Against All Odds: The Brewster Buffalo in the Malayan Campaign

[buffnut453]

The Brits had a plan to occupy Thailand, but like Norway, they let the enemy get there first.

Because it was politically untenable. Implementing Op MATADOR would have greatly increased the probability of successfully defending the peninsula. It was not implemented because it involved, effectively, the invasion of a neutral country which would have gifted a propaganda coup to Tokyo.

There was a missed opportunity in late November 1941 to convince leadership in Bangkok of Japan's intentions. It would have necessitated one of the most daring PR missions of the entire war to identify occupation of certain airfields in FIC with IJAAF fighters. Photographic proof of Japanese fighters in proximity to the Thai coastline could have enabled a diplomatic agreement whereby Bangkok invited Malaya Command to help in the defense of Thailand. Unfortunately, no such mission was directed and the opportunity was missed.

 

[Greg Boeser]

Because it was politically untenable. Implementing Op MATADOR would have greatly increased the probability of successfully defending the peninsula. It was not implemented because it involved, effectively, the invasion of a neutral country which would have gifted a propaganda coup to Tokyo.

There was a missed opportunity in late November 1941 to convince leadership in Bangkok of Japan's intentions. It would have necessitated one of the most daring PR missions of the entire war to identify occupation of certain airfields in FIC with IJAAF fighters. Photographic proof of Japanese fighters in proximity to the Thai coastline could have enabled a diplomatic agreement whereby Bangkok invited Malaya Command to help in the defense of Thailand. Unfortunately, no such mission was directed and the opportunity was missed.

Plus, the Japanese had their own negotiations going on.

 

[smutny]

A major difference between setting up in Britain and in Malaya was the lack of an extensive, developed telephone system in the latter, onto which communications links necessary for the fighter direction system to work could be piggybacked. Even laying more phone lines in Malaya was a major logistical challenge given, topography and weather.

In the book "Indestructible" about Pappy Gunn, early on it chronicles the efforts to put a radar site in place in the Philippines in the days leading up to the war. Logistics and infrastructure were the biggest hurdles for where the sites needed to be placed to be effective.

 

[buffnut453]

Plus, the Japanese had their own negotiations going on.

Agreed, which is why London was nervous about pushing Bangkok further into Tokyo's influence. Now, as it happened, Bangkok was pretty much already there...but that wasn't fully understood in November 1941. If Malaya Command had provided Bangkok with evidence of Japanese intentions and the Thais still refused to allow Britain to help defend Thai territory, it would have been a pretty solid indicator that Malaya Command needed to implement MATADOR without Thailand's approval and to assume the operation would be opposed...but at least Malaya Command would have had a clearer understanding of Bangkok's intentions.

 

[buffnut453]

In the book "Indestructible" about Pappy Gunn, early on it chronicles the efforts to put a radar site in place in the Philippines in the days leading up to the war. Logistics and infrastructure were the biggest hurdles for where the sites needed to be placed to be effective.

There's an incredibly poignant minute in one of the RAF files about establishing radar sites in Malaya. Dated mid/late December 1941, it ironically notes that the installation team might be better served leaving the radar equipment for the Japanese to set up. The note reflects the shock felt by British forces at the rapidity of the Japanese assault as well as the frustration regarding the amount of time it took to get the radar sites up and running.

 

[MikeMeech]

There's an incredibly poignant minute in one of the RAF files about establishing radar sites in Malaya. Dated mid/late December 1941, it ironically notes that the installation team might be better served leaving the radar equipment for the Japanese to set up. The note reflects the shock felt by British forces at the rapidity of the Japanese assault as well as the frustration regarding the amount of time it took to get the radar sites up and running.

Hi
This book covers this area of interest:

From Helion, 2015. Some sample information below:

I hope that is of some use.

Mike

 

[buffnut453]

Hi
This book covers this area of interest:
View attachment 833418
From Helion, 2015. Some sample information below:
View attachment 833419
View attachment 833420
View attachment 833421
I hope that is of some use.

Mike

I have that book in my library. It's a good volume.

 

[Shortround6]

That's why Force Z would have been more useful in an equal weight of submarines and MTBs.

