What Went Wrong At Boeing

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Attached is a NYT article I just received, written by a well known pilot, son of an even better known pilot.



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Attached is a NYT article I just received, written by a well known pilot, son of an even better known pilot.
Well, he doesn't seem to be obsessed with political correctness, does he? I guess as long as Boeing's around, stick and rudder will still be stick and rudder and the third world will continue to be.
 
"Well, he doesn't seem to be obsessed with political correctness, does he?"I

Clearly he does not meet the established standards of the NYT!

We have a lot of those Third World Guys training at our airfield. I fly as soon after sunrise as possible, so I can avoid them.
 
We have a lot of those Third World Guys training at our airfield. I fly as soon after sunrise as possible, so I can avoid them.
I used to hate flying into KHPN, Westchester County, just outside NYC. The pattern was full of 3rd world students in Cherokees dodging between the airliners and corporate jets; sky blind, unintelligible on the radio, and arrogant about right of way conflicts. Many were the offspring of UN diplomatic personnel, and held a rather aristocratic view of their station in life.
Cheers,
Wes
 
This is a huge problem at my place of employment. Most of the supervisors are fresh out of college and have never actually worked in the trucking industry. The ensuing and unescasery meltdowns are often quite spectacular.
 
The FAA has asked Boeing to explain instant messages between two Boeing employees regarding concerns with the original certification of the 737 MAX that the company turned over to the Department of Transportation on Thursday. According to the FAA, Boeing discovered the communication several months ago. The messages were sent in 2016.


"The FAA finds the substance of the document concerning," the agency said in a statement. "The FAA is also disappointed that Boeing did not bring this document to our attention immediately upon its discovery. The FAA is reviewing this information to determine what action is appropriate."


It has been reported that the messages referred to a problem with an automated system on the MAX that made it difficult to control. FAA Administrator Steve Dickson sent a letter to Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg asking for an immediate explanation for the contents of the document and Boeing's delay in bringing it to the FAA. Boeing issued a statement on Friday saying it originally provided the document to "the appropriate investigating authority" earlier this year. The FAA says it has shared the document with relevant congressional committees. The 737 MAX has been grounded since March following the fatal crashes of Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302.
 
The pilot in question was talking about the simulator, and he thought the sim was having simulator issues.
As I read it, it seemed the question was: "Is the simulator behavior in fact an accurate depiction of the aircraft's actual inflight behavior, and if so, is this acceptable?" (doubtful??) Smells like gun smoke to me.
 
As I read it, it seemed the question was: "Is the simulator behavior in fact an accurate depiction of the aircraft's actual inflight behavior, and if so, is this acceptable?" (doubtful??) Smells like gun smoke to me.

From my understanding the sim was having issues and he initially determined the sim had glitches and was told it was being repaired.
 
I guess you are referring to this:

In the November 2016, message exchange, 737 chief test pilot Mark Forkner — Boeing describes him as a "former employee" — writes that MCAS is "running rampant in the sim on me," a reference to a flight simulator in which it was being tested at the time. "I am levelling off at like 4000 feet, 230 knots and the plane is trimming itself like crazy. I'm like, WHAT?" he said.

He quipped, "granted, I suck at flying, but even this was egregious."


Forkner said he "basically lied to the regulators (unknowingly)" based on the simulator experience though the co-worker is quick to counter, "it wasn't a lie, no one told us that was the case."
 
The older planes were not over loaded with electronic flight control systems. And usually had cables connecting the pilots controls to the control surfaces. Not having redundant mechanical back up systems is where all aircraft manufactures went wrong.
 
Not having redundant mechanical back up systems is where all aircraft manufactures went wrong.
In this day of mass production of supercheap microchips, electronic solutions are actually cheaper than aircraft grade mechanical ones. Fuel economy comes at the cost of negative stable airframes that rely on computer driven active "stability" to maintain an artificial "equilibrium". Next time you're watching a video of F18s hitting the boat in rough seas, notice the rate at which the stabilators are flipping up and down, and even going cross control. You don't actually think the pilot is doing all that, do you? Any good ball flyer aims for "steaddy...steaddy...nice an' steaddy". The FBW makes all the tiny corrections before the pilot detects a deviation.
Cheers,
Wes
 
I'm reading all this with considerable interest and it is talk that pops up in our crew room at work, but from a basic look from outside the company, it appears that the venerable 737 design has been stretched to its limit and its time to consider a clean sheet aircraft. Rumour has it that the new mid-range aircraft Boeing are umm-ing and ahh-ing about might be based on a warmed over 767? Boeing, let the engineers do their jobs and start from scratch on an entirely new airframe. Boeing does entirely new stuff really well - the firm has a history of it.
 

