A better Coastal Command?

[Shortround6]

Somebody questioned a while ago about the number of threads that were concerned with improvement of German capabilities and the relative lack of such threads/suggestions for the allies.

So here is one.

Coastal command was in pretty dismal shape in the early part of the war and an "improved" Coastal Command might have made a significant difference. This would require several "AH HA" moments in the early/mid 30s.

1. The realization that early Asdic, on it's own, did not end the threat of submarines. It was big help compared to hydrophones of WW I but a few flotillas of Asdic equipped destroyers were NOT going to sweep the seas/oceans clean of enemy subs. It was going to require both better AS weapons and a better way of finding the subs to begin with (before they torpedoed something).

2. Aircraft had proved quite useful in WW I at finding subs even if not very good at killing them. The larger the area aircraft could cover the more restricted the subs movement and vision was. More and longer ranged aircraft to look for subs would be a good idea.

3. It might be a good idea to actually test planned/approved anti-sub weapons against a soon to be scrapped WW I submarine to see the actual results. This would lead to the conclusion that the 100lb anti sub bomb was total failure well before the war and force a rethink of aircraft weapons and indeed, aircraft needed.

4. Coastal Command might actually be useful for attacking enemy surface ships at some distance from the British coast, at least if equipped with something other than the Vickers Vildebeest

This was a huge airplane that first flew in 1928.

It's ability to deliver a torpedo to a modern warship would be rather dubious even in 1936.

 

[tomo pauk]

If we want from the CC to reach as long as possible, it will be needing 4-engined aircraft ASAP. Not just because of payload it will be lifting, it is that engine-out sizuation in a 4-engined job is far less a dangerous affair than it is for a 2-engined type. Gratnted, plenty of 2-engined aircraft will be needed, too, in order to cover the big ocean, at distances closer to the UK.

 

[Shortround6]

At the start of the war CC had 18 squadrons. 10 of which had Avro Ansons. two Vickers Vildebeest, two Short Sunderland, three Saro London and one Supermarine Stranraer squadrons. The engine out situation can be solved (somewhat) by using higher powered engines and by using feathering propellers and cross feed fuel systems. Duplicate hydraulic pumps and generators help also.
As an example the Lockheed 10E transport of Early 1936 (certified in Dec 1935) using 550hp P & W wasps had a single engine ceiling of 9500ft at full load. It may not have had some of the features I mentioned but was popular for the safety it provided in mountainous areas. Using 450hp Wasp Juniors the one engine ceiling was 4000ft.
Coastal Command was also saddled with 4 squadrons of biplane flying boats (the AIr Ministry in the early 30s seems to have believed the monoplane was a passing fad

Saro London

Top speed 155 mph clean range, range could hit 1700 miles but only with a reduced bomb load (max 2000lbs) and fitted with the over fuselage fuel tank shown in photo. It first flew in 1934 and entered squadron service in 1936. RAF still believed gunners in open cockpits made effective lookouts after 6-8 hours??
Please note that the Catalina was in production and entering squadron service in 1936 (although with 900hp engines and not the 1200hp engines most WW II versions had) but had ranges over 2000 miles.
Sikorsky had also flown the S-43 in 1935 and sold a number in 1936.

Including this one sold to Norway in 1936. top speed was 190 mph but range was a bit short (775-800miles) however could passenger capacity be traded for fuel/weapons? Payload with 400 gal of fuel and 3 crewmen was 3300-3600lbs. One specification claims the plane could make 125 mph at 7000ft on one engine (doesn't say for how long). Constant speed propellers were an option and controllable props were standard. Saro London may have been using fixed pitch props.

 

[buffnut453]

The problem you face in 1939 is that, no matter how good the aircraft are, they won't have much impact on the U-boat threat until the advent of ASV and even then it was the combination of radar and Leigh light that enabled consistently accurate attacks against U-boats.

 

[swampyankee]

Even unarmed, radar-free aircraft would tend to force submarines to submerge -- the submarine commander can't assume that a spotting report wasn't passed to somebody with weapons capable of putting a teeny little hole in the pressure vessel.

