A better Coastal Command?

[Shortround6]

Coastal Area, and its successor organisation, existed as a Fleet support body. After the Admiralty took over responsibility for the Fleet Air Arm in 1937, the maritime branch of the RAF became an orphan child, all but losing its raison d'etre. It was lucky to survive at all.
Nobody had any idea what Coastal Command's role was to be in a war and without such plans operational requirements could not be established. It's why the Command was in the state it was in 1939, and nothing but a fundamental change in priorities, years earlier, could have changed this.

If nobody had any idea what coastal commands role was to be in war then everybody making the decisions in the 1930s had flunked WW I history in stunning fashion.
How many squadrons of flying boats and shore based aircraft had been flying anti-sub patrols in 1917-18?
What was going to substitute for them in a future war?

as an example the US Navy claimed in WW I
"The first recorded attack on an enemy submarine by a U.S. Naval Aviator was made by Ens. John F. McNamara on March 25, 1918, while serving at the Royal Navy Air Station, Portland, England. During the Great War the US Naval Air Force, Foreign Service, executed 30 attacks against enemy submarines, of which ten were considered to have been at least partially successful; it dropped 100 tons of high explosives on enemy objectives, and it had to its credit a total of 22,000 flights in the course of which it patrolled more than 800,000 nautical miles of submarine-infested areas."

One wonders what the British numbers were like????

and less than 20 years later (or even 15) nobody had any idea????

 

[Shortround6]

I would note there is a book on the RN aircraft in WW I but the price is a bit steep.

about $42.00 in paper back and $44.00 for an electronic edition.

256 pages.

 

[EKB]

Studies done 25 years ago showed that Coastal Command got far better results for sinking ships by dropping mines into the sea.
Direct attacks on ships had been more expensive and less productive.

 

[pbehn]

With many things on all sides at the outbreak of war it was amazing what hadn't been considered. Did anyone seriously "wargame" what would happen to Wellingtons and Hampdens if attacked by single engine fighters in daylight. Did anyone test out Defiants against SE fighters?

The UK had submarines in the 1930s and had seen how dangerous they were in WW1, to not properly research how to deal with what you yourself have is an oversight bordering on stupidity. As for solutions more priority for Sunderlands and a land based version like a B24 instead of Stirling bombers?

 

[pbehn]

Studies done 25 years ago showed that Coastal Command got far better results for sinking ships by dropping mines into the sea.
Direct attacks on ships had been more expensive and less productive.

But if you drop mines in the open sea they act at random and the Allies had more ships in the Atlantic than the Axis.

 

[Shortround6]

Coastal Command had several responsibilities.
1 was the anti-sub effort.
2. was the support of the Navy in areas near Britain, as in reconnaissance and strike efforts.
3. would be the interdiction of enemy shipping in areas neat Britain.

Mining is not a simple as it seems. To get the best effect you cannot just randomly drop mines in enemy waters. You have to put them into areas where there are a high number of enemy ships passing through. You can "maximise" the effect of your mines by putting them in choke points and using the threat of bomb, torpedo, rocket, gun strike missions to help "herd" the enemy ships into those choke areas.

Mine entrances to harbors and coastal areas and attack ships/convoys in more open waters so the enemy stays closer to shore where the mines are.
For instance mine the area of the Dutch/German coast behind the row of barrier Islands and attack the convoys that try to sail outside, and or mine passages between some of the islands.

 

[Graeme]

If nobody had any idea what coastal commands role was to be in war then everybody making the decisions in the 1930s had flunked WW I history in stunning fashion.

A sentiment shared by John Terraine in his book "The Right of the Line".

 

[Graeme]

If they had built even 12-20 of the 100lb anti-sub bombs at some point in 1934/35 and tested them against a mock-up hull or scrapyard bound ex-WWI sub the failings of the 100lb would have been found out and a larger more effective weapon could have been built, however a larger, heavier bomb means the Anson, as built, can't carry them. You either need a bigger plane or an Anson with bigger engines and better propellers.

Terraine again - on the ineffectiveness of the 100 - pounder...

 

[Airframes]

Heck, had it been a 200 lb bomb, the six light bulbs might have been broken !

 

[stona]

If nobody had any idea what coastal commands role was to be in war then everybody making the decisions in the 1930s had flunked WW I history in stunning fashion.
How many squadrons of flying boats and shore based aircraft had been flying anti-sub patrols in 1917-18?
What was going to substitute for them in a future war?

