How did the I-16 Really Perform in WWII? (1 Viewer)

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Models have to fly better than the full scale versions.
Only if they are scaled to be lighter than the full scale versions and only if the thickness to chord ratio is also scaled correctly. Generally, RCs have a much better power to weight ratio, but you can't scale down the air, so the wings have to be thicker to fly the same.

From 35+ years of RC flying, spins are simple, assuming the design is decent. An actual scale Gee Bee might not be recoverable from a spin, I don't know.

I've seen one actually fly, but I didn't get to fly it. Seemed to fly OK. If I had gotten to fly it, I would not have spun it. If it were mine, I doubt I'd have spun it, ever or, tried a snap-roll it either. I'm unsure it would have enough tail authority to be recovered if it DID spin or snap-roll. The full scale one didn't.

The improved model above CAN spin and recover with the large rudder/fin. Don't know that many actual owners and pilots actually spin them, though. For myself, I used to spin every RC airplane I built, but I chose design deliberatly aerobatic or scale aerobatic. Even a Quickie 500 racer spins well.

Quickie 500 racer:
s-l400.jpg


500 square inches (3225 sq cm) of wing area, 0.40 engine (6.5 cc). The first season started out at about 90 mph (145 kph). A modern version can reach 140 mph (225 kph) or more and they pull 20 g's in a typical pylon turn at the end of the straight away. An old K&B .40 engine made 0.75 hp or so at 7,000 - 8,500 rpm. A modern Nelson makes 2.2 hp at 16,500 rpm.

Here is a modern RC aerobatic demo by Jason Dussia to demostrate the difference between RC and full scale power to weight ratio and RC to full scale control authority in scale aerobatic models.

View: https://youtu.be/ScHvLhb3wu8
 
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It was a serious mistake to start production of the wooden LaGG. The result was a very mediocre aircraft with a huge number of serious shortcomings, which required two years of improvement to achieve acceptable quality.
While the LaGG-3 wasn't a great aircraft, it served a purpose, to make a modern fighter without using strategic materials and by unskilled workers and in large quantities when necessary. BTW, in those two years it was made the La-5 and, one year latter, the La-7, both of which could be said that were most capable of performing well in the realities Eastern Front. So calling it a mistake could be too much. A good idea badly executed (kind of understandable under the circunstances of sudden war and industrial displacement) may be a better definition.
Interesting facts from the report:

As a teenager, I talked to a Soviet pilot who fought on a Boston. I didn't ask about the technical details, but I remember well that the pilot spoke only enthusiastically about his aircraft. He said he was very lucky - the Boston was reliable, could withstand significant damage, and was very comfortable for the crew. In general, the figures seem somewhat strange to me, perhaps because the Bostons were mainly involved in the fiercest battles - in this particular case, the interpretation of the statistics is far from obvious.
Maybe the early Boston delivered were some without SS tanks and armour protection, which coupled with fierce battles made them more vulnerable early on and after the losses were reduced.
 
While the LaGG-3 wasn't a great aircraft, it served a purpose, to make a modern fighter without using strategic materials and by unskilled workers and in large quantities when necessary. BTW, in those two years it was made the La-5 and, one year latter, the La-7, both of which could be said that were most capable of performing well in the realities Eastern Front. So calling it a mistake could be too much. A good idea badly executed (kind of understandable under the circunstances of sudden war and industrial displacement) may be a better definition.

I tend to agree with this. Maybe a bit more so. Many if not most of the problems with the LaGG-3 were also experienced by early Yak-1 and had mostly to do with really poor build quality, which varied from factory to factory. Early LaGG-3 also had some design issues and were heavier, but I don't think enough so as to be dramatically different from the early Yak -1 in overall effectiveness. Yak-1B however was a significant improvement as was the Yak 7B.

Maybe the early Boston delivered were some without SS tanks and armour protection, which coupled with fierce battles made them more vulnerable early on and after the losses were reduced.

This was indeed the case - the early Bostons fighting in Russia, North Africa and the Middle East (equivalent to A-20A / Boston III and before) all had minimal armor and at least some unprotected fuel tanks. But it was only in Russia where they seemed to take very high casualties, which is generally blamed on their being used to attack heavily maritime targets in the Baltic at low-level, though this was not of course the only way they were employed.
 