Submarines are very expensive per ton as are MTBs.
The Problem with trying to use local builders for hulls is you still need engines. A lot of them, MTB engines have much shorter lives than most other marine engines.
You also need hull builders that are used to making light weight/high speed boats.
Just because they can make fishing boats or coastal passenger ferrys doesn't mean they can make MTBs.
There may also be material's problems. There may be some suitable local woods, there may not be, or there maybe a learning curve in using local woods.

 

[EwenS]

Submarines are very expensive per ton as are MTBs.
The Problem with trying to use local builders for hulls is you still need engines. A lot of them, MTB engines have much shorter lives than most other marine engines.
You also need hull builders that are used to making light weight/high speed boats.
Just because they can make fishing boats or coastal passenger ferrys doesn't mean they can make MTBs.
There may also be material's problems. There may be some suitable local woods, there may not be, or there maybe a learning curve in using local woods.

While MTBs were not built overseas in WW2 other than in the USA, Fairmile B MLs (ordered from Sept 1939) and HDMLs (ordered from Jan 1940) were. All the way from Canada and the Caribbean to East Africa, India, Australia, Hong Kong & New Zealand. About 280 ML built overseas in all. BUT 180 of those were produced using kits of parts sent out from Britain. How extensive those kits were I'm not clear about but see below for one example.

Finding builders and wood to build them seems to have been less of a problem. In the Far East theatre both types were built at Karachi, Bombay, Ceylon, Calcutta, Rangoon, Singapore & Hong Kong. Some of these places also proved capable of building the 105ft MMS.

As for the reliability of engines for these craft, they seem to have a sufficient degree of reliability for several ML flotillas to sail all the way from Britain to Rangoon in 1944/45 with very few engine changes being noted in books on the subject. Plenty of stops along the way allowing for proper servicing.

For example HMIML 440 was built in Calcutta using Indian Teak but with the design modified with copper sheathing below the waterline to stop marine creatures boring into the wood. Her electrical gear and engines were shipped from Britain.

The 2nd MTB Flotilla was based at Hong Kong in Dec 1941 equipped with Vosper short hulled boats built in Britain. They were however overwhelmed by the opposition losing 40% of their strength in their first attack on Japanese landing craft in Kowloon Harbour on 19 Dec.

 

[Admiral Beez]

In 2018 I visited the Battlebox in Singapore - which I highly recommend, as well as Fort Siloso. What was this plotting table in the Battlebox for if there was no radar or telephone communications?

 

[buffnut453]

In 2018 I visited the Battlebox in Singapore. What was this plotting table for if there was no radar or telephone communications?

View attachment 833446

It's not that there were no radars or telecommunications. Rather, they were totally inadequate for the scale of forces necessary and the area to be defended. For example, there was just one trunk line from northern Malaya to Singapore....and that line was for both military and civilian users. It simply wasn't usable for sustained military operations. Similarly, radar had been established in Singapore but deploying systems further north into Malaya proved massively problemmatic.

 

[Shortround6]

2nd MTB Flotilla

This points to the problems of lumping different classes of boats (small craft ) together.
Most of the boats in the 2nd MTB Flotilla were the early 60ft boats powered by a trio of Napier Lions of 550hp each.
There were two purchased boats, 55ft Thornycroft that were about 2/3rds the tonnage, that had been built for the Chinese.
These 55 footers were small boats with the crew not sleeping aboard.
The more common 72ft boats wound up with 3 Packards of 1200hp once supply shortages had been over come.

The Big Fairmile boats Started with the Type A (12 built) with three 600hp American Hall-Scott engines. These were 110ft boats of 57 tons light. These were hard chine boats. And held 1200 imp gal of fuel (not enough)
The mass produced Type B round chine boats used two 600hp Hall-Scotts because they couldn't get enough engines. Weight went to 67 tons. Later to 85 tons with increase armament and equipment. Fuel went to 2305 gal. Speed dropped to 20kts at best and 17.5kts max continuous for the early light boats.
Endurance was 600 Nautical miles at max speed and 1500 Nautical miles at 12kts.
It may have been these type of "boat" that did most of the long range voyages.
The Hall-Scotts were 2181(?) cu in engines that were close to 4000lbs with clutch and gear box (forward and reverse).
The 24 Fairmile C motor gun boats used a Type A hull with a strengthened deck and three supercharged Hall-Scotts of 850-900hp engines and could hit 26-27kts. Weight was 72 tons to start. More guns and equipment were added.
The Hall-Scotts were fairly rugged engines compared to the lighter/higher powered Packard V-2500 engines.
The later Fairmile D boats modified the hull a bit and used four Packard engines to drive the 90-118ton boats at 29-30kts (for the lighter boats).

