A better Coastal Command?

Shortround6 said:

I quite agree with the Sunderland, trouble is there were only two squadrons of them, which is somewhat understandable as they are large, expensive and somewhat difficult to build.

.

Click to expand...

Sunderland would be good, Stirling would be better.

Perhaps the B-17 would be a better option.

freebird said:

Sunderland would be good, Stirling would be better.

Perhaps the B-17 would be a better option.

Click to expand...

The Stirling didnt have great endurance it wasnt much longer ranged than a Wellington with the same load

fastmongrel said:

The Stirling didnt have great endurance it wasnt much longer ranged than a Wellington with the same load

Click to expand...

Stirling is a perfect example of what not to use. Too large, too expensive to operate in terms of crew, maintenance and fuel burn.

nuuumannn said:

But in 1936, no other country had a comparable land based maritime patrol aeroplane. The Do 17 was not in service and in 1934 the DC 2 and Boeing 247 was an aberration in world service. Advanced all metal airliners were just entering service, not the status quo. The point I'm trying to make is that yes, I agree with you in that the Anson was obsolete in 1939, but as I have pointed out on so many occasions, you go to war with what you have, not what you want. Yes, the RAF was behind in certain technologies, but ahead of everyone else in others. Yes, government was reluctant to spend on military equipment in the mid Thirties as the British wanted peace sooo much; its politicians had seen their sons march off to war and not return, so the Anson was it in 1936.

Click to expand...

The point was that there were all metal, multi-engine monoplanes with retractable landing gear not only being built somewhere but in the headlines of major newspapers and in cinema/movie newsreels. Not to mention two, if not all three "aberrations" had been in Britain, on British airfields even if only for a few days at the time of 1934 race let alone in 1935/36. IF the RAF and AIr Ministry were patting themselves on the back for putting the Anson into service they were delusional.
The situation was so bad, and so well known that Lord Rothermere commissioned the Bristol 142 "Britain First"

surprisingly he was almost talked into canceling the order by Brigadier General P R C Groves, a former Secretary-General of the Air League of the British Empire who claimed that Rothermere was being taken for a fool and the plane would kill anyone foolish enough to fly in it.
As we all know the 142 was turned into the Blenheim.

None of the offered aeroplanes above were dedicated maritime patrol aircraft, and on the world stage the only profferable machine comparable to the Sunderland offered thus far is the PBY, which between 1937 and 1938 some 14 squadrons were so equipped - good numbers. In 1938 the German maritime patrol aircraft in service was the Heinkel He 59. The Ha 138 was in prototype form and the BV 138 derivative would not go into service until 1940 and the He 115 was not yet ready for service, it entered production at the very end of 1939.

Yes, the RAF only had a small number of Sunderlands in service in 1939, but my point is that by then no other country (with the exception of the United States) could match the RAF's aerial assets in quality or quantity to deal with a sustained U-boat campaign. The Sunderland was the world's most modern maritime patrol bomber in service.

Click to expand...

That is not really the point. I have never argued that the Sunderland was not a first class airplane. However the rest of coastal Command (at least 14 squadrons worth) was in no way up to snuff. A much more effective Coastal Command could have been fielded using different aircraft in the squadrons that didn't use Sunderlands and without using much more in the way of crewmen or ground support personnel. None of the of the planes I offered up were maritime patrol aircraft but simply show that the Anson was hardly a first class or even up to date aircraft when first issued in 1936 let alone being the backbone of CC in 1939. This was obviously well known By the RAF and Air Ministry or there wouldn't have been the Programs for the Botha and the Beaufort and the Saro Lerwick. Unfortunately the first and third crashed and burned (or sank) and the 2nd ran much later than it should have and was crippled (in it's first year) by unreliable, overheating engines.

The French and Italians had pretty much given up on biplanes well before the British. The French and Italian aircraft should have been somewhat familiar to the British industry due to the air shows and competitions of the 20s and 30s.