While the LaGG-3 wasn't a great aircraft, it served a purpose, to make a modern fighter without using strategic materials and by unskilled workers and in large quantities when necessary. BTW, in those two years it was made the La-5 and, one year latter, the La-7, both of which could be said that were most capable of performing well in the realities Eastern Front. So calling it a mistake could be too much. A good idea badly executed (kind of understandable under the circunstances of sudden war and industrial displacement) may be a better definition.
I tend to agree with this. Maybe a bit more so. Many if not most of the problems with the LaGG-3 were also experienced by early Yak-1 and had mostly to do with really poor build quality, which varied from factory to factory. Early LaGG-3 also had some design issues and were heavier, but I don't think enough so as to be dramatically different from the early Yak -1 in overall effectiveness. Yak-1B however was a significant improvement as was the Yak 7B.
A lot of this got into connections too. Yakovlev was (somewhat) more experienced than Lavochkin (and related), and on top of this he had political affiliations. He could get the best resources when needed. Lavochkin didn't have mass-production experience and was not quite as in favor with the higher ups in Soviet Aircraft Production (though still way better than Polikarpov), and that showed in the differences between the I-301 prototype and the production aircraft. The base LaGG-3 did evolve into a decent inline engined aircraft with the Gorbunov 105, but by this point the La-5 entered production and better Yak fighters were as well.
1764184007449.png
 
A lot of this got into connections too. Yakovlev was (somewhat) more experienced than Lavochkin (and related), and on top of this he had political affiliations. He could get the best resources when needed. Lavochkin didn't have mass-production experience and was not quite as in favor with the higher ups in Soviet Aircraft Production (though still way better than Polikarpov), and that showed in the differences between the I-301 prototype and the production aircraft. The base LaGG-3 did evolve into a decent inline engined aircraft with the Gorbunov 105, but by this point the La-5 entered production and better Yak fighters were as well.
View attachment 858091

Is that the same as the version they sometimes call "LaGG-3/66"? which I know is just a factory iteration number
 
While the LaGG-3 wasn't a great aircraft, it served a purpose, to make a modern fighter without using strategic materials and by unskilled workers and in large quantities when necessary.
I suppose that the qualifications of workers employed in the production of wooden aircraft should be no lower (if not higher) than those employed in the production of metal aircraft. The production of the LaGG required a very strategic material - phenol-formaldehyde resins for the production of "delta wood". The USSR experienced an acute shortage of these materials and purchased them from Germany before the war. Furthermore, if Plant No. 21 had not abandoned its existing technology and had continued to produce the I-180, even with the M-87B engine, the benefits would have been much greater. The LaGGs from early production batches suffered from a huge number of shortcomings, and La-5s from early production batches were no better (if not worse) than LaGGs from the later production batches - the first feedback on the use of the La-5 at the front was rather negative. The La-5 was improved to an acceptable quality level in early 1944. If Plant No. 21 had not been forced to produce LaGGs, then by early 1942 (at the latest), mass production of the I-185 would be quite realistic, which, even with the M-82, was much better than the La-5 in terms of overall performance. Yes, the I-185 required more metal, but it could easily have been found by cutting back on the production of the Pe-2 and especially the Il-4, the value of which was quite low.
The La-7, with its higher performance, had major problems with its engine due to poor cooling - the service life of the M-82FN on the La-7 was much shorter than on the La-5FN. The problem was solved by introducing a parabolic piston profile, but it was too late.
Unfortunately, the LaGG was mainly produced to increase the scores of German aces.
BTW, in those two years it was made the La-5 and, one year latter, the La-7, both of which could be said that were most capable of performing well in the realities Eastern Front. So calling it a mistake could be too much.
The I-185 was superior to both the La-5 and La-7, and, most importantly, its mass production could start earlier.
A good idea badly executed (kind of understandable under the circunstances of sudden war and industrial displacement) may be a better definition.
It was a bad idea from the very beginning, since the aircraft was originally intended for the more powerful M-106 engine, which was never finalized for mass production. It took more than three years to transform the LaGG into a fighter with acceptable performance characteristics. This was a clear miscalculation on the part of the Soviet leadership. Nowadays, many Russian authors writing about the LaGG try to justify its mass production, passing off necessity as virtue: an experienced pilot could win in a LaGG, the aircraft had certain advantages, but this was not enough, as most pilots were poorly trained. The LaGG gave them little chance to gain experience.
Maybe the early Boston delivered were some without SS tanks and armour protection, which coupled with fierce battles made them more vulnerable early on and after the losses were reduced.
It is quite possible - the A-20Bs delivered at the end of 1942 - beginning of 1943 had no SS tanks and armor protection.
 