Going back to the 70-72ft boats at the beginning of the war the high speed boats were powered by three Isotta-Fraschini engines of 1100-1150hp each which gave about 40-42kts in the early boats, but when Italy joined the war supplies were cut off and some boats were built with only two engines (?), a slow boat being better than no boat. There was period when they stuck three 600hp Hall-Scotts in the boats but that dropped the top speed to well under 30kts. Packard then supplied the V-2500 engines (not Merlins).

MTB/MGBs worked with a number of bases. They are short ranged boats, at least the small fast ones.
If you want fast (over 30kts) you are very limited on available engines or very, very limited on the size of the boats, Even 300-450hp light weight marine engines are not common in 1930s.
The 105ft MMS

was a rather different beast. A single diesel of up to 500hp in a 240-255 tons 'boat' that could hit 11-12kts.
Sticking a pair of 18in TT on board needs a strange combination of optimism and desperation. ( I don't think it was ever done).
But boatyards that can build such craft successfully may not be able to build 30+kt torpedo boats (at least and have them last very long).

There were some yards that could do it but most Far Eastern navies in the late 30s just bought a few boats from European makers (often British) although the Philippines managed to build a few.
Most of these were slightly updated/lengthened versions of the WW I 55ft Thornycraft boats that used a single step hydroplane hull to help with high speed. But this type of hull only worked in fairly calm waters which is why most of the British and American boats used V hulls.
The single step hydroplane was also rather sensitive to where the weight was.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Agreed, which is why London was nervous about pushing Bangkok further into Tokyo's influence. Now, as it happened, Bangkok was pretty much already there...but that wasn't fully understood in November 1941. If Malaya Command had provided Bangkok with evidence of Japanese intentions and the Thais still refused to allow Britain to help defend Thai territory, it would have been a pretty solid indicator that Malaya Command needed to implement MATADOR without Thailand's approval and to assume the operation would be opposed...but at least Malaya Command would have had a clearer understanding of Bangkok's intentions.

And at that point, invading Thailand would have added yet another opponent to the Japanese.

 

[buffnut453]

And at that point, invading Thailand would have added yet another opponent to the Japanese.

There was considerable confusion over Thailand's position in late 1941. The British Ambassador, Sir Josiah Crosby, had essentially gone native and wasn't providing a clear, objective picture of Bangkok's intentions. The only way to pierce the resultant fog would have been to provide clear evidence of Japanese intentions, via the PR flight (which would have been flown by the sole PR Buffalo available at the time) mentioned above, and then see how Bangkok reacts. If they had seemed unconcerned or objected to British proposals for a mutual defence pact, it would have been a pretty strong indicator that Thailand was more aligned with Tokyo than with London. Such a move would have required extremely rapid military decision-making coupled with equally dynamic diplomacy, so the odds of success were always slim...but it was a missed opportunity to be sure

The biggest opportunity Malaya Command had to prevent or seriously hinder the Japanese assault would have been to deny them the port of Songkhla (aka Singora). It was, by far, the biggest port on the east coast of the Malay peninsula. Preventing the Japanese from using that port would have seriously disrupted their ability to land reinforcements en masse, as well as the Japanese logistics chain. Unfortunately, Malaya Command lacked sufficient ground forces (both numerical and qualitative) for such an aggressive move, and hence settled on taking "the ledge", an easily defensible road position on the main highway from Songkhla into Malaya.

All the rest is "coulda-woulda-shoulda" but Songkhla was key to British defensive success and it was never seriously attacked at any time during the brief campaign.

 

[EwenS]

The more I read the more it becomes clear that politics of the whole south east Asia region in 1940/41 seems to have been incredibly complicated and ever changing. Siam / Thailand (it changed its name in 1939) was the only independent nation and had its own internal political struggles as it sought to modernise, becoming more nationalistic in the process. Add in that the diplomacy was being run from London not Singapore just adds to the complexity. I almost get the feeling Thailand was trying to play both sides of the fence at the same time.