I would be bit careful about other countries abilities in 1938-40. Italy supposedly had about 200 Cant 501s when they went to war in 1940.

first flown in 1934 it was hardly a Sunderland but it was a lot closer in ability (speed, range, bombload) to the Saro London than to a Walrus despite the single engine (amazing what a monoplane could do). These were supplemented by about 95 CANT Z.506S with over 30 delivered before Sept 1939

First flight August 1935, 15 commercial examples before military version built. There were other Italian Maritime aircraft.
The S.M. 79 first flew in 1934 but was too late to compete in the London-Melbourne air race, It did set several records in the next few years (and around two dozen more before WW II) so it to should have been known by British authorities.

Yes, you go to war with what you have but the British screwed up in many ways leading up to WW II, in ways that should have been noted and corrected at the time with the knowledge and experience that existed. In some ways they were leading the world. In other ways they were 3-6 years behind the world and paid for it in blood and treasure for several years at the start of the war.

The problem wasn't so much that the Anson was obsolete; it's that it was too small to be capable of carrying a worthwhile warload.

Coastal Command had two overlapping but different roles: maritime strike, that is attacking surface ships, and maritime patrol, the latter including anti-submarine patrol. The Anson could probably due something like checking to see if fishing boats were sneaking past customs, but they didn't have enough warload for a serious maritime patrol aircraft.

But didn't earlier posts assure us that there mere presence of an aircraft over a convoy was enough to deter U-boats? In which case the Anson's negligible bombload wouldn't impact the primary mission of getting the convoy though.

I think it's a little unfair to compare the state of British maritime aviation with other European nations.

Britain was Europe's (and the world's, still, just) premier maritime power, and to have allowed the state of maritime aviation, particularly shore based, because that is where the emphasis should have been placed, to deteriorate to the nadir at which it found itself in 1939/40 was a bad mistake, even without the benefit of the hindsight we enjoy today.

It happened for many reasons, many of which have already been discussed in this thread, but that doesn't justify it.

I'm not a fan of the Blenheim. This was yet another British 'Stopgap' aircraft. It was a feature of the Air Ministry's propensity for ordering aircraft which were at least available over more advanced types which were encountering problems in development. It led directly to an increase in the numbers of superseded aircraft in service, and further delayed the supply of more advanced aircraft.
Between 1937 and 1938 a total 1,770 Blenheims were on order. The term 'Stopgap' was first applied to the Blenheim in March 1938 when it was mentioned as the only aircraft available (not the best aircraft) to fill certain General Reconnaissance squadrons. By 1939 the Blenheim was considered by the Air Ministry as 'beyond effective operational value' but another 62 were ordered to 'fill the gap' until the Beaufort came into production.
All these obsolescent aircraft could be put to work somewhere, something appreciated by the Air Staff. Coastal Command lay in a distant third place behind Bomber and Fighter Commands, barely a nose ahead of Training Command. It was not only issued with obsolescent aircraft, like the Blenheim, but also received them when other Commands found no further use for them. The Hampden and Wellington are both examples of this.

At the end of 1939 Coastal Command (Bowhill) asked for three Blenheim IVs for trials. Sholto-Douglas replied that

"...it is agreed that it will be necessary in the future to provide reconnaissance aircraft with increased range, manoeuvrability and defensive power."

I don't know if the three requested aircraft were ever delivered, but In December Coastal Command received 20 Bothas, which was not what Bowhill had in mind.

The Blenheim was not a favoured son. In January 1942, 16 Blenheims from No. 143 Squadron were allocated to N0. 489 Squadron. These Blenheims had been 'operating' from Northern Ireland, but just how much 'operating' they had been doing is arguable. A report at the time found grass growing in their wing sections!

Cheers

Steve

stona said:

I think it's a little unfair to compare the state of British maritime aviation with other European nations.

Britain was Europe's (and the world's, still, just) premier maritime power, and to have allowed the state of maritime aviation, particularly shore based, because that is where the emphasis should have been placed, to deteriorate to the nadir at which it found itself in 1939/40 was a bad mistake, even without the benefit of the hindsight we enjoy today.

It happened for many reasons, many of which have already been discussed in this thread, but that doesn't justify it.
...

Click to expand...

Nobody was suggesting that UK produces less ships, but rater to improve the long-range patrol maririme recon and attack abilities. And they don't need many hundreds for this, a hundred or two (but capable ones) will do. Those aircraft will save british sipping from losses, thus making the UK have easeir time in war that was looming.