Is that the same as the version they sometimes call "LaGG-3/66"? which I know is just a factory iteration number
That was actually the final major production variant, which was the 66th series. With the 66th series the LaGG-3 finally (mostly) reached the I-301 prototype performance specs, but by this point it was 1943 and that was falling behind a bit.
 
The base LaGG-3 did evolve into a decent inline engined aircraft with the Gorbunov 105, but by this point the La-5 entered production and better Yak fighters were as well.
The Gorbunov "105-2" failed state tests in the summer of 1944: in addition to insufficient flight performance, it had problems with the M-105PF-2 engine and armament. Tests demonstrated that the "105-2" was inferior to German fighters in terms of key parameters.
 
The Gorbunov "105-2" failed state tests in the summer of 1944: in addition to insufficient flight performance, it had problems with the M-105PF-2 engine and armament. Tests demonstrated that the "105-2" was inferior to German fighters in terms of key parameters.
This is true. It still was outdated in 1944 in terms of performance. It really should've been a 1942 aircraft. With the productions LaGG-3s sadly the bar was not very high.
 
The I-16 performed about as well as could be expected in WWII. It may have done better had the USSR been more prepared for Hitler's invasion, but Stalin seemed to put more trust in the racist, antisemitic, slavophobic, rabidly anti-bolshevik Hitler than his own people. Maybe he should have had somebody give him a summary of Mein Kampf

Mark Davis Kuss
Collective security or world domination: the Soviet Union and Germany, 1917-1939
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, 2012

p. 125
Vyacheslav Molotov, Chairman of the Council of Commissars and future Foreign Minister, also sought a cautious policy toward Germany as he explained in a speech to the Central Executive Committee of the Supreme Soviet in January, 1936. Again, he was addressing his comrades in the party. If there was a "secret plan" to align with Germany, as the German schools asserts, why not discuss this possibility with his own party members? Molotov cited the portions of Mein Kampf specifically mentioning Russia as the lands of German conquest. He further stated that the present Nazi government had done nothing to disown these plans of aggrandizement. He was careful in his remarks, however, not to close the door on improved relations in the future:

I must say quite frankly that the Soviet Government would have desired the establishment of better relations with Germany than exist at present. This seems to us unquestionably expedient from the standpoint of the interests of the peoples of both countries. But the realization of such a policy depends not only on us, but also on the German Government.139
He quickly shifted tone with a long, detailed criticism of Nazi intentions:

Everybody knows that German fascism is not merely confining itself to elaborating plans of conquest, but is preparing to act in the immediate future. The German fascists have openly transformed the country which has fallen into their hands into a military camp, which, owing to its position in the very centre of Europe, constitutes a menace not only to the Soviet Union but to Europe in general.140
These arguments do not indicate a desire to unite with Hitler and the Nazis in an axis of domination. Soviet diplomacy correctly assessed the German threat and called for united action. France and England, like other "bourgeois" individuals, were more afraid of communism than fascism. These deeply held attitudes served to limit Soviet effectiveness.

Mein Kampf was translated into Russian very early. The first unexpurgated English translation was not published until May, 1939. As a result, the English-speaking world was broadly unaware of its contents until it was too late. The British ambassador in Berlin sent an annotated precis to the Foreign Office, but it's not clear whether Chamberlain saw it, and if he did, how it was presented. (CEOs, prime ministers, and presidents need to get clear presentations with context because they are bombarded with information on a vast range of topics.)

It wasn't translated into English because Hitler held the copyright and refused to grant a license for a full translation.
 
That is a bit simplistic.

There is a whole bunch of other stuff going on. Yes they probably could have rounded off the edge of cowl a bit better. But Curtiss didn't do any better with the Cyclone powered Hawk 75s.

What Curtiss did do better was fairing the cowl into the fuselage a bit better, not having large gaps in the cowl to fuselage joint. Not having all those large holes for the exhaust pipes creating drag. What is often invisible is large changes in fuselage cross section, like from large diameter radial to skinny cockpit and sometimes just another foot or two of length can reduce the turbulence.

