Would the RAF had been better off building more transport aircraft than bombers in 1940/41?

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I don't think British transport aircraft would have survived for very long over Singapore, Malaya or Burma in the early part of the war without air superiority, even the fighters in use there struggled against the Japanese army and navy fighters. The British at that time did not have an air supply mindset.
 

Could flying boats help, I wonder. As Short Empire, for example. Not very effective in terms of payload but probably easier to deploy in new theatres since they did not require airfields? On the other hand, productions costs were probably higher than of specialised transport.
Other "stop-gap" contenders: DH.91 or DH.95 as troop transports, subject their production could be ramped up.
Large order of DC-3 could be the best solution but it should be made early enough...
 

They would still have to "run the gauntlet" of the IJN Mitsubishi A6M Zeros and the IJA Nakajima Ki-43 Hayabusas without effective air support.
 
I don't know the answer to this, but some of earlier campaigns where air transport made a difference include


First Allied paradrop of the war, Barce airfield I think January 1941. Carried out by 18 men including Stirling their commander. It was a great success, given the size of the operation.

Somewhere Ive read the first sir supply mission by the allies was in support of the Allied counterattack at Gallabat in southern Ethiopia.

There followed a series of minute and insignificant air transport operations in 1941

Im not sure of the RAF contribution to the China or the airlift into airlift Burma.

Australiaqn air transpoty efforts in New Guinea were considerable and included efforts at Kokoda, Buna, Wau and Milne
 
Kevin J said:
The RAF had a bomber mindset that bombers would deter the enemy and it clearly didn't work.
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Transport aircraft wouldn't have deterred anybody either.

The British had a long history with military transport aircraft. At least as long as anyone else and they probably bought more in the 1920s and very early 30s which may have hurt them in the late 30s or beginning of the war.
Vickers Vernon dates from the very ealry 20 s and two squadrons did a lot of work in the mid East.

They built 96 of these from 1926 on

Unfortunately design rather stalled the RAF converted 54 of them (plus 28 new builds) to this

in 1934-36. And since they worked (flew) many were still in service in the mid east and India at the start of of WW II and a few lasted until 1944.

Part of the British problem was the change in politics and what the planes of the time could actually do. In the 20s you could fly from England to the Middle East or India, It just required stops in either France and/or Italy and/or maybe Greece. The Range of planes didn't increase a whole lot during the 30s (at least not until the end) which means as the relations between the British and Italy got more strained the option of flying from even southern France to Egypt got a lot harder.

It takes longer to design and build planes than it does to build up armies, especially hastily trained ones, so the air transport in many areas of the British Empire was suitable for peace time duties but not for taking care of the numbers of troops that were brought in just before the fighting actually started.

Once the big build up came the RAF, the Navy and the army were all arguing for money. Transports dropped to the bottom of the list.
 
Kevin J said:
The RAF had a bomber mindset that bombers would deter the enemy and it clearly didn't work.
Click to expand...

That was in fact the raison d'etre not just of Bomber Command, but of the entire RAF as an independent force.

It came as a nasty shock when deterrence didn't work and an even worse one when the 'counter blow' promised throughout the inter war period proved well beyond the RAF's capability too.

Cheers

Steve
 
The Dutch Navy had about 30 Dornier Do24s in operation in the East Indies during the war, being used in several roles.
 
Kevin J said:
The Whitley was derived from the
Armstrong Whitworth A.W.23 - Wikipedia
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That is not an Air Ministry specification. That is the designation given to the aircraft by Armstrong Whitworth. It was built to Specification C.26/31 (as was the Bristol Bombay).

The Whitley bomber was built, as I said, to B.3/34. The fact that the company utilised some aspects of an earlier design to realise the specification is neither here nor there, it was in fact common practice. What became the Whitley was designated the AW.38 by the company. The names had to be approved by the Air Ministry, just as the Type 300 (Supermarine) became the Spitfire the AW.38 became the Whitley.

Cheers

Steve
 

Yes on the debate.

Patrolling the Atlantic Gap allowed Doenitz to shift the U-Boats to other shipping lanes, so he could react to the Allied air patrols. By patrolling the Bay of Biscay, any U-Boat leaving France was vulnerable, regardless of the shipping lane they were targeting. The Sub Pens in France were essentially bomb proof. Given the accuracy of bombing, and the strength of the Pens, in hind sight it seems foolish to attack them. If you ever visit one of the French Ports, the size and depth of concrete of the surviving Sub Pens is staggering.

Google Maps
 
At the end of the day the decision to concentrate on combat aircraft and depend on the USA for transport aircraft was the right decision. We had some so so designs but nothing to compare to the DC3 which was the backbone of our transport fleet.
 
Harris was thinking of targets like these, in the shipyards:





And the factories themselves.

Later in the war U-boats were constructed inland and floated by night, in sections, to the shipyards for assembly using Germany's canal network. Attacks on these canals were very successful in preventing the U-boats reaching the yards form final assembly.

I don't think Harris was right, and more aircraft should have been afforded Coastal Command to disrupt operations of the U-boats which were already at sea or otherwise operational.

Cheers

Steve
 

My advice for English speakers visiting somewhere like Lorient is to say that you are Irish. After endless bombing all that was left was Admiral Doenitz's residence, a 3 storey block of flats on an intersection, and an old house on the quayside AND OF COURSE THE SUBMARINE PENS. Its a beautiful part of France well worth a visit and Larmour Plage is chique. Been there, done that.
 
stona said:
I don't think Harris was right, and more aircraft should have been afforded Coastal Command to disrupt operations of the U-boats which were already at sea or otherwise operational.
Click to expand...

He wasn't right and it doesn't need hindsight to figure it out.

The Anti-sub planes didn't have to swan about all over the ocean. If a sub was 200-300 miles away for a convoy it posed no threat to the convoy (or any other convoy it was that far away from). which was the whole point of the convoy system.
It the planes patrolled within a certain distance of a convoy say flew 30 mile circles around it or something (pick a useable number) you don't need anywhere near as many planes and any sub even forced underwater for several hours could loose it's opportunity to attack that convoy.
 
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