Allied Bombers and Fighter Bombers in 1942:, North Africa, China, Burma, Pacific, Aleutians

[Shortround6]

Just about everything was on a sliding scale or if you prefer, every weapons was sort of a light on a dimmer switch. It is not just off or on but a large variation. A really dim light is better than dark, it keeps you from walking into the table or sofa, it does not keep you from stepping on the kid's toy car or stepping on a Lego with your bare feet.

And no gun or weapons system works 100% of the time. Even a super bright light will not help if I am not looking at the floor.

But I am not buying dim light bulbs to save on electricity

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Just about everything was on a sliding scale or if you prefer, every weapons was sort of a light on a dimmer switch. It is not just off or on but a large variation. A really dim light is better than dark, it keeps you from walking into the table or sofa, it does not keep you from stepping on the kid's toy car or stepping on a Lego with your bare feet.

And no gun or weapons system works 100% of the time. Even a super bright light will not help if I am not looking at the floor.

But I am not buying dim light bulbs to save on electricity

One other thing I've learned in the last few years is that M2 Brownings and HS 404 20mm cannons, and some of the German kit too, jammed constantly especially in the first couple of years of the war. I think that tends to get underplayed, especially in things like pop culture ala TV and video games.

 

[Greg Boeser]

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Almost all the Japanese crew served weapons seem to be described as terrible, and yet they seem to have made a lot of them work regardless

In Europe low level attack missions were abandoned due to the quality and quantity of German light and medium flak.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Hi
I am attaching extracts from 'Shark Squadron Pilot' by Bert Horden, these included reference to bomb loads (including the invention of the twin bomb rack) and changes that had to be made to the Kittyhawk to allow heavier bomb loads (there are always compromises). The time period covers (late) North African and Italian operations. I am sure this question has been covered before on the Forum and I think I have put some of these extracts on before so I apologise for repeating the information:
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Mike

So Mike, I'd like to thank you very much for introducing this book to the discussion. I bought a copy of it which I've read now and I think it contains a wealth of information on the subject of the use of Kittyhawk fighters as fighter bombers, and their bomb-loads and so on. Plus some other interesting data points I hadn't seen before.

Normally I am not really drawn to this type of pilot's memoir precisely because it's mainly to do with bombing missions that are mainly fighter-bomber sorties without a lot of action other than the random (and still very scary) risk of flak. The author, Bert Horden, joined 112 Sqn in 1943 when they were transitioning over into pretty much exclusively fighter bomber missions. He was also using Kittyhawk III, which could either mean P-40K or M, during most of his tour. Toward the end they got Kittyhawk IV which is the P-40N, which was disappointing since some of the other Kittyhawk squadrons in the same fighter wing got Mustang IVs / P-51D, and the P-40Ns they got a had host of vexing technical problems initially which caused him several issues during missions.

Bert includes a lot of nice photos in the memoir but I didn't see any full length shots of the Kittyhawks to tell if they were P-40K or M, and he also is a little sparse on dates though one can vaguely peg most incidents to a particular time period.

I'll post some excerpts from this book which I think may clarify a few issues relevant to the discussion in this thread.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

In Europe low level attack missions were abandoned due to the quality and quantity of German light and medium flak.

Until the tactical war resumed in Europe, which it did fairly early on in Sicily and Italy...

 

[Steamed_Banana]

So following up on my previous post, I'm starting to see two or three timelines emerging with two different narratives about the Kittyhawk variants adaptation to carrying heavier bomb loads in the MTO. This is a bit different from what happened in CBI and the Pacific but I'll have to circle back to those Theaters later.

According to Shark Squadron Pilot, typical armament in early 1943 for Kittyhawk IIIs (I believe P-40K at this point) in North Africa consisted of one 500 lb bomb or two 250 lb bombs on the center line, with another six 40 lb bombs (three on each wing). The 250 lb bombs often had 12" or 18" detonation rods mounted. An example of this is listed on page 63.

By August he also describes carrying a 63 gallon (!) fuel tank on the centerline.

He refers to Cab Rank operations in September (44?) on page 125. In the next few pages he discusses increased bomb armament being carried.

He notes that Warrant Officer Smith, the squadron engineer for 112 Sqn, 'invented' a special bomb rack for Kittyhawks to carry two 250 lb bombs on the centerline in North Africa, for which he received the MBE.