Streamlining radials was a lot harder than it looks. At high speed you only need about 10-15% of the air that is approaching the front of the fuselage to actually go through the cowling for cooling and the more air that can be routed around the cowling rather than through it is an advantage.
What is unseen is shown by photos in wind tunnels with smoke. Most radial engines actually develop a high pressure zone ahead of the engine that starts moving the air towards the sides of cowling before it actually gets there. Turns out the spinners actually don't do much of anything at high speed. In fact they sometimes do their best work on the ground, keeping warm air from flowing forward around the prop hub and mixing the with cool air a little further out on the blades. That and not having the totally round area of prop blade beating up the air;)
The United States really never bothered with spinners on radial-engined aircraft. This was with the N.A.C.A. doing fundamental research into the best ways to minimize drag for radial-engine installations and N.A.C.A. providing the full-scale wind tunnel to aircraft manufacturers. You could run the engine of the aircraft in the full-scale wind tunnel and we know that the N.A.C.A. did first-class work on aerodynamic cleanups.

It's difficult to credit the idea that all of the American aircraft designers, and the N.A.C.A., with full knowledge of foreign developments, were so misguided that they missed a simple addition that provided huge and obvious aerodynamic benefits.
 
To further what elbmc1969 as said, in addition to a number of wind tunnel studies the NACA funded tests of both the Vultee P-66 and the Curtiss XP-42 (P-36 in a Jimmy Durante disguise)

Curtiss_XP-42_061019-F-1234P-033.jpg

The XP-42 went through at least 12 different nose shapes.
960px-Curtiss_XP-42_in_flight_1945.jpg

Note the all flying tail in this 1945 photo.
I am not saying that spinners never helped but the spinner had to work with the cowing and not be an add on. And in some cases, the spinner was there to help with low speed cooling, not streamlining.
 
I suppose that the qualifications of workers employed in the production of wooden aircraft should be no lower (if not higher) than those employed in the production of metal aircraft. The production of the LaGG required a very strategic material - phenol-formaldehyde resins for the production of "delta wood". The USSR experienced an acute shortage of these materials and purchased them from Germany before the war. Furthermore, if Plant No. 21 had not abandoned its existing technology and had continued to produce the I-180, even with the M-87B engine, the benefits would have been much greater. The LaGGs from early production batches suffered from a huge number of shortcomings, and La-5s from early production batches were no better (if not worse) than LaGGs from the later production batches - the first feedback on the use of the La-5 at the front was rather negative. The La-5 was improved to an acceptable quality level in early 1944. If Plant No. 21 had not been forced to produce LaGGs, then by early 1942 (at the latest), mass production of the I-185 would be quite realistic, which, even with the M-82, was much better than the La-5 in terms of overall performance. Yes, the I-185 required more metal, but it could easily have been found by cutting back on the production of the Pe-2 and especially the Il-4, the value of which was quite low.
The La-7, with its higher performance, had major problems with its engine due to poor cooling - the service life of the M-82FN on the La-7 was much shorter than on the La-5FN. The problem was solved by introducing a parabolic piston profile, but it was too late.
Unfortunately, the LaGG was mainly produced to increase the scores of German aces.

The I-185 was superior to both the La-5 and La-7, and, most importantly, its mass production could start earlier.

It was a bad idea from the very beginning, since the aircraft was originally intended for the more powerful M-106 engine, which was never finalized for mass production. It took more than three years to transform the LaGG into a fighter with acceptable performance characteristics. This was a clear miscalculation on the part of the Soviet leadership. Nowadays, many Russian authors writing about the LaGG try to justify its mass production, passing off necessity as virtue: an experienced pilot could win in a LaGG, the aircraft had certain advantages, but this was not enough, as most pilots were poorly trained. The LaGG gave them little chance to gain experience.

It is quite possible - the A-20Bs delivered at the end of 1942 - beginning of 1943 had no SS tanks and armor protection.

I'm getting the notion somebody really likes the I-185 ;)
 
Here's an I-185 I just finished. Moscow in the background.

I 185 New.jpg



Looks altogether like a decent airplane. It actually flew with 4 different engines: Shvetsov M-81 (1,200 hp), Shvetsoc M-82 (1,700 hp), Tumansky M-90 (2,000 hp), and Shvetsov M-70 (2,000 hp). Stalin listened to Yakovlev, who thought the aircraft could not possibly perform as Pilokaropv said it would, and he cancelled the project. Surviving test data shows it DID perform as Polikarpov said it did.
 
