wuzak
Captain
Imagie a Merlin version of the M.B.2. Would probably need retractable landing gear and somewhat larger tail surfaces!
WW2 with no Spitfire - Hurricane being primary interceptor
- Thread starter RCAFson
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FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
Notice my emphasis on "might."
Nothing that couldn't be learned in time.
The compound curve in the wing should be a non-issue if the wing was jig assembled. From photographs of the assembly line I see nothing that would make Spitfire that difficult. The P-38 and B-17 had corrugated structure under the wing skins, assembly was difficult but do-able.
Again, compared to the Hurricane, the Spitfire was harder to build - compared to other all metal aircraft, I see little difference.
wuzak
Captain
True. And 20,000 Spitfires later would suggest that they did learn.
A case of, as you say, learning how to do it.
I think that is the point of view of a couple of members here - Hurricane production was cheaper and easier, so why not stick with that.
An alternative scenario:
Halt production of the Fairey Battle after the first production lot and insist Fairey turn over to building either Hurricanes or Spitfires - this also frees up more Merlin IIs and IIIs, otherwise wasted in the Battle, as well as opening up another production line.
Stop development of the Henley (200 built by Gloster) and Hotspur and channel those resources into Hurricane development and production. Why halt production of the best fighter in the inventory when there was a perfectly unusable light bomber being built using the same techniques, materials and many sub-assemblies as the Hurricane?
Don't bother basing so many Hurricanes in France - the decision to base so many units in France and transit more squadrons between France and Britain was political and against the better judgement of Dowding. As it was they were badly resourced, the French were not providing much support, and what little was provided was grudging. Instead send more Hurricanes to Malta and the far East, preferably with better resources.
The turret fighter was a waste of time and not worth delving into. As for the initial production difficulties - these were self-inflicted because Supermarine were tardy with supplying properly drafted drawings and expertise to sub-contractors building the wings. The myth about it being difficult to build?
Once the initial teething problems were sorted out the Spitfire's construction was no real problem, such that when the Southampton factory was bombed out in 1940 a plethora of small shadow factories could be set up instead: had the Spitfire been as hard to build as some continue to make out, the dispersal scheme would have been a bust. Ergo, the Spitfire was not that difficult to build.
In addition Castle Bromwich could have and should have swung into production more quickly had Lord Nuffield been more co-operative with the Air Ministry and Supermarine.
Halt production of the Fairey Battle after the first production lot and insist Fairey turn over to building either Hurricanes or Spitfires - this also frees up more Merlin IIs and IIIs, otherwise wasted in the Battle, as well as opening up another production line.
Stop development of the Henley (200 built by Gloster) and Hotspur and channel those resources into Hurricane development and production. Why halt production of the best fighter in the inventory when there was a perfectly unusable light bomber being built using the same techniques, materials and many sub-assemblies as the Hurricane?
Don't bother basing so many Hurricanes in France - the decision to base so many units in France and transit more squadrons between France and Britain was political and against the better judgement of Dowding. As it was they were badly resourced, the French were not providing much support, and what little was provided was grudging. Instead send more Hurricanes to Malta and the far East, preferably with better resources.
The turret fighter was a waste of time and not worth delving into. As for the initial production difficulties - these were self-inflicted because Supermarine were tardy with supplying properly drafted drawings and expertise to sub-contractors building the wings. The myth about it being difficult to build?
Once the initial teething problems were sorted out the Spitfire's construction was no real problem, such that when the Southampton factory was bombed out in 1940 a plethora of small shadow factories could be set up instead: had the Spitfire been as hard to build as some continue to make out, the dispersal scheme would have been a bust. Ergo, the Spitfire was not that difficult to build.
In addition Castle Bromwich could have and should have swung into production more quickly had Lord Nuffield been more co-operative with the Air Ministry and Supermarine.
