1918 - the year of offensives

[parsifal]

Austria had plans in place to destroy Serbia since 1912. Negotiations with Germany led to German endorsement of any action against Serbia from 1 July. Preprarations for war, short of actual mobilization began 14 July. Originally it had been intended to attack Serbia from the 22nd July, but certain delays in preparations delayed that initial target date. meanwhile there were alsmot daily violent disputes at the border between Serbian frontier guards and the Austrian Army.

An ultimatum was delivered finally on the 23rd July that was known as the "impossible ultimatum" It was naed that because it was designed to be impossible for Serbia to comply. By this stage both Austria and Germany had long been making preprations for war, short of full mobilization. Because of these preparations and the known superiority of the Central Powers call up mechanisms, the Entente powers were forced in some ways to order general mobilzations earlier than their enemies. However, it is a travesty to try and argue that austria was not prepring for war far earlier than everyone else. They had been prepring for war with Serbia for more than two years in fact.

For Germany the decision for war had also been made in 1912, with active preparations beginning mid may 1914. The Germans had the most efficient mobilization program in Europe, and the fact that they were known to be making preprations and plans short of mobilization only added to the apprehension in the allied camps.

Though the germans did not declare war until August, they were undertaking incursions into French and Belgian frontier positions from the 28th July

Arguing that the mobilization orders were responsible for the general outbreak of hostilities ignores the facts that both Austria and Germany had begun their preprations for war from 1908 (for Austria) and 1912 (for germany), and that direct prepration began well before anyone else anbnd well before mobilization. Allied mobilzation only occurred as a defensive measure (well, defensiver in the sense that they planned to attack the germans and Austrians but only if they were attacked) . It further ignores the facts that allied mobilzation took considerably longer to complete, and that generally at the time they were ordered (except Russia) incidents were already occurring that required military action to be prepred for by them.

There is no doubt that by the beginning of July both Germany and Austria were no longer acting in good faith towardsd maintaining peace. They were actively plotting for war. As I said, there are extenuating circumstances to justify this dis-ingenuous approach, but it cannot be argued that the Central powers were not responsible for the outbreak of hostilities

 

[davebender]

Dragutin Dimitrijevi

In 1911 Dimitrijević organised an attempt to assassinate Emperor Franz Josef.

Austria should have put those plans in motion. They would have been fully justified to destroy Serbia after that nation attempted to assassinate KuK Franz Josef.

 

[parsifal]

Austria was in fact destroying and occupying territories that Serbia considered essential to its national interst, and Serbia was in pretty bad shape after the Balkans war.

Austria was seeking the destruction of Serbia for years before they went to war with her in 1914. Dragutin was one of those "extenuating circumstances" that caused the Central Powers to Initiate aggressive acts that led to total war, and even though he was part of the Serbian Government, his activities in the black hand movement were not known or sanctioned by the government per se. Balkan politics was a hotbed of ultranationalism, tribal feuds and extreme violence, and Dragutin fitted in perfectly with that scene, as did the behaviour of the Austrian Army after its subjugation of Bosnia in 1908. Black Hand was able to flourish because of Austrian brutality in slavic territories, and franz Ferdinand was targetted because he was a moderate that the Black Hand did not want around. This was a game that both sides were playing very roughly, but it was the Austrians that decided to risk total war.

And remember, that the Black Hand was not an organization that was part of the Serbian Government, nor was it oficially supported by Serbia. it was a secret organization with friends in high places. The link you posted is revealing, because it shows what happened to Dragutin....

"Nikola Pašić decided to get rid of the most prominent members of the Black Hand movement, by then officially disbanded. Dimitrijević and several of his military colleagues were arrested and tried on false charges blaming them with attempted assassination of regent Aleksandar I Karadjordjevic. On May 23, 1917, following the so-called Salonika Trial, Dimitrijević was found guilty of treason and sentenced to death. A month later, on June 11, 24 or 27, he was executed by firing squad".

Austria had reason to to not like Dragution or the Black Hand, but its a stretch to try blame the whole of Serbia for the activities of this group. And it seems ironic to me that the Black Hand organization evolved primarily asa result of Austrian attrocities in the balkans, specifically targetting slavs for persecution.

 

[davebender]

On reflection 1912 won't work as Serbia, Greece, Montenegro and Bulgaria were busy beating up the Ottoman Empire. 1913 might not work either as the Balkan situation remained very confused.

All of this could have been avoided if Austria had acted after Captain Dimitrijević seized control of the Serbian Government during 1903. Russia was occupied fighting Japan and internal Bolshevik revolution. Britain and Russia were barely on speaking terms after the Russian Baltic fleet shot up some English fishing boats. Maybe Britain could even be convinced to take charge of Serbia after the terrorist regime has been driven from power.