That's my point.
For a maritime power to so neglect maritime aviation is not excusable. The saddest aspect is that hundreds of men would die in obsolescent aircraft, re-learning lessons already once learned twenty years earlier.
The British obsession with strategic bombing (it was the RAF not the Navy that was charged with attacking the German fleet, just one result of this) had dire consequences for what would become Coastal Command in 1936.
Cheers
Steve

KiwiBiggles said:

But didn't earlier posts assure us that there mere presence of an aircraft over a convoy was enough to deter U-boats? In which case the Anson's negligible bombload wouldn't impact the primary mission of getting the convoy though.

Click to expand...

Presence did deter, but there also has to be credible threat.
A Destroyer 7-8 miles away would take 15 minutes to reach a dropped smoke float and a submerged sub could be anywhere in a 2 mile radius if running at max underwater speed. A 12kt trawler takes??????

Earlier the figures for 1939 were posted. AIrcraft spotted (or reported) U-boats 57 times, they managed to convert 40 of those sightings to attacks (dropped or fired weapons) Of the 40 attacks they claimed 8 damaged ?(or sunk, it was very hard to tell).

If you are going to use a twin engine aircraft with 3-4 men and the ground personnel that requires, a better plane (bigger warload) might give at least slightly better results.
AS mentioned earlier, due the short range/endurance of the Anson you need a lot of flights per day to cover a convoy.

The site U-Boat.net says that the U-Boats claimed 165 ships hit in 1939, Hit does not always mean sunk. Would better planes/weapons/tactics have reduced that???? and by how much, 10%? 15%? 20?

Please remember in 1939 the Germans were doing very good to have even 20 boats in the combat areas at any given time. most of the time it was much less.

KiwiBiggles said:

But didn't earlier posts assure us that there mere presence of an aircraft over a convoy was enough to deter U-boats? In which case the Anson's negligible bombload wouldn't impact the primary mission of getting the convoy though.

Click to expand...

Presence was an annoyance, which reduced effectiveness in a way that could be easily fixed: more submarines. Obviously, sunken submarines can be replaced, but it's harder to get a net increase when the annoyed submarine can return to dock with a live crew than when a submarine is sunk and its crew are all captured or dead.

I kind of like the Blenheim. Granted it was pretty much obsolete at the start of the war (let alone taking part part in 1000 bomber raids in 1942)
but it wasn't all that bad compared to some of it's contemporaries. Contemporaries meaning planes designed in 1933-35 and first issued in 1935-36.
Like the Tupolev SB first flight in 1934

Those are V-12 engines with really bad radiators. Unlike the Blenheim the SB got more powerful engines and some better streamlining.


The British faced a number of problems, many traceable to too few engineers/technical people. New aircraft took too long to design and build. Existing engines (at least Bristol radials) got frozen as available resources went to new engines.
As an example counter to the latter, the PBY Catalina started with 900hp engines for the -1 & -2 versions, shifted to 1050hp engines for the -3 & -4 and finally to 1200hp engines for the -5 and latter. the 1200hp engines showing up in the fall of 1940, 33% increase in take-off power in 4 years to help offset increased operational weights.

British seemed to have a strange idea that new airframes designed around existing engines (or similar powered ones) would somehow have significantly improved performance. (may have been true in the 1920s?) I have no other explanation for the Botha and Beaufort.
The Beaufort MK I wound up weighing more empty than a Blenheim I did loaded. A 20-35% increase in power was not going to make up the difference.
I don't know what the Taurus was initially proposed as but it wound up as a low altitude engine, so low that it makes a Merlin MK VIII look like a high altitude engine. Fine as a torpedo bomber engine but then it runs counter to the RAFs seeming plan to swipe as many Beauforts as possible for regular bombing. Peak engine power at 3500 to 4000ft doesn't sound good over land where there are AA guns.

Shortround6 said:

The Beaufort MK I wound up weighing more empty than a Blenheim I did loaded. A 20-35% increase in power was not going to make up the difference.

Click to expand...

The Beaufort was originally planned to use the 900hp Perseus. It might have been more reliable but given a performance worse than the lighter Botha.

Yes, you go to war with what you have but the British screwed up in many ways leading up to WW II, in ways that should have been noted and corrected at the time with the knowledge and experience that existed.

