incompetent/lying.
It is simple manufacturing, building in small lots or building different parts on the same machinery in alternating time periods (days or weeks) is not as efficient as a constant production run. There is no incompetence about it. Unless you consider some the American companies to be incompetent. Not only did they not set up factories to build R-1830s at the same time as R-2800s but even the single stage R-2800s were built in a different "shadow" factory than the two stage R-2800s.

The word "cost" can have a number of different meanings. Cost in money, cost in man hours, cost in materials, cost in production effort. Even the "cost" of certain production procedures changes with the number of parts in a production run or production rate. Machining parts from the solid can be cheaper than either castings or forgings if the production run is small enough that the cost of the molds or forging dies would out weigh the extra machine time. Specialized fixtures/jigs can speed up production and cut scrap, but are expensive to design and build and are only worth it if the production run is sizable.

I said obsolescent, which is not the same thing.

From your post #27:
"But the Merlin had many uses, while the Peregrine had only one, which was an obsolete airframe."

In an inter-departmental note, an Air Ministry mandarin states,".....while the Peregrine is being cleared for 12 (not 9) lb boost and 100 octane fuel for emergency use, the development of the engine for full 100 octane rating is quite a different business, and would take a considerable time."
Emergency use in a Merlin was always seen as a last resort, and the amount of time had to be carefully registered; I see no reason why the Peregrine should have been treated any differently.

AH, I see, not a directive, user note or anything connected with Rolls-Royce but an opinion from an "Air Ministry mandarin".

That explains it all. Just like the rumour that said it took 2 hours to change a wheel on the Whirlwind ( under 33 minutes by test at the A&AEE) or the high ranking officer that claimed it took two weeks to change an engine (35.4 man hours by test).

I also see no reason that the Peregrine should be treated any differently using either 9lbs or 12 lbs of boost but that is a far cry from damaging the engine in seconds. Most ,if not all performance figures are with 6lbs of boost, 9lbs seems to have been OKed sometime in 1941, quite possibly with the same restrictions the Merlin had at 12lbs boost. But it seems to me, looking at this passage that the Peregrine may have already been cleared for 9lbs and this is a clearance for 12lbs in emergencies. Which is what ALL 12lb boost useage was during the BoB, correct?

Now, for all I know the experiment failed and the 12lb boost was never approved for the Peregrine but don't tell me that 9lbs would wreck the engine in seconds.

I would also like to know when this Manderin made this pronouncement and what the status of the Merlin was in regards to boost pressures at the same time.

And your evidence for this is..........?

the comedy of errors or the sweeping under the rug?

Comedy of errors.

Fluctuating initial requirements.

Production contract delayed until test fights done while other war winning aircraft (like the Blackburn Botha) were ordered off the drawing board.

Westlands own failures to get work done in a timely manner, subcontractors failure to supply parts in a timely manner.

Time taken to adjust requirements to modern conditions. Like relaxing the requirement for 35lb tire pressure up to 42lbs which might mean more wheel ruts in the grass airfields but saved redesigning the the landing gear and rear of the nacelles.

The Failure of the MAP to get a second source on line or even to instruct Westland as to which aircraft had priority in the Westland factory, the Lysander or the Whirlwind. of course if R-R wasn't going to provide the engines in a timely fashion there wasn't much sense speeding up airframe production.

It goes on.... and on..... and on.

Sweeping under the rug???

Who was going to admit they canceled the Peregrine to work on the Vulture???

It might have been the right decision (cancel 900-1000hp engine to work on 1800-2400hp engine) but with the notoriety of the Manchester fiasco I would think people weren't in a hurry to line up to take credit for it.
Canceling the Whirlwind in order to build all those trouble free Typhoons probably didn't look like a career boosting note on the resume in 1941-42 either.

While in a cold analytical look, it was the right decision to cancel both the Peregrine and the Whirlwind the fact that the projects they canceled in favor of both had sever problems seems to have perpetuated many of the "excuses" given at the time.
While a government doesn't have to give excuses, excuses were given at the time. Unfortunately a number of the excuses do not hold up.