Since I am far from expert on RAF history and, especially, its internal politics, I can't really give a good reason for why its aircraft were what they were. Since WW1 had demonstrated that submarines could be severely damaging to the UK -- while there was no actual starvation in the UK, there was what is euphemistically called food insecurity, including resulting malnutrition -- it would seem prudent to put Coastal Command rather higher on the list of priorities than was actually done.

Send me back in time with enough bullion to pull some weight, and I'd have somebody like Shorts buy a license from Martin or Sikorsky to produce patrol seaplanes and to have the Vildebeest replaced with something much more modern. And spend some money on ASV radar and associated tactical development.

 

[buffnut453]

Even unarmed, radar-free aircraft would tend to force submarines to submerge -- the submarine commander can't assume that a spotting report wasn't passed to somebody with weapons capable of putting a teeny little hole in the pressure vessel.

But the aircraft has to find the U-boat in the first place. Without radar, the aircraft only has a chance of finding the U-boat in daytime...but even then the odds of a successful engagement are vanishingly small.

 

[dogsbody]

Shore-based torpedo aircraft with a good range. The Vickers Wellesley:


Chris

 

[Shortround6]

Aircraft had proved their worth in WW I for anti-sub work. It had been noticed that U-Boat activity (attacks) were lower in areas that aircraft patrolled even if there were NO sinkings attributed to AIrcraft in WW I (there was one shared kill?)
The U-boats also had no radar and depended on visual spotting of ships/convoys. Of course the U-boats visual range was dependent on weather but in clear weather even smoke on the horizon was a good indicator. However that meant the U-boat (or anybody else's submarine) had to run on the surface at 10-18kts in order to get actual visual ID of the target. Depending on sea state the wake could be seen for some distance from the air. U-boats often spotted a target (ship or convoy) during the day and maintained contact until night when they could attack on the surface using their superior speed. Things changed as the surface escorts got radar. So limiting the subs daylight activity puts a big dent in it's overall activity as it has the same problem at night as the aircraft and surface escorts, poor visibility at night. Closing on a convoy that a sub has been tailing for hours during the day is one thing. Finding a new convoy at night, even surfaced, is another thing altogether.

If the aircraft can keep the sub under water then the subs visual search range shrinks considerably and most subs cruised at about 4kts underwater so their ability to close on even a 7kt convoy was extremely limited. Subs could peak at 8-9 kts but the extra power and the discharge characteristics of lead acid batteries often mean that 16-20 hours of endurance at 4 kts shrank to around 1 hour at full underwater speed.

Chances of a successful engagement go up with 1. a higher attack speed 2. a bigger spread of anti sub bombs 3. bombs with a bigger blast radius.
The faster a plane can reach the subs position the less time the sub has to dive and evade. A German type VII could dive in 25-30 seconds so a 120kt (138mph) airplane has to be within 1 N mile of the target when spotted by the sub.

early tactic was to drop one or two bombs per attack which pretty much meant a direct hit was needed and for the Anson even a direct hit by the 100lb anti sub bomb was no guarantee of a kill. A stick of four bombs gave a much longer lethal pattern if the bombs used had some sort of lethal radius.

Please note that the standard MK VII depth charge used by surface ships weighed about 420lbs and had a 290lb charge. testing later in the war showed it had a 19-20ft lethal radius which certainly puts the 52lb charge in the MK I anti sub bomb in perspective.

The standard surface depth charge was used from aircraft when fitted with nose and tail fairings (which broke off when hitting water) total weight 450lbs but it was large in diameter and would not fit on 250lb bomb racks/carriers or internally on Hudsons. It also was unreliable if dropped from over 100ft and 100kts. This was later improved to 150ft and 150 kts.

There were 250lb and 500lb anti-sub bombs but information is sketchy and they were not popular. the explosive used may have had problems in a salt water environment or not been particularly violent. It took until 1941 to get 250lb airborne depth charges. and while anti-sub bombs and depth charges had priority for better explosives it took a while.

 

[Shortround6]

If they had built even 12-20 of the 100lb anti-sub bombs at some point in 1934/35 and tested them against a mock-up hull or scrapyard bound ex-WWI sub the failings of the 100lb would have been found out and a larger more effective weapon could have been built, however a larger, heavier bomb means the Anson, as built, can't carry them. You either need a bigger plane or an Anson with bigger engines and better propellers.

