Against All Odds: The Brewster Buffalo in the Malayan Campaign

[ThomasP]

In 1941 Malaya, a serious radar net would only have been practical around the Singapore base itself, and maybe with a few of the newer & smaller semi-portable naval radar based sets set up as local search radar at some of the outlying bases/airfields. The outlying posts could have communicated by radio with Singapore, thereby allowing a bit of early warning at longer distances. Protecting the outlying bases/radars would have been a problem.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Meiklereid could have been the man who saved Singapore. Instead, he's largely forgotten to history despite an illustrious service in the Foreign Office, and ultimately being knighted for his services.

I can't find anything about his time during the war (was he a POW?) or postwar. At least he didn't end up hanged by the Japanese as a spy, like Richard Sorge. Like Meiklereid, Sorge warned his government (USSR) that an invasion was eminent, but was ignored.

 

[EwenS]

I can't find anything about his time during the war (was he a POW?) or postwar. At least he didn't end up hanged by the Japanese as a spy, like Richard Sorge. Like Meiklereid, Sorge warned his government (USSR) that an invasion was eminent, but was ignored.

See this thread on WW2talk.

Ernest William Meiklereid, British Diplomat

Hi all, I'm trying to find out a bit more on the British Diplomat, Ernest William Meiklereid. I am interested in his time in the Far East, especially...

ww2talk.com

He was married to a French woman. His next posting was as Consul General at Dakar, French West Africa in 1943 after it switched from Vichy to Free French allegiance.

When it comes to diplomats thing were / are a bit more civilised than locking them up as POWs. Generally diplomats were exchanged. For example Sir Robert Craigie, British Ambassador in Japan, and his staff were exchanged via Mozambique in July 1942.

Robert Craigie (diplomat) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Admiral Beez]

Makes me wonder (again) how the Buffalo would have faired if there were more of them and tactics had been developed.

It's a good question. Per Wikipedia there were 509 Buffaloes produced. Of these approx. 225 went to the USN, 170 to the RAF, 72 to the DEI and 44 to Finland. Let's give the RAF all of the Dutch and Finn Buffaloes, for a total of 286 Buffaloes in Malaya by autumn 1941. One of big issues outlined in Bloody Shambles was the lack of pilots, personnel and spares, meaning that of the 150-odd Buffaloes available (many of the original 169 were lost in accidents) in Dec 1941, only about half were operational, with the rest being considered spares. Now, you always need some spare aircraft, but if we have 286 Buffaloes in Malaya, along with air/ground crew and spares/service, we should be able to field at least 200 fighters.

As for tactical improvements, I think the priority is less in how the aircraft are used than in where they are operated from. Airfield placement and defence must be reconsidered. Our resident contrarians will otherwise leap to tell us that without improvements in airfields (along with personnel/spares/service) any increase in the number of Buffaloes makes no difference.

 

[EwenS]

It's a good question. Per Wikipedia there were 509 Buffaloes produced. Of these approx. 225 went to the USN, 170 to the RAF, 72 to the DEI and 44 to Finland. Let's give the RAF all of the Dutch and Finn Buffaloes, for a total of 286 Buffaloes in Malaya by autumn 1941. One of big issues outlined in Bloody Shambles was the lack of pilots, personnel and spares, meaning that of the 150-odd Buffaloes available (many of the original 169 were lost in accidents) in Dec 1941, only about half were operational, with the rest being considered spares. Now, you always need some spare aircraft, but if we have 286 Buffaloes in Malaya, along with air/ground crew and spares/service, we should be able to field at least 200 fighters.

As for tactical improvements, I think the priority is less in how the aircraft are used than in where they are operated from. Airfield placement and defence must be reconsidered. Our resident contrarians will otherwise leap to tell us that without improvements in airfields (along with personnel/spares/service) any increase in the number of Buffaloes makes no difference.

One of the problems with the Buffalo is the variation in engine and equipment fit across the 509 aircraft produced. The 170 for the RAF probably represents the single most homogeneous group.

