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Is this discussion meant only to discuss naval airpower? Nobody has mentioned the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of airpower in support of army operations. Tactical air support employed a lot more sorties then naval attack.
The British RN used torpedo Bi-Planes, to slow down Bismarch and might not have sunk her, at least at that time, without aircraft. Then the RN was able to effectivly attack Italian battleships at Totanto, doing enough damage, to force Italy to relocate and stop the FLeet in Being tactic.
Then the Pearl Harbor Attack also showed how aircraft could take out battleships.
To me, it should have beeb clear, not to send ships into battle without air support.
Yet, Adm Phillips took Force Z (Repulse Prince of Wales) into battle with little air support and quickly destroyed. PoW was a modern ship with good armor, TDS, damage control. Along with state of the art, radar controlled anti-aircraft gunnery.
American-British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA), still tried to fight the Japanese, without much air support, during the Java Sea seriers of naval battles and of course lost a lot of ships. Is this correct?
This multi-nation command only lasted 6 months and I realize it had other problems.
Shouldn't have the Allies have withdrawn, until they could beef-up their air force?
In 1942 Aug, during the Guadalcanal Battles, Japan always used dark of night, for naval operations, fearing US air power.
Force Z WAS supposed to have land based air cover: 452 Squadron, equipped with Brewster Buffaloes, was standing by for air cover duties but was not radioed with Force Z's position until after the attack was underway. 488 Sqdn also offered to provide air cover, but the offer was declined.
The original plan was that Force Z would include an aircraft carrier but the intended vessel ran aground so HMS Repulse and PoW had to go it alone. Admiral Phillips was told that the RAF couldn't guarantee air cover over northern Malaya which he seems to have interpreted as an inability to provide air cover anywhere. This was a fatal misunderstanding as at least 1.5 squadrons of Buffalos (453 Sqn at Sembawang plus elements of 243 and 488 Sqns at Kallang) were standing by waiting for the order to scramble to support Force Z.