He notes that several things were removed in North Africa to lighten the aircraft which had to be put back in for Italy- artificial horizon, a smaller battery (which had to be upgraded back to a bigger one), aluminum wheels replaced the steel wheels, but as bomb loads went up in Italy, these cracked so had to be replaced with steel rims again. He states the following:

"In North Africa the weather was so good we didn't need our artificial horizons on the instrument panel. When it was decided to uplift the bomb-load to two 500 pounders under the wings the authorities decided to remove the artificial horizon and other equipment to compensate for the additional bomb-load."

So I take this to mean that they were already carrying 500 lb bombs on the wing in North Africa. No explanation is given to any modification to the aircraft to carry 500 lbs on the wings, but it seems to be a decision taken in the field which was later officially followed up with the Kittyhawk Mk IV / P-40N.

He goes on to note that in Italy, they were now carrying either a 500 lb under the centerline, plus another 500 lb under each wing, or a 1,000 lb bomb under the fueselage, plus a 500 lb bomb under each wing. This is still with the Kittyhawk III though it's not clear if this is a P-40K or M, (however, I believe I can follow up on that and find out). He notes that this is almost as much bomb load as the B-25s they sometimes escorted.

He notes (page 127) that to takeoff with this load they had to add some flap and stand on the brakes until the revs had mounted up before moving forward. He discusses one incident where a Kittyhawk failed to take off and skidded off the field and into some tents, which luckily didn't cause any casualties. But he doesn't mention many other issues.

One other thing which comes up is that by this point in Italy they were operating largely from Marsden mats due to the issue of mud. These were very good but they made the prospect of a belly landing much more perilous, and even more so with bombs still on board. He mentions one colleague belly landing outside of the base on a nearby beach. Something I'd never thought of.

He mentions a bit later (page 149) having to spiral up slowly to altitude with the heavy bomb load, and their climbing over the saddle on a mountain range, and they were waffling over that very slowly with a 1,500 lb bomb load, the Germans had dragged a light AAA gun up to the mountain and wiped out one of their fighters before the other could get away.

They still occasionally used 40 lb bombs on the wings (so the 500 lb wing mounting must have still allowd this?) later in the book on page 161, describing another raid with 500 lb bombs on the wings the next day.

It is not until almost at the end of his tour, on page 163, that he describes their unit receiving Kittyhawk IVs. These were 'officially' rated for the 1,000 lb bomb on the centerline and 500 on each wing. (an important distinction). Unfortunately they had a lot of problems with the Kittyhawk IVs with several things not working properly - this isn't the first time I've read about problems like this with the type.

I found a similar narrative with equivalent detail about the Kittyhawk II / P-40F and L but I'll have to post that tomorrow.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Ok so in a part two to this as a followup, there is a very good website (may it persist forever) for 3 Sqn RAAF, and this has a detailed breakdown of their service use of the Kittyhawk IIa / P-40L (mostly in 1943) which you can read yourself here:

The Kittyhawk Mk.IIa (P-40L) in 3 Sqn RAAF Service

(that page links to a couple of other related pages with more info on the Kittyhawk II and other planes used by the unit)

This site says that normal bomb load for the Kittyhawk IIa was one 500 lb or two 250 lb bombs on the centerline, and the six 40 lbs bombs on the wings. So the same as with the earlier Kittyhawk III, 740 lbs. Later in Italy this was increased by carrying a 1,000 lb bomb so the total load is up to 1,000 or 1,240 lbs.

The site notes:

"It was at Cutella [Italy] that 3 Squadron began bombing with 1,000 pounders after it had been tested and proven safe by W/Cdr Wilmont."

So the emphasis here is that once again the unit itself established the bomb load.

 

[Buz101]

OK I'll apologise for the size of this post, but it needs to be this long to address the timeline

Reading through this lot, I'd like to present the following:

Firstly - most of the time a weapons idea was presented by the SQN's to Higher HQ and then testing was commenced - first bomb drops were undertaken by experienced pilots, first bomb overall was by SQNLDR C Caldwell, LtCol (later Col) WIlmot did a lot of testing as did WDCDR Bary (WGCDR FLying 239WING) as the bomb weights got larger, dropping and testing 1000lb bombs, and then variations of the loads up to 2000lbs. The early Kittyhawks carried 250lb bombs later 500lb but also a few other nasty surprises (such as German Bomb cluster in a return to sender option)

The Squadrons didn't suddenly decided "oh lets go drop a 1000lber and see what happens", the DAF may have been a little looser than UK based elements, Squadrons etc, but not that loose - imagine being a SQNLDR trying to explain to the GPCPT or AOC that "hey we decided to try something and lost an aircraft and pilots just on a whim..........."

