1918 - the year of offensives

[BombTaxi]

While the Entente stance seems overly aggressive, lets not forget that aggressive German foreign policy and naval expansion had been one of the things that had driven the UK, France and Russia to form the Entente in the first place. Indeed, the fact that France and the UK entered a co-operative agreement at all, after 50 years of sizing each other up and engaging in an on-off naval arms race, indicates how serious a threat Germany had become. Germany out-produced even the UK in terms of strategic materials, had a massive, well-trained, well-equipped army, was building a navy that could challenge the UK for control of the North Sea and Atlantic approaches, and had show a willingness to use the threat of force to intervene in Africa, where both Britain and France had massive colonial interests. Taking these guys out was top of the Franco-British Agenda, and it's hardly surprising that they wanted to do it quickly and cleanly. Not trying to take sides, but Wilhelm II certainly did nothing to make friends amongst the European nations prior to 1914.

 

[tyrodtom]

Back in the 60s, the then Australian prime Minister, Harold Holt, coined the phrase..."all the way with LBJ" suggesting Australia should become the 53rd (???) state in Union. That put the whole country of 14 million (at that time) on a par with nebraska or Hawaii.

Harold Holt didn't coin that phrase, that's from the 1964 LBJ election campaign.

 

[davebender]

Germany out-produced even the UK in terms of strategic materials

The German economy was booming during the decade prior to 1914. So was the British economy. What's the problem?

had a massive, well-trained, well-equipped army

The German Army was far smaller then armies belonging to the Franco-Russian Alliance. As for being well trained, so is the modern day American Army. What's wrong with providing your soldiers with high quality training?

had show a willingness to use the threat of force to intervene in Africa

I think you mean Britain and France, both of whom invaded multiple African nations between 1890 and 1911. Meanwhile Deutsches Reich invaded no one between 1871 and 1914.

building a navy that could challenge the UK for control of the North Sea and Atlantic approaches

The German goal was a dreadnought fleet 60% the size of the RN. I agree it was larger then necessary and a huge waste of German tax money. But it was never a serious threat to RN control of the North Sea, a point driven home at Jutland.

 

[BombTaxi]

In your rush to defend Germany at all costs, you miss a few things. Firstly, the strength of the German economy was a great concern to the Entente powers as it meant Germany had the means to produce weapons in larger quantity than anyone else, particularly heavy equipment like artillery and warships. Nothing 'wrong' with that, but in the context of the early 20th century, enough to make the Entente jittery.

Secondly, when you take into account potential mobilisation of reserves, Germany did have a huge army, and even if Russia's was bigger, it was badly led and some of the men didn't even have weapons. Nothing 'wrong' with training your troops well, but again, it hardly serves to calm the nerves of people who think you're trying to take over Europe.

Thirdly, anyone with a brain in their skull knows Britain and France were colonial powers and acted in the fashion this implies. But the Agadir crisis showed that Wilhelm wanted to use Germany's growing strength to interfere in other nation's business. I'm sure if he had sent gunboats to Cuba, the US would have been perfectly pleased to talk... or invoke the Monroe Doctrine and blow them off the face of the map.

Finally, the German dreadnought building program was aimed at the Royal Navy. There was no other major naval power with whom Germany might fight in that period. Britain felt threatened in the same way the US felt threatened by the Russians stockpiling thousands of nukes after WW2. It doesn't matter that Wilhelm 'wanted' a small fleet to show how important it was, it looked like a threat to the most powerful navy in the world.

I'm not taking sides here, just pointing out that the Entente had it's reasons to feel threatened by Germany. This isn't about defending the poor innocent Germans, it's about seeing that Wilhelms bumbling and foolhardy approach to foriegn policy and armament s building, coupled with the strenght of his nation, made others around him very edgy.

 

[davebender]

Franco-Russian Miliary Alliance Battleships.
3 x Bretagne class. 1912 program.
4 x Courbet class. 1910 program.
6 x Danton class. 1907 program.
.....13 x French dreadnoughts. Total.

4 x Borodino class. 1912 program.
4 x Gangut class. 1909 program.
.....8 x Russian dreadnoughts assigned to the Baltic Fleet.

