Would the RAF had been better off building more transport aircraft than bombers in 1940/41?

[tomo pauk]

Looks like using a sledgehammer to crack open a nut. LOL.

??
It is an aircraft, designed as a passenger aircraft (= it is not too tightly tailored), Pegasus engines are in mass production, engine-out situation on a fully laden A/C is manageable without much of calamity (unlike on most of ww2 twins), one set of crew for a lot of cargo or soldiers etc. Longer ranges are easier to achieve with 4000 HP than with 2000 HP.
Actually, most of the reasons that 'guided' people from 2-engined startegic bombers to 4-engined types apply.

 

[stona]

It the planes patrolled within a certain distance of a convoy say flew 30 mile circles around it or something (pick a useable number) you don't need anywhere near as many planes and any sub even forced underwater for several hours could loose it's opportunity to attack that convoy.

What would they do at night?

ASV radar was not exactly reliable or particularly effective in 1939/40/41. ASV Mk I could detect a submarine at 3 miles, broadside on, if you were lucky. ASV Mk II was more reliable, but could only get the aircraft within about a mile of the target, which they then couldn't see. Successful attacks were rare. U boats countered with 'Metox', which gave them a warning that they were being illuminated.

Centimetric ASV radar was not flown until December 1941, and production of the resulting ASVS (a version of the Mk VII or Mk VIII AI radar, can't remember) was halted in 1942 in favour of H2S. This was yet another bone of contention between Bomber Command and Coastal Command, and Bomber Command prevailed again.

A version of H2S, which really could find submarines on the surface up to nine miles away was first used operationally in early 1943.


Cheers

Steve

 

[buffnut453]

He wasn't right and it doesn't need hindsight to figure it out.

The Anti-sub planes didn't have to swan about all over the ocean. If a sub was 200-300 miles away for a convoy it posed no threat to the convoy (or any other convoy it was that far away from). which was the whole point of the convoy system.
It the planes patrolled within a certain distance of a convoy say flew 30 mile circles around it or something (pick a useable number) you don't need anywhere near as many planes and any sub even forced underwater for several hours could loose it's opportunity to attack that convoy.

'Fraid I disagree with your first point and, while I can agree with many of your observations, the operational realities simply don't back it up.

Whether Harris was right or wrong in his views rather depends on which year you're talking about. Prior to 1943, which is precisely when he was trying to build up Bomber Command, his statements were probably valid. After 1943, they become less convincing. The reason for the change was the advent of the ASV Mk III radar which enabled a massive increase in the number of U-boats being sunk. The following stats may help showing year / total number of U-boats sunk and, of that total / number sunk by (or involving) aircraft:

1939: 9 0
1940: 24 3
1941: 35 4
1942: 87 40
1943: 244 146

(Source: U-boat losses 1939-1945 - Fates - German U-boats of WWII - Kriegsmarine - uboat.net)

Now, you're absolutely right that you don't need to sink a sub to prevent it completing its mission. However, it's abundantly clear that radar, and particularly the ASV Mk III, made it MUCH easier for aircraft to locate submarines and so, by extension, there were no doubt more opportunities to disrupt submarines even if they weren't actually sunk.

The earlier radars (ASV Mk I and Mk II) were relatively short-ranged (typically 5.5 miles in good sea conditions) so even if the aircraft got relatively close to the sub, there was no guarantee of detecting it...and approaching to within 5.5 miles is bluddy close given the size of the Atlantic Ocean. Bottom line is that, even with the ASV Mk I and II, there wasn't a huge increase in successes. It was only after the introduction of the ASV Mk III that aircraft became the dominant causal factor in U-boat losses.

Even if more resources were given to Coastal Command there's no guarantee it would have had a significant operational impact. Certainly not before 1941 and 1942 is the year when the UK started to make inroads against the U-boat threat. However, it was 1943 when the tide was absolutely turned.

While I fully accept that Harris was "bomber-centric" and fought for every single aircraft that made up his command, any comments about wasting airframes on anti-submarine duties would, in large part, be an accurate reflection of the state of things up until 1943. Now, after 1943, his arguments lose their impact but, by the end of that year, the War in the Atlantic was largely a foregone conclusion. Indeed, only 5 more submarines were sunk in 1944 compared to 1943 so if the battle wasn't absolutely won in 1943, the writing was certainly on the wall.

 

[Shortround6]

I will take the U boat discussion here.