Thailand in World War II - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

12 June 1940 there was an Anglo-Thai Non-aggression Treaty signed and ratified at the end of the Aug. This was to have a life of 5 years with options to extend. An invasion of Thailand from Malaya would be a breach of this, and would make Britain the aggressor. Diplomatically massing troops along the border might have proved problematic had the Japanese not invaded.

Anglo-Thai Non-Aggression Pact - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

On the same day, 12 June 1940, they signed a "Treaty between Thailand and Japan Concerning the Continuance of Friendly Relations and the Mutual Respect of Each Other's Territorial Integrity" in Tokyo, which was ratified in Dec.

Treaty between Thailand and Japan (1940) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

July 1940 Britain bowed to Japanese pressure and closed the Burma Road supply route to China, to much disapproval both in Parliament at home and in the USA. It was reopened at the end of Sept when Japan signed the Tripartite Treaty with Germany & Italy.

From June 1940 Japan sought to take advantage of France's weakened position to seek closure of the supply route from the port of Haiphong in the northern Tonkin region of FIC. That led to various ultimata and eventually to a Japanese invasion and 4 day war at the end of Sept. From that a Treaty allowing stationing of 6,000 Japanese troops on the FIC / China border.

Then in Oct 1940 Thailand sought to exploit French weakness at home and invaded FIC over disputed border territories. An Armistice at the end of Jan 1941 was followed by a Japanese sponsored peace conference and a Treaty giving Thailand about 25% of the land it had gained in the war. It was hailed internally as a great victory over a colonial power, but externally the Thai Govt worried about the prospect of Japanese expansion and even invasion, tried to maintain good relations with Britain & the USA. The Treaty also maintained Franco-Japanese relations in a status quo regarding China.

Franco-Thai War - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Dec 1940 Vichy France agreed to let the Japanese increase their forces in FIC to 40,000 to fight the Allies, while retaining sovereign rights over their own forces and civilian administration. The Japanese did not immediately take up that right. It was the end of July 1941 before they invaded southern FIC. Then there existed an odd situation. The French retained control of their troops and civilian administration but under Japanese supervision. It was March 1945 before the Japanese staged a coup d'etat to take full control of FIC.

Japanese coup d'état in French Indochina - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

This curious arrangement gave them access to all the bases they needed, particularly space for air bases around Saigon, and the use of the natural harbour at Cam Rahn Bay, from which to stage their next moves into Malaya.

As an aside, 19 May 1941 the League for Independence of Vietnam (Viet Minh) was officially formed in northern FIC led by Ho Chi Minh and his Indochinese Communist Party, with its close links to the Chinese Communist Party.

Incidentally the British Ambassador to Thailand, Sir Josiah Crosby, had been in post since 1934 and earlier had spent most of his career in the Foreign Office in posts in FIC, Siam, and the DEI. So he was well experienced in dealing with matters in the region. The accusation was that he went "rogue" in 1941. But an alternative explanation might lie in his reporting line being to his superiors in the Foreign Office in London and not the Governor of the colony in Malaya. What instructions was he receiving from London and was he following these? The two places might well have been seeing matters differently from a diplomatic standpoint. Another thing to add to the list of things to investigate!!!

As for the implementation of Operation Matador, control of the "go" order for it remained in London until 5th Dec 1941. Only then did it pass to command authorities in Malaya. Japanese invasion convoys heading for Thailand and Malaya left Hainan Island on 4th Dec to sail south along the FIC coast and then west across the Gulf of Thailand. Planning for a remodelled and reduced in scale Matador took place on the 6th. The first aerial recce reports of Japanese troop convoys on the move in the Gulf of Thailand started being received around noon that same day.

Edit:- Britain also had at least a Consulate in Saigon in this period (a new Acting Consul General was appointed in Feb 1941) if not a full embassy. Anyone know what information was coming from officials there?

 

[Juha3]

[The Air Fighting Development Unit at Northolt filed this report on 5 Nov 1940 after testing a 339B.--D(aniel) F(ord)]

Pilot's Cockpit - The pilot's cockpit is roomy and comfortable and well laid out, and the design of the hood gives an exceedingly good field of view, especially to the sides and rear. The type of hood itself is to be recommended in that it is very strongly built and operates on robust runners. It is difficult to close at high speed but opens easily at all speeds. The arrangement for raising and lowering the pilot's seat is bad; it is exceedingly difficult to raise when flying.