I think 21 modern dreadnought battleships belonging to a hostile military alliance, all of which were less then 7 years old, constitutes a major naval power during 1914.

 

[BombTaxi]

The French and Russian navies posed nowhere near the threat that the Royal Navy did - if any member of the hostile military alliance was going to be a naval threat to Germany, it was the UK. They were the only power who could implement a rapid and total blockade of German shores and maintain it. Which was exactly what they did...

 

[parsifal]

It also assumes that the French and Russian navies were efficient and able to collaborate. The British had shown 110 years previously, what happens to a navy that is not well trained or well motivated or well organised (ne: the Spanish Navy at Trafalgar). The Japanese Navy had shown just how poorly trained the Russian Fleet was at Tshushima in 1905, and the IJN at that time was probably more British than the British Navy.

The Imperial Fleet was built for one purpose, to challenge the RN control of the oceans. This, in itself constituted an overtly aggressive and de-stabilising act, as it challenged what the british saw as a vital interest for them.

As far as serbia being a terrorist state, hardly. It was radicalised, because it represented a nemesis for the Austro Hungarian empire. Serbia was an ultranationalist state, and nationalism was the poison that threatened the very existence of Austria Hungary. Austria Hungary was not amodern state, with any hope of nationalist progressive change. It was aconglomeration of nationalities and ethnic groups governedby a small section of the country, and not on democratic or even popular grounds. Everything that Austria represented, was anathema to Serbia, and the serbians were rightly seeking self determination for many of the oppressed minorities within Austrias borders. The Austrians reacted to that in a highly aggressive devious and destabilising way....in other words, by acts of overt aggression. There can be no doubt who was at fault here....the paranoid austrians. And they were supported by the germans, who knew they also had to act aggressively and pre-emptively to defeat their enemies. But by reaching that conclusion they crossed an ethereal, subtle line, that makes all the difference in determining war guilt. Who attacked who first. Germany invaded belgium and attacked france, not the other way around. Austria attacked Serbia, a Russian ally. They initiated a war of aggression in a highly charged and dangerous situation.

So, who lit the match that blew the powder keg sky high??????

 

[davebender]

That's rather obvious from looking at ship numbers and naval base structure.

However there was a serious naval war in the Baltic which most of the popular history books ignore. Including divsion size amphibious assaults against heavily fortified islands in the Gulf of Riga and the first successful use of aerial mine laying.

 

[BombTaxi]

Correct, but the Baltic grew in importance for the Germans only after the RN locked them out of the North Sea at Jutland. The war would not be won or lost in the Baltic, and German planners new this. The German fleet was designed to fight the Royal Navy, and everyone around the North Sea knew it . If Wilhelm seriously wanted Germany to be a world power, he knew that battle would have to be fought at some point.

 

[davebender]

The RN locked German surface ships out of the North Sea by August 5th, 1914. Almost two years before the Battle of Jutland.

 

[BombTaxi]

Not at all. The near-engagement off Scarborough in 1914, the Whitby Raid, the Lowestoft Raid, and the Battle of Dogger Bank are all proof that the Germans had freedom of action in the North Sea prior to Jutland.

But coming back to my earler point, do you really believe the Germans were blameless in starting the war in the first place?

 

[davebender]

"Blame" has no meaning in international diplomacy. The winner gets to write the popular history books so they are always right and the loser is always wrong.

 

[parsifal]

Incorrect.

War guilt has a very specific meaning internationally agreed upon by the majority of nations. (Generally the ones that dont are the ones guilty of waging such wars or the ones intending to do so....pariah states in other words). One of the preconditions of war guilt is who embarked on agressive "shooting" wars first. And the records clearly show that it was the central powers that took that option. Ther may well have been extenuating circumstances, they may well have been delivered almighty sucker punches, but it is still they that are guilty of initiating aggressive wars. It is generally accepted that they did not initiate war crimes (although their conduct in belgium kind of challenges that)

In the aftermath of the second world war, it was an important first step to determine war guilt, on a more refined basis to the way it was applied after the first war, and then from there to apply the concept of war crimes on specific individuals.