Like the one you gave about the Hurricane holding 50% more cannon ammo. While true on the surface there was nothing to prevent continued production of Whirlwinds with belt feed cannon which not only would have eliminated the difference but given the Whirlwind a 33% advantage.

 

[wuzak]

Who was going to admit they canceled the Peregrine to work on the Vulture???

It might have been the right decision (cancel 900-1000hp engine to work on 1800-2400hp engine) but with the notoriety of the Manchester fiasco I would think people weren't in a hurry to line up to take credit for it.
Canceling the Whirlwind in order to build all those trouble free Typhoons probably didn't look like a career boosting note on the resume in 1941-42 either.

The Peregrine wasn't cancelled in favour of the Vulture. Both programs were suspended during 1940 (BoB) and cancelled in 1941.

 

[Shortround6]

A bit more on the "comedy of errors".

Petter and Westland themselves.

One of the less than stellar features of the prototype was that the exhaust pipe was routed through the fuel tank and wing to the trailing edge is an attempt to hold drag to a minimum. This would also hold any thrust due the the exhaust to a minimum in addition to the fire hazard and the hazard of leaking high temperature exhaust gasses into areas of the airframe not able to withstand them. This last nearly caused the loss of the Prototype when an exhaust leak severed an aileron control rod. Another delay while the exhaust and corresponding area of the wing were redesigned and modified.

We are told that Dowding didn't think much of the Whirlwind for fighter v fighter. That may be but the intended replacement for the Whirlwind was the Bristol Beaufighter. However great the Beaufighter was at a number of jobs the Whirlwind could never do, I don't think that fighter v fighter against 109s was one of them.

The Air Ministry had an off--on, then off--then on then off once again policy as to the suitability of the Whirlwind for tropical use. Not a conspiracy against the whirlwind as those were confusing times but a more clear headed approach as to what aircraft were going where would have helped out more than one company. The Tropical requirement was NOT part of the intital specification. Then it was added, then it was taken out when production was limited, then it was added back in and then finally dropped. Since tropical requirements affect things like radiator and oil cooler sizes and air flows through the radiators and oil coolers this flip-flopping did nothing to speed up development or production.

Sweeping under the rug.
Some accounts say that fitting of the bomb racks "saved" the Whirlwind. the Decision to stop Whirlwind production was made in 1940 when the decision to stop Peregrine production was made. The Bomb racks were not fitted to operational aircraft until Aug/Sept of 1942. No. 263 Squadron made it's first flight into enemy territory in Jan 1941 and No. 137 Squadron sent a couple of planes on the Squadrons first combat operation to France on 24th Oct 1941. I guess I was off by 2-3 months.

Peregrine was canceled in 1940 to allow greater effort on the Merlin and Griffon, Fair enough. But the Vulture staggered on until the fall of 1941 or, according to one source the spring of 1942. Misprint? there is also a difference between the date a decision is made and the final delivery.

 

[Shortround6]

The Peregrine wasn't cancelled in favour of the Vulture. Both programs were suspended during 1940 (BoB) and cancelled in 1941.

I would like to see some exact timing. I don't doubt that both were suspended during the BoB. Both may have been canceled in 1941.

BUT there is an awful lot of of 1941. While I know that disbanding a design team is not the same as end of production both the Peregrine and the Vulture have different end of production dates in different sources. Might be the last couple of engines assembled from parts? The Vulture doesn't stop production until march or April of 1942, the decision to end the program could have come much earlier however.
There seem to be 2 Peregrines The MK I and MK II (reverse rotation?) and a paper version of about 1000hp, how far that one got I have no idea.
The Vulture has 3 marks. The MK I (87 octane?), the MK II (100 octane)and the MK V, which leaves one wondering what happened to the MK III and the MK IV. Also how much effort was going into finding solutions to the Vultures woes in 1941?

The Vulture V is often referred to as a 2500hp engine ( sometimes 3000hp is said to have been hit in tests?) which would have meant a 1250hp Peregrine if developed to the same level.

Once again I say that stopping work on a 800-1000hp engine in favor of a 2000hp engine was the right decision. The 2000hp engine had many more applications (sales). Unfortunately the 2000hp engine wanting came up wanting.