02/03/42 First Kittyhawk Fitted with a bomb rack arrives for testing purposes (112SQN)
10/03/42 AM Hours - First practice drop using a 'Dead' 250lber undertaken (112SQN)
PM Hours – First live drop using 250lber undertaken (112SQN)
11/03/42 First drop against enemy, Single aircraft attempted to bomb Martuba (112SQN)
17/03/42 Commencement of fitting racks to all aircraft (112SQN)
01/05/42 First Squadron Bombing practice (112 SQN) – Until this date it had been senior pilots gaining experience and data on bomb drops.
08/05/42 Mock attack using live bombs on an Indian Brigade to accustom them to air attack

16/05/42 First SQN attack using bombs against Tmimi – 6 Aircraft bombed, 4 as cover
26/05/42 First bombing raid by 3 SQN – 6 with Bombs, 6 as cover
13/06/42 New aircraft arrive fitted with 500lb bomb racks (450SQN)
Different bomb racks required for US Bombs vs British GP Bombs due to lugs
15/06/42 First bombing sortie for 260SQN
16/06/42 First bombing sortie with 250lbrs for 450SQN
03/07/42 First bombing sortie by 250 SQN

02/07/42 First recorded use of 500lb Bombs (3 SQN)
31/07/42 First recorded use of 40lbrs (450SQN)
At this point certain air frames can drop 660lb loads, however not all aircraft can, and wasn't until Sep 42 that complete Squadron Ops with with 660 loads happen, the advent of the K and F models allows up to 740lbs.

17/03/43 Bomb rack designed for carriage of 250lbers as a pair vice single 500lber (450SQN) - I believe this was designed early Mar by the WOE at 112SQN)
At this point the heaviest load that can be carried by the Kittyhawk is 740lb until the advent of Kittyhawk IV's (they could not put 500lbers on the wings (F/L/E/K/M)) Often the load was a pair of 250lbrs and the 20 or 40lbrs

05/11/43 Reported that Kittyhawk IV's cleared for 1500lb Bomb loads (450SQN) - Col Wilmot (239 WG) had been testing this as one of a number of configurations before this date
11/11/43 Tested 6 x 250lbrs - ok but braces strained (450SQN)
27/11/43 Bomb rack mods for Kittyhawk IV's to allow 500lbers under the wings (450SQN)
10/01/44 First 1000lbr and 2 x 250lbrs lifted by 450SQN (not dropped)
11/01/44 First 1000lbr dropped by 450SQN (previously tested by the Wing OC Col Wilmot)
12/01/44 Single 1000lbr and 2 x 500lb on Wing Commanders aircraft as test during Operations.
13/01/44 First single 1000lbr dropped by 3 SQN RAAF

From early Jan 1944 the bomb load was as required, distance and target played a big part in what was carried.

Looks like the first use of P-40s as bombers in North Africa was on 16 May in 1942, six Kittyhawk I (P-40D) of 112 Sqn to attack Timimi each with a single 500 lb bomb. They did not lose any aircraft in this strike though other British units lost 8 that day (5 Kittyhawks, 1 Tomahawk, and 2 Hurricanes from multiple different squadrons). 112 Sqn did another raid on the 18th and lost 2 (one shot down by flak, one hitting it's prop on the ground) plus one crash-landed back at base, and another damaged.

Sorry only 250lbrs not 500's - as for the 5 losses, it was 6 Kittyhawks, 4 were shot down, one was a mid air (hit by one of those shot down), one was a ferry flight loss)

as for the other images in message #1
Image 2: - Kittyhawk IV of 450 SQN May 1944 in Italy – by this time Kittyhawk IV's were cleared to
carry a 2000lb load.
Image 3 – Trapeze bomb rack set up – 2 x British 250lbrs with daisy cutter fuses, around Mar
43
Image 4 – those look like US 500lb GP Bombs

To the pictures in Message #3
Image 1 - Kittyhawk III 76 SQN
Image 2 – 450 SQN Kittyhawk IV – 6 x 250lb bombs Nov 1943
Image 5 – not P-40 CBI with 1000lb bomb – This is "Trixie" of 318th FS/325th FG aircraft (MTO), armed with a Fuel bomb not a normal bomb at all
Image 7 – Nope 2 x 500lb and single 1000lb centreline

Pictures in Message #11
Image 1 – P-40L of 324th​ FG and yes 500lb in Italy
Image 2 – P-40F and looking at the finish of the aircraft likely Tunisia
Image 3 – Another image of Trixie with a Fuel bomb
Image 4 – P-40F with 660lb bomb load.