British have an engine gap, there is nothing in existence between the 7 cylinder Cheetah and the 9 cylinder Mercury. Armstrong Siddeley had built several two row ten cylinder engines in the 20s and very early 30s, perhaps a modern version of one them? stick 9 Cheetah cylinders on one crank throw?
Bristol had built the 7 cylinder Neptune in the 20s with Mercury sized cylinders but the 4 valve cylinder seems expensive.
Ansons were built in Canada using 450hp P&W Wasp Juniors so a more powerful Anson doesn't seem unreasonable.
I would note that the Sikorsky Flying boat pictures above used 750hp P & W Hornet engines so either using Mercuries or build a British twin monoplane using Mercuries doesn't seem unreasonable either.

Building a few more Harrows or Bombays might have been useful for land planes. Again make sure they have feathering propellers.

The Anson is doing well if it can patrol 200 miles from land. A patrol means flying out and then turning and covering an arc before flying back, or flying to an area and performing a search pattern, not simply flying out and immediately turning around and flying back. This left the 6 squadrons of flying boats to actually cover anything more than 200 miles from the coast or to escort convoys (fly circles around the convoy for several hours at a time). Even 3 squadrons of planes would be a 50% improvement and planes that could operate (spend several hours) at 600 miles from the coast would mean an extra day of steaming for a convoy over a 400 mile distance and 2 days steaming over a 200 mile air patrol distance.

Even if the "improved" Coastal Command doesn't sink many U-boats (2-3?) if they can keep the number of sinkings down during 1939/40 will the Germans keep pouring resources into the U-Boat campaign or will they reconsider and spend the resources elsewhere?

 

[tomo pauk]

...
British have an engine gap, there is nothing in existence between the 7 cylinder Cheetah and the 9 cylinder Mercury. Armstrong Siddeley had built several two row ten cylinder engines in the 20s and very early 30s, perhaps a modern version of one them? stick 9 Cheetah cylinders on one crank throw?
Bristol had built the 7 cylinder Neptune in the 20s with Mercury sized cylinders but the 4 valve cylinder seems expensive.
Ansons were built in Canada using 450hp P&W Wasp Juniors so a more powerful Anson doesn't seem unreasonable.
I would note that the Sikorsky Flying boat pictures above used 750hp P & W Hornet engines so either using Mercuries or build a British twin monoplane using Mercuries doesn't seem unreasonable either.

I'm not sure that there was an 'engine gap'. Use the Mercury as entry-level engine. Will do just fine in a 2-engined job (a Blenheim-sized A/C, or indeed Blenheim itself), in a 4-engined it will be even better.

Building a few more Harrows or Bombays might have been useful for land planes. Again make sure they have feathering propellers.
.....
Even if the "improved" Coastal Command doesn't sink many U-boats (2-3?) if they can keep the number of sinkings down during 1939/40 will the Germans keep pouring resources into the U-Boat campaign or will they reconsider and spend the resources elsewhere?

Good points.
Going out on a limb here - each long range patrol A/C might saw a convoy arrive with just one or two ships sunk instead of half dozen, plus perhaps one damaged or sunk sub? A net gain for the British/Allied war effort.

 

[wuzak]

Could they have got some Whitleys earlier?

 

[Shortround6]

Could they have got some Whitleys earlier?

Probably not unless there was a huge change in thinking in the RAF/Air ministry.

The Armstrong Siddeley Tiger engines engines were so bad that the early Whitleys using them were banned from long over water flights before the war broke out. That leaves the Merlin powered versions as the only viable bombers and Anti sub planes. About 150 Whitley's had been built with the radial engines. Even the Merlin powered versions could not maintain height on one engine.

 

[Shortround6]

I'm not sure that there was an 'engine gap'. Use the Mercury as entry-level engine. Will do just fine in a 2-engined job (a Blenheim-sized A/C, or indeed Blenheim itself), in a 4-engined it will be even better.

The British had no engine in the Wright Whirlwind 9 (R-975), Wasp JR (R-985) or Wasp (R-1340) catagory, aside from the De Havilland V-12 and so the Mercury was in high demand for even such things as training aircraft.
The jump pre-war goes from the 335-355hp Cheetah right to the 745hp Kestrel or the Mercury.
While it would have been nice to replace the 10 squadrons of Ansons with 10 squadrons (or more) of 4 engine long range patrol planes it was probably out of the question. Granted this is a "what if" and even a 1/2 dozen squadrons of Blenheims would have been a major improvement.