Click to expand...

Screwed up? That's a little harsh and easy to say with heaps of hindsight, which you possess in spades. Yes, the technology existed and it was applied, in aeroplanes such as the Sunderland! The Anson entered service in 1936 amd was based on an aeroplane that first flew in 1934! Britain wasn't at war in 1934, or 1936 when the Anson entered service, so why was it a bad decision then, when there were no U-boats prowling British shipping and the highest performing enemy fighter the British were likely to encounter was the Heinkel He 51? Geez, you expect Britain to build a Liberator when it didn't need it and couldn't! And remember, the Anson was conceived as a landplane to supplement the more numerous flying boats in patrol duties, not to replace them and out strip them in capability. Let's also remember that of the existing Anson units in 1939, 10 were with CC and 16 with Bomber Command in a training capacity. The warlike stance adopted by Britain around the Munich crisis brought about the Sunderland and Beaufort etc, but what Britain had in service could not be discarded, so, as I said it went to war with them.

Screwed up? Not really. Bad planning, maybe with a big hindsight telescope, but not a screw up. After all, in 1939 Germany had precious few U-boats and dodgy torpedoes, yet what it did do was remarkable in spite of this and the British could be thankful for the fact the Germans didn't have a greater capability. If Britain was brought to its knees owing to German successful sinkings that caused unsustainable losses, then you could regard their effort as a screw up, but since the Germans were in no position to do that, Britain hardly 'screwed up'; it survived against the odds, suffering enormous losses owing to decisions made in the past, before the war, but made with awareness of the situation as it existed before the war. Again, what are you basing this on? Some fictional wargame in your mind where everyone is equipped with aircraft with B-29 like capabilities except the British and their Ansons?

As Steve has pointed out, CC took a distant third in RAF planning and yes, perhaps in the years prior to WW2 more could have been done to bolster CC's capabilities, but wasn't because, rightly or wrongly, it just wasn't regarded as much of a priority as bombers ("The bomber will always get through" - Stanley Baldwin in 1932). When Gloster was instructed to build Hurricanes in its new factory instead of Wellingtons, the head of BC was very disappointed, but it was a sensible decision; it also goes to show how much emphasis was placed on bombers, not fighters until such decisions were made.

Remember, the fears that were held proved largely unfounded in the crucible of war, but in 1934 to 1936 the British could hardly be blamed for getting it wrong. For example, during the Great War there was a huge scare around the threat of airship raids against Britain in 1914, but they didn't (and couldn't) eventuate. The Brits couldn't be blamed for that either. The Royal Navy based much of its defensive strategy on defeating airships, from bombing airship sheds to devising fighters (scouts) to fly from improvised turret platorms to intercept them and building aircraft carriers to accommodate aircraft used to counter airships (it's remarkable how much of the strategic decisions the navy of WW1 made were based on the threat of airships attacking Britain).

Fears, regardless of how irrational in hindsight were very real at the time and Britain believed it had the strongest navy in Europe in the mid Thirties, that's how submarines could be defeated, it was assumed. In the meagre budgets of the mid 30s, remembering that the front line fighters and bombers were biplanes capable of little more than 200 mph and armed with only two machine guns, (not to mention the fact that the rest of Europe was so equipped, too) then what do you expect?! Britain's aviation industry worked slowly in peacetime and the competition to the Anson specification 18/35, was a modified de Havilland DH.89!

No, I'm not making excuses, but I have to question your benchmark by which you are judging Britain's efforts, SR. Certainly not by the standards fo the time, which is my point; no other country could have done what Britain was faced with any better, based on decision their governments had made before the war. Could the US have done it any differently? Not likely. Look at what happened off the coast of the USA in late 1941, early 1942 with the large number of sinkings of merchant shipping, with all those squadrons of modern, all metal flying boats, B-17 bombers and maritime patrol airships! How many U-boats were sunk compared to merchant ship losses? The US didn't even impose blackouts on the coast! And this was after the Brits had warned them of what was about to happen. The German U-boat crews regarded it as the 'Second Happy Time'.

Re: Coastal Command in a distant third place.
In all the expansion schemes proposed and implemented before the war Coastal Command, if we take the torpedo bomber and general reconnaissance aircraft as yardsticks, never had a larger than 12% share of the total, the average is just 11%.