Availability of German U boats early in the war

 

[parsifal]

Coastal command requirements changing controlling over time,and its responses were sometimes routine, sometimes inspired, and sometimes just straight up dumb mistakes. Some of the changes reacted to changing technologies, weaponary, threats operational areas. It is very difficult to succinctly describe in a few words the challenges the command faced.. But the fall of Western Europe and Norway along with the steadily increasing range capabilities of the uboat Arm resulted in a vastly increased zone of conflict for CC to cover. The potential conflict zone stretched from North Cape to Bay of Biscay. The entry of Italy extended CCs responsibilities even further

CC failed to keep pace with its expanded responsibilities. In June 1940, there were about 200 aircraft operational under the control of CC, nostly hudsons and Ansons. There were three squadrons of hudsons, some blenheims, and 4 understrengt squadrons of Sunderlands as well as about the same number of hudsons . There were some coastal squadrons of Stranaer flying boats, I think there were three squadrons of Saro London Flying Boats and Vilderbeetes both types had proven disappointing in service for various reasons. .

The Anson and Hudson were expected to act as interim solutions. The Anson in particular had limited range and did not possess the capacity to carry heavy weaponry needed to sink a submarine.

Towards the autumn of 1941, U-boats began operating further into the Atlantic. Coastal Command's requirement programme was 150 Catalinas and 76 Sunderlands for 26 flying-boat units; 32 Liberators and 32 Wellingtons or Whitleys to equip four long-range GR squadrons; 64 Mosquitoes and 180 GR Hudsons for 15 medium to long-range units; 128 Beauforts for eight torpedo-bomber squadrons; and 160 Beaufighters for 10 long-range fighter squadrons. However, four flying-boats and two GR short-range squadrons were to be sent to West Africa, and another three flying-boat squadrons were for Gibraltar. Operational strengths were at no time anywhere near projected requirements and resistance to pouring more resources into the command were voracious and frankly hysterical..

By December 1941 operational requirements necessitated aircraft with an extra-long-range of 2,000 miles as U-boats were operating 700 miles from the British Isles. If patrols were deployed 350–600 miles covering port approaches, the enemy would move to the 600–700 mile area and out of range. By then ASV (air-to-surface-vessel) radar homing had been developed, and aircraft were being developed with all-weather and short-take off capabilities. Priority went to Coastal Command ASW, units by this time.

In January 1942 it was decided (on very questionable grounds), that the limit of long-range aircraft endurance should be the crew's limits, (due to extreme aircrew fatigue seriously effecting efficiency) not the fuel supply of the aircraft. De la Ferté decided, on 7 January, sorties should not exceed 14 hours, which reduced flying hours by four per mission. This was despite the entry of the very long-range Liberators in June 1941. The Liberator I had a stated Air Ministry range of 2,720 miles, but crew endurance methods now meant it would be airborne for just 2,240. De la Ferté wrote to the Ministry arguing the Liberator should be used for reconnaissance work, rather than bomb load for the solitary squadron being accepted at that time. The Liberator would assist in closing the 'Mid-Atlantic Gap' which U-boats could operate in without worrying about air interdiction. After replacing Bowhill in 1941, de la Ferté had issued a directive on 12 June 1941 to use Wellingtons and Whitleys as an interim solution to unrestricted submarine warfare now practised by the Germans. Their uneconomical operational cost meant immediate replacement of these medium-range machines was pressing. Some Lancasters and Halifaxes were temporarily seconded from Bomber Command for this purpose, again only after the most shrill and quite irrational arguments were mounted about their deployment.

The Lancaster was denied as a large-scale or long-term replacement. The Chief of the Air Staff, Portal, argued it was the only aircraft capable of carrying an 8,000 lb bomb to Berlin and could not be spared. As a result, the RAF official history does not include the Lancaster as a Coastal Command aircraft. With a range of 2,350 miles it could have been invaluable. The American made Fotress was given to the service only because the Air Ministry considered it unfit as a heavy bomber. It issued a directive on 27 January 1942 stating all Fortresses were to given over to Coastal Command for A/S operations. Numbers 59 206 and 220 sqns all used the Fortress as successful reconnaissance aircraft. However, the bulk of the force by early 1942 was still medium-range aircraft, which could now reach only 600 miles into the Atlantic. U-boats were now operating at 700 miles plus.

De la Ferté pushed his case hard to Portal to get the resources needed for the spring, 1942. Portal had accepted that production of Sunderlands was "disappointing" and it had only just met wastage of the existing five squadrons. Portal also admitted a complete "lack of interest on the part of all concerned". Portal insisted he would emphasis the Command's case. But by February 1942, the expected rate of new Catalina aircraft, which the command expected at a rate of three per week, with a final six to complete a batch of 30 before May, were offset by the move of three Catalina squadrons overseas (No. 209, 240 and 413 squadrons).