I totally reject the concept that history was substantially rewritten so that germany got all the blame. Germany doesnt get all the blame for the two major wars of the 20th century, just that bit that they were responsible for (which happens to be most of it). its just that Germany (and/or her proxies) happened to be responsible for firing the first shots in these events. In law, that has significant culpability.

 

[BombTaxi]

The loser gets to write history as well, they just have to wait a while. This is usually called 'revisionism', and is similar to what you are practicing in this thread. Both blocs involved in WW1 spent long enough preparing, that they fully understood what would happen when the Austro-Serbian situation went hot. Wilhelm knew he was handing the Austrians a blank cheque by promising to support them against Russia. And he knew that this meant he would have to fight France. The only thing he got wrong was Britain, who were not expected to mobilise in defence of Belgian neutrality. To pretend that Germany suddenly found herself thrust into a war entirely of other's making is ridiculous. All of the major alliance partner take an equal share of the blame for creating a situation where the Balkan Wars spilled over into a general European conflagration, and for being foolhardy enough to honour their alliances and unleash that war upon Europe.

 

[parsifal]

The Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties was instituted at the plenary session of the Paris Peace Conference of 25 January 1919. Its purpose was to formally assign war guilt, a judgement that inevitably saw blame fully attributed to the Central Powers. Clearly, this committee was commissioned for a biased purpose, however it also contains a section that outlines the basic statements of facts about how war broke out. Whilst the language is clearly biased, the facts are known to be an accurate record of what happened in the late summer of 1914, and these facts clearly speak for themselves.

The commission was comprised of two representatives from each of the five main Allied powers - the U.S., Britain, France, Italy and Japan - and one from Belgium, Greece, Poland, Romania and Serbia. Robert Lansing was selected as its chairman.

The commission's two conclusions briefly summarised the findings of the report, in particular the first, i.e.: "The war was premeditated by the Central Powers together with their Allies, Turkey and Bulgaria, and was the result of acts deliberately committed in order to make it unavoidable".

The key parts of the first chapter of the commission's report, which was accepted at the Paris Peace Conference on 6 May 1919, is reproduced below:

"On the 27th Sir Maurice de Bunsen telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey: "This country has gone wild with Joy at the prospect of war with Serbia." At midday on the 28th Austria declared war on Serbia. On the 29th the Austrian army commenced the bombardment of Belgrade, and made its dispositions to cross the frontier.

The reiterated suggestions of the Entente Powers with a view to finding a peaceful solution of the dispute only produced evasive replies on the part of Berlin or promises of intervention with the Government of Vienna without any effectual steps being taken.

On the 24th of July Russia and England asked that the Powers should be granted a reasonable delay in which to work in concert for the maintenance of peace. Germany did not join in this request.

On the 25th of July Sir Edward Grey proposed mediation by four Powers (England, France, Italy and Germany). France and Italy immediately gave their concurrence. Germany refused, alleging that it was not a question of mediation but of arbitration, as the conference of the four Powers was called to make proposals, not to decide.

On the 26th of July Russia proposed to negotiate directly with Austria. Austria refused.

On the 27th of July England proposed a European conference. Germany refused.

On the 29th of July Sir Edward Grey asked the Wilhelmstrasse to be good enough to "suggest any method by which the influence of the four Powers could be used together to prevent a war between Austria and Russia." She was asked herself to say what she desired. Her reply was evasive.

On the same day, the 29th of July, the Czar dispatched to the Emperor William II a telegram suggesting that the Austro-Serbian problem should be submitted to the Hague Tribunal. This suggestion received no reply. This important telegram does not appear in the German White Book. It was made public by the Petrograd Official Gazette "January, 1915).

The Bavarian Legation, in a report dated the 31st of July, declared its conviction that the efforts of Sir Edward Grey to preserve peace would not hinder the march of events.

As early as the 21st of July German mobilization had commenced by the recall of a certain number of classes of the reserve, then of German officers in Switzerland, and finally of the Metz garrison on the 25th of July. On the 26th of July the German fleet was called back from Norway.

The Entente did not relax its conciliatory efforts, but the German Government systematically brought all its attempts to nought. When Austria consented for the first time on the 31st of July to discuss the contents of the Serbian note with the Russian Government and the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador received orders to "converse" with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Germany made any negotiation impossible by sending her ultimatum to Russia.