 

[wuzak]

Not sure about the Mk III, but the RRHT gave me some data for the IV and V.

From the RRHT:

The take off rating of the Vulture II is given as 1800bhp at 3200rpm and +6 lb boost: for the Mk.IV V, the 'fighter' engines, t/o power is given as 1955bhp at 3200rpm and +9lb boost.

I have not been able to find anything to substantiate that the Vulture attained 3000hp on occasions but the Vulture V is known to have reached 2500hp, and it is possible that, under the right conditions of test, 3000hp was achieved.

 

[NiallC]

A bit more on the "comedy of errors".

One of the less than stellar features of the prototype was that the exhaust pipe was routed through the fuel tank and wing to the trailing edge is an attempt to hold drag to a minimum. This would also hold any thrust due the the exhaust to a minimum in addition to the fire hazard and the hazard of leaking high temperature exhaust gasses into areas of the airframe not able to withstand them. This last nearly caused the loss of the Prototype when an exhaust leak severed an aileron control rod. Another delay while the exhaust and corresponding area of the wing were redesigned and modified.

Peregrine was canceled in 1940 to allow greater effort on the Merlin and Griffon, Fair enough. But the Vulture staggered on until the fall of 1941 or, according to one source the spring of 1942. Misprint? there is also a difference between the date a decision is made and the final delivery.

I'm afraid that the "exhaust ran through the fuel tank" is among the top 10 Whirlwind myths. Sadly, I think it originates with the memoirs of Westland test pilot Hal Penrose and, even more sadly, it's now been repeated so many times it's become "true". At no point in its development did the Whirlwind prototype's exhaust system run through the fuel tank: right next to it, but not through it. The routing of the 1st prototype's exhaust and its cooling duct can be seen in the wing spars of the production aircraft: the swaged holes in the spar webs through which the duct passed were left in place even though they were redundant once the exhaust system had been redesigned. It doesn't go through the tank. The aileron control rods do pass through the rear tank on all Whirlwinds and perhaps that's where the confusion arose.

There seems to be some long-running confusion about timing. The Whirlwind programme was cancelled in its entirety in October 1939 (not 1940). 114 aircraft were reinstated in December 1939 after both Westland and Rolls persuaded the Air Ministry that a substantial quantity of part-manufactured components for both airframes and engines had been made that would otherwise be scrap.

This is the issue as I see it: it's been stated (or at least cut-and-pasted from book to book and website to site) repeatedly that Rolls-Royce cancelled this or that engine programme in order to focus its energies on the Merlin (or Griffon or whatever), but I wonder how credible this is. At the time Rolls was a one-customer company. It had neither licensed its products to others nor courted the civil market. The Air Ministry was its only customer. That ministry set Rolls' prices (or at least its unit profits) and either directly funded Rolls' capital expenditure or underwrote it through the Capital Clause (thereby absolving the company from pretty much all commercial risk). Handley-Page described his company – which was in an identical position – as being nationalised in all but name. Was Rolls really in a position to unilaterally cancel anything? To decide what programmes it focussed its energies on? Or did it simply build what was on its order book? Once the Whirlwind was cancelled and when it was clear both that the Peregrine could not be de-rated to replace the Kestrel XXX for the Miles Master and that the Gloster F.9/37 would be built, if it was ever to be built, with Taurus rather than Peregrine engines, the Peregrine order book was empty. It never was cancelled: it just died because there was no application for it and no prospect of any. The death of the Vulture is rather later, but for much the same reasons.

HTH
Niall

 

[Shortround6]

Thank you for the correction. Not going through the tank does make more sense but right next to it doesn't sound a whole lot better even if it is a pipe within a pipe.

as far as this goes:
"That ministry set Rolls' prices (or at least its unit profits) and either directly funded Rolls' capital expenditure or underwrote it through the Capital Clause (thereby absolving the company from pretty much all commercial risk). Handley-Page described his company – which was in an identical position – as being nationalised in all but name. Was Rolls really in a position to unilaterally cancel anything? To decide what programmes it focussed its energies on? Or did it simply build what was on its order book?"

