There were numerous writings about the USAF during the 1950's and 1960's. If I recall it had to do with several things
- The attitude that air superiority wouldn't be essential: For a nuclear conflict, there's probably some truth to that (particularly if the flight profile is (Lo-Lo-Lo); for non-nuclear war, well that wouldn't always apply as you would need more aircraft to do the same job, and a protracted campaign (which brings the amount of "acceptable losses" lower as you need to sustain the campaign) which would probably be measured in weeks to months instead of a day or two, maybe a few days at most.
- The fixation on safety seemed to start with SAC, and revolved around early jet aircraft: The USN & USAF both had problems and both implemented solutions, but the USAF seemed to lose their mind; this was then carried over progressively to TAC.
Okay, we are thinking of two different forms of safety.
I was talking about robust training being needed if a war breaks out to allow pilots to maximize the use of their aircraft, craft tactics and structure the combat so it is most in their favor. This degree of training often keeps pilots from getting killed because they know when they're getting into a dangerous situation (so they can avoid it), avoid falling into traps that can get them killed if the enemy were to turn the tables on them (so they can avoid such a set-up).
If you can't score a lot, make sure they can't score on you?