Trimming Tabs - The aircraft is supplied with elevator, rudder and aileron trimming tabs operated from the cockpit. These are very effective although rather sensitive and contribute materially to the ease of the control of the aircraft.

Field of View - For a single-seater single-engined fighter, the pilot's field of view is exceedingly good all around. For taxying, take-o9ff and landing the nose rather obscures the view directly ahead. The view to the rear is far superior to the Spitfire or Hurricane.

Take-off and Landing - The aircraft has a good take- off, being better than a Hurricane, with a slight tendency to swing to the left. . . . For landing, it has a flat approach, and to approach with comfort a little engine is required. It has a comparatively fast approach but pulls up very quickly once having touched down. The actual touch down is simple. The brakes, which are pedal operated, are very efficient both for taxying and landing.

Climb and Dive - The climb to 15,000 feet is better than that of the Hurricane, and the aircraft easily out-dives the Hurricane.

Comparative Speed in Level Flight - [The fighters were flown at the rated heights for the two-speed supercharger on the Brewster's Cyclone engine.] At 6,000 feet the Brewster was approximately 15 m.p.h. faster than the Hurricane; while at 14,700 feet the speeds were practically identical. [If similarly equipped,] the Brewster's speed at 6,000 feet would be approximately the same as the Hurricane, whereas at 14,700 feet it would be approximately 12 miles slower.

Maneuverability - In the air the Brewster Fighter is very maneuverable, its aileron and elevator controls being positive and lighter than the Hurricane or Spitfire at all speeds. The rudder is definitively heavy, but only a little movement is required for full control. It can easily turn inside the Hurricane.

Steadiness of aircraft as gun platform - Although the guns were not fitted, it is the opinion of all pilots who flew the aircraft that it should be a steady gun platform.

 

[OldGeezer]

I've always suspected that if you gave the Buffalos to Japanese pilots and the "on paper" superior Japanese fighters to the British pilots, the results would probably have been the same. Japan had been fighting in that Theater for years, and Japanese pilots were well seasoned in air combat. Brits - not so much. Given pilots of equal experience on both sides, who knows what the outcome might have been?

 

[Greg Boeser]

For all the talk of the superiority of Japanese fighters, let us remember that the Japanese had their own problems. The Ki 43 had only just entered service and suffered many teething problems. Weak structure resulted in skin wrinkling and even wing failure at high Gs. The 12.7 mm explosive ammo had a tendency to explode upon leaving the muzzle, resulting in engine damage. This problem was so accute that the 12.7mm guns were pulled and replaced with 7.7mm. Rendering the firepower of the Ki 43 to that of the Ki 27.

 

[buffnut453]

Incidentally the British Ambassador to Thailand, Sir Josiah Crosby, had been in post since 1934 and earlier had spent most of his career in the Foreign Office in posts in FIC, Siam, and the DEI. So he was well experienced in dealing with matters in the region. The accusation was that he went "rogue" in 1941. But an alternative explanation might lie in his reporting line being to his superiors in the Foreign Office in London and not the Governor of the colony in Malaya. What instructions was he receiving from London and was he following these? The two places might well have been seeing matters differently from a diplomatic standpoint. Another thing to add to the list of things to investigate!!!

I don't think that Crosby went "rogue." I do, however, believe he'd been in post too long and was painting an overly optimistic picture of Bangkok's intentions, hence my "going native" comment earlier in the thread. He took every opportunity to stress how Bangkok was leaning towards Britain despite there being virtually no evidence to support that assertion. When Bangkok asked Britain to provide aircraft, Crosby immediately passed on the request, advocating that Buffalos from Malaya Command should be provided immediately. Thankfully, calmer heads prevailed in Singapore because it was recognized that any aircraft provided to Thailand would (a) be lost to the defence of Malaya/Singapore, and (b) almost certainly be gifted to the Japanese if the latter gained sway over Bangkok. I must admit to being tempted to do a what-if Buffalo wearing Thai elephant markings - I think it would look awesome, I'd just copy the scheme applied to Thai Ki-43s:

Edit:- Britain also had at least a Consulate in Saigon in this period (a new Acting Consul General was appointed in Feb 1941) if not a full embassy. Anyone know what information was coming from officials there?