 

[BombTaxi]

The Russo-Japanese War was 1904-1905, and the shooting-up of the North Sea fishing fleets and the first Russian Revolution also occurred in 1905. I also doubt the UK would have 'taken control' of Serbia in the event of an Austrian intervention, as the country was none of their business and offered no benefits to the British. Britain would only intervene in Europe or European overseas posessions to preserve the balance of power or respond to a direct threat to herself. British policy was in some ways much smarter in 1905 than it was in 2005...

 

[davebender]

If Britain took that attitude they wouldn't have most of the empire.

Things didn't work that way during the early 1900s. Britain was cementing control over Egypt at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, trying to expand the border of Malaysia at the expense of sovereign Siam and French controlled IndoChina, invading two sovereign Boer Republics in Southern Africa, sparring with Russia over who gets to control Persia etc. Offer them a chance to control Serbia and they will jump on it like starving wolves on fresh meat.

 

[BombTaxi]

You rather miss the point that Britain's imperial possessions all offered some benefit to Britain - Egypt gave control of the Suez Canal, the Northwestern frontier contolled overland access to India, the Far East colonies exported valuable commodities back to the UK, etc. Serbia offered no such benefit to the UK and as such, I doubt the British would 'jump' on it at all, with, as you would have it, half a planet to massacre and subjugate

 

[davebender]

I'd hazzard a guess 1903 Serbia had a higher GDP then places such as Uganda and Kenya. It sits astride the main rail line to Constantinople (hence the reason 1915 Germany invaded). Control of Serbia would greatly increase British leverage over the Ottoman Empire and probably over Greece too.

 

[parsifal]

The balkans were of interest to all the great european powers, as it was essentially a power vaccuum. If one nation attempted to gain control of the region other nations were attracted to it, simply to deny that control to the other nation.

In the case of Aust4ria, there was an added complication. Its human rights records towards ethnic slavs was so bad that it generated radical opposition groups like the Black Hand every time it made incursions into the region. The problem however, was greatly compounded by the fact that significant slices of the subjugated peoples of the Austro-Hungarian empire were of slavic descent, and were bei8ng affected by the ultra-nationalist influences of serbia.

Britain had no interest in gaining territory in Europe. Since the peace settlement following Waterloo, Britain had been ceded control of the seas, and with it, control of overseasd trade. Britain had done very well economically from this arrangement. She had had a very extensive empire in 1815, but the imperial expansion era was not really done so9lely for economic reasons. The amount of red on the map of the world served prestige and nationalist sentiments.

The only real foreign policy objectives for the Brits were

1) Undisputed control of the oceans, as had been given them after Waterloo
2) Control of trade omnto and out of Europe....by extension this meant dominance of the colonial possessions outside of Europe.
3) Maotenance of the balance of power in Europe, preventing any single power on the continent. A united Europe under the control of one power had the potential to subvert the british position. In its crudest form,this meant Britain would always support the second most powerful continental power in Europe.


Onto this was grafted the French alliance system, after rapprochement with that country was achieved after 1870. This meant inevitably that britain France and Russia ended up in alliance with each other. Though they had differences, they remained allies bound by common purpose....to deny dominance of the continent to their enemies

Their enemies had diametrically opposed objectives....they wanted to upset the fine balance of power that existed....Germany wanted to break free of British control of the seas, subvert and occupy France and the low countries, and push Russia out to the peroiphery of Europe. Germany wanted dominance of Europe, here enemies meant to deny her of that prize.

Therein lies the causes of the war.

 

[davebender]

Then why did Britain expend so many resources attempting to control the Agean during both world wars?

Getting Serbia for free during 1903 is a lot cheaper then invading Salonika and Gallipoli during 1915.

 

[parsifal]

Then why did Britain expend so many resources attempting to control the Agean during both world wars?

Getting Serbia for free during 1903 is a lot cheaper then invading Salonika and Gallipoli during 1915.

because by getting control of the Aegean, they could place pressure on the turks, open up one of the seas closed to british power (the Black sea) and excercise control far beyond the rather limited expenditure of resources that they would need to excerise that control. Garrisoning an island or a city is a far cry from garrisoning and administering a whole country or region.

Best analogy would be to analyze British reactions in Italy during the napoleonic wars. by enlisting support of a local nation, Britain got control of the med at a small cost in gold. They hoped to achieve something similar in 1913.

Projection of this power into Serbia achieved nothing in terms of this agenda, and would have cost a bomb, given the ungoverbnnable nature of the Serbs.

The most realistic option for avoiding war in 1900-14 would be to allow the break up of the hapsburg empire into ethinically based nations, much as historically transpired in the post WWWI peace treaty.