Prince Lichnowsky wrote that "a hint from Berlin would have been enough to decide Count Berchtold to content himself with a diplomatic success and to declare that he was satisfied with the Serbian reply, but this hint was not given. On the contrary they went forward towards war."

On the 1st of August the German Emperor addressed a telegram to the King of England containing the following sentence: "The troops on my frontier are, at this moment, being kept back by telegraphic and telephonic orders from crossing the French frontier." Now, war was not declared till two days after that date, and as the German mobilization orders were issued on that same day, the 1st of August, it follows that, as a matter of fact, the German Army had been mobilized and concentrated in pursuance of previous orders.

The attitude of the Entente nevertheless remained still to the very end so conciliatory that, at the very time at which the German fleet was bombarding Libau, Nicholas II gave his word of honour to William II that Russia would not undertake any aggressive action during the pourparlers, and that when the German troops commenced their march across the French frontier Mr. Viviani telegraphed to all the French Ambassadors "we must not stop working for accommodation."

On the 3rd of August Mr. von Schoen went to the Qual d'Orsay with the declaration of war against France. Lacking a real cause of complaint, Germany alleged, in her declaration of war, that bombs had been dropped by French airplanes in various districts in Germany. This statement was entirely false. Moreover, it was either later admitted to be so or no particulars were ever furnished by the German Government.

Moreover, In order to be manifestly above reproach, France was careful to withdraw her troops ten kilometres from the German frontier. Notwithstanding this precaution, numerous officially established violations of French territory preceded the declaration of war.

The provocation was so flagrant that Italy, herself a member of the Triple Alliance, did not hesitate to declare that in view of the aggressive character of the war the casus foederis ceased to apply.

Conclusions
1. The war was premeditated by the Central Powers together with their Allies, Turkey and Bulgaria, and was the result of acts deliberately committed in order to make it unavoidable.

2. Germany, in agreement with Austria-Hungary, deliberately worked to defeat all the many conciliatory proposals made by the Entente Powers and their repeated efforts to avoid war."

 

[davebender]

The Austro-Serbian conflict is about responding to a terrorist attack. It has little to do with the Franco-Russian decision to invade Germany except to serve as a convenient casus beli.

 

[parsifal]

The Austro-Serbian conflict is about responding to a terrorist attack. It has little to do with the Franco-Russian decision to invade Germany except to serve as a convenient casus beli.

Dave

I dont know what version of history you are following, but it is nothing like any history I have read, and nothing like the basic statements of fact that i have seen (and some of which I have posted) . Lets analyse briefly the statments you are making above....

"The Austro-Serbian conflict is about responding to a terrorist attack"

The records clearly show that Serbia as a nation was not responsible for the assassination. Offers by serbia to hunt down and deal with the small group of extremists (including those in the government, but acting outside of it) to justice. Serbia agreed to comply with the Austrian ultimatum, but Austria invaded anyway, and the records show they acted deliberately to cause war, by keeping secrets and telling fibs.

Serbia was guilty of ultranationalism, which the austrians were terrified of. The Serbs resented Austrian aggression and persecution of Serbian and slavic nationalities within the borders of the austrian empire, the latest example of which was the brutal invasion of Bosnia in 1908 (they also wanted access to the sea, lets be clear about that). Trying to argue that Austria was responding to a terrorist threat is a shocking disconnect of the facts.....serbia was not responsible for the assassination, though nationals from that country were. The Serbs were quite prepred to deal with these crimials themselves, and meet all the other austrian demands (except one minor one), but this was rejected by the Austrians...why....because they wanted war, not resolution.

