WWII Rate of Turns

[Zipper730]

Don't buy into many of those 1960's training clips, they could be a little over-dramatic.

I found the video interesting because it matched a statement made by the author of Clashes who was an RF-4 pilot, but clarified things a little better.

It does seem to confirm what Barrett said about having to fight in deep buffet

 

[pbehn]

So the issue was the fear over being able to properly gauge when they'd stall?

That makes sense, different amount of stick forces are needed to pull a given g-load at a given speed.
Would that flood the engine?
Makes enough sense: They don't know what they can and cannot get away with... there's natural skill in that, but also practice is often a helpful cure.

Automatic slats were extended through usually two means: Dynamic pressure and G-load

• Slats extend outwards and downwards opening up an aerodynamic gap between the slat and the leading edge, which increases lift and delays stall-onset
  
• G-load is correlated to lift, and lift is related to angle of attack and airspeed
• As angle of attack increases, g-load increases until a stall occurs; at low speeds, the amount of lift available ranges from being able to maneuver only to a minimum extent, to actually stalling at the point at which you are holding 1g (stall speed).
• The extension of the slats as a function of dynamic pressure ensures that when lift is very low, the slats will come out and increase it.
  
• The extension of the slats as a function of g-load ensures that they come out when angle of attack is high

It would provide a guide as to how close you were getting...

so we agree on angle of attack then?

The slats normal position is "out" or deployed, it is solely air pressure that compresses the springs. In level flight the slats will be pushed back to the wing at a certain speed.

 

[DarrenW]

Please remember that there were no anti-suits, and no "G" meters in the cockpit. Pulling 5-6 "G"s means you are near blacking out (or at least greying out) and your arms are 5-6 times heavier than normal while trying to control the stick...

And once pilots began utilizing G suits the game changed dramatically. I have a US combat report from 1945 which basically states that the accelerometers installed on the aircraft were registering as high as 8 Gs but the pilots were not affected by it much.

 

[Zipper730]

so we agree on angle of attack then?

Indirectly as I explained: Though I guess the goal is that it extends at low speed where AoA is higher.

And once pilots began utilizing G suits the game changed dramatically. I have a US combat report from 1945 which basically states that the accelerometers installed on the aircraft were registering as high as 8 Gs but the pilots were not affected by it much.

That's quite good

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I found the video interesting because it matched a statement made by the author of Clashes who was an RF-4 pilot, but clarified things a little better.

It does seem to confirm what Barrett said about having to fight in deep buffet

Well having actually flown in F-4s, i still find some of the comments in the movie a little over dramatic, but then again it was a training film made 50 years ago.

 

[Zipper730]

Well having actually flown in F-4s

What model if I may ask?

i still find some of the comments in the movie a little over dramatic

Well I think they were to iron home the point of flying the plane right as if you got into a flat spin you were doomed.

Frankly, the USAF at the time was far too obsessed with safety to emphasize the aggressive combat training needed to endure in combat. I'm not saying I don't think safety is important -- I just think it has to be balanced against the danger of the war you're fighting. War is inherently dangerous.

 

[pbehn]

What model if I may ask?
Well I think they were to iron home the point of flying the plane right as if you got into a flat spin you were doomed.

Frankly, the USAF at the time was far too obsessed with safety to emphasize the aggressive combat training needed to endure in combat. I'm not saying I don't think safety is important -- I just think it has to be balanced against the danger of the war you're fighting. War is inherently dangerous.

Do you have any proof at all for this? Fighting is inherently dangerous but I can put forward a very good argument that proves the top aces in two world wars were cowards, "if it is a fair fight you have done something wrong", they were as much, if not more concerned with their own survival as they were with a "kill". If the USAF is in the position of losing football games by two goals to one they can try to score more or concede less, constructing strategies to concede less is not being "far too obsessed with safety" in fact the strategy worked.

 

[Zipper730]

Do you have any proof at all for this?

There were numerous writings about the USAF during the 1950's and 1960's. If I recall it had to do with several things

• The attitude that air superiority wouldn't be essential: For a nuclear conflict, there's probably some truth to that (particularly if the flight profile is (Lo-Lo-Lo); for non-nuclear war, well that wouldn't always apply as you would need more aircraft to do the same job, and a protracted campaign (which brings the amount of "acceptable losses" lower as you need to sustain the campaign) which would probably be measured in weeks to months instead of a day or two, maybe a few days at most.
  
• The fixation on safety seemed to start with SAC, and revolved around early jet aircraft: The USN & USAF both had problems and both implemented solutions, but the USAF seemed to lose their mind; this was then carried over progressively to TAC.

Fighting is inherently dangerous but I can put forward a very good argument that proves the top aces in two world wars were cowards, "if it is a fair fight you have done something wrong"

Okay, we are thinking of two different forms of safety.

I was talking about robust training being needed if a war breaks out to allow pilots to maximize the use of their aircraft, craft tactics and structure the combat so it is most in their favor. This degree of training often keeps pilots from getting killed because they know when they're getting into a dangerous situation (so they can avoid it), avoid falling into traps that can get them killed if the enemy were to turn the tables on them (so they can avoid such a set-up).

If the USAF is in the position of losing football games by two goals to one they can try to score more or concede less, constructing strategies to concede less is not being "far too obsessed with safety" in fact the strategy worked.

If you can't score a lot, make sure they can't score on you?