As for the statement that getting Serbia for free, well this is rather a silly statement to make. Serbia would not be obtained for free....it would come at the price of the alliance with Russia. This was a very high price to pay for a country that strategically was of no interst to the british, (escept as mentioned before to keep the balance of power. if the british lost russia as an ally that would be a price that far outweighed any benefits that might be derived (though I doubt any such benefits would arise)

 

[davebender]

The recently conquered Boer Republics were ungovernable too but somehow Britain made it work. IMO the creation of friendly South Africa from hostile conquered territory in only a decade may rank as Britain's finest achievement in colonial administration.

Work that same colonial magic in Serbia. Europe and the world would be a better place if Britain can pull it off.

 

[parsifal]

Its a matter of opinion, but IMO there was a world of difference between the Boers and the Serbs. Boers were few in number, and could be reasoned with. Serbs....there were plenty of them, and could not be reasoned with. Stubborn, cranky, great fighters. who would want to be governing them. Leave Serbia to the Serbs.....which was why it was so much of an issue for Austria, because Serbs means slavs, and a big part of Austria was Slavic.

In any event, Britain was never going to take over the serbs in that fashion. It represented the same behaviour that got the british upset with Germany. Germany completely ignored the sovereign interests of other countries, from 1866 on, and ending with the flouting of Belgian neutrality. The very thing that got the british back up, is never going to become British policy. It just would never happen. Britain was not going to turn on its own allies, and wasnt going to engage in behaviour within Europe that got Germany into trouble.

Regarding Brish attempts in the Aegean, I see you raise the campaigns in Gallipoli. Gallipoli was a brilliantly conceived plan that was attociously executed. With better planning and prepration it might actually have worked. But Gallipoli was not just about getting seaborne access to the black Sea. It was also about protecting Suez, by taking the fight directly to the turks own doorstep. It was about trying to knock Turkey out of the war early, and threby protecting the oil installtions in the Middle East, which even then were of some importance. It was about relieving pressure on the army of Egypt which was too weak to resist the Turks at that time.

The British had wanted to divert troops for a proper invasion of Salonika, but Joffre would have none of it. Joffre was right IMO. So the allies tried a naval assault firstly, and when that didnt work, opted for a smalller scale assault on the Dardanelles.

 

[michaelmaltby]

".... In any event, Britain was never going to take over the serbs in that fashion. It represented the same behavior that got the british upset with Germany. Germany completely ignored the sovereign interests of other countries, from 1866 on, and ending with the flouting of Belgian neutrality."

British foreign policy and "Imperial" policy had taken a couple of hundred years to evolve and was nuanced. Germany ... on the other hand ... thought that it could just invent itself and everyone would step aside and bow to the superior German logic and geist.
For example: the Peninsular Wars that Wellesley fought against Napoleon .... there's no equivalent in the German repertoire. Why
would Britain take a physical interest in Serbia ..... DaveBender? It is so out of character that I wonder you even suggest it.

MM

 

[davebender]

For the same reasons they were interested in Serbia during both world wars. Britain desired to have some influence in that region.
- Counter French influence in the Balkans.
- Counter Russian influence in the Balkans.
- Gain leverage over the Ottoman Empire and Greece.
- The value of the rail line through Serbia cannot be overstated. Among other things, that rail line was crucial to development of the Mosul oil fields (i.e. Berlin to Baghdad Railway).

 

[parsifal]

Most of the gains you mention run counter to basic British foreign policy objectives, and would in fact destroy the alliance system that by the beginning of the 20th century was an essential aspect to British relations in Europe.

Britain did not object to French influence being extended by 1903. Not sure about their attitude to Russia, but they certainly did not see the Rusians as a threat to essential British interests (as an aside, the Australians did....there were nagging fears of a Russian invasion in the Far east since the 1880s...however these were not fears shared by Britain to any significant degree).

Why would Britain not object to French or Russian increases in power within Europe? Because Britain did not view either of these countries as major threats to any of their essential interests. Germany, and her allies, however were viewed with a great deal of concern. Any increase in the power prestige and influence of nations opposed to germany was viewed with approval by Whitehall. Any increase to German strength or power was not. Its pretty much that simple.

Having said all that, the situation regarding turkey and the allies was complex, and difficult. France and Britain had fought the crimean war against Russia, largely to protect an ailing Turkey. The loss of territory in the balkans wars had seen the western nations acquiesce to the Balkan states victories. Italy's war with the turks in 1911 over Libya had further driven the turks away from the allied camp. The entry of Russia to the triple entente in 1907 had completed the turn around in relations between the west and Turkey and Russia. No longer was Russia an enemy of the west, they were an important ally. A more valuable ally than Turkey. But Turkey and Russia had long standing disputes, and the alliance between Russia France and Britain, kinda left them in the cold.