Almost all the lessons learned by the RNAS in four years of operations were either willfully or woefully lost when that service ceased to exist on amalgamation with the RFC. It was the RFC that completely dominated the newly formed RAF. The RAF/Air Ministry had no clear idea what role shore based maritime aviation would have in a future war, everything was dominated by a concentration on strategic bombing.

In 1937 the Admiralty, as part of its efforts to regain control of shore based maritime aviation, relieving the RAF of Coastal Command, argued that the role of the Command should be "North Sea reconnaissance and trade defence", which required careful coordination with the RN's surface forces. It argued that air operations over sea were essentially naval in character. "The methods employed in air attack and defence at sea are the universal naval methods which differ fundamentally for those overland."
The Admiralty was correct, but nobody at the Air Ministry was listening. The Air Ministry simply pointed out that shore based units were not provided exclusively for naval work. This was accepted by Inskip, Coastal Command remained an orphan child of the Navy, in the hands of the RAF. Furthermore, Inskip regarded the Air Ministry, not the Admiralty, as the "central authority for developing air power". The Admiralty did get the FAA, swayed by the Admiralty argument that the FAA's pilot environment was entirely naval and that it made sense that jurisdiction be passed to the Navy.

It is difficult to overestimate the malign influence of this inter Service rivalry. Between July 1937 and September 1939 Coastal Command and the FAA undertook just two combined exercises. In 1936 the RAF was restructured into the Commands that we are all familiar with (Fighter, Bomber, Coastal and Training) but it wasn't until 1938, as war loomed, and at the suggestion of the AOC Coastal Command (Joubert), that an Area Combined Headquarters was established in each Group to coordinate the efforts of the RAF's maritime squadrons and the RN's vessels. At an operational level there was subsequently cooperation between the two services just as war began. This is in stark contrast to the situation existing between the Admiralty and the Air Ministry where there was virtually no cooperation, all the lessons learned by naval airmen in the First World War would be re-learned at great expense by the airmen of the RAF in the Second World War.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Shortround6]

Thank you.

What could have been changed, and when, to make CC more effective in the first few years of the war and what knock on effect would this have had.

We know they screwed up big time. But without fantasy aircraft and weapons (Lancasters using sonobuoys and air dropped homing torpedoes in 1939

what could have been done?

Somebody in the Air Ministry seemed to think that something should be done because they issued the Air MInistry Specification R.1/36 for a monoplane flying boat to replace the Biplane flying boats, unfortunately this resulted in the Saro Lerwick which was one of the few planes that could make a Botha look good.

In my opinion the big 4 engine aircraft aren't needed in 1939-40 because the mid-atlantic gap didn't exist yet. The Germans still had easy pickings closer to the British Isles and they really didn't have that many subs that could operate effectively in the mid-Atlantic, especially from bases in Germany, Fall of France obviously changes things, as does the introduction of U-boats with bigger fuel tanks and additional spare torpedoes. But the Germans ability to operate in the mid-Atlantic in numbers is 1 to 2 years away in 1939.

 

[swampyankee]

One rather obvious thing would have been to use bombers -- real bombers, even if obsolete for strategic bombing -- in place of the Ansons, which were basically trainers. Even the Vickers Wellesley or Handley-Page Heyford would have been a better choice than the Anson -- at least they could carry a significant warload.

 

[Shortround6]

What seems to have been a major disconnect or oversight is that any plane intended for long over water flights should have been able to keep flying on one engine (or land in water).
This lets out the Wellesley and the Battle, engine failure pretty much meaning loss of crew. Unfortunately all too many of the British twins were under powered and could NOT keep flying on one engine even at low altitudes except in unusual circumstances. The lack of feathering propellers tipped the scale on some aircraft from staying in the air at low altitude to ditching.

The Lerwick in the photo above not only could not maintain height on one engine, it couldn't even fly in a straight line with one engine out. And several were lost when a wing float parted company with the plane on landing causing the plane to flip over so it's ability to land with one engine out is suspect.

It shouldn't take any more (or many more) ground personnel (Erks) to take care of satisfactory aircraft than the unsatisfactory ones so low purchase price tends to blur into ongoing operational costs over time.

Going back to WW I they used a lot of single engine float planes because of their ability to at least attempt to land on water if an engine failure should occur, which they did all too often in WW I but it seems this lesson was forgotten also.