The situation continued in the same way throughout 1942. By March, the few suitable aircraft in operational service were not serviceable most of the time. By 15 January 1942, de la Ferté knew just one-fifth of his aircraft were operational. The situation slowly improved throughout the year despite mounting convoy losses and voracious resistance from Bomber Command. It has to be said this dogged continued resistance contributed to the tangible possibility of the allies being forced to the surrender table. That and Admiral Kings stupidity made losing a real possibility. By the time Slessor succeeded de la Ferté as AOC-in-C, he identified the need for 60 squadrons with a total of 850 aircraft, of which 34 were A/S squadrons, operating 450 machines. Slessor felt the Catalina was too vulnerable to U-boat flak 9by then more or less standard) and the "prima donnas", namely the Liberator with its long range, were not available in sufficient numbers. On 18 June 1942 the War Cabinet was told that Coastal Command had only 39 Liberators. When it became obvious that the losses to U-boats were becoming unacceptable in March 1943, Coastal Command was finally given sufficient resources it needed. In the latter part of the war it operational responsibilities were again altered, or re-emphasises to include more offensive actions against the DKM convoys operating off the Norwegian coast (mostly)

 

[stona]

Coastal Command had been fighting for its survival since the foundation of the RAF. It, and it's shore based facilities became the rope in a tug of war between the Air Ministry and Admiralty which continued throughout WW2.

In February 1944, when discussions were underway regarding the supply of RAF resources to SHAEF for the invasion of Europe it was suggested that nearly half of the 27,000 men and 650 aircraft required should come from Coastal Command. The Command was expected to give up 17 squadrons, almost half its front line operational strength. Once again it found itself at the bottom of the pecking order. Portal argued that there would be no serious targets for anti-shipping targets in the future. The statistics did show that U-boat predation had significantly reduced but there was no evidence to support such a contention in regard to surface shipping.

There followed a serious row, beyond the scope of this reply. There was opposition to Portal's plan from the MEW, obviously Coastal Command and the Admiralty, but even from within the Air Ministry itself. In the end the decision was deferred until after Overlord, but the vulnerability of Coastal Command within the RAF and at the hands of the Chief of the Air Staff had been illustrated once more.

Cheers

Steve

 

[parsifal]

Steve good information. I was wondering if the B17s used for EW purposes in the latter part of the war (100Gp?) were ex-CC machines. Perhaps they were transfers made to meet SHAEF demands?

 

[stona]

Steve good information. I was wondering if the B17s used for EW purposes in the latter part of the war (100Gp?) were ex-CC machines. Perhaps they were transfers made to meet SHAEF demands?

I don't know, I will see if I have anything on that. To be honest I don't recall 100 Group using B-17s, doesn't mean that it's not so

Edit: What do I know? 100 Group flew 1,465 sorties with 'Fortresses', second only to the Halifax. On that basis alone I doubt that they were ex-Coastal Command aircraft. No. 214 Squadron received the aircraft in January 1944, No. 223 not until April 1945, so it cannot have contributed much to those totals.

Cheers

Steve

 

[pinehilljoe]

The turning point was increasing aircraft patrols to the Bay of Biscay in 1943. U-boats had to transit the Bay to reach any shipping lane. One problem was there really no way to implement lessons learned from pilots of Coastal Command. There is no report of a single pilot or aircrew sinking more than one U boat. If anyone can find one, please let me know.

 

[Shortround6]

Squadron leader Terrence Bulloch.

At least four u-boats sunk, others damaged.

 

[stona]

No. 214 Squadron operated Fortress IIs and IIIs which were I believe B-17 Fs and Gs.

I can't find which aircraft Coastal Command operated. It would be revealed in this book, 'Boeing B-17 Fortress: In RAF Coastal Command Service' by Robert Stitt but I don't have it.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Airframes]

CC operated Fortress I, II and III (B-17C, E, F and G).

 

[stona]

CC operated Fortress I, II and III (B-17C, E, F and G).

I thought that might be the case.

Without a list of individual aircraft, and there were not that many, 100 or so, it would be difficult to say whether any were transferred to Bomber Command or not. The Americans were understandably keeping most production for themselves, so the British may well have repurposed older examples.

A lot of Stirlings and Halifaxes found their way to 100 Group in this way.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Airframes]

The 100 Group B-17s were provided by the 8th USAAF 1st Air Division, with 14 B-17F being delivered in January 1944, and later, 85 B17G.
None of these aircraft had served with Coastal Command, all being ex - 1st AD stock machines. Bomb bays were fitted with RCM equipment, including 'Mandrel', and other ECM/RCM equipment was fitted internally, the work being carried out by Scottish Aviation at Prestwick.

 

[stona]

Excellent!
Thanks for that.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Airframes]

You're welcome Steve.
The information is from 'The Aircraft of 100 Group', by Martin Streetly, the companion book to his 'Confound and Destroy'.
The book lists all of the B-17s, showing type /block, serial numbers and original USAAF numbers, and details the equipment carried, along with diagrams and B&W profiles and photos, and describes the operations carried out.
Worth looking at - if you can find a copy at a realistic price.

 

[parsifal]

Excellent information terry