Rolls may not have been in a position to unilaterally cancel a project or program but I believe it was in a position to make some rather strong recommendations about what it could and could not do.

Allison had been in a similar position around 1935-37 when the US government (it's only customer) wanted Allison to develop fuel injection in addition to the the other projects they were working on. Allison told them they didn't have the resources to handle all the projects and do the fuel injection and to pick which projects they really wanted. The Fuel injection was shelved.
Rolls may have given the Air Ministry some similar choices. Out of 5 projects pick 3 or something along those lines, of course a short report giving projected out comes of each project would be included allowing Rolls management some capacity to 'steer' the decision.

I am not sure why the Peregrine could not be de-rated but it would have been several hundred pounds heavier than Kestrel XXX and if de-rated to the same power level would have been a worse choice.

 

[Edgar Brooks]

As Shortround says, R-R did not cancel the Peregrine, but they made it plain that any continuation would have a serious effect on the Vulture (still a going concern in 1940/41,) and various Merlins, even delaying the Griffon. At first, Bulman, who was in charge of a Ministry department, D.E.M. (Engine Manufacture?) at the time, asked them to continue with research and work on making 100 octane usable, but at a reduced level of urgency.
The Whirlwind order was not cancelled in 1939, the order was simply not confirmed; I realise that this might seem like playing with words, but the first prototype had handed engines, while the 2nd. prototype did not, and the Ministry wanted to know if there was any difference in handling before going ahead. The second prototype did not fly until Spring 1939, and did not go to A. A.E.E., Martlesham for full service trials until September 1939. Adding to the delay was the production programme, for Peregrines, which was only 8 in February 1940, 12 in March, 22 in April, rising to 48 in December. Add to that Westland's estimate, to the Ministry of a maximum production of two airframes per week (though they told Dowding it was only one p.w,) and it was realised that production would never keep pace with losses (later, 4 were lost in one day during the Channel Dash.) The Minister for Air, Sir Wilfrid Freeman, in June 1940, ordered that no more should be produced, and 30-10-40, Beaverbrook told Dowding that he would continue with material to hand, then cease production.
Petter visited the Whirlwind squadron in November 1940, and found that, out of the (only) eight airframes they had, there were just three that were serviceable, which didn't help their case at all.

 

[Shortround6]

To continue the comedy of errors, that squadron (in 1940) was in Scotland, about 400 miles from the Westland factory and while not the furtherest from the factory one could get and still be in the British Isles was obviously not close enough to get decent factory support for a squadron trying to bring a new type to service. I believe (so the the "story" goes) that Westland was making 4-5 Lysanders a week at the time and had received no clear directive from the Air Ministry as to which program should receive priority.
I am sure that a number of other programs, both in England and and in other countries, if examined in the same way, could be seen as a comedy of errors also. I am not claiming that there was a planned conspiracy or group in the Air Ministry that was "out to get" either Petter or Westland.

 

[Edgar Brooks]

