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The Brits had a plan to occupy Thailand, but like Norway, they let the enemy get there first.
Plus, the Japanese had their own negotiations going on.Because it was politically untenable. Implementing Op MATADOR would have greatly increased the probability of successfully defending the peninsula. It was not implemented because it involved, effectively, the invasion of a neutral country which would have gifted a propaganda coup to Tokyo.
There was a missed opportunity in late November 1941 to convince leadership in Bangkok of Japan's intentions. It would have necessitated one of the most daring PR missions of the entire war to identify occupation of certain airfields in FIC with IJAAF fighters. Photographic proof of Japanese fighters in proximity to the Thai coastline could have enabled a diplomatic agreement whereby Bangkok invited Malaya Command to help in the defense of Thailand. Unfortunately, no such mission was directed and the opportunity was missed.
A major difference between setting up in Britain and in Malaya was the lack of an extensive, developed telephone system in the latter, onto which communications links necessary for the fighter direction system to work could be piggybacked. Even laying more phone lines in Malaya was a major logistical challenge given, topography and weather.
Plus, the Japanese had their own negotiations going on.
In the book "Indestructible" about Pappy Gunn, early on it chronicles the efforts to put a radar site in place in the Philippines in the days leading up to the war. Logistics and infrastructure were the biggest hurdles for where the sites needed to be placed to be effective.
HiThere's an incredibly poignant minute in one of the RAF files about establishing radar sites in Malaya. Dated mid/late December 1941, it ironically notes that the installation team might be better served leaving the radar equipment for the Japanese to set up. The note reflects the shock felt by British forces at the rapidity of the Japanese assault as well as the frustration regarding the amount of time it took to get the radar sites up and running.
Hi
This book covers this area of interest:
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From Helion, 2015. Some sample information below:
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I hope that is of some use.
Mike
Submarines are very expensive per ton as are MTBs.That's why Force Z would have been more useful in an equal weight of submarines and MTBs.
While MTBs were not built overseas in WW2 other than in the USA, Fairmile B MLs (ordered from Sept 1939) and HDMLs (ordered from Jan 1940) were. All the way from Canada and the Caribbean to East Africa, India, Australia, Hong Kong & New Zealand. About 280 ML built overseas in all. BUT 180 of those were produced using kits of parts sent out from Britain. How extensive those kits were I'm not clear about but see below for one example.Submarines are very expensive per ton as are MTBs.
The Problem with trying to use local builders for hulls is you still need engines. A lot of them, MTB engines have much shorter lives than most other marine engines.
You also need hull builders that are used to making light weight/high speed boats.
Just because they can make fishing boats or coastal passenger ferrys doesn't mean they can make MTBs.
There may also be material's problems. There may be some suitable local woods, there may not be, or there maybe a learning curve in using local woods.
In 2018 I visited the Battlebox in Singapore. What was this plotting table for if there was no radar or telephone communications?
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This points to the problems of lumping different classes of boats (small craft ) together.2nd MTB Flotilla
Agreed, which is why London was nervous about pushing Bangkok further into Tokyo's influence. Now, as it happened, Bangkok was pretty much already there...but that wasn't fully understood in November 1941. If Malaya Command had provided Bangkok with evidence of Japanese intentions and the Thais still refused to allow Britain to help defend Thai territory, it would have been a pretty solid indicator that Malaya Command needed to implement MATADOR without Thailand's approval and to assume the operation would be opposed...but at least Malaya Command would have had a clearer understanding of Bangkok's intentions.
And at that point, invading Thailand would have added yet another opponent to the Japanese.
Incidentally the British Ambassador to Thailand, Sir Josiah Crosby, had been in post since 1934 and earlier had spent most of his career in the Foreign Office in posts in FIC, Siam, and the DEI. So he was well experienced in dealing with matters in the region. The accusation was that he went "rogue" in 1941. But an alternative explanation might lie in his reporting line being to his superiors in the Foreign Office in London and not the Governor of the colony in Malaya. What instructions was he receiving from London and was he following these? The two places might well have been seeing matters differently from a diplomatic standpoint. Another thing to add to the list of things to investigate!!!
Edit:- Britain also had at least a Consulate in Saigon in this period (a new Acting Consul General was appointed in Feb 1941) if not a full embassy. Anyone know what information was coming from officials there?
Given the small size of the IJAF in FIC and Formosa relative to the Luftwaffe in France and Norway, the infrastructure needn't be BoB scale. A limited radar setup, observer corp, ops room and more fighter aircraft would go a long way.