Advantages & Disadvantages: Nations & Doctrine, Aircraft and Technology of WWII

It also helps to know what the book says so if/when they deviated from it they had a good reason why.
"I felt like it" " It seemed like a good idea at the time" are pretty poor excuses if things go wrong.

Attacks or operations are seldom carried out in isolation and one officer taking off on his own (with his troops) can leave other troops exposed or isolated.

Know what the rules say, and why they exist. then break them if need be.

I would note that before the war promotion was slow and there was no combat to judge performance by. Rule breakers didn't get promoted.

Glider said:

Officers trained before the war had to do things by the book.

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I already figured that out, I'm just curious why the case was such. Generally being creative and thinking outside the box is important to engage in effective combat. Sure, one has to follow orders, but there should be a degree of attitude to accept outside the box thinking, within reason.

I guess it wasn't until WWII that we figured this out...

This was pretty endemic in all the US pre war forces and carried on into the first years of combat.

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The USN did seem to value in it's commanding officers, the ability to think on your feet.

Shortround6 said:

I would note that before the war promotion was slow and there was no combat to judge performance by. Rule breakers didn't get promoted.

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And that's probably the best reason -- they had little experience to compare with, so those who followed doctrine got promoted. Those who were mavericks were seen as bucking the system and got bounced out

Armstrong Custer broke the rules, look where that got him.

Shortround6 said:

Armstrong Custer broke the rules, look where that got him.

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He lost his head (he was decapitated)

Glider said:

I'm struggling to understand how the US Army was different from many other armies in the aspects you identified. For example, the British Army wasn't particularly large in 1939 and was an all-volunteer force. Compare that with the size and complement in 1944-45, and there's no comparison. So why was the US Army exceptional?

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The British Army was a lot bigger than the US Army which in 1938 had a smaller army than Portugal. Its army had always been deployed across the world and in these overseas areas officers were encouraged to show initiative and go on expeditions.

The growth was much greater in the USA
In 1939 the US Army had approx. 184,000 men including the USAAF and peaked at approx. 8,300,00
In August 1939 the British Army had approx. 630,000 men (including the territorials) excluding the RAF and peaked in 1945 at approx. 2,900,000

In percentage terms the US Army increased massively more than the British Army peaking at about 45 times the size at the start of the war. The British increased by approx. 4.6 times a tenth of the growth of the US Army.[/QUOTE]

Firstly, please ensure you're comparing apples to apples. Does your US Army number include reservists or National Guard soldiers? From what I can see, the 184,000 is just active duty US Army soldiers (the US Army Center of Military History at Fort McNair has a total of 187,893 active-duty Army soldiers as of June 30, 1939). I'd like to see your numbers once the National Guard is thrown into the mix (either that or delete the Territorials from the British numbers and let's see where things stand).

I'd also like to know the source for the size of the British Army being 630,000 in August 1939. The biggest number I've found is 428,000 including territorials. For direct comparison purposes, the US had approx. 200,000 National Guard soldiers and a further reserve of 100,000 of trained personnel, mostly from OTC units. So the US Army was about 487,000 compared to a British Army of 428,000. Granted, there's still the thorny issue of airpower numbers which are include in US Army totals but not in the British Army. However, the extent of British growth is larger than you gave credit, while the US Army growth is considerably less. I'm not taking anything away from the US Army...it was a phenomenal achievement. However, let's not besmirch that accomplishment by cooking the statistics to make it look bigger than it actually was.

By 1944, I don't think the British Army was any less a "citizens' army" than was the US Army. The proportions of professionals to draftees were undoubtedly different but not to the extent that it made much difference at the teeth end of things, particularly for the Brits after June 1940 when a fair proportion of the "professional Army" had been killed or captured in France.

Shortround6 said:

Some people believe the US sitting back, fat dumb and happy until Dec 7th 1941 at which point, angered and aroused, the US swung into action.
This is totally false.
The US, from a production standpoint had been gearing up since at least 1939, in large part due orders from France and England (England had ordered the Lockheed Hudson in 1938). Ford was making P & W R-2800s in a government paid for factory several month before Pearl Harbor.

The US Navy had been getting larger and larger appropriations and starting construction of new ships and equipment.
There had a been a 40% increase in naval spending from 1935 to 36, another 8% from 36 to 37, held steady in 1938 and then jumped 27% in 1938 and then jumped 68% on 1940 over 1939. Total increase in spending had jumped over 300% from 1935, 1941 saw almost a 400% increase over 1940 and please remember that these appropriations are voted on before the start of the Gov fiscal year so the 1941 appropriation was made months before Pearl Harbor.