USN
1xXF2A -
11xF2A-1 - 940hp Wright R-1820-34 Hamilton Standard prop; weight 3,785lb empty, 5,055lb gross,; armament 3x0.5" + 1x0.3"
43xF2A2 - 1,200hp Wright R-1820-40 Cyclone driving Curtiss electric cuffed prop; weight 4,576lb empty, 5,942lb gross; armament 4x0.5" and provision for 2x100lb bombs. Replacements for the aircraft transferred to Finland.
108x F2A3 - 1,200hp Wright R-1820-40 Cyclone, weight 4,732 empty, 6,321lb gross; armament 4x0.5". Fuselage extension ahead of cockpit and extra fuel. Ordered Jan 1941.
Total - 163

Finland
44xB-239 (equivalent of the USN F2A-1 except for engine replaced with an export spec 950hp R-1820-G5) - weight 3,900lb, max 5,820lb. Transfer to Finland agreed in Nov / Dec 1939. 6 arrived by March 1940 with rest following end of war with USSR.

Belgium
40xB-339B - (denavalised equivalent of USN F2A-2) - 1,100hp Wright R-1820-105.
1 was diverted to France in May 1940 where it was captured and tested by the Luftwaffe.
6 were diverted to the Martinique and were interned there
33 to Britain in July 1940. 18 to Med in 1941 for use by FAA and RAF

Dutch East Indies
24xB339C - Wright 1,100hp R-1820-G105 Cyclone (many of the supplied for these were second hand and reconditioned by Wright) driving an uncuffed Curtiss electric prop; armament 2x0.5", 2x0.303". Dutch specified armour self sealing tanks & reflector sights but these were not fitted before delivery. Some of these were fitted along the way.
48xB-339D - Wright 1,200hp R-1820-G205 Cyclone; armament etc as above.
All of the above delivered to Java April-Sept 1941.

20x339-23 - (export version of the USN F2A-3) 950hp Wright R-1820-G5. Delivered to Australia in early 1942 minus some of their intended equipment and retained there

Dutch total 92.

Britain
170xB-339E Buffalo I - 1,100 Wright R-1820-G105A with Hamilton Standard prop; weight 4,479lb empty, 6,500lb gross; armament 2x0.5" + 2x0.3". Fitted with armour protection for pilot, reflector gunsight
Order placed early 1940 i.e. after the US decision to transfer the 44 aircraft to Finland.

Allocations
The Dutch did send some of their B-339s to Singapore to fight alongside the RAF. But if you purlion all the Dutch B-339s what do you expect the Dutch to defend the whole of the DEI with? In total Bloody Shambles gives them a total of 83 B-339, CW-21B & Hawk 75As spread between Java, Amboina, & West, East and North-East Borneo.

Burma
Remember Britain not only had Malaya to defend. It had Burma as well (it was invaded across the mountains from Thailand in mid-Jan 1942). 67 squadron, having re-equipped with Buffalos in Malaya in March 1941, was sent to Mingaladon, Rangoon in Oct, leaving its existing aircraft (and some of its pilots?) behind. It collected 30 new Buffalos after it arrived. 16 as unit equipment and another 14 in reserve. See "Bloody Shambles" Vol 1 p236 and the comment:-

"None of the New Zealanders who formed the the majority of the pilots, had been fortunate enough to participate in a proper course at an Operational Training Unit, so their individual total flying hours were very low. Nearly all the pilots were inexperienced in aerial combat and air gunnery but while the squadron as a whole could not claim to be properly trained as a fighting unit, morale was high and all were bursting with enthusiasm to 'have a go'. As soon as sufficient aircraft were available, flying training began in an effort to weld the unit together as a disciplined entity. More pilots - mainly New Zealanders - continued to arrive and by early December, 27 pilots and 16 aircraft were on hand."


Pilot availibility
AFAICT the problem in the Far East was not necesarlly a shortage of pilots. It was a shortage of TRAINED pilots. You just need to look at the histories of the Buffalo squadrons in Malaya in Dec 1941.

21 RAAF - while it had existed as a Citizen Air Force unit since 1936 and had arrived in Malaya in Aug 1940, it only converted to the Buffalo in Aug 1941.
243 - formed in Singapore in March 1941 with the Buffalo.
453 RAAF - formed in July 1941 in Australia from drafts of ground personnel and went to Singapore in Aug where it equipped with the Buffalo.
488 RNZAF - formed on 1 Sept 1941 in New Zealand and was sent to Singapore where it received Buffalos in Oct.

Many of the pilots were straight out of the training schools with only a seasoning of experienced personnel in the more senior roles as squadron & flight commanders.