Nevertheless, Turkey was still split. Turkey had viewed Britain as her natural ally, and even as late as 1913, there were many in turkey that still considered that to be the prefereable position to adopt. however the increasing influence of Germany in the region, exemplified by the completion of the berlin to bagdhad railway, gained favour within certain elements of the Turkish government. The likely outcome of the prewar drift of turkey might have been continued neutrality, except for the rise of radical elements within Turkey. Led by Enver Pasha these radical elements were incensed by British refusal to hand over warships already purchased by Turkey. Pashas secret allowance of the Goeben and Breslau into turkish waters, and then the bombardment by these ships of Russian Black Sea Ports was instrumental in securing turkish belligerency on Germany's side.

The occupation of Serbia would not have assisted in unravelling this complex diplomatic impasse, in fact it would have made things worse in my view. And would have been achieved at the expense of losing russia as an ally, and destroying British credibility as a bulwark against german aggression. It would even have strained the Franco British alliance, since it would have been a clear shot across french aspirations.

In a word, the occupation of Serbia served none of the british essential interests, and would have come at a massive, disastrous cost to the British position. It would have served austrian and German intersts however. in other words, Britain would have sacrificed itself, so as to promote the intersts of its enemies. As if that was ever going to happen.....

 

[michaelmaltby]

Agreed.

Why would Britain do anything by land that it could do be sea ..? And external commerce for Britain was by sea.

MM

 

[Readie]

Most of the gains you mention run counter to basic British foreign policy objectives, and would in fact destroy the alliance system that by the beginning of the 20th century was an essential aspect to British relations in Europe.

Britain did not object to French influence being extended by 1903. Not sure about their attitude to Russia, but they certainly did not see the Rusians as a threat to essential British interests (as an aside, the Australians did....there were nagging fears of a Russian invasion in the Far east since the 1880s...however these were not fears shared by Britain to any significant degree).

Why would Britain not object to French or Russian increases in power within Europe? Because Britain did not view either of these countries as major threats to any of their essential interests. Germany, and her allies, however were viewed with a great deal of concern. Any increase in the power prestige and influence of nations opposed to germany was viewed with approval by Whitehall. Any increase to German strength or power was not. Its pretty much that simple.

Having said all that, the situation regarding turkey and the allies was complex, and difficult. France and Britain had fought the crimean war against Russia, largely to protect an ailing Turkey. The loss of territory in the balkans wars had seen the western nations acquiesce to the Balkan states victories. Italy's war with the turks in 1911 over Libya had further driven the turks away from the allied camp. The entry of Russia to the triple entente in 1907 had completed the turn around in relations between the west and Turkey and Russia. No longer was Russia an enemy of the west, they were an important ally. A more valuable ally than Turkey. But Turkey and Russia had long standing disputes, and the alliance between Russia France and Britain, kinda left them in the cold.

Nevertheless, Turkey was still split. Turkey had viewed Britain as her natural ally, and even as late as 1913, there were many in turkey that still considered that to be the prefereable position to adopt. however the increasing influence of Germany in the region, exemplified by the completion of the berlin to bagdhad railway, gained favour within certain elements of the Turkish government. The likely outcome of the prewar drift of turkey might have been continued neutrality, except for the rise of radical elements within Turkey. Led by Enver Pasha these radical elements were incensed by British refusal to hand over warships already purchased by Turkey. Pashas secret allowance of the Goeben and Breslau into turkish waters, and then the bombardment by these ships of Russian Black Sea Ports was instrumental in securing turkish belligerency on Germany's side.

The occupation of Serbia would not have assisted in unravelling this complex diplomatic impasse, in fact it would have made things worse in my view. And would have been achieved at the expense of losing russia as an ally, and destroying British credibility as a bulwark against german aggression. It would even have strained the Franco British alliance, since it would have been a clear shot across french aspirations.

In a word, the occupation of Serbia served none of the british essential interests, and would have come at a massive, disastrous cost to the British position. It would have served austrian and German intersts however. in other words, Britain would have sacrificed itself, so as to promote the intersts of its enemies. As if that was ever going to happen.....

Interesting points Michael,
I would add that we (and other European countries) held our breath when we realised that the spectre of a reunited Germany after the collapse of the Soviet bloc was a reality.
John

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Interesting points Michael,
I would add that we (and other European countries) held our breath when we realised that the spectre of a reunited Germany after the collapse of the Soviet bloc was a reality.
John

Why? I really never got that feeling from any other European countries, and don't see why they would.

 

[parsifal]

We havent yet analysed the German offensives of 1918. perhaps we should....

Anyone feel up to leading off on these amazing military achievements. If not, i will, later tonite, though rather hoped a student of german history better than me might take up this mantle