263 was in Scotland because it was virtually a new Squadron, since it had lost most of its aircrew when Glorious was sunk, and it needed to work up, before joining the Battle; it was July 9th before it received its first Whirlwind, so had to use Hurricanes instead.
17-10-40 Dowding told Beaverbrook,"I purposely put No.263 Squadron well out of the way because I know Westlands and I knew what a packet of trouble the squadron would be in for. I cannot put them anywhere in the South because I cannot carry any "passengers" in that part of the world. All the squadrons there have got to be fighting fit. It is too soon yet to form an opinion, because the squadron has never had enough Whirwinds serviceable for any operational work, but my present impression is that they will have too high a gliding and landing speed for use as a nightfighter, and it is rather an uneconomical vehicle for carrying 4 cannon guns by day. Directly they can be whacked up to a complete squadron, I will send them down South and see how they shape as a fighting machine."
When Petter visited 263 he noted that the majority of problems were with the engines, and, in Scotland, 263 was a lot closer to Derby than Yeovilton.
I think that the idea that Westland had received no clear orders about the Whirlwind is rather wide of the mark, as a paragraph from a "history" of the aircraft shows," Quite apart from this trouble over the engines, there were other substantial difficulties. The firm were anxious to have as few changes in design as possible in the production machines as they felt that deliveries would be held up. The Air Ministry however were determined that as the aircraft would not be in service until 1940, it must be as up to date as possible. This meant of course many alterations some of which were suggested at the Final Conference on 1-3-39. They were nearly all items of equipment. Mr. Petter sent in a list showing delays which would accrue in production if these modifications were included. The Air Ministry thought these delays were excessive and were estimated on purpose to avoid having to do the modifications on early production machines. The friction between the Air Ministry and the firm was gradually dispelled, after the firm had been given a sharp rap over the knuckles. A concession was allowed them and the modifications were only to be applied from the 25th aircraft onwards, although they were all specified in the production specification. It appears that the firm had been neglecting the Air Ministry's advance notification of equipment requirements and consequently no trial installations had been started. This may account for the first prototype being given over to a concentrated programme of trial installations that was only completed in December 1940. The only other outstanding feature of the period while the Whirlwind was coming into production was the fuss over the maintenance qualities of the type. The director of Repair and Maintenance had criticised them as being too complicated, and A A.E.E. were asked to make recommendations for improving them."
It rather sounds from this as if Westlands didn't help their own case very much, and, coupled with R-R's reluctance over the Peregrine, the Whirlwind had no chance.
Oddly, the Hurricane was slated to finish production in March/May 1941, but, possibly due to the Whirlwind's "failure," it stayed in production for three more years, doing the anti-tank attack work that Dowding had foreseen for the Whirlwind, and adding rockets and 40mm cannon to its armament, as well, while being easier to repair, using one engine, and capable of better performance at 25,000'+.
Add to this the one/two airframes Westland could produce weekly, and set it against the hundreds of Spitfires and Seafires that they did produce, at about 6 per week, and it's fairly easy to see why the right decision was made (however much I like the look of the Whirlwind.)

 

[NiallC]

The Whirlwind order was not cancelled in 1939, the order was simply not confirmed; I realise that this might seem like playing with words, but the first prototype had handed engines, while the 2nd. prototype did not, and the Ministry wanted to know if there was any difference in handling before going ahead. The second prototype did not fly until Spring 1939, and did not go to A. A.E.E., Martlesham for full service trials until September 1939. Adding to the delay was the production programme, for Peregrines, which was only 8 in February 1940, 12 in March, 22 in April, rising to 48 in December.

Sorry to disagree Edgar, but the record says otherwise. You're absolutely correct that the second prototype did not physically go to A&AEE until late August 1939, but that was not the first opportunity that A&AEE pilots had been given to express an opinion of the aircraft. 4 pilots from A&AEE (then at Martlesham) each briefly flew the first prototype at RAF Boscombe Down on December 30th 1938. On the basis of their highly positive report, Freeman and Tedder thought that the aircraft should be ordered into production. A firm order for 200 aircraft was placed early in January 1939 – that being the maximum number of aircraft Westland could commit to completing by July 1941. While Rolls-Royce was advised of the resulting Peregrine requirement and was given an ITP for 440 engines (200 pairs plus 10% spares), no firm order was placed for the engines because, as you note, no decision could be taken as to whether counter-rotating engines were really needed until the second prototype (with identical, right-hand engines) had flown. That prototype flew on 29 March 1939 and two A&AEE pilots flew it on 15 April (again at Boscombe). They found that the handling was largely the same as that of the first prototype, although the lack of elevator authority when landing was even more marked on the second aircraft than the first. The counter-rotating engines were duly dropped and the Peregrine order confirmed for right-hand tractor engines (i.e. Peregrine Is). Rolls was told to plan for an output of an additional 1960 Peregrines to cover planned Whirlwind production from Westland and Castle Bromwich. (As a point of interest Rolls was told at the same time to plan for 1560 Vultures).