The Acting Consul General in FIC was William Meiklereid and, of all the British bureaucrats in the Far East, he comes closest to being the one man who might have saved Singapore...had people paid attention to him. He produced remarkably accurate intelligence on Japanese developments in FIC, including providing a sketch map (that's still accessible in the National Archives at Kew) showing where the Japanese were building new airfields. One such location was on Phu Quoc Island and it's the development of an airfield at Duong Dong on Phu Quoc that was key to the British understanding Japanese intentions because it was the closest airfield to British Malaya.

In October/November 1941, Malaya Command expected Japanese convoys to land in FIC and then either take the overland route through Thailand into northern Malaya, or to re-embark the troops and ferry them across the Gulf of Siam. Nobody expected the Japanese to simply sail direct from Formosa to the east coast of Malaya. In early November 1941, the work on Duong Dong Airfield was progressing but the type(s) of aircraft that would deploy there would be key to understanding Japanese intentions. If the Japanese put maritime aircraft or bombers there, then it would indicate a push northward into Thailand (because the defending IJAAF fighters would be up-threat near the FIC-Thai border). If the Japanese deployed fighters to Phu Quoc, then it was a pretty strong indicator of an intent to move west across the Gulf of Siam to attack Malaya directly.

As things panned out, Duong Dong became the main operating base for the 64th and 77th Sentai, providing a force of some 35 Ki-43 and 33 Ki-27 fighters. To put that force in context, that's 64 fighters in just one airfield whereas the RAF had 72 Buffalos in all of Malaya...and bear in mind that the IJAAF had a further 24 Ki-43s and 67 Ki-27s at Kampong Trach just east of Phu Quoc island on the FIC mainland, well positioned to use Duong Dong as a forward staging base. Neither Duong Dong nor Kampong Trach are well-positioned for a move northward into Thailand. Since fighters are based up-threat compared to bombers, it's pretty clear that Japan was moving west towards Malaya. The simple fact of Japan constructing new airfields was a key indicator that wasn't fully exploited.

Unfortunately, at no time did Malaya Command conduct PR to determine Duong Dong Airfield's readiness, nor did they attempt to establish the date when aircraft occupied it. There was a specially-modified PR Buffalo sitting in Singapore that could have accomplished the PR missions to Duong Dong. It was certainly risky, and was a very long way to fly over water with just a single engine. However, desperate times need desparate measures. Per my earlier post, had Malaya Command aggressively employed their scarce PR asset in this manner, there's a chance that Malaya Command could have established a clear picture of Japanese intentions. Instead, they wasted time and effort trying to divine the intent of the Japanese invasion convoys. By the time those convoys had started landing troops, it was too late to do much of anything and Singapore's fate was essentially sealed.

If Singapore had paid attention to Meiklereid's reports of airfield construction on Phu Quoc and tasked PR to investigate, it would have prevented a great deal of indecision in Malaya Command. Meiklereid could have been the man who saved Singapore. Instead, he's largely forgotten to history despite an illustrious service in the Foreign Office, and ultimately being knighted for his services.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Given the small size of the IJAF in FIC and Formosa relative to the Luftwaffe in France and Norway, the infrastructure needn't be BoB scale. A limited radar setup, observer corp, ops room and more fighter aircraft would go a long way.

But you actually specified "UK-level radars, telephone-linked spotting teams, ops rooms, airfield defence, along with fewer and focused all-weather airfields". What is "limited" radar if not BoB scale? A set out in the middle of nowhere with no telecommunications to relay their contacts to a site a few hundred miles away which then has to relay it to airfields equipped with planes that climb slower than goats? Where are these observers, and how are they contacting control centers that themselves are not built?

You can't eat your cake and have it too. The Brits leant that when they pegged their defense of Malaya to Singapore without equipping that base with what you suggest above. Putting it into the hinterland? Not happening. UK-level radars, a radar tower every fifty miles or so, without a good telephone network, and even UK airfields in 1940 often weren't concreted runways so we're shipping concrete to Malaya anyway, none of that is happening while Germany is carving off chunks of Europe even before the outbreak of the European war.