The Army changed several of the specifications for the AR-15 primarily because it was it was designed outside the normal in-house procurement chain. It was the first infantry weapon to be developed completely out of the purview of the U.S. Army Ordinance Corp. In addition to the powder change and attendant cyclic rate increase, the rifling was changed. All of these changes to the very reliable AR-15 led to the less than reliable M-16A1.

The AR-15 was not a USAF innovation, but was developed independently by Eugene Stoner of the ArmaLite Corporation. He demonstrated the AR-15 to Curtis LeMay, a hunting and firearms enthusiast. at a private non-military gathering. LeMay was so impressed he ordered the AR-15 for SAC's Security Forces. A demonstration of his authority as head of SAC to be able to purchase such a weapon outside the normal procurement chain. Within the U.S. Army, some members of the Special Forces also carried the AR-15 as was their choice.

So while I am willing to lay some of the blame for the poor performance of the M-16A1 at the feet of the Colt Firearms Corporation, who produced the weapon under a license from ArmaLite. In my humble opinion, the real culprit behind the failure of the M16A1 was the U.S. Army Ordinance Corp and it's inability to just get past "Not Invented Here".
 
I remember going by the Lockheed Marietta plant in the late 80's and being aghast at the condition of the tooling that was being "stored" outdoors.
It turned out that storing the C-130 "plaster masters" outside in Georgia didn't work out as well as in southern California.
 


Bingo!!

I contract to various businesses and see this change all the time. When I go to a business with a manager who has years of experience it is easy if there is a problem.
We solve it. When I go to businesses who hire people to manage in their early twenties because they have completed a bachelor of business degree it is more a case
of them telling me why it is not their problem. One even said she was going to call head office to complain because I went in to ask to see the store room (as instructed)
just to inventory what was there - why complain - because it was inappropriate for me to ask her ?? In other words I am the manager so I don't .... something ??

One unfortunate example of sales/marketing managers getting control of product line policy (deadly) was Hewlett Packard. From years in computing HP (high price) was
always amongst the best. Yes, not cheap but definitely a case of getting what you paid for. Computers and printers were solid stuff that was also kept up to date.

In the early 2000's the dark side crept in - to keep the share price up was easy - downsize - lose many of these expensive time wasters such as the R & D people. Thousands
of experienced workers were cast off. This improved the bottomline and allowed the marketers to do more advertising. Cheaper production meant more sales so it
all looked good to share holders and resulted in higher salaries for the marketers. Excellent.

The problem was they went for the blind of market share. Get a higher share and you have more customers thus squashing the opposition. Unfortunately those customers
started finding other stuff that worked for less and higher end customers started finding better stuff that cost more but kept working. In other words the marketers had
put HP into what the computer industry calls the race to the bottom. The only thing that matters in that case is that you are the cheapest. Going cheaper requires certain
obvious trade offs and as soon as someone else goes cheaper you are basically in trouble. I remember computers that retailed for $1500 having a build price then of
$1470. A $30 gross profit. To share holders it still looks good as revenue of X billion dollars looks pretty good. Trouble is revenue ain't profit.

HP have since gone back to more sane practices but the damage is taking a long time to sort. many engineers etc will work for less at other companies with a different
mindset because they want long term job security plus somewhere that lets them achieve.

I don't know if there is something of this problem with Boeing but I hope whatever it is can be sorted. I have always found the story of the insistence of what went into
the 747 (safety/ backup systems etc) to be a good starting point for anyone wanting to know how to give themselves a good start with product development.
 
One unfortunate example of sales/marketing managers getting control of product line policy

And the odd thing was, that HP then had TERRIBLE product support! They literally did not have a phone number you call all unless you wanted to pay for that privilege. Sales and marketing might have been in charge, but they were avoiding the whole job.

At work we had a HP color laserprinter and when the toner cartridges got down to about 30%they started leaking all over everything. I wanted so much to call them and say "Pardon me, but WTF?" but there was no way to do that.
 
It turned out that storing the C-130 "plaster masters" outside in Georgia didn't work out as well as in southern California.

Based on the size? I'd guess it was for C-141. I was just amazed there was zero effort made for preservation or corrosion control.
 

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