The Whirlwind order was cancelled at Freeman's suggestion in October 1939 as a part of the "First wartime production plan" (aka the "Harrogate Plan"). The decision was rubber-stamped by the Supply Committee at its 86th-88th meetings (12th-14th October): '…orders for Whirlwind aircraft, Peregrine engines and allied equipment should be cancelled at once and all work on them stopped. Jigs and tools and semi-manufactured material should be put in store pending further instructions.'

This prompted a protest from Lord Aberconway, Westland's chairman, who later told Freeman that so much part-finished material was available that "around 100" Whirlwinds could be built at almost no additional cost. Eric Mensforth (joint MD at Westland) re-stated this case at an interview with the Supply Committee in mid November. Having satisfied itself that a similar quantity of part-finished forgings and castings for Peregrines had also been made, the committee re-instated an order for 114 aircraft in December 1939 'to use up the material and avoid waste.' 26 of these were to be delivered as unarmed aircraft for the PDU, the remainder as fighters.

Freeman and Beaverbrook's later comments are a bit of a red herring. Freeman's June '40 comment was in the context of contemporary Air Ministry discussion of the possibility of a further Whirlwind order (prompted by Teddy Petter's numerous "Whirlwind MK II" proposals). Freeman shut down this debate with a terse memo: 'no new Whirlwinds'. Note 'new'. Beaverbrook's October comments don't represent a new decision on his part – rather, leaving in place one taken by others a year earlier. Beaverbrook seems to have been prepared to have re-instated the Whirlwind programme if Dowding thought highly of the aircraft. Dowding didn't. So Beaverbrook let the decision stand.

It's often been said that delayed Peregrine deliveries were a primary cause of slow deliveries of production Whirlwinds in 1940, but the numbers make me wonder. MAP's own delivery stats indicate Peregrine deliveries (actuals rather than plan) of 12 per month in Q2, 4 per month in Q3 and 15 per month in Q4. This is far in excess (and in advance) of Whirlwind production so perhaps the reason for delay lies elsewhere. In its correspondence with Fighter Command, Westland cited slow/late deliveries of self-sealing tanks as the primary cause of slow deliveries of the aircraft. Who knows.

Shortround: Like you I'm unclear about what the supposed difficulty was in de-rating the Peregrine. It was fairly common for the RAF to order de-rated engines for training applications: trading performance for longer overhaul intervals. The most explicit first-hand, contemporary reference I've found is the minutes of a meeting between Ernest Hives of Rolls-Royce and Wilfrid Freeman (then AMDP) on 14th October 1939: "It was agreed that Peregrine engines could not effectively be de-rated (eg with Kestrel type superchargers) for installation in Masters for which the Mercury XV must be provided after all possible Kestrel XXX engines have been secured." Which doesn't really tell us very much.

HTH
Niall

 

[Shortround6]

You are quite right that Petter and Westland did not help their own case. Petter was still shooting himself in the foot when he refused to put bigger tyres on the Folland Gnat and bulge the landing gear doors and so helped loose the contract for the NATO light fighter to the Aeritalia G-91. The contract may have been lost anyway due to politics (or other performance ) but refusal to meet such requirements as ground loading just gave them excuses.

Dowding's reasons might carry a bit more weight if there had been NO squadrons in the south equipped with either Gladiators, Defiants or Blenheim day fighters. While 263 Squadron shouldn't have been in No 11 group that still leaves an awful lot of the south (like Cornwall

Not sure were the Night fighter idea was coming from either. Of course they did have a number of night fighter squadrons with no radar at that time.

It would be interesting to see the number of employees and the sq footage of factroy space that Westland had in late 1939 and early 1940 compared to what it had when it was turning out hundreds of Spitfires too.

 

[NiallC]

When Petter visited 263 he noted that the majority of problems were with the engines

Hmm. I wonder whether this would be the first time a designer has played a little fast and loose with the facts when defending his creation? 13 Group organised a conference, attended by Westland, at Drem on September 25th 1940 to discuss 263 Squadron's problems with the Whirlwind, the report from which notes 'The Rolls-Royce Peregrine has given very little trouble'. There had been a single in-flight engine failure, the cause of which was found to be fuel filters clogged with tank sealant, it apparently being Westland's standard practice to seal leaking tanks, post-manufacture, with Bostick! The rest of the report is given over to a litany of more serious failures – all airframe and systems-related: fractures in the convoluted carburettor air intake ducting, repeated hydraulic failures (caused by poor-quality plumbing), collapsing canopies, disintegrating slats, slats popping off their tracks, inability to maintain rated engine boost at altitude (found to be due to more poor-quality plumbing), fragile tailwheel oleos and failing wingtips. It was this last issue which caused the squadron engineering officer to ground the aircraft, prompted by pilot concerns that a wingtip failure in flight might jam the ailerons.