Scale of Aircraft reserves
Back in Aug 1939 the RAF had been arguing for reserves in wartime to cope with a 70-90% per month wastage rate for fighters and 50% per month for their flying personnel. And that had been approved by the Cabinet. I don't know how that had changed by 1941.


Airfield locations
We have discussed before how the geography of Malaya affected the campaign. It is simple to say that the RAF should not have placed airfields where they did. But just where would you like the RAF to place their airfields? You simply can't provide an air defence for the whole country from Singapore or the southern end of the Malayan peninsula, particularly when the radar / observer corps only covers the southern part incompletely, unless you have a far larger air force to allow standing patrols to be run during daylight hours when the weather permits. Then note that the Malaya / Thailand border does not run straight across the peninsula. It runs roughly North West to South East.

On the east coast Singapore is about 350 miles from the border with Thailand. The mountains and jungle come close to the coast line for much of its length. The RAF built a cluster of airfields around Khota Bharu on about the only possible area in the North East. Kuantan about half way down was the next best location, where they did build an airfield. A mountain range runs down the middle of Malaya, virtually cutting one side of the country off from the other. On the west coast it is 450 miles from Singapore to the Thai border. Airfields had to be slotted in between the jungle and the swamps forming the coastal areas. Here is a link to a map showing most of the airfield sites. Even today there are few civilian airports or military airfields on the east coast.

Malaya, Location of Military Formations, Airfields and Air Force Units, 8th December 1941 by HMSO | Antiqua Print Gallery

Malaya, Location of Military Formations, Airfields and Air Force Units, 8th December 1941

www.abebooks.co.uk

Airfield Defence
Airfield defence had been an Army responsibility from the interwar period. Problem was that the Army never seemed to have enough resources in any campaign to maintain the front line let alone protect airfields. It had been a problem in France in 1940 and Crete in 1941 and again in Malaya in 1941/42. The upshot was the formation of the RAF Regiment on 1 Feb 1942. While it started with some 66,000 personnel drawn from existing airfield defence units, these were mostly based in Britain. Even if they had been available in Malaya, the middle of a battle is not the time to make such a reorganisation.

 

[SaparotRob]

Out of curiosity, could another manufacturer have taken over from Brewster when issues first appeared? One of the smaller companies. A Buffalo built to spec might've saved a few Allied lives.

 

[smutny]

Out of curiosity, could another manufacturer have taken over from Brewster when issues first appeared? One of the smaller companies. A Buffalo built to spec might've saved a few Allied lives.

I don't think they realized the depth of Brewster's issues soon enough. By the time they did, better aircraft were in the boards and America had yet to spool up to war production seen just a couple years later.

 

[EwenS]

Out of curiosity, could another manufacturer have taken over from Brewster when issues first appeared? One of the smaller companies. A Buffalo built to spec might've saved a few Allied lives.

Who did you have in mind?

None of the US aircraft companies were particularly large in 1939/40. Until European nations started rearming and looking for large numbers of aircraft, they were all existing on small orders from the USAAF.

When Britain went looking for a fighter in early 1940 for secondary theatres like the Far East, the only options were Brewster with the Buffalo and Seversky with the P-35. The latter was rejected because the company had just won a contract to supply 120 of the EP-106 (a version of the P-35) to Sweden. Half that order ended up in the hands of the USAAF after mid-1940.

Curtiss was swamped with orders for P-36 & P-40. Lockheed had orders for Hudsons and was developing the P-38 (ff Jan 1939). Bell had its hands full with the P-39 (ff April 1939). Grumman, having lost out on the initial new USN fighter USN contract to Brewster, was still developing the F4F and was starting work on the TBF. Douglas & Boeing were also were busy.

 

[SaparotRob]

Beech? Bellanca? Pretty much grasping at straws here. I imagine Piper was now part of Boeing and building trainers.

 

[FulmenTheFinn]

11xF2A-1 - 940hp Wright R-1820-34 Hamilton Standard prop; weight 3,785lb empty, 5,055lb gross,; armament 3x0.5" + 1x0.3"

[...]

44xB-239 (equivalent of the USN F2A-1 except for engine replaced with an export spec 950hp R-1820-G5) - weight 3,900lb, max 5,820lb.

The R-1820-G5 had a max. rating of 1,000 hp, although it could be maintained only for 5 minutes at a time. 950 hp was the TO rating. I assume the R-1820-34 also had a military rating of 1,000 hp. Curtiss-Wright gave the latter a TO rating of 950 hp, the same as on the G5.

