Why did the British airforce adopted highly similar Hurricane and Spitfire at the same time?

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Admittedly, I'm saying this on the basis of relatively little hard data. I was never able to acquire the "Bloody Shambles" series which is sadly out of print now and very expensive.
I bought a used copy via www.abebooks.com for cheap, read it cover to cover and them, due to my minimalist tendencies quickly resold it on eBay.

Here's an online version >
 
Well, there's a signed copy available from the publishers for less than 30 quid.


Maybe the postage is exorbitant?

Then again, there's a version available post-free in the US for $24 via AbeBooks. I'm pretty sure there are decently-priced options available.

yeah I've seen Vol 1 reasonably priced, but I'm much more interested in the later volumes, usually around $50-$70 or more

 
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yeah I've seen Vol 1 reasonably priced, but I'm much more interested in the later volumes, usually around $50-$70 or more


Well, AbeBooks also has Vol 2 for sale at just over $30. I did see Vol 3 for sale on the same site for around $50 which isn't too bad (but it makes me think twice before buying any book at that price or higher).
 
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Well, AbeBooks also has Vol 2 for sale at just over $30. I did see Vol 3 for sale on the same site for around $50 which isn't too bad (but it makes me think twice before buying any book at that price or higher).

Yeah I'm kinda broke these days... a couple of years ago I wouldn't have hesitated to buy all of them. I'll collect them eventually. I hope somebody else is also looking at this same data so we can get another angle on it.
 
Which of the Spitfire or Hurricane would have been better for Malaya from early 1941? Some of the airfields had terrible drainage issues, but that might be so bad as to cancel out the advantages of wide track undercarriage.
 
Spitfire would probably be better but in 1941 they were still pretty worried about defense of the homeland so Spitfires had the priority for home defense I think.
 
Don't forget timing. The Hurricane was designed and accepted before the Spitfire and was at war with the BEF in France when the first Spitfires with two-blade props were just entering service to join it. The Hurricane, although utilising bi-plane build techniques was immensely strong and a very stable gun platform which made it ideal as a bomber interceptor during the Battle of Britain. Later in its career it became an awesome ground attack and "tank-buster" - very effective in North Africa and the Med. Its fabric rear fuselage could soak up a massive amount of damage from cannon shells. It was hardly a "stop-gap".
 
If Britain wasn't risking Spitfires in France in 1940, I don't think they'd send them to Malaya in 1941.
The Castle Bromwich factory started making Spitfires in 1940, before that with various issues producing it and then having to disperse production away from Southampton meant there werent many Spitfires to send to France even if they wanted to. There were about 120 in service when war was declared and around 250 at the fall of France.
 
The Castle Bromwich factory started making Spitfires in 1940, before that with various issues producing it and then having to disperse production away from Southampton meant there werent many Spitfires to send to France even if they wanted to. There were about 120 in service when war was declared and around 250 at the fall of France.
Yeah, that too.
 
Don't forget timing. The Hurricane was designed and accepted before the Spitfire and was at war with the BEF in France when the first Spitfires with two-blade props were just entering service to join it. The Hurricane, although utilising bi-plane build techniques was immensely strong and a very stable gun platform which made it ideal as a bomber interceptor during the Battle of Britain. Later in its career it became an awesome ground attack and "tank-buster" - very effective in North Africa and the Med. Its fabric rear fuselage could soak up a massive amount of damage from cannon shells. It was hardly a "stop-gap".
Time line got a little whiplash here.
Only the first 77-78 Spitfires had two blade props (wood/fix pitch) and they stopped fitting them in the spring of 1939.
How long it to replace them I don't know.
Being fitted in late spring were the 3 blade 2 pitch propellers, somewhere in the summer and/or fall of 1939 they were fitting the blade constant speed props for testing.
Somewhere around 1/2 of the Spits in Sept 1939 may have had the old two blade props (or less, depends on refit schedule). By the fall of France very few would have had them.
We also have to sure we are looking at the same numbers.
Planes in service can mean planes in operational squadrons or planes in all squadrons ( squadrons that working up with newly issued planes but are not "declared operational" yet and/or OTU squadrons). British had a habit of stockpiling aircraft in depots, so active/operational squadrons could draw replacements from the depots and not have to wait for factory delivery for combat or accident damaged aircraft.
250 in service might have been backed up 50-100 in depot (maybe more) so the front line units could keep up their numbers.

I would really like to see some sort of study on the ability of the Hurricane to soak up damage.

main-qimg-8228ab92ab4b421617ae21c5cd333868-lq.jpg

What did it get by?
How many times?
(this is actually bomb damage)
A single 20mm hit can take off a lot of fabric. The question is how much of the steel tube structure was damaged?
We have the oft repeated photos of a Spitfire that was wrecked by 3 canon shells. But it got the pilot home (or satellite field) and the pilot could have been flying the next day with one of those depot Spitfires.
 
