Did General Doolittle's change of tactics for Fighter escort from close bomber support to more aggressive seek and destroy and attacking of ground targets have anything to do with the reluctance to change to the P51.
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No. But complicated.
First, the doctrine of changing the role of escort to 'pursue and destroy' was encapsulated at AAF HQ with the release of FM-1-15 "Tactics and Techniques of Air Fighting" in late 1942. Led by MG Muir Fairchild, the foundation doctrinal change from convoy to pursuit was that the role of fighter aircraft was "Destroy Hostile Air Forces Freedom of the Air".
The priorities of the Combined Bomber Offensive changed in June 1943, raising 'destroy the luftwaffe' to number one, replacing 'destroy the Submarine industry'. Also in June, Arnold directed his CoS Barney Giles to field an escort fighter capable of escorting a B-17 to any target at limit of range. Giles personally drove NAA, Republic and Lockheed to increase internal fuel capacity, and all to conceptually place Range extension at top of new designs.
Lockheed and North American responded immediately with mods to increase fuselage fuel and leading edge fuel, respectively to compliment wing rack/drop tank capability, respectively. Republic added centerline (B-7) shackle in July, promised the deliver the wing pylon/fuel feed by December and begin designing for adding 65 gal to main fuel tank by Spring 1944.
Arnold prioritized delivery of P-38J and P-51B to ETO. That the P-51B was conceptually designated for CAS and delivered to 9th AF rests on General Saville - who believed that the P-51B was ideal to replace the P-39, and personally believed that the P-38 was the best fighter in AAF inventory. Long complicated story that I addressed in my Bastard Stepchild book, and well discussed in Ludwig's P-51 Mustang book.
Operationally, the 8th AF was handicapped by a.) too few Fighter Groups, b.) the limited range of the P-47C with no drop tank capability other than Republic designed Ferry tank, until September 1943. The original AWPD-1 Plan called for one FG per BG - which was Never achieved operationally. The disaster at Schweinfurt-Regensburg highlighted the urgency to deliver the P-51B and P-38J, already in production but not operational until December- and too few to execute on changing from defensive to offensive fighter strategy until shortly after Big Week. As an aside, only Zemke was developing offensive fighter tactics in fall 1943. Eaker knew that the LW had developed a 'ring strategy' in which major forces were not deployed until escorts turned back, but helpless to do anything but 'press on' beyond escort range.
The achievement of FM-1-15 doctrine was limited through the end of 1943, simply because no fighter capable of pursue and destroy anywhere over Germany existed in both strength and internal fuel to execute beyond mid-Germany. The P-47D equipped FG's had grown to seven, P-38 to two and the P-51 to one - but the latter two had not yet completed mods to increase internal fuel. So, the target selection post Black Thursday Schweinfurt (10-14-43) was limited to fighter escort range. The arrival of the 55th G with P-38H capable of two 150/165-gal drop tanks extended target escort range to Kiel, but only on a limited basis because they were too few in number. It took 20th FG nearly four months to become operational after their arrival in August 1943.
However, the Combined Chiefs had agreed Overlord and recognized that destruction of Luftwaffe capability to interfere with the invasion was a critical success factor - and Operation Argument was conceived leading to Big Week.
Now, to your question. Doolittle and Spaatz had zero reluctance to change from P-47 to P-51. Eaker had specifically appealed to Arnold to send both P-38 and P-51B to ETO in June, 1943. Doolittle, when asked for an opinion by Arnold (among others), which AAF fighter was best suited for long-range escort - replied "P-38 and then P-51", but he was citing the P-51A because of known range superiority although limited above 20,000 feet. Doolittle made it a point to stay up to speed with all aircraft of importance, so he also was aware of AAF Flight test results for the P-51B-1.
IMO, Doolittle's major contribution to FM-1-15 doctrine was to award equal victory credits for aircraft destroyed on the ground toward Ace status. Historically the first such awards were made by P-47D pilots of the 78th FG in February 1944, then to 355th FG on March 8, 1944 (the day before they were fully converted.
Even though the 'promise' of near equal range in the P-47D-25, it was operationally available only after D-Day. The first production article rolled off the Republic line on Feb 15, 1944.
By that time, nearly 600 P-51Bs had arrived in UK. Cheaper, more maneuverable, faster, better ROC, much better range = B-17. And, the P-38J was having serious reliability issues in comparison.
No brainer.
to P-51B0
. I thought maybe the P-47M appearance and will to see it's performance in combat had something to do with it. But still, with the scale of production of everything at the time, I wouldn't think anybody really cared about one hundred aircraft with no future really.