The Model 239s came equipped with 3 x 0.5" + 1 x 0.3", though the fuselage 0.3" was later swapped out for a fourth 0.5". The quoted max. weight of 5,820 lb (2,640 kg) is interesting as according to Finnish sources that is the flight weight of the aircraft in Finnish service. That's with the standard 1941 modifications the Finns made to it. The R-1820-G5 could certainly handle an aircraft heavier than that, as evidenced by BW-392 weighing 6,063 lb (2,750 kg) in flight tests when outfitted with a wooden wing. By my calculations a regular "1941" Model 239 with max. fluids (160 gal fuel, 11 gal oil) and ammo (1,300 x 0.5") weighed, incidentally, 6,063 lb. That's not including trapped fluids. If America's Hundred Thousand p. 442 on the F2A-3 no. 01516 is anything to go by, trapped fluids could add some 147 lb (67 kg) of extra weight, perhaps somewhat less on the F2A-1-based Model 239.

 

[EwenS]

Beech? Bellanca? Pretty much grasping at straws here. I imagine Piper was now part of Boeing and building trainers.

You really are grasping at straws!

I don't think Piper was ever part of the Boeing empire, at least not in the time period under discussion. It was building nothing more sophisticated than the Cub series of aircraft, demand for which took off in 1940.

The most sophisticated aircraft from Beech was the twin engined Model 18. Although over 9,000 in various versions were eventually built, only 39 of those were produced between 1937 and Dec 1941, with 29 for the civil market. Other than that it was the Beech Model 17 Staggerwing of which it built a few hundred between 1933 & Dec 1941.

There were many other small aircraft companies producing simple light aircraft in relatively small numbers. You mentioned Bellanca but there was also Waco & Taylorcraft. It would have been a major step for them to switch to building all aluminium monocoque modern fighter designs.

And commercially, why would the parent company of a design allow licence production of those when production orders were still running at relatively low levels. It was April 1940 before the British Purchasing Commission approached North American and asked them to build the P-40D under licence because Curtiss was swamped with orders. Britain ordered 560 P-40D from Curtiss in May 1940 on top of the previous nearly 1,200 Tomahawks. Curtiss also had USAAF orders on its books. The attraction of Brewster was that it didn't have these commitments.

NAA at the time was also busy knocking out Harvard's etc for the RAF amongst others.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

To add some timings to the Brewster Buffalo production. Firstly the USN says F2A/B339D for Netherlands East Indies, F2A-1 for USN and Finland (B339), F2A-2 for Belgium (B339), RAF (B339E) and USN, F2A-3 USN

F2A-1, USN July to December 1939, Finland probably December 1939 to February 1940, exported January and February 1940

F2A-2, Belgium April to July 1940, exported 7 to Belgium in June, 33 to Britain June to August, received the same months, Britain exported 15 during November and December.

F2A-2 USN 42 September to November 1940 plus 1 in January 1941, Britain 170 December 1940 to May 1941, exported December 1940 to June 1941, plus 1 laggard in November 1941, 2 arrived Britain January 1941, 167 arrived Far East February to August 1941, 1 more arrived Far East January 1942.

F2A, Belgium 72 from March to June 1941, 71 exported March to August, 20 more January to April 1942, exported, along with 1 from the earlier order the same months. So 21 to Australia, Archives Series A705 Control Symbol 9/1/1377 Aircraft Status - Aircraft received from USA [United States of America] and NEI [Netherlands East Indies] Barcode 273020, page 30 has a list of NEI serials for the 17 used by the RAAF

F2A-3 108 USN July to December 1941.

To the end of 1939 the reports defined new US aircraft produced when either a) delivered to the US military, b) civil aircraft registered in the US or flew using manufacturer's markings or c) exported (including military aircraft for foreign governments). In 1940 the report's definition of produced was changed to a) military aircraft accepted by the US or foreign military, b) civil aircraft registered in the US or flew using manufacturer's markings or c) a civil aircraft exported, with all twelve or more seat transports counted as military aircraft even if for civil customers.

The following excludes Gliders and lighter than air types and production for export.

Civil production figures were deliberately blurred to hide individual company totals and measurement was different by different agencies, the Department of Commerce had Monthly Survey of Current Business and yearly supplement reports, The Aircraft Year Book by the Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce of America Inc and the Annual Report of the Civil Aeronautics Administration and its Statistical Handbook, plus others. While they tend to agree over a year their monthly figures can be quite different.

