1936-1941: your best RA (tanks/artillery)

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

The railway constraint was because of British railways and the need to transport tanks from the factories in the home country - not across Europe.

I keep saying that all the time - the wide Medium Mk.II was transported across the UK by British railways.

The fighting compartment refers to the area the crew uses which includes the turret but in the British design did not "flow over" the tops of the tracks
as in have sponsoons as the T34 and Panther. This kept the hull height down.

Matilda II, the best British tank before the Churchill was debugged, have had the sponsoons. Hull of the Matilda I was much higher than the returning tracks.

The British may have had many designs but again most were not able to be refined due to budget constraints.

In many instances it is not easy to make a silk purse from sow's ear.
 

The British actually had several loading gauges as during the 1800s some of the railways built to their own standards. The later railways were more standardized but the "official" nation wide loading gauge was limited by a few of the early Railways, SOme of the later ones (and that still means before the turn of the century) had wider and/or taller loading gauges on their systems but it tend to limit what could go nation wide, Not much good if you can transport tanks from Liverpool to Glasgow if you can't transport them from London to Southampton for a made up example. The restrictions may have come about after trying to move the WW I tanks and the Vickers mediums and finding it could not be done all rail systems?




This over states the British types and under states the German types/problems.
For the British the light tanks MK V and VI are very similar with the main difference being an overhang on the turret of the MK VI to hold the radio. MK VII being a total redesign.

For the Cruisers it was sort of a mish mash and evolution. The MK II was a simplified up armored MK 1 (same drive train and suspension and pretty much the same turret), The III and IV were pretty much the same, the V was the Coventeer (which kept the MK III?IV suspension) in which the British tried to be too clever and really screwed up and the VI was a stretched Coventeer with different engine/transmission (went back to the MK III/IV engine) and an extra roadwheel.

The Matilda I was certainly a mistake but they only built 140 and since it was powered by a Ford car engine not too much design time was lost on the powertrain.

The Germans had two MK Is, using different engines, a flat four air cooled and an inline 6 that was water cooled which required an longer hull with an extra road wheel.
The Germans tried 3 different suspension systems on the MK II during the period in question.
The MK III went through 3 different suspensions (5 large road wheels, 8 small road wheels and final the familiar 6). The transmission went from a 6 speed tp a 5 speed and back to a six speed before the "E" model went to a 10 speed and finally back to a six speed on the H model which started production in very late 1940. Won't go into the guns
MK IV was a lot more "standardized" but did see some changes.
 
I keep saying that all the time - the wide Medium Mk.II was transported across the UK by British railways.

Loading gauge for British railways was 9 foot to 9 foot 3 inches. The MKII was 9 foot 1.5 inches wide so not all railways could take it (narrower than the PZIV).
The Churchills side stowage boxes had to be removed before transport to take it down to a nine foot width.

Matilda II, the best British tank before the Churchill was debugged, have had the sponsoons. Hull of the Matilda I was much higher than the returning tracks.

The Matilda had short overlaps but a look at the Valentine, Churchill and cruiser tanks all the way through to the Comet and then the Centurion shows the compartment
between the track requirement (the hull being higher than the tracks doesn't make it a sponsoon).


In many instances it is not easy to make a silk purse from sow's ear.

True as all tank building countries found out during the war.
 
The British had a rather nice starting point, the cruiser A13

But then threw it away with the Covenanter tank


Now please notice that on both of these tanks the hull was much higher than the return track with the tank at rest.
However with the tank in motion and at maximum deflection the return track could be much higher.

The space occupied by external storage boxes on the A 13 could have been used for sponsons to increase the size of the turret ring. The Driver could have shifted to one side to allow more clearance front to back for a larger turret ring. A better set up for front end armor shouldn't have been too hard to figure out.
The older tank had a cupola, it may have been a lacking in vision devices but at least it was there. on the Covenanter the Commander was reduced to one periscope or sticking his head out of the hatch, a common practice in many armies but on the Covenanter the hatch was the rear half (or third?) of the turret roof.

Pipe work above the turret on the 1st tank is the AA mount for the Bren gun?
Driving around with that opening in the top makes the tank crew somewhat more vulnerable to airburst shells.
 
British rail loading gauges depend upon the specific track/route/obstacles and other traffic on the same route. A national gauge allowed all traffic on all standard gauge lines. A careful choice of routing other traffic can allow a wider and/or taller load than that national standard. Britain's pioneer rail construction used shorter units allowing tighter turns and hand cut tunnels and bridging/ embankments/cuttings resulted in minimum widths etc. Later rail networks elsewhere in the world benefitted from later tools, materials and construction methods and were designed around longer units and wider units so Britain had particular internal restrictions for normal traffic. In a managed wartime national rail network trains carrying tanks could be routed via longer routes, times of day and sole use of certain ways temporarily so could accommodate larger loads. In the end more and larger road transporters allowed other choices until an A39 Tortoise could be transported from Britain to Germany without using it's own tracks. Also, pre Bailey Bridge, the Royal Engineer's tactical bridging was limited to 17 tons (?) and a certain width.