Several tank production lines had been started in locomotive factories well before Pearl harbor. The M3 Stuart started production in March of 1941, April of 1941 saw pilot models of M3 Grant built in the Detroit tank arsenal (new factory started construction in 1940), American Locomotive, and Baldwin Locomotive. By July of 1941 all three plants were making production versions. (Pilot tank models are often made of mild steel and not armor).

US response in 1942 was not the result of anger or a shift in will (although that certainly helped) but the result of several years of building up the infrastructure and numbers. How much sooner some of these things could have been done I don't know.

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I agree completely ….as a benchmark look at the West Bromwich Spitfire factory and the factories that built the Mustang, when the decisions were made, when ground was first broken for the construction and when planes started to be produced, regardless of design a factory was made, whether it made P-40s or P-51s was actually a small issue , at the outset they would make something. Those factories and the aircraft designs that came out of them were not just thought about in December 1941.

Because the war started a bit earlier in Europe and the build up started a bit earlier a better picture might be to use the numbers from 1938 for the British starting point.
IN 1939 there were 1,068,850 British service personnel (all forces including navy?) and this went to 1,812,600 in 1940 and 3,285,400 in 1941.

However it was only 384,800 in 1938 and that was up from 352,400 in 1937.
The 10 divisions in France in 1940 were hardly "professional" when they landed. By dint of a lot training they turned into a quite respectable force by April/May of 1940 and performed very well indeed at one of the most difficult tasks that any army can execute. An orderly, sustained retreat in contact with an enemy while their own flanks are repeatedly compromised by the retreat (at times uncommunicated ) of allies.

The US had several advantages in WW II.
1. was a higher standard of education on average, than other forces (Certainly not all US troops were highschool graduates but then most other countries often stopped education at a certain point for men/boys going into trades).
2. US troops, on average, had more exposure automobiles and other machinery.
3. US troops, on average, had more exposure to radios and other electrical equipment.

A few other nations may have been close (or exceeded?) the US but they were comparatively small (Canada?)

Plenty of areas of the US were rural or poor or both and many people living in large cities did not own cars but the US had, by far, the highest per capita ownership of motor vehicles in the world at the time. But out of every 1000, or 10,000 inductees the number that had experience in driving and/or repairing (minor repairs) motor vehicles was higher than any other country.

Pre war the
Firstly, please ensure you're comparing apples to apples. Does your US Army number include reservists or National Guard soldiers? From what I can see, the 184,000 is just active duty US Army soldiers (the US Army Center of Military History at Fort McNair has a total of 187,893 active-duty Army soldiers as of June 30, 1939). I'd like to see your numbers once the National Guard is thrown into the mix (either that or delete the Territorials from the British numbers and let's see where things stand).

I'd also like to know the source for the size of the British Army being 630,000 in August 1939. The biggest number I've found is 428,000 including territorials. For direct comparison purposes, the US had approx. 200,000 National Guard soldiers and a further reserve of 100,000 of trained personnel, mostly from OTC units. So the US Army was about 487,000 compared to a British Army of 428,000. Granted, there's still the thorny issue of airpower numbers which are include in US Army totals but not in the British Army. However, the extent of British growth is larger than you gave credit, while the US Army growth is considerably less. I'm not taking anything away from the US Army...it was a phenomenal achievement. However, let's not besmirch that accomplishment by cooking the statistics to make it look bigger than it actually was.

By 1944, I don't think the British Army was any less a "citizens' army" than was the US Army. The proportions of professionals to draftees were undoubtedly different but not to the extent that it made much difference at the teeth end of things, particularly for the Brits after June 1940 when a fair proportion of the "professional Army" had been killed or captured in France.[/QUOTE]
I have had a second look and Pre war the British army was 227,000 regulars and a TA of 204,000 but with the war coming by August 1939 the TA had expanded to 428,000 men so my number should have been 655,000. A source that summarises this is British and Empire Armies 1939
You are right In that I should have thought of the National Guard a serious mistake on my part. I am finding it difficult to find the numbers for the national guard apart from a statement that it doubled the size of the army when activated as the USA entered the war which roughly equates to your number of 200,000.
If we stick with that then the US Army went from about 400,000 to 8,300,000 a phenomenal increase.

The phrase Citizens Army wasn't just to do with numbers. With that sort of increase the 'old guard' officers were overwhelmed with new officers and with the recognition that almost everyone was inexperienced there was a cross fertilisation of ideas and a willingness to listen. It's that which was the driving force for the title.