Many of these problems should have been picked up during development flying, but the two prototypes actually flew very few hours before the first production aircraft were delivered. This seems largely because of Petter's inflexibility regarding modifications as you note. Standard ministry practice was to approve such mods on the basis of a mockup, but Petter insisted on making trial installations of them all on the two prototypes – which were accordingly grounded for long periods of time when they should have been piling on the hours. As an example, the second prototype L6845, had only 65 total airframe hours to its name when it was delivered to 25 Squadron for operational trials in May 1940 – nearly 18 months after its first flight.

Shortround: Whatever we may think of the usefulness of Gladiators, Defiants and Blenheims in Fighter Command at the time, they were at least serviceable and operationally fit at a time when the Whirlwind was not. The Fighter Command state reports show shockingly poor Whirlwind serviceability throughout the summer of 1940 and 263 Squadron does not appear as "Operational" in the Command OrBat until 22nd December 1940 – and even then only 1 section is shown as being so.

I don't have the factory area and workforce data to hand right now, but my sense of it is that almost all of the expansion of Westland capacity took place earlier than this: mainly when John Brown took a majority shareholding in late '38 and another phase when Westland took over Petters old engine factory – again pre-war. Ironically and interestingly, according to MAP's figures Westland airframe output averaged 70 aircraft per month in Q3 1940 and 65 in Q4, figures it did not achieve again at any time during the war. The closest it got was in Q2 1945 – 66 aircraft per month (61 Spit/Seafires and 5 others – presumably Welkins). So the capacity was certainly there in mid-late 1940, but was devoted to producing Lysanders not Whirlwinds.
Niall

 

[wuzak]

I wonder if the MAP considered getting Westlands to adopt the Supermarine Type 327 design - at least for protootyping. The 327 used Merlins and promised much higher performance than the Whirlwind (or anything in the air at the time), and could easily take 4 cannon - it was supposed to take 6, but the MAP thought the installation impractical.

The MAP was also wary about how long it took Supermarines to produce prototypes and then production machines. I suppose Westlands were no better.

 

[Edgar Brooks]

Dowding's reasons might carry a bit more weight if there had been NO squadrons in the south equipped with either Gladiators, Defiants or Blenheim day fighters. While 263 Squadron shouldn't have been in No 11 group that still leaves an awful lot of the south (like Cornwall)

Normal squadron complement was 15 (at least) airframes; Dowding couldn't (and wouldn't) shift an incomplete squadron anywhere while they were still working up. 263 did have Hurricanes, and did fly operations with them while they were in Scotland.

Not sure were the Night fighter idea was coming from either. Of course they did have a number of night fighter squadrons with no radar at that time.

The idea came from 263's C.O. If Spitfires and Hurricanes were being pressed into service as nightfighters in 1940, I can see why an aircraft, with the armament of the Whirlwind, would be considered, as well, since it would have been able to down German bombers, whatever their armour. Even the Typhoon, at one stage, was tested as a nightfighter, but rejected because it was felt that the work was too much for one man.

 

[fastmongrel]

Muzzle flash on the Whirlwind would have destroyed the night vision of the pilot. I can think of worse aircraft than the Whirlwind for night fighting but not many. Possibly the best use of the Whirlwind would have been low level recce, I believe down low it could outrun a Spit so a cleaned up unarmed version with cropped supercharger impellors would have been a hot ship.

ps I still have my 40 year old Airfix Whirlwind love that little model one of the first that I built where I knew what I was doing. Its missing the tail wheel and the port prop from being badly stored in the loft but wouldnt throw it out for any money.