Don't forget timing. The Hurricane was designed and accepted before the Spitfire and was at war with the BEF in France when the first Spitfires with two-blade props were just entering service to join it. The Hurricane, although utilising bi-plane build techniques was immensely strong and a very stable gun platform which made it ideal as a bomber interceptor during the Battle of Britain. Later in its career it became an awesome ground attack and "tank-buster" - very effective in North Africa and the Med. Its fabric rear fuselage could soak up a massive amount of damage from cannon shells. It was hardly a "stop-gap".

This is an important point. The purpose of air forces was to destroy the enemy ground forces (and / or strategic targets) and to prevent the other side from doing so.

In North Africa, many observers including some German pilots and ground commanders pointed out that the fighter units in the Luftwaffe were a little too focused on running up the scores of the 'experten'. They basically attacked British (and later on, American) fighters in a manner that was safest and most conducive to victory for them. For several months, this meant that units like J.G. 27 and guys like Hans Joachim Marseille ran up amazingly high victory tallies, and while these were not quite as high as the number they claimed, there is no doubt that they took a very heavy toll on a lot of poor British and Commonwealth (and later American) pilots. But in fighting war this way, they often failed to protect their own bombers and sometimes failed to intercept Allied bombers and fighter bombers which were starting to get through in greater numbers and bomb Axis troops, tanks and supplies.

The Allies, by contrast, very much put the priority on bombing enemy forces and operational ground targets, and destroying Axis bombers and / or fending them off so they couldn't effect the war very much. When J.G.27 first arrived, the British and Commonwealth pilots were very much on their back heel, and took heavy losses. But almost from the beginning, the increasing sophistication of their tactical and operational bombing started to make a telling difference in the ground war. German stukas and Ju-88s had a hard time getting to their targets, Allied Bostons and Baltimores - and bomb carrying Hurricanes and Kittyhawks were making it to theirs more often and getting back to base afterward. German fighter pilots were avoiding mixing it up with the close escorts because this put them at a disadvantage, they preferred to pick off the high cover.

After a few months, a series of improvements to everything from fighter tactics (switching to finger four, turning into attacks as a unit) to better radios, and improved fuel supplies, to the boost pressures used in engines improved. The DAF fighters began to be much more effective and much harder to prey upon. The Spitfire Mk V, the merlin engined P-40F/L and the P-38 arrived in Theater, posing new problems for the Axis. Meanwhile DAF fighter bombers and light twin engined bombers were being used in an ever more efficient manner which is starting to matter more and more on the battlefield. . By the time you get to the fall (2nd El Alamein) JG. 27 is broken, and so is the Afrika Korps.
 
Time line got a little whiplash here.
Only the first 77-78 Spitfires had two blade props (wood/fix pitch) and they stopped fitting them in the spring of 1939.
How long it to replace them I don't know.
Being fitted in late spring were the 3 blade 2 pitch propellers, somewhere in the summer and/or fall of 1939 they were fitting the blade constant speed props for testing.
Somewhere around 1/2 of the Spits in Sept 1939 may have had the old two blade props (or less, depends on refit schedule). By the fall of France very few would have had them.
We also have to sure we are looking at the same numbers.
Planes in service can mean planes in operational squadrons or planes in all squadrons ( squadrons that working up with newly issued planes but are not "declared operational" yet and/or OTU squadrons). British had a habit of stockpiling aircraft in depots, so active/operational squadrons could draw replacements from the depots and not have to wait for factory delivery for combat or accident damaged aircraft.
250 in service might have been backed up 50-100 in depot (maybe more) so the front line units could keep up their numbers.

I would really like to see some sort of study on the ability of the Hurricane to soak up damage.

View attachment 699243
What did it get by?
How many times?
(this is actually bomb damage)
A single 20mm hit can take off a lot of fabric. The question is how much of the steel tube structure was damaged?
We have the oft repeated photos of a Spitfire that was wrecked by 3 canon shells. But it got the pilot home (or satellite field) and the pilot could have been flying the next day with one of those depot Spitfires.
The Hurricane steel structure was riveted by fishplate joints. A damaged steel tube could be in riveted and a new one riveted back in place.
 
This is an important point. The purpose of air forces was to destroy the enemy ground forces (and / or strategic targets) and to prevent the other side from doing so.

In North Africa, many observers including some German pilots and ground commanders pointed out that the fighter units in the Luftwaffe were a little too focused on running up the scores of the 'experten'. They basically attacked British (and later on, American) fighters in a manner that was safest and most conducive to victory for them. For several months, this meant that units like J.G. 27 and guys like Hans Joachim Marseille ran up amazingly high victory tallies, and while these were not quite as high as the number they claimed, there is no doubt that they took a very heavy toll on a lot of poor British and Commonwealth (and later American) pilots. But in fighting war this way, they often failed to protect their own bombers and sometimes failed to intercept Allied bombers and fighter bombers which were starting to get through in greater numbers and bomb Axis troops, tanks and supplies.