 

[swampyankee]

What seems to have been a major disconnect or oversight is that any plane intended for long over water flights should have been able to keep flying on one engine (or land in water).
This lets out the Wellesley and the Battle, engine failure pretty much meaning loss of crew. Unfortunately all too many of the British twins were under powered and could NOT keep flying on one engine even at low altitudes except in unusual circumstances. The lack of feathering propellers tipped the scale on some aircraft from staying in the air at low altitude to ditching.

The Lerwick in the photo above not only could not maintain height on one engine, it couldn't even fly in a straight line with one engine out. And several were lost when a wing float parted company with the plane on landing causing the plane to flip over so it's ability to land with one engine out is suspect.

It shouldn't take any more (or many more) ground personnel (Erks) to take care of satisfactory aircraft than the unsatisfactory ones so low purchase price tends to blur into ongoing operational costs over time.

Going back to WW I they used a lot of single engine float planes because of their ability to at least attempt to land on water if an engine failure should occur, which they did all too often in WW I but it seems this lesson was forgotten also.

If a two-engined aircraft doesn't have enough power to maintain altitude on one engine and the range to get to a safe landing site, the only benefit to that second engine is that there's a longer period of time before the crash, but, overall, it's arguably worse than a single, as a twin-engined aircraft has twice the chance of engine failure. The Anson's twin engines may have provided some operational safety, but the aircraft was basically a trainer with a trivial warload.

 

[ChrisMcD]

What about the Lockheed Hudson?

Clearly someone realised the Anson was not up to the job and that there was nothing else available in the UK.

Lockheed Hudson - Wikipedia

In all fairness it was ordered in time for 78 to be in service in September 1939 and it did a creditable job - not the least of which was to ensure that Lockheed was a rapidly expanding company in time for WWII!

 

[Shortround6]

Something like the Hudson is what the British should have been building in 1937,

Bombing up a Hudson of No 224 squadron. First to be equipped with Hudsons.

It took almost a year to get 5 squadrons operational with Hudsons. Completed aircraft at Lockheed's factory being weeks, if not months away from operational use. Not all Hudson's went to CC even in the first year of the war. Some also went to both the RCAF and the RAAF.

 

[stona]

At the beginning of the war Coastal Command received the lowest of all priorities. Even Beaverbrook wanted to sever it completely from the RAF and dump it on the Navy.
The Command's role was largely limited to reconnaissance for the Navy (as in the Norwegian campaign) and anti-invasion duties. Unsurprisingly, from June 1940 Britain's air defences took priority over all else, even within the Air Ministry, where the building up of Bomber Command was always a major pre-occupation.

Incidentally one Hudson squadron was involved in reconnaissance, performing 'line patrols' between the Shetlands and the Norwegian coast just above Stadlandet down to a line extended out into the North Sea from the Tyne. The other five General Reconnaissance squadrons comprise Ansons which couldn't make the Norwegian coast, the last 60 miles was supposed to be covered by RN submarines.

As far as obtaining aircraft, Coastal Command asked for Blenheim IVs in September 1939. Unfortinately the Air Ministry had other aircraft in mind, the Botha and Beaufort. These were to replace the aircraft operated by the two Vildebeest squadons (an aircraft ACM Bowhill describes as "of such limited range and performance as to make them of very little value for the purpose for which they were designed".).
Trials with Nos. 22 and 608 Squadrons soon showed that both the Beaufort and Botha were, in their existing forms, unsuitable. It wasn't until late the following year (1940) that an 'up-engined' Beaufort, emerged. Until then operational restrictions limited sorties to UK coastal waters and torpedo training. The Botha was simply a disaster.

By 1941 Coastal Command did have it's Blenheims, more Hudsons, and was prising some Hampden's from Bomber Command's grasp. By mid 1941 Joubert was competing with Bomber Command for so called 'very long range' aircraft to close the Atlantic Gap. The B-17 and B-24 seemed up for grabs. Liberators with ASV equipment were promised in June 1941, but didn't arrive until July 1942!

Given that two years into the war Coastal Command was still receiving obsolescent aircraft from Bomber Command and having to fight for the types it had needed since 1939 it is hard to see what could have been done to ameliorate the situation.

Cheers

Steve

 

[swampyankee]

At the beginning of the war Coastal Command received the lowest of all priorities. Even Beaverbrook wanted to sever it completely from the RAF and dump it on the Navy.
The Command's role was largely limited to reconnaissance for the Navy (as in the Norwegian campaign) and anti-invasion duties. Unsurprisingly, from June 1940 Britain's air defences took priority over all else, even within the Air Ministry, where the building up of Bomber Command was always a major pre-occupation.