We must understand the size of the Command. From a pre-expansion strength of just five squadrons, four of which were flying boat 'squadrons' whose operational strength has already been explained, the maritime figure rose to 18 squadrons by September 1939. Total operational strength 176 aircraft.
The growth areas were only in general reconnaissance and trade defence, 16 of the 18 squadrons being assigned to these roles, a modern anti-shipping strike force was simply not considered, Bomber Command would take care of that. 12 of those 16 units were operating aircraft that were considered deployable as bombers, should the bomber offensive need reinforcement. An Air Staff memorandum summarised quite nicely the attitude to maritime aviation and what was considered the real air war.

"Such shore based air forces should be available equally for the air war proper and for deployment in support of naval operations in accordance with the requirements of the situation at any given time."

My bold.

By the way, the other two units not involved in general reconnaissance or trade protection duties were operating the Vildebeest. At the outbreak of the war they had 12 operational and serviceable aircraft between them. It was built to a 1926 specification and was obsolete, not obsolescent. It was supposed to be a torpedo bomber (with an operational radius of 150-185 miles!) but had been originally designed as a light bomber before modification to a torpedo carrier. An Air Staff note of 1935 entitled 'The classes of aircraft required for the Royal Air Force and the policy on which obsolescent aircraft should be replaced' noted of the Vildebeest that

"Our mistake has been to make a bomber and then add a torpedo instead of vice versa"

And yet men were still expected to go to war in them in 1939. They were saved because the aircraft were mostly unserviceable and they were practically useless..

Cheers

Steve

as a defence of the Faithful Annie (Anson), the view from its cockpit was fairly good even if it was a low wing a/c. One of the reason why the only sqn that flew operational patrols with Botha, 608, wanted its old Ansons back was that even if Botha had shoulder wing, view from it was much worse than from Anson. Anson was also very easy to fly, so easy that it wasn't very good training a/c.

stona said:

...By the way, the other two units not involved in general reconnaissance or trade protection duties were operating the Vildebeest. At the outbreak of the war they had 12 operational and serviceable aircraft between them. It was built to a 1926 specification and was obsolete, not obsolescent. It was supposed to be a torpedo bomber (with an operational radius of 150-185 miles!) but had been originally designed as a light bomber before modification to a torpedo carrier. An Air Staff note of 1935 entitled 'The classes of aircraft required for the Royal Air Force and the policy on which obsolescent aircraft should be replaced' noted of the Vildebeest that

"Our mistake has been to make a bomber and then add a torpedo instead of vice versa"

And yet men were still expected to go to war in them in 1939. They were saved because the aircraft were mostly unserviceable and they were practically useless..

Cheers

Steve

Click to expand...

But the crews of Nos 36 and 100 Sqns were not so lucky and were shot to pieces in early 1942 off Endau (Malaya) by japanese fighters when attacking a Japanese landing force, still flying Vildebeests.

The CC was unlucky with its new a/c, 2 out of 4 were outright failures (Botha and Lerwick) and one badly delayed (Beaufort).

Juha2 said:

But the crews of Nos 36 and 100 Sqns were not so lucky and were shot to pieces in early 1942 off Endau (Malaya) by japanese fighters when attacking a Japanese landing force, still flying Vildebeests.

The CC was unlucky with its new a/c, 2 out of 4 were outright failures (Botha and Lerwick) and one badly delayed (Beaufort).

Click to expand...

Part of that first may be because India and Malaya were not as critical as Britain; part may be because of a general European underestimate of Japanese capability.

I think Shortround6 also has a good point: not enough engineers to create the aircraft needed in a timely enough fashion.

swampyankee said:

Part of that first may be because India and Malaya were not as critical as Britain; part may be because of a general European underestimate of Japanese capability..

Click to expand...

Although underestimating Japanese ability was part of the story, the bigger issue is one of priorities and the completely unexpected situation the British Government found itself in following May 1940. No British defence planning considered a situation where France would be knocked out of the war so quickly. That event simultaneously imposed greater dependence on trans-Atlantic trade with the US and opened the window for Japan to complete further aggressions in the Far East (eg moving into Indo-China and forcing Britain to close the Burma Road).