July 1937, Department of Commerce 296 aircraft, ACCA 261, meantime type breakdown from the magazine Aviation, Vol 36, no 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, month ending the first for July 1937 was 210 deliveries, 10 Beech 17, 6 Cessna C37, 12 Fairchild G, 5 Fairchild H, 2 Howard DGA, 1 Lockheed 10B, 1 Lockheed Electra, 4 Monocoupe 90A, 1 Monocoupe 110, 2 Ryan STA, 1 Spartan 7W, 1 Stearnman-Hammond Y-15, 3 Stearnman-Hammond Y-15, 19 Stinson SR, 67 Taylor J2, 57 Taylor-Young Model A, 1 Waco EGC, 1 Waco UKS, 2 Waco YKS, 2 Waco YQC, 7 Waco ZGC, 2 Waco ZKS, 2 Waco ZPF, 1 Waco ZQC

As war came closer published reports began being dropped, monthly production figures for military aircraft ceased in September 1938, resumed after the war, but stopped again after July 1948. One result of this is later publications sometimes report production for the US military in 1938 as the January to September total, not the 1,253 total the USN+USAAF report.

Going forward to 1940 Department Of Commerce monthly figures total 6,748 in 1940 (which is also the ACCA 1941 yearbook total) but later reports say the monthly average civil production is 565 = 6,780 for year while the CAA and later ACCA yearbooks say 6,785. CAA Second Annual Report (1940) says 2,289 civil aircraft built January to June 1940 versus the Department Of Commerce figure of 2,329. The amended monthly figures have not been published.

Seats	Total	1 to 2 Seat	3 to 5 Seat	6 to 20 Seat	over 20 Seat	Seaplane	Amphibious	Unclassified
1940​	6,785​	5,527​	1,031​	8​	132​	18​	3​	66​
1941​	6,844​	6,060​	573​	3​	112​	16​	30​	50​
Power	Total	Under 50 HP	51 to 70 HP	71 to 100 HP	101 to 165 HP	166 to 225 HP	226 to 300 HP	301 to 600 HP	601 to 1,600 HP	Unclassified
1940​	6,785​	490​	4,529​	935​	211​	318​	37​	72​	137​	56​
1941​	6,844​	7​	4,303​	1,805​	206​	309​	15​	31​	118​	50​

In July 1940 the War production Board started tracking civil production using what it called deliveries = USAAF acceptances, which means its monthly figures vary considerably compared with other references, the following is the 1941 totals EXCLUDING the currently unlocated July and August reports, which would probably add over 1,000 aircraft.

Program companies
4 Beech
16 Bellanca
4 Boeing
26 Cessna
133 Culver
70 Douglas Santa Monica/El Segundo
83 Engineering & Research
54 Fairchild
30 Grumman
23 Lockheed
0 Ryan
4 Stearman
1 Vega
1 Vought Sikorsky
9 Vultee Tennessee

Non Program companies
840 Aeronica
0 All American
14 AGA Aviation
154 Columbia
5 deHavilland
0 Funk
44 Howard
20 Luscombe
6 Noorduyn
0 North American
2,569 Piper
56 Rearwin
0 Republic
266 Stinson
812 Taylorcraft
0 Texas Engineering
42 Vultee Wayne
206 Waco
5,492 Total

Civil also hits a definition change at the end of 1941, the Department of Commerce has 985 civil type in 1942, others have none, with appropriate adjustments to military aircraft totals.

Jane's All the Worlds Aircraft 1951/52 reports Piper produced 707 Cubs in 1937, 737 in 1938, 1,806 in 1939, 3,016 in 1940 and the 10,000th Cub was built during 1941, implying over 3,000 Cubs were produced in 1941. These figures indicate Piper was about half the US civil aircraft production 1937 to 1941. The Book Mr Piper and his Cubs by Devon Francis indicates Piper built and sold 8,020 out of 17,727 private aircraft 1939 to 1941, the figures for 1941 are given as Piper 3,197, Taylorcraft 1,000 and Aeronica 999.

 

[SaparotRob]

You really are grasping at straws!

I don't think Piper was ever part of the Boeing empire, at least not in the time period under discussion. It was building nothing more sophisticated than the Cub series of aircraft, demand for which took off in 1940.

OOPS! I meant Stearman. My proof reader wasn't around.