Nice, Aozora and as a result of not having to concentrate on the Defiant, BP could build the type as a single-seat fighter, which, not fitted with the complex turret, there would not be as much delay in getting the type in service sooner than the defiant was, and in larger numbers. That and the designs that Wuzak suggested to F.5/34 are Fighter Command's Second Irons (to borrow from the Luftwaffe).
wuzak
Captain
Intesting that you should mention Fairey. It seems they were asked to develop and produce Seafires - in 1938!
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
Because you had an aircraft with a lot of growth in it. Although easier to build, the era of the fabric aircraft was just about over, the Spit offered the "next generation" and it grew accordingly.
Exactly! The full story is told in Morgan and Shacklady. Although the Battle seemed a good idea when it was first designed and built there were many in the RAF and Air Ministry who doubted that it could survive (From "The Battle File", Sidney Shaile, Air Britain, 1997):
The first batch of 136 Battles were built with Merlin Is while the other 2,065 used Merlin IIs and IIIs. 1,164 were built by Fairey at Stockport, 1,032 by Austin at Longbridge. Take a wild guess where many Hurricanes were built - starting in September 1940? Hawker - Places Note, too, that the Battle used a steel-tube structure up to the engine/pilot's bulkhead, and that lots of difficulties were experienced getting it into production at both factories because of its advanced construction techniques.
Hawker Henley; designed to similar specs as Battle, much better performance but still an obsolescent concept. Used Hurricane outer wings (span 47ft 10.5in), and many components, sub assemblies and construction techniques were the same as, or similar to the Hurricane. Approx same loaded weight as Hurricane IV, 8,480lb. 200 Built at Gloster starting in 1939: as soon as production finished, Hurricane production started, in mid-1940.
Ended life as target tugs, where the Merlins consistently suffered from overheating, accelerated wear and constant failures because the Henley struggled to tow the standard drogues at high enough speeds without needing to use constant full throttle. Superseded by 1942 by Miles Martinet and B-P Defiant.
yulzari
Tech Sergeant
Does anyone know why the Henley had this problem and the Defiant did not? Both had the same engine and not dissimilar sized and weight airframes. Was the Henley cooling system so bad or the Defiant so good?
Can't find any reference to the Henley issues on any books I have on the Defiant, so possibly the former. From reading Mason in Hawker Aircraft since 1920, it looks like engines melted at high speeds (for the Henley) of 265 mph, with short periods at full throttle another 10 mph could be added. The result of this caused more engine failures, so a limit of 220 mph was imposed on towing. A quote;
"The Henley's trouble now started in ernest, for, with the larger drogue target on tow, it was as much as the aircraft could do to achieve 200 mph at near full throttle, with the result that the Merlin (always an engine requiring a reasonable airspeed for cooling in the best of circumstances), now suffered perpetual overheating, excessive wear and engine failures by the score."
Mason is where I got my info; it might well be that the Henley's chin radiator installation might have been inefficient (possibly) at certain air speeds and/or incidences, so the poor old Merlin, which would have been better spending its useful life in a Spitfire or Hurricane, was being slowly strangled..*cough! choke!*
Long story short, with Battle production finished after first 136, lines turned over to Hurricane production (after all, a less complex aircraft) and Henley production swapped for Hurricane there's at least 2,000 more Hurricanes (assuming some time taken up reworking assembly lines). OR Battle stopped for Spitfire at Fairey while Austin and Gloster builds Hurricane - say 600-800 extra Spitfires, 800 more Hurricanes.
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yulzari
Tech Sergeant
This is the puzzling thing. The Henley certainly had the problem. I knew an ex-Henley TT pilot who confirms this and crashed one as a result.
However, I cannot see why a Defiant, with the same engine, should not suffer the same problem. It suggests that the Henley radiator was, at best, optimised for maximum speed at maximum power, or that the Defiant had too much cooling capacity in normal use.
