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For the US and British the difference in ballistics (drop and time of flight) was so close at up to 600yds as to make little practical difference. The differences increase as the range opens up and can be substantial at ranges between 1000-2000yds but no pilots had any business trying to shoot at 1000yds, didn't keep some of them from tryingOh, and one thing I forgot above, I think there was an advantage to having a uniform armament on a plane. Identical ballistics, and one less thing for pilots to worry about (which guns should I use in this situation, or just blast away with everything I have hoping that at least something hits?), and of course the logistical advantages as well. That was an advantage of the all-HMG armament the US fighters preferred over the mixed MG + cannon armaments many others used, to some extent compensating for the lower punch per weight of the Browning HMG.
The 20mm Hispano and the .50 BMG were pretty well matched ballistically, yes. Some other cannon + MG combinations, not so much.For the US and British the difference in ballistics (drop and time of flight) was so close at up to 600yds as to make little practical difference.
For AA the factors affecting the "optimal" choice of gun size are a bit different, so the result ends up a bit different as well. Due to the velocity difference between the plane and the AA gun, you want more range so you have more time to pump shells into the air before the target flies out of range. Also the gun platform is more stable than a plane, and weight is less of a concern, all driving the optimal point towards bigger guns.The USN found it needed to upgrade its AA armament for Kamikazes which had to be blown out of the sky, not just shot down and continue on a ballistic path until crashing (into a ship).
Just missing the war the 3in AA gun with auto loader and proximity fuse was the best solution. It was being worked on during the war but just missed.For AA the factors affecting the "optimal" choice of gun size are a bit different, so the result ends up a bit different as well. Due to the velocity difference between the plane and the AA gun, you want more range so you have more time to pump shells into the air before the target flies out of range. Also the gun platform is more stable than a plane, and weight is less of a concern, all driving the optimal point towards bigger guns.
All this to say the 40mm Bofors was exactly the right tool for the job, and is justifiably called the best medium AA of the war. Light AA, like the ubiquitous 20mm Oerlikons, were somewhat marginal already at that point, but you can fit only so many Bofors guns on a ship, and sprinkling Oerlikons in every corner where you couldn't fit a Bofors was better than nothing.
So much effort wasted on the .60 and .90 caliber efforts, the errors in the 20mm development too.The Browning 0.5 inch machine gun was just about perfect for what the USAAF encountered in WW2, it would not be its fighters armement if the USAAF was tasked with shooting down B-17, B-24 and B-29.
True, but maybe they were reacting to the troubles they had with the M2 .50 cal and the 20mm.And still took them years to get the RoF reliable for the .50 M3
Embarrassing.
Yes, I didn't mention the 3" as it missed the war.Just missing the war the 3in AA gun with auto loader and proximity fuse was the best solution. It was being worked on during the war but just missed.
" with the first prototype being ready for test firing on 1 September 1945. The end of the war slowed development and resources were diverted to the more potent 3"/70 (7.62 cm) design. As a result, it was not until 1948 that this weapon was delivered to the fleet in quantity."
But you can't even fit a 40mm Bofors into an airplane. However you can get a fast firing quad 20mm into an airplane and get it fairly close
Separate or not, would still have to deal with the clownshow that Army Ordnance was with arms development of both MGs and Artillery.Ironically, it seems that if the US built the HS-404 to the same tolerances that the British did (ie, looser), that could've resolved most of the issues.
There's also the odd issue that the US Army (and by extension the USAAF at the time) considered anything over .60 cal to be a cannon, and hence artillery, and any automatic weapon below that to be a MG.
Maybe an argument that the USAAF should've been more separate from the Army (or maybe just a standalone USAF like post-1947) before the war?
Well, I canI cant think think of any plane that was carrying armament that was substantially "wrong",
It had a large number of .303 from individual low rate of fire, and then the issue of dispersion, and what range the guns were harmonized at, than the 'lance of steel' that a gatling gives.A Hurricane IIB had the firepower of TWO Mini guns and two extra machine guns.
Problems were lack of gunnery training, less than optimum firing patterns at times (trying to make up for the poor training) and lack of good projectiles.