 

[pbehn]

There were numerous writings about the USAF during the 1950's and 1960's. If I recall it had to do with several things

• The attitude that air superiority wouldn't be essential: For a nuclear conflict, there's probably some truth to that (particularly if the flight profile is (Lo-Lo-Lo); for non-nuclear war, well that wouldn't always apply as you would need more aircraft to do the same job, and a protracted campaign (which brings the amount of "acceptable losses" lower as you need to sustain the campaign) which would probably be measured in weeks to months instead of a day or two, maybe a few days at most.
  
• The fixation on safety seemed to start with SAC, and revolved around early jet aircraft: The USN & USAF both had problems and both implemented solutions, but the USAF seemed to lose their mind; this was then carried over progressively to TAC.

Okay, we are thinking of two different forms of safety.

I was talking about robust training being needed if a war breaks out to allow pilots to maximize the use of their aircraft, craft tactics and structure the combat so it is most in their favor. This degree of training often keeps pilots from getting killed because they know when they're getting into a dangerous situation (so they can avoid it), avoid falling into traps that can get them killed if the enemy were to turn the tables on them (so they can avoid such a set-up).
If you can't score a lot, make sure they can't score on you?

I asked for proof not musings, as a British national I have no great knowledge of the USA post war military, but your post was completely dismissive of the actions of people who had many lives in their hands. An "obsession with safety" with early jet aircraft may have stemmed from the number of early jet aircraft that crashed and even as far as the number of people in training who did not eject when they could have.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

What model if I may ask?
Well I think they were to iron home the point of flying the plane right as if you got into a flat spin you were doomed.

F-4D, F-4E. We had an RF-4E but I never got to fly in that one

Frankly, the USAF at the time was far too obsessed with safety to emphasize the aggressive combat training needed to endure in combat. I'm not saying I don't think safety is important -- I just think it has to be balanced against the danger of the war you're fighting. War is inherently dangerous.

Actually it was the opposite. There were many things being done during that period that were terribly unsafe. There was little room for discussion and safety mitigation because of the pace of the Vietnam War. Look at the accident rates of that period - they were horrendous by today's standards.
List of aircraft losses of the Vietnam War - Wikipedia

 

[FLYBOYJ]

• The fixation on safety seemed to start with SAC, and revolved around early jet aircraft: The USN & USAF both had problems and both implemented solutions, but the USAF seemed to lose their mind; this was then carried over progressively to TAC.

Zipper, that is one very ignorant statement. Unless you have some hands on experience or can quantify that statement, to put it bluntly, you're talking out of your ass, really!

The safety card was a necessity and probably more could have and should have been done to spare the lives of many young men who perished during that period just to attempt to see how much the muscle could stretch. Unless you were there, either as a maintainer or pilot, please keep your ill-informed armchair perspectives to a minimum.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Fixation on safety?

I'm confused as to what the problem with that is.

 

[Zipper730]

Fixation on safety?

I'm confused as to what the problem with that is.

When it reaches a point that it undermines effective training...

 

[Zipper730]

Unless you were there, either as a maintainer or pilot, please keep your ill-informed armchair perspectives to a minimum.

Since I don't want to be banned, I'll stop.

 

[pbehn]

When it reaches a point that it undermines effective training...

From the first world war where planes and pilots were treated as disposable the cost of an aircraft steadily increased, with post war jets the cost went up still further and the pilot is always a more valuable asset than the plane he flies. The B 29 could not suffer the loss rates that were accepted on B17 and B 24s not only because of the huge difference in cost but the similar difference in training for pilots and flight engineers. Disregarding safety was simply not affordable, the object is to down the enemy not yourself.

Anyone with good practical skills can build a plane similar to a ww1 aircraft, any Euromillions lottery winner can buy a ww2 warbird and the training required to fly it, this includes armament, warbirds are not armed but machine guns are not prohibitively expensive. Even a huge winner on a lottery cannot afford to buy and run something like an F4 for more than a couple of years and that is without using any arms which cost millions each.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

When it reaches a point that it undermines effective training...

What?

You are talking to an aviation safety and quality assurance advisor...

Nothing in aviation trumps safety.

My experience in aviation is pretty broad. At least I like to believe. Army air crew member, mechanic, private pilot, safety advisor, and in all these years nothing comes before a crew going home at night and an aircraft safe in a hangar.

Why would you put training before the safety of your most important asset? I'm honestly at a loss of words here, and not sure how to dumb this down any more.

And how the hell does safety, get in the way of training? Where are you coming up with this?

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Maybe I am looking at things from a modern point of view, but I like to think safety was evolving back then as well. Even during a war,

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Since I don't want to be banned, I'll stop.

Smart move.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

When it reaches a point that it undermines effective training...

Do you even know anything about combat training aside what you might have read or seen on youtube? So in your worldly aviation experience, tell us what is effective training?

 

[pbehn]

Below are Adolph Malans rules of air fighting, only the first two have no aspect of self preservation AKA safety.

TEN OF MY RULES FOR AIR FIGHTING

1. Wait until you see the whites of his eyes. Fire short bursts of one to two seconds only when your sights are definitely "ON".
2. Whilst shooting think of nothing else, brace the whole of your body: have both hands on the stick: concentrate on your ring sight.
3. Always keep a sharp lookout. "Keep your finger out".
4. Height gives you the initiative.
5. Always turn and face the attack.
6. Make your decisions promptly. It is better to act quickly even though your tactics are not the best.
7. Never fly straight and level for more than 30 seconds in the combat area.
8. When diving to attack always leave a proportion of your formation above to act as a top guard.
9. INITIATIVE, AGGRESSION, AIR DISCIPLINE, and TEAMWORK are words that MEAN something in Air Fighting.
10. Go in quickly - Punch hard - Get out!