On a different tack. The Comet managed a decent turret ring despite it's overall width. Sufficient to cope with a 20 Pounder gun when refitted to the Cromwell chassis as the Charioteer.

Overall it means that there was a real rail restriction which was particularly tricky in Britain but it should not preclude a perfectly adequate period tank carrying a decent gun.
 
To move a bit from the 3pdr preaching of mine, let's say British army in mid-1930s decides to piggy-back on the RN's 6 pdr in development from late 1920s/early 1930s, the 6pdr 10cwt. Both for AT and tank gun roles. How much the British/Allied tankies & AT gunners are better off in 1st two-three years of ww2?
 
Not much better if as good as getting the 6pdr AT gun into production when the design was ready.
A prototype gun was supposed to have been fired at some point in 1939, after which the the design was "sealed" and put into a drawer to await it's day of need.
An order was placed in June of 1940 for 400 guns but they had to wait while 2pdrs were built to re-equip the forces Dunkirk and to equip the rapidly expanding British army, a 2pdr gun was figured to be better than no gun. First guns are not made until Nov of 1941 but by May of 1942 1500 guns a month are being built. 17,854 guns were built in 1942 in the UK alone.
400 guns in NA in 1940 might have seen some rather different results to more than one battle.
The regular 6pdr AT gun was about 300lbs lighter (barrel and Breech) than the coast defence gun and fired at about 300fps higher velocity.

Of course you still have the British self defeating shoulder control of the elevation screwing up long range gunner in the dessert.
 

I was not suggesting it as a supposedly equal, let alone superior piece than the historic AT 6pdr gun, but because it was in, granted, limited production even before the 2pdr is in production. The effect of British Army chipping in the production of guns and ammo by 1936, the AT and tank gunners might have their version in general use by 1939.

Of course you still have the British self defeating shoulder control of the elevation screwing up long range gunner in the dessert.

Yes, indeed.
 
There were other problems with tank design / procurement as the earlier covenanter post shows. A tank ordered before it was even built mainly because
it was cheaper (around 1938 I think).

The first problem was the engine which was a Meadows flat 12 designed for the tank. Inexperience with tank design showed as the cooling system
didn't fit and had to go outside on the hull. As a result the tank always had heating problems. Later tanks had the Nuffield Liberty engine which
was a very old design. The Rolls Royce Meteor was the version of the Merlin with cast iron pistons and no supercharger. This engine type was
investigated early on (1939 ?) but the need for aircraft supply meant it was a no go till much later in the Cromwell. The Churchill used a Bedford
engine which was also underpowered and got worse as more armour was added. In other words there wasn't a decent engine to power a heavier
vehicle at a reasonable speed in the early years.

Cost and speed of production played a part as well. Building tanks without the larger turret ring capability was faster and cheaper which was
politically expedient at the time and especially after Dunkirk even though it wasn't a good long term solution. The other factor in this was that
the Char B1 and Matilda had been able to withstand German tank guns but the quicker moving enemy units made an impression (lots of them
getting around flanks etc).

The efficient use of communications and air support was not fully realised until much later either.
 

The tank might be underpowered, not the engine?
Liberty have had two problems. 1st was that cooling system was not that well designed/executed until later? 2nd problem was that, while the 340 HP versions run acceptably well, uprating them to 410 HP didn't work.
Unfortunately, British Army/Tank Corps seem to never took a look at RR Kestrel as a tank engine before the war, nor they tried to twin the AEC engines of 135 HP and more. Air cooled radial engines also seem not to be on the list.
IIRC the Meteor was still using light metal pistons.


British were ordering the 40 ton Churchill with 2 cannons by the time of the Sudettenland crysis - does not sound neither cheap nor fast to produce.
Valentine have had a bigger turret ring than T-34-76.
Problem was the doctrine of firing while moving, that favored light and ballanced cannon, meaning a lot of that gun need to be well within turret, than in turn meant internal mantlet that eats in the turret too much.
Aim for installation of an actual cannon, while in the same time throw the "fire on the move" doctrine throught the window. All of the sudden the same turret ring is a non-issue, since the gun truninons can be located beyond the turret ring so the cannon has enough of room to recoil.
 
The Kestrel was evaluated at the time the Meteor was looked at and found to be unable to provide the required horsepower per ton that the Meteor could.
The Meteor was trialled in a Crusader in April 1941 and was found to be highly suitable. Leyland were asked to produce the Meteor as Rolls Royce were
to concentrate on the Merlin. 1200 engines were to be produced in1942 but Leyland never got to the stage of production.

The first prototypes of the Churchill A22 were not produced until the end of 1940 with the first production models being built in mid 1941.

Again, fitting a bigger gun in quantity wasn't able to be done in those years. The tank procurement program was only allocated 1% of the
military budget in those years so costs were a big factor.