 

[tomo pauk]

The British had no engine in the Wright Whirlwind 9 (R-975), Wasp JR (R-985) or Wasp (R-1340) catagory, aside from the De Havilland V-12 and so the Mercury was in high demand for even such things as training aircraft.
The jump pre-war goes from the 335-355hp Cheetah right to the 745hp Kestrel or the Mercury.
While it would have been nice to replace the 10 squadrons of Ansons with 10 squadrons (or more) of 4 engine long range patrol planes it was probably out of the question. Granted this is a "what if" and even a 1/2 dozen squadrons of Blenheims would have been a major improvement.

The engines of 600 HP for late 1930s are in the category of 'why bother?'. UK has plenty of the 700-900 HP engines that will make much more sense for actual military aircraft of late 1930s, in any number of engines per aircraft, even if it is a 'low threat' enviroement of Atlantic.

Anson was pressed in the role of patrol aircraft because it was only 2-engined aircraft RAF was willing to give to the Coastal Command, not because it was suitable for the job. One squadron of Bombays, Blenheims or Harrows would've cost the UK less than two squadrons of Ansons, while offering better/longer coverage.

Could they have got some Whitleys earlier?

With Mercury or Pegasus engines the reliability (neccessary for long over-water flight) should've improved.
On the other hand, the A-S Ensign shows that a 4-engined job was there when needed. link

 

[stona]

Probably not unless there was a huge change in thinking in the RAF/Air ministry.

I'll quote from chapter 1 of Christina Coulter's excellent 'A Forfotten Offensive-Royal Air Force Coastal Command's Anti-Shipping Campaign, 1940-1945'

"When the First world War broke out, the aeroplane was in its technical infancy. A practical flying machine had only existed for a couple of years, but the impetus of war was such that by the end of hostilities in 1918, most of the problems associated with maritime aviation had been discovered, and considerable progress made towards solving them. Yet, in the time between the two wars, virtually nothing was done to advance the science of maritime aviation, so that the technology, in particular, with which Coastal Command entered war in 1939 was, in many respects, essentially the same as that perfected by the Royal Naval Air Service.
There are two principal reasons for the lack of progress. The first, and most important, was inter-Service rivalry and related predominance in the interwar years of strategic bombing doctrine, which overshadowed other ideas on the employment of air power. The other factor was the amalgamation in 1918 of the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying Corps to form the Royal Air Force. The RFC, being the larger of the two air branches, dominated the new service, and hence lost sight of valuable research work and conclusions drawn from the RNAS's four years' operational experience. The Naval Staff, as a whole, had a positive attitude towards aviation, and their interest intensified in the course of the First World War, while the War Office demonstrated less ambition."

That's a good summation of the situation of British maritime aviation in the interwar years, and why it was in such a hopeless state at the outbreak of WW2. It's worth bearing in mind whilst indiulging in flights of fancy regarding what might have been done

Cheers

Steve

 

[buffnut453]

Granted this is a "what if" and even a 1/2 dozen squadrons of Blenheims would have been a major improvement.

I think we're over-applying the retro-spectroscope here. Building up Coastal Command by an additional 6 squadrons needed to start before 1939 in order to have the personnel and equipment necessary. At that time, nobody expected France to fall in such rapid order. It was that fall which isolated Britain and imposed such a heavy dependence on materiel from the US. Ergo, before they could bolster CC, the Air Ministry would need to invent a really, REALLY good crystal ball to discern the future path of the war in Europe. Yes it's a what-if but the justification for a bigger CC simply wasn't there at the time when expansion of CC resources could have impacted the operational fight much sooner than it did in reality.