Could a Defiant using 100 octane fuel perhaps use less boost and/or revs to pull the same drogue at the same speed and hence put less heat stress on the engine? I know the Henley used 87 octane fuel as my old local ex target tug airfield only had one fuel bunker for all types from Tiger Moths onwards in 1940/41.
Another possibility is the Defiant having a constant speed propellor whilst the Henley was a 2 speed IIRC.
yulzari
Tech Sergeant
To return to the actual thread issue.
The BoB bottleneck was pilots. Not that there were not enough, but that only a limited number could be released as a viable number needed to be retained to deal with any invading ground/sea forces.
Making more Hurricanes was certainly possible but an earlier investment in pilot training would be needed as well to man those extra Hurricanes. More Hurricanes would release extra for advanced conversion training boosting the value of the graduating pilots, even a 2 seat trainer version. One of your freed up factories would have to make extra basic trainers to move new pilots on so a metal 2 seat Master/Harvard level type with a UK available engine with production capacity to spare. Not a Kestrel then. Out of production. Not a Mercury as all are spoken for. Maybe an AS Tiger? Even a Rapier or Dagger.
The BoB bottleneck was pilots. Not that there were not enough, but that only a limited number could be released as a viable number needed to be retained to deal with any invading ground/sea forces.
Making more Hurricanes was certainly possible but an earlier investment in pilot training would be needed as well to man those extra Hurricanes. More Hurricanes would release extra for advanced conversion training boosting the value of the graduating pilots, even a 2 seat trainer version. One of your freed up factories would have to make extra basic trainers to move new pilots on so a metal 2 seat Master/Harvard level type with a UK available engine with production capacity to spare. Not a Kestrel then. Out of production. Not a Mercury as all are spoken for. Maybe an AS Tiger? Even a Rapier or Dagger.
Dowding vetoed the creation of further OTUs during the BoB period as he considered they would have been a further drain on his resources. I think he was probably correct at the time.
He failed to retrain pilots qualified on obsolete Fighter Command aircraft like the Defiant on Spitfires or Hurricanes. Many were already highly qualified and the conversion would have been relatively rapid. This I believe was a rare mistake. Isn't hindsight wonderful though!
He has been criticised for not seeking qualified pilots from Bomber Command, but he would never have got them given the internecine feuding within the RAF at the time. He did obtain some pilots from the Royal Navy (FAA).
Cheers
Steve
He failed to retrain pilots qualified on obsolete Fighter Command aircraft like the Defiant on Spitfires or Hurricanes. Many were already highly qualified and the conversion would have been relatively rapid. This I believe was a rare mistake. Isn't hindsight wonderful though!
He has been criticised for not seeking qualified pilots from Bomber Command, but he would never have got them given the internecine feuding within the RAF at the time. He did obtain some pilots from the Royal Navy (FAA).
Cheers
Steve
yulzari
Tech Sergeant
Dowding had to make some decisions for short term gains but we do miss the overall requirement for pilots to be retained for anti invasion actions. I have previously referred to target tug pilots being refused permission to transfer to Fighter Command as they would be needed come an invasion.
Getting pilots from elsewhare was not an option for Dowding without higher command support. OTUs were in his purview but not the prior training process. He did have to cope with the situation he was given.
With more squadrons and more pilots the squadrons in the SE could have had their pilots more frequently rotated elsewhere for rest and updated tactical training. Many of the lessons learned in the BoB were disseminated and practiced after the battle not during it.
On a different tack.
With more Hurricane squadrons available 1939/40, and given the limited BEF frontage in France, the possibility exists of being able to achieve local air supremacy for light bomber attacks on transport choke points during the BoF. Although this would mean the RAF would have to improve the command, control and intelligence of their forces to coordinate this cover. This could mean that the German right flank is delayed and, just maybe, the French Army and BEF can hold it back. It does, however, mean a greater input of resources and Dowding found that defeat in the BoF did not lose him that many Hurricanes (which he could replace) but experienced ground staff, tools,bowsers and specialist equipment generally that limited the number of front line airfields he could have at once. Perhaps some of these extra squadrons could have been based in Kent or Essex and carry out their operations over NE France.