Tactical use was definitely incorrect but so was integration with air support, something which also had to be relearned. The core of the problem is
not so much the guns and armour but the steadfast opposition from many to the tank in the first place. This lead to the tank corps being pushed
to the bottom of the pile in the early 1930's with the lessons already learned being totally ignored.

The combined power of aircraft and tank use was missed by Britain and France even though it had been shown to be effective as far back as
the First World War. It was not missed by Germany. Guderian had been a transport officer in WWI and had noted the importance of communication
thus German tanks and command vehicles were well equipped and trained when it came to radio comms.

Kesselring was an artillery officer who noted the potential power of air observation and bombing (close support), again in WWI.

Germany had this combination.

Britain and France were expecting a more static front system. It didn't happen that way.
 
The Kestrel was evaluated at the time the Meteor was looked at and found to be unable to provide the required horsepower per ton that the Meteor could.
Part of this problem was the requirement itself, which in time became meaningless. They wanted a certain amount of power per ton of tank which, as you say, the Kestrel could not provide. however as things turned out that amount of power was rarely used.

The Covenanter didn't meet the spec with it's special built engine, the Churchill sure didn't, The Liberty engine didn't meet the spec in most tanks it was used in (except the very early ones) and by late war, the Centurion didn't meet the spec by a fair margin and the Cromwell, which came closest (or meet the spec) had to be regrared to slow it down to avoid wear and tear on the suspension and (rarely mentioned, the crew).

The Kestrel was a 22 liter engine which falls rather neatly between the 21 liter engine in the early Tigers and the 23 liter engine in the later Tigers and Panthers. Granted the larger tanks could have used an even bigger engine to advantage but the Kestel should have had no problem with tanks of up to 35-40 tons as a practical matter.
 

Please note that I've specifically said "British Army/Tank Corps seem to never took a look at RR Kestrel as a tank engine before the war ". Meteor was not even gleam in eyes of RR designers before the war.

The first prototypes of the Churchill A22 were not produced until the end of 1940 with the first production models being built in mid 1941.

Production of prototype is done many moths after the request for proposals is sent around.

Again, fitting a bigger gun in quantity wasn't able to be done in those years. The tank procurement program was only allocated 1% of the
military budget in those years so costs were a big factor.

The non-fitting of the bigger gun was due to current doctrine. Designing two brand new guns and their ammo from the scratch is opposite of being frugal with budget.


Agreed pretty much.
 
Whatever way this is looked at incomes down to a lack of forward thinking. Bigger, heavier, more powerful engines, bigger guns should have been considered earlier
than they were.

From the other side of the coin once the war was on Germany actually slipped back by building bigger. From 1943 on the combination of larger tanks with a significant
lowering of reliability and range coupled with an ever dwindling capacity for air support meant no more successful offensives could be carried out. Although the
larger German tanks were hard to kill they were also harder to manufacture (materials and time) which allowed British and American types to do what they were
made for - move with and protect infantry.

Much is made of British design faults but ultimately they weren't alone. It must also be remembered that no one had all the answers when it came to how to build
and use a good tank. Mistakes were made all round with the Panther being a good example.
 
Whatever way this is looked at incomes down to a lack of forward thinking. Bigger, heavier, more powerful engines, bigger guns should have been considered earlier than they were.

Agreed.


Agreed again. Looking at Germany, they IMO made a mistake of not designing a 30-ish ton tank by 1941, and we can also see that a 18-22 ton tank can be very useful reliable and of long life.
But then, this thread is about British tanks and artillery.
 
Any thread like this is predicated on comparisons - what could have been done to take on the opposition ?

I think you hit the nail on the head with the opinion on the 30ish ton tank. That is what Britain should have aimed for as well. Throw the
restrictions on size and build a vehicle which may only take the two pounder at the start but is solid enough to be given an engine upgrade
when available along with more armour and a much larger gun. 30 tons would also mean the tank would have the ability to move at a decent
speed without overtaxing the mechanicals. It would also allow variants to be useful - self propelled artillery being one as this didn't happen
quickly enough either.

Tanks were produced either side of this. The Churchill was much heavier and found a niche (AVRE etc) but wasn't the answer.
The Crusader came close but was too light overall to take major upgrades.
 
Any thread like this is predicated on comparisons - what could have been done to take on the opposition ?

It is not just a comparison of tank from country A vs. tank of country B, but also: are we making a better tank (better armed/armored while avoiding being too heavy, faster/more maneuverable on tough terrain, safer and easier to use/mantain; not a 'single target' tank) for tomorrow, than what our tank of yesterday offered?
 
Okay, now that we have our 30 ton tank up and running, and Germans are up to no good, it is time to up-gun it. Plus, a good AT gun is needed. I'd suggest thata new gun uses ammo of the 12 lb 20 cwt gun (7.2 kg at 762 m/s), and obviously be of new construction, so it is neither too bulky nor too heavy.
 

Users who are viewing this thread