 

[stona]

Between 1930 and 1939 Coastal Command almost disappeared entirely. Not all sections of the RAF enjoyed the fruits of an injection of funds into defence spending after 1933. Maritime aviation suffered heavier cuts in the post WW1 disarmament than other branches and then grew most slowly when expansion of the air forces did occur.
Everyone, civil and service, was pre-occupied with the threat of strategic bombers from Continental Europe (first France, then Germany), against which the best defence was considered the establishment of an equivalent and deterrent force. The Air Staff claimed that if the RAF were to be called upon to perform tasks outside strategic bombing it could be done with minimal diversion of effort from the main bomber force. There was a general satisfaction with the results of bombing trials against naval targets, and the development of a specialised maritime strike force was not even considered.
Coastal Area, and its successor organisation, existed as a Fleet support body. After the Admiralty took over responsibility for the Fleet Air Arm in 1937, the maritime branch of the RAF became an orphan child, all but losing its raison d'etre. It was lucky to survive at all.
Nobody had any idea what Coastal Command's role was to be in a war and without such plans operational requirements could not be established. It's why the Command was in the state it was in 1939, and nothing but a fundamental change in priorities, years earlier, could have changed this.
Cheers
Steve

 

[buffnut453]

Hi Steve,

As always an insightful and informative post. Your statement "Nobody had any idea what Coastal Command's role was to be in a war" pretty much makes the same point I was trying to make. We're looking at this problem after the fact with an understanding of how things truly played out as regards the Battle of the Atlantic. Such insight was not available, indeed the actual battle as it evolved wasn't even imagined, at the time when decisions could have been made to make Coastal Command more effective in the opening stages of the war. Focusing on longer-ranged aircraft and more/better depth bombs might help a little but it isn't going to substantively improve CC's effectiveness to make an earlier impact on the U-boat war. The biggest single impact on U-boat losses was the deployment of ASV radar...and that's a tough technology to bring forward in time given the other pressures on the radar designers.

Cheers,
Mark

 

[tomo pauk]

<snip>

The ww1 proved that U-boat is a potent threat to the UK shipping, the shipping itself being vital for survival of the UK in the wars centuries ago. WW1 also proved that aircraft are very capable as recon platforms. Threat and asset were sure pointers into the usefulness of the Coastal command in keeping the UK in a future war where enemy uses submarines.
No crystal ball needed, just like Dowding didn't needed it.

 

[Shortround6]

I forgot another "AH AH" moment.

When the Germans negotiate their Naval treaty with the British that "limits" their naval surface tonnage to 35% of the British but gives them 45% of the tonnage in submarines. in fact the wording of the paragraph in question :
" In the matter of submarines, however, Germany, while not exceeding the ratio of 35:100 in respect of total tonnage, shall have the right to possess a submarine tonnage equal to the total submarine tonnage possessed by the Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The German Government, however, undertake that, except in the circumstances indicated in the immediately following sentence, Germany's submarine tonnage shall not exceed 45 percent. of the total of that possessed by the Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The German Government reserve the right, in the event of a situation arising, which in their opinion, makes it necessary for Germany to avail herself of her right to a percentage of submarine tonnage exceeding the 45 per cent. above mentioned, to give notice this effect to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, and agree that the matter shall be the subject of friendly discussion before the German Government exercise that right."

should have been a real tip off that the Germans were planing a submarine campaign in the future and even a very fuzzy crystal ball would give the answer that it would be the British that such a campaign would be directed against. There simply being no other logical target. France being nowhere near as dependent on imported food/raw materials. It shouldn't take the sharpest knife in the drawer to figure out that the Germans were claiming the right to build submarine tonnage equal to what Australia and Canada were building (in addition to Great Britain) but the German tonnage would be concentrated in European waters (or North Atlantic)

I am not advocating the enlargement of Coastal Command (more squadrons) so much as the replacement of aircraft/weapons that had more capability.
10 squadrons of Ansons which had neither the bomb lifting capability to carry effective weapons or the range to patrol areas of vital interest to the British forces like the Shetlands-Norway gap should have been seen as a very poor bargain even in 1935/36.
If they had tested the 100lb A/S bomb in 1934-36 they would have realized the Anson needed to carry 500lbs (or more) instead of 200lbs of A/S weapons and planned accordingly.

As it was not only did CC go to war to too few aircraft and aircraft that were substandard but the weapons they carried took until 1942 or so to sort out. (improve size of charges, improve explosives used, improve drop envelopes) which needed to be done regardless of what improvements were made to detection gear.