Far East Command was at the bottom of the totem pole when it came to reinforcements. By mid-1941, Britain was alone and the air war was alive and well not only in western Europe but also north Africa and the Mediterranean (Greece, Malta, Crete, Iraq etc). There simply weren't the resources available to reinforce everywhere at the same time. It had been long planned to replace the Singapore-based Vildebeests with Beauforts but they arrived too late, and the performance of the latter was so poor, that they were, with one exception, flown back to Australia. That left the poor Vildebeest crews to soldier on in their biplanes. That said, up until the Endau debacle, they did sterling service operating at night where they were safe from Japanese fighters. It's just that the extreme situation in late January 1942, coupled with some rather poor decision processes in AHQFE, forced a daylight operation at Endau...with disastrous results for 36 and 100 Squadrons.

nuuumannn said:

Screwed up? That's a little harsh and easy to say with heaps of hindsight, which you possess in spades. Yes, the technology existed and it was applied, in aeroplanes such as the Sunderland! The Anson entered service in 1936 amd was based on an aeroplane that first flew in 1934! Britain wasn't at war in 1934, or 1936 when the Anson entered service, so why was it a bad decision then, when there were no U-boats prowling British shipping and the highest performing enemy fighter the British were likely to encounter was the Heinkel He 51? Geez, you expect Britain to build a Liberator when it didn't need it and couldn't!

Click to expand...

I don't wish to argumentative and name calling.
The "heaps of hindsight" should have been in 1935-36 by the people in charge looking at what the experience of WW I showed. No need for post WW II hindsight.
Adopting the Anson as a trainer would have been a good decision. Adopting it as a maritime patrol plane when it carried less bomb load (and untested bombs at that) than the WW I anti sub planes and fewer guns than some is best classified as????? you are adopting a plane 17-18 years after WW I that is less capable than planes being used at the end of WW I aside from being a bit faster. Planning of aircraft and ship purchases/programs should always have been looking 5-10 years ahead. The Germans were not the only bench mark of aviation progress. The British could look at the French and Italians.

First flight in 1932 and entering squadron service in 1935. speeds up to 250mph and armament varied form two mGs to four or one 20mm and two mgs. Even if the Germans have nothing better than He 51s in 1935-36 doesn't mean that is all they will have in 1937-38.
and please point in which post I ever advocated the British build a Liberator or equivalent during this or any other time period under discussion.
Please do not put words in my mouth or twist my positions.

nuuumannn said:

Screwed up? Not really. Bad planning, maybe with a big hindsight telescope, but not a screw up.

Click to expand...

Bad planning equals screw up. For Bristol building the 9 cylinder 24.9 liter Mercury, the 9 cylinder 24.9 liter Perseus, the 14 cylinder 25.4 liter Taurus and the 9 cylinder 28.7 liter Pegasus equals what?

nuuumannn said:

Fears, regardless of how irrational in hindsight were very real at the time and Britain believed it had the strongest navy in Europe in the mid Thirties, that's how submarines could be defeated, it was assumed.

Click to expand...

Again, it doesn't take hindsight from after WW II to realize that this was an error. It takes remembering the lessons of WW I when Britain had the strongest navy in the world. The invention of asdic did not render the U-boat impotent.

nuuumannn said:

In the meagre budgets of the mid 30s, remembering that the front line fighters and bombers were biplanes capable of little more than 200 mph and armed with only two machine guns, (not to mention the fact that the rest of Europe was so equipped, too) then what do you expect?! Britain's aviation industry worked slowly in peacetime and the competition to the Anson specification 18/35, was a modified de Havilland DH.89!

Click to expand...

See above French fighter. Also see several French and Italian bombers of the time that were NOT biplanes (lets assume that the German bombers were developed in total secret ) or even the S 55 flying boat of 1924

Granted the two hulls are a bit archaic but 24 made a mass formation flight from Italy to Chicago in 1933,(with a number of intermediate stops)

I am sorry but congratulating the British on getting a monoplane into service in 1936 is a bit like giving the stable master an award for putting a lock on the stable door after all the horses are gone.

BTW the Fairey Hendon first flew in 1930 but delays in procurement meant it didn't enter service until 1936

Unfortunately is was slower than the flying boats pictured above.