Official bomb loads often were not what some of the squadrons used.
P-40F seems to be model where the two under wing 100lbs show up.
This seems to be the official bomb load (one 500lb and two 100lbs) until the P-40M shows up (at the factory) at the end of Nov 1942 and it is supposed to be designed to carry one 500lb bomb and two 250lb bombs. MAX gross weight as listed at 9100lbs.

Concur with this on the P-40F model, however I'm not certain about the M model details, designed unknown, but certainly never seen with that bomb load, most of the time it carried variations up to 660lb

Hope this of some help to all - I'll have a look at the USAAF in the SWPA/CENTPAC/ME later (I don't feel like pulling all the SQN records out right now due to the number (yes I do have them all, and the Group records)) - if there's any massive changes in timeline from above I'll write a summery.

Buz

 

[Buz101]

Got into the US records so this loop can be closed, the summery is as follows:

USAAF P-40 dropped similar weapon types to the RAF and on similar time lines (weapons used in xxx month and XX year were the same between RAF and USAAF) - heaviest weapon loads were up to 740lb until Nov 1943 (but mostly 660lb) when they dropped their first 1000lb weapons, although not at Squadron strength until Dec 1943. By Jun 1944 max weapon load had grown to 1120lb,s but these seem to be the Max and only on short hops.

What I did find interesting is that whilst 100lb weapons were in the MTO none seem to be used in operations, only 20, 40, 350 and 500lb (until the above Nov date when the 1000lbers came into use) - the only mention of their use I can find is a couple of diary entries that state they had been loaded, but when cross referenced with the SQN records they state there was no operations on those days only training flights.

Another interesting point that came up was the use of 20/40lb bombs, which were far more common than realised. Often they were the only bombs carried, but did give more options for Armed Recce type sorties etc so makes perfect sense from an operational perspective.

A pilot flying a P-40F from the US 324th FG sank the Italian destroyer Leone Pancaldo off of Cape Bon on 29 April 1943, using 1,000 lb bombs

I found the reports on the attack by 324th FG aircraft on the destroyers running out of Tunisia and it clearly states 500lb weapons, of which they hit with two with two very close near misses - not sure where you found this data, however I would suggest its very much in error.

Now to PNG - Yes the first strike was the 22nd Mar 1942, however the records clearly show that it was strafing, (ORB, Diary and Logbooks all show this as do many written publications).... 76SQN the date is correct for the first one launched however due to being intercepted the bombs were jettisoned. The RAAF like the RAF (and the USAAF as well) quite often returned unused bombs and air to surface type munitions to the previous owners as a fine for leaving them lying around (which is why you see imagery of these weapons fitted). RAAF and USAAF units in SWPA also followed quite a similar timeline on weapon sizes and when they started carrying them as the MTO based P-40 Units.

Now sources for the above information in both posts - I have used data from a number of Diary/journals/Logbook copies I hold, as well as offical records as follows

Squadron ORB for RAAF, SAAF and RAF Kittyhawk Units (RAF - 94, 112, 250, 260, 450, RAAF - 3, 75, 76, 77, 80, 82, 84, 86 -SAAF 2, 4 and 5SAAF)
Wing ORBs (233, 239, 258)

SQN Histories for USAAF (58th, 59th, 60th, 64th, 65th, 66th, 85th, 86th, 87th, 314th, 315th, 316th, 317th, 318th, 319th and 99th )
Group histories for USAAF (33rd, 57th, 79th, 324th and 325th)

These I believe are much better sources (yes they have some errors) than some publications over the years.

Buz

 

[PAT303]

One other thing I've learned in the last few years is that M2 Brownings and HS 404 20mm cannons, and some of the German kit too, jammed constantly especially in the first couple of years of the war. I think that tends to get underplayed, especially in things like pop culture ala TV and video games.

Its the reason I get annoyed talking with people. All you hear is in the BoB the .303's should have been replaced by the Hispano and the bombers would have been blasted from the sky, people seem to forget that Spitfires were fitted with cannons but they were so heavy the planes struggled to intercept incoming raids and the cannons jammed if they did, same for the .50, it's so powerful it can sink ships, destroy Tigers by bouncing rounds off cobble stone streets and wipe the Luftwaffe from the sky, unfortunately it didn't work as designed until at least 1943 and the ammunition was sub par for more of the war than it was acceptable.