Here's an I-185 I just finished. Moscow in the background.

View attachment 858256


Looks altogether like a decent airplane. It actually flew with 4 different engines: Shvetsov M-81 (1,200 hp), Shvetsoc M-82 (1,700 hp), Tumansky M-90 (2,000 hp), and Shvetsov M-70 (2,000 hp). Stalin listened to Yakovlev, who thought the aircraft could not possibly perform as Pilokaropv said it would, and he cancelled the project. Surviving test data shows it DID perform as Polikarpov said it did.

It's one of the great 'coulda / woulda / shoulda' planes, every major nation in the war has them.

I really love your drawings Greg, I think you should make a book of them. I'll buy a copy!
 
That is a bit simplistic.
View attachment 857547
There is a whole bunch of other stuff going on. Yes they probably could have rounded off the edge of cowl a bit better. But Curtiss didn't do any better with the Cyclone powered Hawk 75s.

What Curtiss did do better was fairing the cowl into the fuselage a bit better, not having large gaps in the cowl to fuselage joint. Not having all those large holes for the exhaust pipes creating drag. What is often invisible is large changes in fuselage cross section, like from large diameter radial to skinny cockpit and sometimes just another foot or two of length can reduce the turbulence.

Streamlining radials was a lot harder than it looks. At high speed you only need about 10-15% of the air that is approaching the front of the fuselage to actually go through the cowling for cooling and the more air that can be routed around the cowling rather than through it is an advantage.
What is unseen is shown by photos in wind tunnels with smoke. Most radial engines actually develop a high pressure zone ahead of the engine that starts moving the air towards the sides of cowling before it actually gets there. Turns out the spinners actually don't do much of anything at high speed. In fact they sometimes do their best work on the ground, keeping warm air from flowing forward around the prop hub and mixing the with cool air a little further out on the blades. That and not having the totally round area of prop blade beating up the air;)
Streamlining radials -- mostly that means minimizing cooling drag -- is harder than streamlining the engine itself of a liquid-cooled engine, but streamlining a liquid-cooled engine's cooling system isn't much easier. As to American aerodynamicists, first, pre-WW2 aerodynamics was very much an international community, with aerodynamicists having regular international conferences and crossing borders (usually from Germany to the UK and USA), so there wasn't that much not known by the aerodynamicists of one country that wasn't known to those from another, second, the NACA performed a lot of research into minimizing cooling drag of radial and liquid-cooled engine installations. As frequently said, the NACA also had a close collaborative relationship with US airframe companies.

Something related was, of course, that the US had a significant domestic, commercial air transport industry, which meant that there were strong drivers for fast, efficient aircraft. The DC-2 (and its more noted younger sibling, the DC-3) existed because of this (as did the less famous 247). The most famous and numerous German transport was the flying airbrake, the Ju52.
 
Something related was, of course, that the US had a significant domestic, commercial air transport industry, which meant that there were strong drivers for fast, efficient aircraft. The DC-2 (and its more noted younger sibling, the DC-3) existed because of this (as did the less famous 247). The most famous and numerous German transport was the flying airbrake, the Ju52.
The Lockheed twins were also part of this. What is somewhat overshadowed by some of this is the Boeing 307 as only ten were built.
ng_307_Stratoliner_%28NC19902%29_%2816630490987%29.jpg

Which rather intertwined with the B-17 (common wing) and while the first one used a tail fin closer to the original B-17s the later ones used the tail fin in the photo which predated the B-17E. There were two different cowlings depending on wither the planes were TWA or Pan Am. The Pan Am planes did not use the cowling gills and used the blanking plates in the photo to prevent over cooling in cooler climates. The entire cabin area was pressurized to enable passenger service at 20,000ft.
It is very hard to say what the sales would have been like in 1940-41 if the world had not gone to war.

Curtiss had been working on their own pressurized transport
q=tbn:ANd9GcQHT8YVHzIeYgNQ7EkiNM2Ko_jtq2H8CHonOQ&s.jpg

Modified into the single tail C-46 without pressurization.
Douglas had their own DC-4 saga, Only things the DC-4E and DC-4A had in common was four engines and a nose wheel.
Lockheed had plans for a 4 engine airliner of their own and scrapped the first few years of work to come up with the Constellation.

A significant difference between the US airliners and most of the European airliners was that the American airliners were expected to make a profit without government subsidy.
 

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