Getting pilots from elsewhare was not an option for Dowding without higher command support. OTUs were in his purview but not the prior training process. He did have to cope with the situation he was given.
With more squadrons and more pilots the squadrons in the SE could have had their pilots more frequently rotated elsewhere for rest and updated tactical training. Many of the lessons learned in the BoB were disseminated and practiced after the battle not during it.
On a different tack.
With more Hurricane squadrons available 1939/40, and given the limited BEF frontage in France, the possibility exists of being able to achieve local air supremacy for light bomber attacks on transport choke points during the BoF. Although this would mean the RAF would have to improve the command, control and intelligence of their forces to coordinate this cover. This could mean that the German right flank is delayed and, just maybe, the French Army and BEF can hold it back. It does, however, mean a greater input of resources and Dowding found that defeat in the BoF did not lose him that many Hurricanes (which he could replace) but experienced ground staff, tools,bowsers and specialist equipment generally that limited the number of front line airfields he could have at once. Perhaps some of these extra squadrons could have been based in Kent or Essex and carry out their operations over NE France.
It's a different subject but the situation of the RAF in France was totally shambolic with a very complicated chain of command. From the minute the Germans broke through at Sedan the Hurricanes of the AASF were back peddling and becoming increasingly less effective.
The possibility of obtaining local air superiority anywhere on the western front never existed in any practical sense. Even the possibility of coordinating the actions of the "light bombers", I assume you mean Battles and Blenheims, with the Hurricane squadrons is wishful thinking.
Attempting to operate the 1940 versions of both the Spitfire and Hurricane over France from airfields in Britain was fraught with the same problems that the Luftwaffe would face a few months later with its Bf 109 E. They did better than was appreciated at the time around the Dunkirk evacuation.
The numbers of Hurricanes available in France was also limited. Only 8 squadrons were based in France. 4 more operated from France, but flew home each night. Compare that to the numbers available to Dowding a few months later to defend the British mainland.
As it is the greatest loss to the RAF, with no disrespect intended to the bomber crews lost, was the roughly 300 fighter pilots who were lost between the beginning of the German offensive in May and the end of the Dunkirk evacuation.
It is impossible to over estimate the shock of the fall of France to the British. This second war against Germany was going to be fought primarily by French soldiers. Britain had invested in its Air Force and of course the Royal Navy, but not the Army. The British were haunted by memories of the carnage of WWI. Most of the planners and decision makers had seen it first hand. The title "British Expeditionary Force" (BEF) was not used in the inter war period. When it was reinstated in, 1938 the soldiers, with humour familiar to most who live in these islands, joked that BEF stood for "back every Friday".
The first years of the war reinforced the idea that the British Army was not capable of winning. Defeat after defeat, evacuation after evacuation, at the hands of both the Germans and Japanese. Dunkirk, Crete, Singapore, Tobruk........No wonder we make such a song and dance about a victory at El Alamein, 2,100 dead Germans and 30,000 prisoners. Compare those figures with Stalingrad.
Cheers
Steve
The possibility of obtaining local air superiority anywhere on the western front never existed in any practical sense. Even the possibility of coordinating the actions of the "light bombers", I assume you mean Battles and Blenheims, with the Hurricane squadrons is wishful thinking.
Attempting to operate the 1940 versions of both the Spitfire and Hurricane over France from airfields in Britain was fraught with the same problems that the Luftwaffe would face a few months later with its Bf 109 E. They did better than was appreciated at the time around the Dunkirk evacuation.
The numbers of Hurricanes available in France was also limited. Only 8 squadrons were based in France. 4 more operated from France, but flew home each night. Compare that to the numbers available to Dowding a few months later to defend the British mainland.