 

[ColFord]

In Europe low level attack missions were abandoned due to the quality and quantity of German light and medium flak.

Nope. Plenty of footage held in the IWM collection of RAF gun camera footage showing RAF fighters shooting up a broad range of ground targets between 1942 and 1945. That is strafing using aircraft fixed armament and also bombs and rockets. Footage of Luftwaffe aircraft inside protective pens on airfields being shot up; railways - steam engines, rolling stock, traffic control/switching huts/towers; canal shipping - armed launches, tugs, barges, lock gates, E-boats, small minesweepers and 'squealers'; road traffic - staff cars, trucks, HDT, light AFVs, artillery in place or on the move; radio and radar sites. The RAF just got smart over time about what targets they attacked and how they attacked them. The addition of dedicated anti flak aircraft attacking AA positions around targets of high value reduced the risk for the attacking aircraft. RAF did that for a number of low level attacks by 2 Group Mosquitoes against German HQs, supply depots and armour concentrations after D-Day - as well as attacks against transportation targets before D-Day.

Example, RAF Allison engine Mustang II on a Tac/R sortie shooting up target of opportunity on a Dutch canal in the form of an armed German launch. Note how low and close he is, you can count the insulators on top of the poles alongside the path that runs next to the canal. In another photo from the same pilot, you can see a German guard diving for cover as an armed barge is shot up whilst passing through a set of canal locks he is guarding. The number 2 of the pair of Mustangs, who would be sitting above, behind and to one side, would be providing overwatch, and would provide warning of any AA during the attack, and would move to suppress the AA site if possible. No.2 would also be keeping an eye for any potential enemy fighters whilst No.1 carries out his strafing run.

 

[NZTyphoon]

...people seem to forget that Spitfires were fitted with cannons but they were so heavy the planes struggled to intercept incoming raids and the cannons jammed if they did, same for the .50, it's so powerful it can sink ships, destroy Tigers by bouncing rounds off cobble stone streets and wipe the Luftwaffe from the sky, unfortunately it didn't work as designed until at least 1943 and the ammunition was sub par for more of the war than it was acceptable.

First off, the Hispano installation in the original Spitfire Is used by 19 Squadron was not "so heavy the planes struggled to intercept oncoming raids": you're conflating the Spitfires with an experimental Hurricane I, L1750 of 151 Sqn, that was fitted with an Oerlikon cannon in a gondola under each wing : that had a reputation for being a bit of a pig to fly, the few times it went into combat during the B of B. The reason the Hispanos jammed in the Spitfires of 19 Sqn was because the wing mountings were not rigid enough, allowing the Hispanos to twist out of alignment, thus jamming the feed. Once the mountings had been redesigned to be far more rigid, the Spitfire Hispano installation was perfectly satisfactory.

 

[NZTyphoon]

In Europe low level attack missions were abandoned due to the quality and quantity of German light and medium flak.

The very existence of the RAF's 2nd Tactical Air Force and the USAAF's 9th AF should automatically tell you that that comment is mistaken. The job description of both 2 TAF and the 9th AF was to provide close support to the Allied ground forces in Europe: that job entailed routine (ie: just about every day, except when weather conditions were too bad to fly in) low level attack missions being carried out, particularly by fighter bombers and fighters. While the German light/medium flak could be effective, it hardly, if ever, inflicted such a high casualty rate that low-level ground attack missions were abandoned.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

It is perhaps more accurate to say that it was effective enough to restrict operations at least in some areas to carefully planned missions using fast, heavily armed aircraft and sometimes requiring combinations of strafing, dive bombing, and level bombing attacks to neutralize flak so that other targets (like bridges, or vehicles) could be attacked. They were certainly doing this though and not just in Europe, DAF was doing it from 1942 in spite of risks and fairly high losses.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

It is perhaps more accurate to say that it was effective enough to restrict operations at least in some areas to carefully planned missions using fast, heavily armed aircraft and sometimes requiring combinations of strafing, dive bombing, and level bombing attacks to neutralize flak so that other targets (like bridges, or vehicles) could be attacked. They were certainly doing this though and not just in Europe, DAF was doing it from 1942 in spite of risks and fairly high losses.

I think the idea that low-level attacks over Europe were abandoned is nonsense.

What happened in 1944 was that Allied radio comms were so much better that cab-ranks actually meant something. But comparing what good work DAF was doing in 1942 to what 2nd/9th TAFs were doing in 1944 is not really apt.