But were they conspicuously wrong? A spread pattern that compensates for lack of training is logical when your pilots arenet trained and training, if you can do it takes a long time. The Spitfire MkII was introduced during the BoB take off run and climb were important, so weight was too. Not or rarely mentioned in this are gun sights, which changed gun effectiveness as much or more than a change of gun did.Well, I can
although many of these planes were constrained by either low powered engines which constrained load availalabitly due to performance or lack of manufacturing capability to build enough guns.
Something else that is not explored quite as much is the fact that it is projectiles that are the actual weapons. The guns are actually just the launchers.
The actual effectiveness of smaller sized guns is also often over looked or criticized unduly. The .303 is often quite heavily criticized and called a pop gun.
A single .303 hit is quite unlikely to cause the loss of an aircraft, golden BBs aside but in British fighters the idea was not to depend on one hit but on scores of hits.
A modern mini gun fires at 6000rpm or 100rps. Just 5 .303 Brownings will equal that and the Hurricanes and Spitfires had 3 more guns, 60% more fire power.
A Hurricane IIB had the firepower of TWO Mini guns and two extra machine guns.
Problems were lack of gunnery training, less than optimum firing patterns at times (trying to make up for the poor training) and lack of good projectiles.
As far as the guns themselves go eight .303s are pretty much the same fire power as 4.7 12.7mm Italian guns or about 3.7 German 13mm or Japanese 12.7mm guns.
Eight .303s are also pretty close to the firepower of a pair of 20mm Oerlikon RR cannon, so the 109E-4 and Zero only had about a 20-30% firepower advantage, which disappeared rather quickly. For some inexplicable reason Japanese 7.7mm/.303 guns/ammo is deadly while British 7.7mm/.303 guns/ammo only scuffs the plane and can be buffed right out
The British increased the proportions of INC and AP ammo after the BoB (supply problems) about the same time that the 20mm began to show up in quantity.
In 1942 a Spitfire was carrying more incendiary ammo for it's 4 guns as the 1940 Spitfire was carrying for 8 guns, The 1942 Spitfire was carrying almost an equal amount of AP.
Against the US .50 M2 the RCMG Browning was about 1/3 as powerful, but weighed about 1/3 less. The .50 did do more damage with a single hit. However in M2 in 1940 was slower firing and used less powerful ammunition. In 1941 the British were getting the less powerful ammunition and had a lot, an awful lot, of trouble getting the guns to run. IN 1942 the US was getting the better ammo but the USN was having trouble getting the guns to run. The US overloaded the planes with guns and ammo and hurt performance.
A P-40E with 6 guns and 235rpg was carrying 807lbs worth of guns and ammo. A Spitfire II/Va with eight .303s and 350rpg was carrying 440lbs worth of guns and ammo.
There was room for ammo in the P-40 ammo bins.
Well, the "lance of steel" seems to be 6.5 mils at 80% (GE literature for the SUU-11B-8 A Minigun pod) and since 6.5mils is about 22 inches at 100 yds (300ft) or 88inches at 400yds (1200ft) I would say that the "lance of steel" may have a bit of flaw.It had a large number of .303 from individual low rate of fire, and then the issue of dispersion, and what range the guns were harmonized at, than the 'lance of steel' that a gatling gives.
What they sometimes have trouble with is the different trajectories and times of flight for the different caliber guns. Cowl guns are generally limited to two guns (Russians used 3 and some times 4) and the hub guns were almost always a different caliber. Sometimes they played well together and sometimes they didn't. The difference in types of guns is not very important if you are at close range (short time of flight).Now Cowl and thru hub cannon mounts did not suffer from that choice of harmonization range and tight or wide grouping choices.
Probably for several reasons.Does come up, if the massed .303 was so awesome, why was the RAF moving away from 12 gun 303 setups to a cannons?
Another was the XP-67, which went from 6 20mm cannons with 165 rpg and 6 .50s with 500 rpg, to ultimately either 6 37mm cannons with 45 rpg, or 2 37mm and 4 20 mm cannons. But the XP-67 was a dedicated bomber destroyer, while the XP-72 was intended to be an interceptor, though for bomber destroying even it was intended to have provision for 4 37mm cannons replacing the .50s.