I must emphasise again that inevitably some people didn't follow the pattern but most did.

The US struggled with the concept of using initiative because of the lack of experience evident in their lower and middle management levels. Inevitably the comparison has to be made between the US army and the Reichswehr of the Weimar republic under von Seeckt . By the time Seeckt left the German Army in 1926 the Reichswehr had a clear, standardized operational doctrine, as well as a precise theory on the future methods of combat which greatly influenced the military campaigns fought by the Wehrmacht during the first half of WWII. Importantly, the Reichswehr was relatively 'officer heavy" moreover men were required to be able to fill the jobs of their specialisation two or three ranks above their current position. this process was continued in the new Wehrmacht, so that when the time came for actual expansion the men filling the management roles were well trained and not overloaded in just getting the basic jobs they were responsible for actually done. with the basic jobs done and dusted the officers in the German armed forces could excel at the "specky sh*t". The wehrmacht was one of the first armies in the world that we would now call a standing regular army, as opposed to the part time nonprofessional citizen armies evident in the French Army or the British army. The British army, for example emerged from WWI with over four years of experience and "toughness" that the US never received, or more correctly received in very limited quantities. Even as late as September 1918, they were still being schooled in the arts of modern warfare (modern as in 1918 styles of battle). When the. war ended, much of the US army was still very short of experience to call upon. The post war period saw massive reductions in manning, and what few officers they had with combat experience were cast out of the military. one only has to look at the treatment of men like Mitchell to see that. The development of progressive military theories atrified in the US worse than nearly all the great armies of the world in that critical interwar period. moreover unlike the Reichswehr where the force structure was brimming with officers, and those officers were given jobs above their current rank (look at guderian for example), in the US army, the forces became weak in officers and experience, in terms of both proportions and also starting experience. As an example of that, long after most other armies had realised the obsolescence of the square ToE, the US army retained them into the early parts of WWII

what is the source of british army at 630,000 in august of '39?

Do British Army numbers include the Indian Army's native units?

The Indian Army was a completely different army to the British Army.

Vincenzo said:

what is the source of british army at 630,000 in august of '39?

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British and Empire Armies 1939

thanks , Glider

i find this TERRITORIAL ARMY (STRENGTH). (Hansard, 23 May 1939)

parsifal said:

The US struggled with the concept of using initiative because of the lack of experience evident in their lower and middle management levels.

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Meaning the people above the operational officers, and below the generals who make policy?

By the time Seeckt left the German Army in 1926 the Reichswehr had a clear, standardized operational doctrine, as well as a precise theory on the future methods of combat which greatly influenced the military campaigns fought by the Wehrmacht during the first half of WWII. Importantly, the Reichswehr was relatively 'officer heavy" moreover men were required to be able to fill the jobs of their specialisation two or three ranks above their current position.

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So a 2LT would have to know how to do the job of a CPT?

As an example of that, long after most other armies had realised the obsolescence of the square ToE

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Square ToE?

Vincenzo said:

thanks , Glider

i find this TERRITORIAL ARMY (STRENGTH). (Hansard, 23 May 1939)

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Thanks for this.

After the defeat in 1918, the german General staff was dissolved, and under the treaty of Versailles, the numbers of general officers limited to no more than 4000. As a means of getting around this many officers were kept at ranks of Major or below, whilst given jobs that really were requiring an officer of of general rank. other officers, whilst forceably discarded from the army, were kept on in paid positions within the paramilitaries. hitler himself was sucked up in this, working as a civilian spy for the German army in Bavaria.

Guderian is an excellent example of how tenaciously the Germans hung on to the considerable pool of talent evident in their officer corps after 1918. In 1927 Guderian was promoted to major and transferred to the command of Army transport and motorized tactics in Berlin. This placed Guderian at the center of German development of armoured forces. Guderian, who was fluent in both English and French, studied the works of British theorists like Fuller Martel and Liddell Hart. . In 1931, he was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel and became chief of staff to the Inspectorate of Motorized Troops under Lutz In 1933 he was promoted to Colonel.

Still, the point is that as a mere major, he was given the critical job of organising and developing the doctrines of motorization throughout the Reichswehr and later the Wehrmacht. How does that compare to the American tank warfare proponent (Chaffee I believe)

I've been looking for this thread for ages, and it has so much information of use.

yulzari said:

The Indian Army was a completely different army to the British Army.

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Sorry for the dilatory reply, but I realize the Indian Army was a separate organization. Did it have the sort of autonomy that, say, the Brazilian Army did relative to the British Army or was its deployment, at least in a European war, controlled by London and the War Office?