That's the one that sudden-stopped the engine.One point I forgot to mention about the repair work is that one prop blade needed straightened and reconditioned and it is not mentioned in the repair items.
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That's the one that sudden-stopped the engine.One point I forgot to mention about the repair work is that one prop blade needed straightened and reconditioned and it is not mentioned in the repair items.
I read that years ago also, and given the timing of this event, when IJNAF vs USAAF/RAAF were trading raids back and forth Port Moresby-Lae, likely it was an A6M2.I read Samauri by Saburo Sakai many years ago. He wrote, IIRC, having spotted a P-39 he came up above and behind it. He followed it noting its cruise speed and the altitude. I think he wrote 200 knots. I can't remember the altitude. He then shot it down. Of course Sakai Saburo was flying a Zero but which model I can't recall.
My whole point is that the weight could be easily reduced AT FORWARD BASES by removing some equipment that wasn't needed. The weight reduction was primarily to increase climb rate and ceiling AT ALL ALTITUDES.
Depends on when that happened, but remember in mid '42 the AAF had no combat experience outside of a couple of guys who got off the ground at Pearl Harbor. Nobody really knew what they were doing.But the simple fact is that the people operating the P-39 didn't do that. Removing unnecessary weight is hardly rocket science, providing it can be done without upsetting the aircraft's CofG. If it was so simple to accomplish and if it would achieve such beneficial results, why wasn't it done? There must be a reason why such an obvious improvement was not implemented.
Depends on when that happened, but remember in mid '42 the AAF had no combat experience outside of a couple of guys who got off the ground at Pearl Harbor. Nobody really knew what they were doing.
You're not wrong. I've read that from several sources. I believe the only changes were to substitute metric hardware.If I remember well, the Zero had a propeller built under an Hamilton Standard license.
So, probably it wasn't too difficult to repair it.
From memory, I may be wrong.
I suspect it might have something to do with the local chain of command and how willing they'd be to tolerate "unauthorized" modifications to the aircraft. Feeling vulnerable to criticism due to the less-than-stellar performance of their fighters, they'd be afraid that the poor performance record would get blamed on those modifications. Basic careerthink.Again, I have to ask why the boots on the ground (or in the cockpit) didn't do something to improve the performance if it was as easy and as impactful as you suggest? Is it possible that the theoretical performance improvements you're proposing weren't achievable in practice?
I suspect it might have something to do with the local chain of command and how willing they'd be to tolerate "unauthorized" modifications to the aircraft.
Guadalcanal was a "generation" of war experience later and an even more desperate situation with a longer and more tenuous supply chain than early days in New Guinea, with the IJNAF by day and Tokyo Express by night. And don't forget "Maytag Charlie"!Given the very rough field conditions at Guadalcanal, I have a really hard time believing that stuff-shirtedness would last very long.
We used to have an Albany based competitor on the SLK-ALB-LGA run who ran ancient beatup Be99s that fit the above description and would have made "The Resurrection" look like a virgin. Great source of pilot recruits, as our company actually paid a living wage, and these guys came to us deep in debt, but well experienced in emergency procedures. Despite being headquartered right next to the FAA FSDO, who received constant complaints about them, their owner's political clout rendered them untouchable until a change of administration in NY state government and the end of the Reagan administration deprived him of his influential connections. Then they lost their certificate.Instruments were plugged into gapping holes in the cockpit panel.
That's quite an item for job application. "Experienced in aircraft catastrophes because I worked for a corrupt air carrier."Guadalcanal was a "generation" of war experience later and an even more desperate situation with a longer and more tenuous supply chain than early days in New Guinea, with the IJNAF by day and Tokyo Express by night. And don't forget "Maytag Charlie"!
And the P400s with their non US standard setups were in an even more desperate spares situation. Any tendency toward formality would be long gone by then, especially with Gen Vandegrift around.
We used to have an Albany based competitor on the SLK-ALB-LGA run who ran ancient beatup Be99s that fit the above description and would have made "The Resurrection" look like a virgin. Great source of pilot recruits, as our company actually paid a living wage, and these guys came to us deep in debt, but well experienced in emergency procedures. Despite being headquartered right next to the FAA FSDO, who received constant complaints about them, their owner's political clout rendered them untouchable until a change of administration in NY state government and the end of the Reagan administration deprived him of his influential connections. Then they lost their certificate.
We stole quite a few pilots from ragtag marginal commuter carriers. It was the boomtown expansion of the regional airline industry in the 1980s, stepping in to serve the smaller places the majors were allowed to abandon under deregulation. It attracted all kinds of slick operators trying to build an empire on other people's money, often with limited understanding of the nuts and bolts of aviation business. It was the Reagan era, entrepreneurship was king, the rules were often more winked at then obeyed, and the carnage was horrendous by today's standards. Shoddy operators like Frank Lorenzo, Carl Icahn, and Allyn Caruso were the darlings of the entrepreneur worshipping set as they amassed fortunes and power off the backs of their creditors, their employees, and the diminished safety of the flying public.That's quite an item for job application. "Experienced in aircraft catastrophes because I worked for a corrupt air carrier."
And where was USAAF's SW Pacific base of operations, command and control? In RAAF territory with plenty of RAF bureaucrats right at hand. "When in Rome, do as...etc, etc."during WW2 it's usually the Brits who get painted as the rule-bound bureaucrats while the American free-spirit-thinkers just did what was needed to get the job done.
And where was USAAF's SW Pacific base of operations, command and control? In RAAF territory with plenty of RAF bureaucrats right at hand. "When in Rome, do as...etc, etc."
That's the one that sudden-stopped the engine.
Guadalcanal was a "generation" of war experience later and an even more desperate situation with a longer and more tenuous supply chain than early days in New Guinea, with the IJNAF by day and Tokyo Express by night.
Armor behind the engine was included in the armor totals. Thinking it wouldn't help much and not knowing how much it would help are two different things.First combat for the 39th took place on 30 Apr 1942 so hardly a 'generation' of war experience. Regardless, even if we include the experience of getting P-39s operational in New Guinea as 'war experience' it still doesn't change my question, in fact it makes it even more relevant.
Inexperienced Aussies operating in Singapore under RAF command could strip weight out of their Buffalos, including changing 50cals for 303s in the wings, after just 3 weeks of combat. Why, then, didn't any USAAF units do a similar thing with their P-39s and P-400s?
The "they were inexperienced" excuse doesn't make sense, nor does it tally with the innovation demonstrated at Guadalcanal, first erecting P-400s without manuals and then keeping them flying despite the incredibly long and at-risk supply chain.
Of note, "Buzz" Wagner (CO of the 39th) recommended around 8 changes to the P-39 including ADDING armour to protect the engine, and improving reliability of the wing-mounted 30 cals. Again, if the "useless" wing guns weren't reliable, why not just take them out?
It seems to me that someone would at least TRY to reduce the weight of the under-performing P-39s if they thought it would do any good. One logical conclusion is that they didn't think it would help much.
I'm open to other suggestions but they need to be realistic and relevant.
Armor behind the engine was included in the armor totals. Thinking it wouldn't help much and not knowing how much it would help are two different things.