As it is the greatest loss to the RAF, with no disrespect intended to the bomber crews lost, was the roughly 300 fighter pilots who were lost between the beginning of the German offensive in May and the end of the Dunkirk evacuation.
It is impossible to over estimate the shock of the fall of France to the British. This second war against Germany was going to be fought primarily by French soldiers. Britain had invested in its Air Force and of course the Royal Navy, but not the Army. The British were haunted by memories of the carnage of WWI. Most of the planners and decision makers had seen it first hand. The title "British Expeditionary Force" (BEF) was not used in the inter war period. When it was reinstated in, 1938 the soldiers, with humour familiar to most who live in these islands, joked that BEF stood for "back every Friday".
The first years of the war reinforced the idea that the British Army was not capable of winning. Defeat after defeat, evacuation after evacuation, at the hands of both the Germans and Japanese. Dunkirk, Crete, Singapore, Tobruk........No wonder we make such a song and dance about a victory at El Alamein, 2,100 dead Germans and 30,000 prisoners. Compare those figures with Stalingrad.
Cheers
Steve
bbear
Airman 1st Class
I (Newbie - BS hazard warning) see this is the first mention of the Dynamo/Dunkirk operation. I had thought that this was the time when the spitfire proved itself the more capable to everyone (in FC senior grades) satisfaction. It was a heavy loss action for the RAF, no integrated defence system to even the odds, no 'favouring' of details of mission if I remember, just desperate and skilful 'maximum effort' - I don't have the sorties and losses data but I believe 15 of 19 Spit squadrons were involved at some point and 16-17 hurricane squadrons and (averaging two conflicting secondary sources) total air to air losses from flights from uk mainland were something like 86 aircraft of both types. Does the comparison of loss rates for both types (which I don't have) not settle the matter - or was it more complex than that, or too small a sample to judge from?
- Thread starter
- #138
Terraine (Right of the Line, p.157) states that RAF FC fighter flew 2739 sorties over Dunkirk and that 99 fighters were lost over Dunkirk, including 42 Spitfires. Given that other fighter types (mainly Defiants) were lost over Dunkirk, these numbers show a rough parity between Hurricane and Spitfire losses, even though it seems likely Hurricanes flew more sorties than any other type since they formed the bulk of 11 Group, which, as usual bore the brunt of the fighting, however it is possible that FC decided to give the relatively unbloodied Spitfire parity in sorties. Hurricane Aces 1939-40, states that 14 Hurricane units were credited with 108 kills, with 22 pilots killed, and 3 captured, while 13 Spitfire units were credited with 109 kills with 24 pilots killed and 4 captured.
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http://freespace.virgin.net/john.dell/henley/hawker_henley.htmBut, then I have posted this previously in the Poll area re: Henley Poll - judging by the number of views to opinions - could well be that most thought it a good option to have had it in service (as opposed to voting for OTL) - but couldn't make up their mind which option to choose.
So, IMHO Gloster would build the F.5/35 (though the prototype needs to fly earlier) chosen as a 'plan b' just in case of problems with the Merlin. Hawker, builds the Henley, and Hurricane - which is also built at the Austin Shadow factory, and yes option there for Fairey to also build them.
The article, from the website - opines that the use of the aircraft wouldn't change anything , unless the RAF uses it as a dive-bomber - and trains for that. But to me - it's an interesting idea to wonder what the LW would have made of a formation of Henleys Hurricanes together - from a distance they'd look the same!?
Interesting - it may well be the Henley was just what the RAF needed, at least for the early part of the war, along with more Hurricanes; if not over France they could have been very useful in the Mediterranean and Pacific, or even replacing the Skua in the FAA Blackburn Skua
What is also interesting is that the radiator installation has a relatively small intake for something feeding the main radiator, oil cooler and carby, plus the small exit flap and exit area - I'm beginning to see why there were cooling problems when towing drogues. Fitting more powerful engines would probably have required a complete redesign, with larger, more efficient intake and larger, more efficient outlet.