Incidentally one Hudson squadron was involved in reconnaissance, performing 'line patrols' between the Shetlands and the Norwegian coast just above Stadlandet down to a line extended out into the North Sea from the Tyne. The other five General Reconnaissance squadrons comprise Ansons which couldn't make the Norwegian coast, the last 60 miles was supposed to be covered by RN submarines.

As far as obtaining aircraft, Coastal Command asked for Blenheim IVs in September 1939. Unfortinately the Air Ministry had other aircraft in mind, the Botha and Beaufort. These were to replace the aircraft operated by the two Vildebeest squadons (an aircraft ACM Bowhill describes as "of such limited range and performance as to make them of very little value for the purpose for which they were designed".).
Trials with Nos. 22 and 608 Squadrons soon showed that both the Beaufort and Botha were, in their existing forms, unsuitable. It wasn't until late the following year (1940) that an 'up-engined' Beaufort, emerged. Until then operational restrictions limited sorties to UK coastal waters and torpedo training. The Botha was simply a disaster.

By 1941 Coastal Command did have it's Blenheims, more Hudsons, and was prising some Hampden's from Bomber Command's grasp. By mid 1941 Joubert was competing with Bomber Command for so called 'very long range' aircraft to close the Atlantic Gap. The B-17 and B-24 seemed up for grabs. Liberators with ASV equipment were promised in June 1941, but didn't arrive until July 1942!

Given that two years into the war Coastal Command was still receiving obsolescent aircraft from Bomber Command and having to fight for the types it had needed since 1939 it is hard to see what could have been done to ameliorate the situation.

Cheers

Steve

This sounds less like a funding issue than a political issue: Coastal Command may have been seen as "too defensive" or "not strategic bombing enough" for both the politicians -- including Churchill -- and the Air Marshalls, like Trenchard. Considering the sheer amount of material that can be brought in by ship -- one ship sunk on in one of the Atlantic convoys carried three weeks of sugar for all of Great Britain -- one does wonder, in retrospect, "What were they thinking?"

 

[Shortround6]

One does wonder what they were thinking.

Looking at the 1935 treaty it seems rather obvious that the Germans still believed in the submarine and were willing to sacrifice surface ships to get them.

Even if they built submarines up to the 100% limit of British submarines every ton of submarine construction had to come out of the 35% total. Which might mean the German surface fleet (if they kept their word) could be under 30% of the British surface fleet.

Despite the experiences of WW I it seems few, if any, of the decision makers in the mid to late 30s and even 1940 had any real idea of how submarine warfare really worked. Harris criticized the use of aircraft to go swanning about all over the ocean looking for subs, yet that is precisely what some naval commanders not only wanted to do but did do with expensive ships with large crews burning oil fuel by the hundreds of tons per day. (and lost the Courageous in the process).
A sub that is sitting in the middle of ocean a hundred miles from a merchant ship or convoy is no more effective than one in port.
A convoy not only limits the chances of a sub finding a target it brings the sub to where the escorts are. The sub has to try to sneak past the escorts instead of escorts/anti sub ships roaming the ocean. You are bringing the subs to where you can concentrate your ani-sub ships and your aircraft.

as far as aircraft flying patrols (swanning about the ocean) the early subs in WW II had somewhat limited range. Most of the Type IIs were lucky they could go 2000 miles and the first ten type VIIs were good for 6500 miles. What is more important was the amount of food/water they had. Every day spent under water and running on batteries was a day they weren't able to effectively search for targets and a day closer to when they had to turn around and head for home. a day spent at 4 kts instead of ten needs the same amount of food/water for the crew.
This "endurance" problem was, or should have been known to military planners ( who had been working out such things as the amount of feed needed for horses since the 1700s, or the amount of food and water on sailing ships).

I tried to point a few moments in time or a few factors that might have changed the historical flow. Like the 100lb anti sub bomb. The sooner it was realized that it wasn't even close to an effective weapon the sooner a substitute could have been worked on and the sooner an "operational requirement" formulated for an airplane to carry at least a pair of the more effective weapon. Like a 660lb weapons load instead of 360lbs.

Making a requirement that a twin engine aircraft had to be able to stay in air on one engine (even if at 1000ft).

