There is a lot of nonsense written about Harris.
Harris followed orders and shortly before he took over Bomber Command the so called area bombing directive (itself not really a very good description) was in place.
Harris was an old school Trenchardian and believed with every fibre of his being that the best application of Bomber Command should reflect that doctrine. This doctrine had never gone away, what the RAF said publicly and believed privately, throughout the 1930s, were two different things.
It was Harris' adherence to his Trenchardian strategy that has left him open to criticism, not just in the official history, but even more with the increased availability of much original material since the 1970s. The core argument against Harris is that he refused to forego his area bombing campaign when the circumstance leading to its adoption, the inability to hit anything more precise than a city no longer applied. The implication is that a substantial portion of the hundreds of thousands killed by the bombing might have been spared had the general area campaign been stopped at the point when alternatives existed which offered the same or better chances of breaking the German war effort. This is a facile argument that divorces the development of British bombing from anything that happened before 1939. Harris was not alone in believing his campaign offered the best chance of breaking the German war effort, and he, unlike us, did not have the benefit of hindsight. It is a fact that when his command's effort was diverted to the pre-invasion effort the German war economy recovered substantially, whether due to the release of pressure previously applied by Bomber Command or other causes is something that few can agree on.
There was no clear and obvious alternative, as is often argued. Various plans were developed, some times concurrently, and in the end Harris did attack oil targets (beloved of the Americans) and more heavily that the 8th Air Force itself. He also attacked the transportation targets (so beloved of Tedder) despite advice from his own Operational Research Section that showed just how difficult such targets were to destroy. Eventually Harris did what he was told. He had to be cajoled, kicking and screaming, to the 'panacea' targets but when he did go after them he did so with the maximum effort his command could make, and did a very good job on them.
A final thought. We can not hope to understand the mindset of these men. We have all grown up in an era of aviation and air power. Harris was 11 years old when the Wright brothers made their first flight. Trenchard was 30 years old.
Cheers
Steve
Harris followed orders and shortly before he took over Bomber Command the so called area bombing directive (itself not really a very good description) was in place.
Harris was an old school Trenchardian and believed with every fibre of his being that the best application of Bomber Command should reflect that doctrine. This doctrine had never gone away, what the RAF said publicly and believed privately, throughout the 1930s, were two different things.
It was Harris' adherence to his Trenchardian strategy that has left him open to criticism, not just in the official history, but even more with the increased availability of much original material since the 1970s. The core argument against Harris is that he refused to forego his area bombing campaign when the circumstance leading to its adoption, the inability to hit anything more precise than a city no longer applied. The implication is that a substantial portion of the hundreds of thousands killed by the bombing might have been spared had the general area campaign been stopped at the point when alternatives existed which offered the same or better chances of breaking the German war effort. This is a facile argument that divorces the development of British bombing from anything that happened before 1939. Harris was not alone in believing his campaign offered the best chance of breaking the German war effort, and he, unlike us, did not have the benefit of hindsight. It is a fact that when his command's effort was diverted to the pre-invasion effort the German war economy recovered substantially, whether due to the release of pressure previously applied by Bomber Command or other causes is something that few can agree on.
There was no clear and obvious alternative, as is often argued. Various plans were developed, some times concurrently, and in the end Harris did attack oil targets (beloved of the Americans) and more heavily that the 8th Air Force itself. He also attacked the transportation targets (so beloved of Tedder) despite advice from his own Operational Research Section that showed just how difficult such targets were to destroy. Eventually Harris did what he was told. He had to be cajoled, kicking and screaming, to the 'panacea' targets but when he did go after them he did so with the maximum effort his command could make, and did a very good job on them.
A final thought. We can not hope to understand the mindset of these men. We have all grown up in an era of aviation and air power. Harris was 11 years old when the Wright brothers made their first flight. Trenchard was 30 years old.
Cheers
Steve
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