The Allies, by contrast, very much put the priority on bombing enemy forces and operational ground targets, and destroying Axis bombers and / or fending them off so they couldn't effect the war very much. When J.G.27 first arrived, the British and Commonwealth pilots were very much on their back heel, and took heavy losses. But almost from the beginning, the increasing sophistication of their tactical and operational bombing started to make a telling difference in the ground war. German stukas and Ju-88s had a hard time getting to their targets, Allied Bostons and Baltimores - and bomb carrying Hurricanes and Kittyhawks were making it to theirs more often and getting back to base afterward. German fighter pilots were avoiding mixing it up with the close escorts because this put them at a disadvantage, they preferred to pick off the high cover.

After a few months, a series of improvements to everything from fighter tactics (switching to finger four, turning into attacks as a unit) to better radios, and improved fuel supplies, to the boost pressures used in engines improved. The DAF fighters began to be much more effective and much harder to prey upon. The Spitfire Mk V, the merlin engined P-40F/L and the P-38 arrived in Theater, posing new problems for the Axis. Meanwhile DAF fighter bombers and light twin engined bombers were being used in an ever more efficient manner which is starting to matter more and more on the battlefield. . By the time you get to the fall (2nd El Alamein) JG. 27 is broken, and so is the Afrika Korps.
Missing from most interpretations of the RAF in France in 1939 and in 1940 is the available airfield states. Whilst a Spitfire coped adequately well on a well purpose built UK grass airfield the reality in France was improvised farmland with filled in ditches and poorly drained. The Hurricane and Gladiators could cope better with this and it made some sense to retain the operationally more fragile Spitfire for home defence from the well drained large domestic airfields and those with hard runways. Purpose built French airfields were used, not surprisingly, by the French Air Force. These issues affected the bombers too and gave an added reason to keep up Lysander squadron numbers being operationally more robust if less so in the air.
 
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Missing from most interpretations of the RAF in France in 1939 and in 1940 is the available airfield states. Whilst a Spitfire coped adequately well on a well purpose built UK grass airfield the reality in France was improvised farmland with filled in ditches and poorly drained. The Hurricane and Gladiators could cope better with this and it made some sense to retain the operationally more fragile Spitfire for home defence from the well drained large domestic airfields and those with hard runways. Purpose built French airfields were used, not surprisingly, by the French Air Force. These issues affected the bombers too and gave an added reason to keep up Lysander squadron numbers being operationally more robust if less spin the air.
Isn't it more apposite that Dowding specifically prevented Spitfires from being deployed to France?

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He wrote that he deliberately husbanded what he regarded as his best fighter asset for the defence of Britain. That was nothing to do with their fragility. Even the Gladiators and Hurricanes were still sent to France in far greater numbers than he wished.

Lysanders were army co-operation aircraft, not bombers. I don't believe their deployment to France was anything to do with their rough field capability per se. They went, along with the Battles and Blenheims because they were front line aircraft and in their case, no alternatives existed.
 
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Maybe an element of truth to both sides.
The British started deploying aircraft to France in Sept-Oct.
The airfields they were given by the French were pretty much "fields". They may have listed as such on some sort of French documents or surveys but they often had no facilities (barracks, cook shacks, hangers etc) aside from not being maintained, if they ever were. Filling in ditches and cutting the hay does not make an airfield. So the British had 6-7 months minimum to look at and operate from the French bases. I am sure there were a bunch of letters, memos, dispatches, etc. going back and forth and and they could not have been complimentary to the idea of sending planes that needed better bases to France. There were aircraft that had been assigned to the "Advanced Striking Force" that stayed in England. Might have included a few squadrons of Whitley's (?) but the ground conditions (and housing and maintenance) stopped that.
As did the realization that the French defense setup/posture was increasing getting to be a clusterf***.
Dowding may have wanted to keep the Spitfires at home in Sept-Oct, when he didn't have many. I don't think there was any real incentive to change his mind as he acquired more.
 
The expression Dowding used was "turning off the Hurricane tap". There were around 120 Spitfires in service when war was declared this increased to 250 at the fall of France. But despite all the Hurricanes produced before the fall of France Dowding only had 250 of them also. Towards the end and over Dunkerque Spitfies operating from England were used, but by that time there was no huge surplus of Hurricanes compared to Spitfires. They had taken Dowding's forces down to what he considered was the absolute minimum of 500. Luckily Dowding had some clue about what he was doing and 500 was enough, just.
 

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