"It has little to do with the Franco-Russian decision to invade Germany except to serve as a convenient casus beli"

Again a gross distortion of the facts. Russia was responding to Austrian aggression to its ally, initiated by the austrians and supported by the germans. Whilst taking sound military preparations, the russians continued to act in good faith and seek a peaceful solution to the crisis. The central powers had already made a decision to go to war and subverted every attempt to avoid the conflict. This is clearly shown in the basic statements of fact previously posted

In the case of France, a decision to invade Germany was only made after it had become apparent that the Germans were preparing to do exactly the same to them. France was reacting, not initiating, and it is also worth noting that French military theory of the time was all about the attack (though if the french had invaded first it would be them that was guilty of the aggressive war). Again the basic facts speak for themselves. Germany had decided to attack its enemies from at least 19 July and did not deviate from that path. they were the first to inititiate mobilisation plans, despite revisionist claims to the contrary, and the first to decide on going to war (well, only after Austrians I guess). They had commenced operations in france without a formal declaration from at least the 28th July. No amount of posturing or rewriting of history can get past that.

If you wanted to argue the extenuating circumstances faced by Germany and Austria, i would be happy to concede certain points there......but to argue that the Austrians were responding to a terrorist threat is a disconnect from the fact, whilst also arguing that France and Russia were initiating the escalation is also not supported by the basic facts.

 

[BombTaxi]

The Austro-Serbian conflict is about responding to a terrorist attack. It has little to do with the Franco-Russian decision to invade Germany except to serve as a convenient casus beli.

My point is, Germany didn't get attacked. So what were they doing invading anybody in the first place? The alliance system was at fault, and Germany must shoulder some of the blame, being party to one of these alliances

 

[parsifal]

The causes behind the outbreak of war in 1914 are complex, and less clearcut than establishing immediate war guilt.

However from wiki, about the causes behind the war in 1914, comes the following

The new French President Raymond Poincaré, who took office in 1913, was favourable to improving relations with Germany. In January 1914 Poincaré became the first French President to dine at the German Embassy in Paris. Poincaré was more interested in the idea of French expansion in the Middle East than a war of revenge to regain Alsace-Lorraine. Had the Reich been interested in improved relations with France before August 1914, the opportunity was available, but the leadership of the Reich lacked such interests, and preferred a policy of war to destroy France. Because of France's smaller economy and population, by 1913 French leaders had largely accepted that France by itself could never defeat Germany.

In May 1914, Serbian politics were polarized between two factions, one headed by the Prime Minister Nikola Pašić, and the other by the radical nationalist chief of Military Intelligence, Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević, known by his codename Apis. In that month, due to Colonel Dimitrigjevic's intrigues, King Peter dismissed Pašić's government. The Russian Minister in Belgrade intervened to have Pašić's government restored. Pašić, though he often talked tough in public, knew that Serbia was near-bankrupt and, having suffered heavy casualties in the Balkan Wars and in the suppression of a December 1913 Albanian revolt in Kosovo, needed peace. Since Russia also favoured peace in the Balkans, from the Russian viewpoint it was desirable to keep Pašić in power. It was in the midst of this political crisis that politically powerful members of the Serbian military armed and trained three Bosnian students as assassins and sent them into Austria-Hungary.


The article elsewhere states:

"With the recently announced Russian military reconstruction and certain British communications, the possibility of war was a prime topic at the German Imperial War Council of 8 December 1912 in Berlin, an informal meeting of some of Germany's top military leadership called on short notice by the Kaiser. Attending the conference were Wilhelm II, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz - the Naval State Secretary, Admiral Georg Alexander von Müller, the Chief of the German Imperial Naval Cabinet (Marinekabinett), General von Moltke - the Army's Chief of Staff, Admiral August von Heeringen - the Chief of the Naval General Staff and (probably) General Moriz von Lyncker, the Chief of the German Imperial Military Cabinet. The presence of the leaders of both the German Army and Navy at this War Council attests to its importance. However, Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg and General Josias von Heeringen, the Prussian Minister of War, were not invited.

Wilhelm II called British balance of power principles "idiocy," (Britain had warned Germany not to write a blank cheque for the Austrians - which germany ignored), but agreed that Haldane's statement was a "desirable clarification" of British policy. His opinion was that Austria should attack Serbia that December, and if "Russia supports the Serbs, which she evidently does…then war would be unavoidable for us, too," and that would be better than going to war after Russia completed the massive modernization and expansion of their army that they had just begun (in 1912). Moltke agreed. In his professional military opinion "a war is unavoidable and the sooner the better". Moltke "wanted to launch an immediate attack".