It would also help, if once the plans shifted to monoplanes, they actually tested and developed weapons that could be dropped at monoplane speeds and altitudes. There was a months if not year gap between issuing monoplanes and development and issue of weapons that could be dropped at over 100kts and 100ft. One book claims Beauforts in 1940 could not use torpedoes because the higher speed of the Beaufort caused the torpedo to malfunction when dropped (a big reason for that tail and perhaps a forward shroud). Please note that most(all) photos of the pre war biplanes the torpedoes do not have to break away tail structures. They didn't need them at the speeds altitudes they dropped from.
This incompatibility is also surprising given the requirements for big bombers to carry torpedoes although one shudders at the thought of an Avro Manchester trying to fly at 100ft off the water and under 100kts into anti aircraft fire.

None of this requires engines that didn't exist at the time or fuel that didn't exist or radar/sensors that didn't exist. It just requires a few people to lokkback at WW I and see what worked and what didn't and go from there. Add in some minimal testing of the weapons you plan to use instead of living in LA-LA land that some tiny bomb that was 44% the size of the most common light case bomb used in WW I was actually going to work. They had over ten years to figure that one out.

 

[swampyankee]

One does wonder what they were thinking.

Looking at the 1935 treaty it seems rather obvious that the Germans still believed in the submarine and were willing to sacrifice surface ships to get them.

Even if they built submarines up to the 100% limit of British submarines every ton of submarine construction had to come out of the 35% total. Which might mean the German surface fleet (if they kept their word) could be under 30% of the British surface fleet.

Despite the experiences of WW I it seems few, if any, of the decision makers in the mid to late 30s and even 1940 had any real idea of how submarine warfare really worked. Harris criticized the use of aircraft to go swanning about all over the ocean looking for subs, yet that is precisely what some naval commanders not only wanted to do but did do with expensive ships with large crews burning oil fuel by the hundreds of tons per day. (and lost the Courageous in the process).
A sub that is sitting in the middle of ocean a hundred miles from a merchant ship or convoy is no more effective than one in port.
A convoy not only limits the chances of a sub finding a target it brings the sub to where the escorts are. The sub has to try to sneak past the escorts instead of escorts/anti sub ships roaming the ocean. You are bringing the subs to where you can concentrate your ani-sub ships and your aircraft.

as far as aircraft flying patrols (swanning about the ocean) the early subs in WW II had somewhat limited range. Most of the Type IIs were lucky they could go 2000 miles and the first ten type VIIs were good for 6500 miles. What is more important was the amount of food/water they had. Every day spent under water and running on batteries was a day they weren't able to effectively search for targets and a day closer to when they had to turn around and head for home. a day spent at 4 kts instead of ten needs the same amount of food/water for the crew.
This "endurance" problem was, or should have been known to military planners ( who had been working out such things as the amount of feed needed for horses since the 1700s, or the amount of food and water on sailing ships).

I tried to point a few moments in time or a few factors that might have changed the historical flow. Like the 100lb anti sub bomb. The sooner it was realized that it wasn't even close to an effective weapon the sooner a substitute could have been worked on and the sooner an "operational requirement" formulated for an airplane to carry at least a pair of the more effective weapon. Like a 660lb weapons load instead of 360lbs.

Making a requirement that a twin engine aircraft had to be able to stay in air on one engine (even if at 1000ft).

It would also help, if once the plans shifted to monoplanes, they actually tested and developed weapons that could be dropped at monoplane speeds and altitudes. There was a months if not year gap between issuing monoplanes and development and issue of weapons that could be dropped at over 100kts and 100ft. One book claims Beauforts in 1940 could not use torpedoes because the higher speed of the Beaufort caused the torpedo to malfunction when dropped (a big reason for that tail and perhaps a forward shroud). Please note that most(all) photos of the pre war biplanes the torpedoes do not have to break away tail structures. They didn't need them at the speeds altitudes they dropped from.
This incompatibility is also surprising given the requirements for big bombers to carry torpedoes although one shudders at the thought of an Avro Manchester trying to fly at 100ft off the water and under 100kts into anti aircraft fire.

None of this requires engines that didn't exist at the time or fuel that didn't exist or radar/sensors that didn't exist. It just requires a few people to lokkback at WW I and see what worked and what didn't and go from there. Add in some minimal testing of the weapons you plan to use instead of living in LA-LA land that some tiny bomb that was 44% the size of the most common light case bomb used in WW I was actually going to work. The yad over ten years to figure that one out.

I think a very basic problem -- and this may have been worse in the British Armed Forces than in others -- is that many people in the armed forces were very averse to change and unwilling to listen to those geeks with glasses who ... etc.; in other words, their opinions were stronger than their belief in evidence.