Both Wilhelm II and the Army leadership agreed that if a war were necessary it were best launched soon. Admiral Tirpitz, however, asked for a "postponement of the great fight for one and a half years" because the Navy was not ready for a general war that included Britain as an opponent. He insisted that the completion of the construction of the U-boat base at Heligoland and the widening of the Kiel Canal were the Navy's prerequisites for war. As the British historian John Röhl has commented, the date for completion of the widening of the Kiel Canal was the summer of 1914. Though Moltke objected to the postponement of the war as unacceptable, Wilhelm sided with Tirpitz. Moltke "agreed to a postponement only reluctantly."

Some historians such as British historian John Röhl, interpret the words of Admiral Müller (an advocate of launching a war soon, but whose diary entries are often misconstrued by German revisionists) as saying that "nothing" was decided for 1912-13, but that war was decided on for the summer of 1914....meaning that the Germans should have gone to war in 1912. Röhl argues that even if this War Council did not reach a binding decision - which it clearly did not - it did nonetheless offer a clear view of German intentions, which were that they favoured an early march to war, at any cost, including the initiation of an aggressive war of conquest. if there was going to be a war, the German Army wanted it before the new Russian armaments program began to bear fruit. Röhl and other historicans see this conference as setting a clear deadline when a war was to begin, namely the summer of 1914.

With the November 1912 announcement of the Russian Great Military Programme, the leadership of the German Army began clamoring even more strongly for a "preventive war" (code for an aggressive war) against Russia. Moltke declared that Germany could not win the arms race with France, Britain and Russia, which she herself had begun in 1911, because the financial structure of the German state, which gave the Reich government little power to tax, meant Germany would bankrupt herself in an arms race. As such, Moltke from late 1912 onwards was the leading advocate for a general war, and the sooner the better.

Throughout May and June 1914, Moltke engaged in an "almost ultimative" demand for a German "preventive war" against Russia in 1914. The German Foreign Secretary, Gottlieb von Jagow, reported on a discussion with Moltke at the end of May 1914:

"Moltke described to me his opinion of our military situation. The prospects of the future oppressed him heavily. In two or three years Russia would have completed her armaments. The military superiority of our enemies would then be so great that he did not know how he could overcome them. Today we would still be a match for them. In his opinion there was no alternative to making preventive war in order to defeat the enemy while we still had a chance of victory. The Chief of the General Staff therefore proposed that I should conduct a policy with the aim of provoking a war in the near future."

It cannot get much clearerr as to what german aims were in the lead up to war in 1914. They were looking for trouble, and eventually they got what they were looking for

 

[davebender]

24 July 1914. Serbia is promised the support of Russia and France in the event of war.
25 July 1914. Serbia orders a general mobilization.
25 July 1914. Austria orders a partial mobilization (vs Serbia only).
26 July 1914. Russia mobilizes forces in the western military districts (i.e. vs Austria and Germany).
27 July 1914. France orders preparations for mobilization.
29 July 1914. Russia orders a full mobilization.
29 July 1914. Belgium orders a partial mobilization.
29 July 1914. Britain orders preparations for mobilization.
30 July 1914. France mobilizes 5 army corps (i.e. an entire field army) on the German border.
31 July 1914. Austria orders a full mobilization in response to the Russian threat.
31 July 1914. Ottomans order a full mobilization in response to the Russian threat.
31 July 1914. Germany orders preparations for mobilization in response to the French and Russian threats.
31 July 1914. Belgium orders a full mobilization.
1 Aug 1914. German 16th AK mobilizes at Metz. Infantry support for the fortress complex in case of French attack.
2 Aug 1914. France and Germany begin full mobilization.

2 August 1914. Russian cavalry raids against German rail lines.
- Attempted to blow up rail bridge over the Warthe River.
- Attacked the town of Prostken in an attempt to cut the Konigsberg-Bialystok rail line.
- Cut the rail line between Johannisburg and Lyck.

It appears to me the Russians were taking advantage of their one week mobilization head start. Just as OHL pre-war intelligence estimate had predicted. If not for the initiative of local German Army reserve units the Russian cavalry raids might have caused serious damage before Germany had even begun national mobilization.