DAF certainly built an outline for close-air support, but by 1944, with better airplanes, better comms, and better ops, just not the same.

I'm not sure that local German flak played big restrictions on wider Allied application of tactical airpower. Didn't seem to keep those bridges up or rail-nets usable.

 

[ColFord]

Message from Field Marshal Rommel to Field Marshal Keitel dated 12 June 1944.

"Our own operations are rendered extraordinarily difficult and in part impossible to carry out [owing to] the exceptionally strong, and in some respects overwhelming, superiority of the enemy air force. The enemy has complete command of the air over the battle zone and up to about 100 kilometres behind the front and cuts off by day almost all traffic on roads. [-] Neither our flak nor the Luftwaffe seem capable of putting a stop to this crippling and destructive operation of the enemy's aircraft."

There were a broad range of factors that came into play in the Allies reaching this level of effectiveness in the eyes of the German High Command. It was not just sheer numbers or improved communications; but experience; application of experience gained in previous campaigns (eg. the placement of experienced and more senior Army Co-operation and fighter bomber pilots into the roles of the ground controllers with the forward Army units and having them in vehicles that were place with forward Army units); speed in responsiveness to changing situations (flexibility eg movement of 2TAF RAF fighter bomber resources to support US Army units at short notice during German counter attacks, tasking of air assets to cover the Falaise pocket and attack German units within the pocket); improved intelligence; training (most if not all 2TAF fighter and fighter-bomber units involved had undertaken Armament Practice Camps in the months immediately leading up to D-Day with a heavy emphasis on air to ground gunnery, rocketry and bombing, plus training in the methods used for close air support - communications, target marking, front line marking, heavy emphasis on identification of friendly and enemy vehicles and AFVs, directions of attack for maximum lethality), and more. For those involved in very low flying operations, terrain masking, use of terrain to conceal them from enemy radar, ground observors and flak units were all taught and considered.

Another part of the experience equation was the 'resting' of units where possible in the timeframe from late 1943 into early 1944, to rest, train, repair, maintain, come back up to strength. Aircrew who were operational tour 'expired' placed into positions where they could pass on their experience in various OTUs and schools, or placed into suitable staff roles where they could support decision makers with their knowledge based on recent operational experience. There was also in around the first three months of 1944, changes to Commanding Officers of Units, bringing in 'fresh', well regarded and experienced leaders, often selected in addition to their experience, for their capabilities as a leader, as problem solvers and for being of an aggressive, offensive minded manner - that is against the enemy. Added to that, the ability to draw on the pool of experienced, 'rested' aircrew and particularly flight and unit commanders, to replace those lost in combat.

From late 1941 onwards, the RAF developed a system to track enemy positions and strengths. In particular for the RAF units involved in low level operations, maps showing the locations and types of enemy flak emplacements, continually updated and used in the planning of operations. Included in that was the analysis of photographs obtained by the low flying Tac/R aircraft of enemy flak positions and terrain and other features that might provide some protection in an attack against a location defended by the flak position(s).

Yes, at times the Germans did place concentrations of flak around high value targets, ranging from light flak thru medium to heavy, providing cover at all altitudes against a range of attacking aircraft. Examples of that would include the V-1 sites in northern France, but then more directly related to the Normandy campaign, the bridges and punts crossing the Seine to the north. The Germans put large concentrations of flak around the bridges, punts and crossing points, but that concentration then stripped flak protection from other potential targets. The Allies in response, in making their attacks against those well defenced targets would launch multi-wave, multi-phase attacks, that would in the early stages aim to destroy or reduce/deplete the flak defences, then followed with the more precision attacks against the bridges, punts, etc. The use of intelligence, tracking resupply convoys and later retreating German units, where they became bottle necked and more concentrated waiting for bridges/punts to be repaired or working slowly along roads blocked by fallen buildings or other obstacles, then led to attacks where maximum damage/casualties could be caused.

There was also then the speed of response, so that when an enemy unit was seen, its location fixed, that appropriate attacking aircraft could be quickly tasked or directed onto the new target. A range of attacking aircraft types and options were more immediately available and able to be deployed against a target without having to go all the way back to a higher headquarters that might be disconnected with the actual situation at that time, and often were deployed from airfields closer to the frontline.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

9th Air Force, ETO combat operations, percentage rates of credit sorties, MIA plus write offs, all causes includes flak losses. 2,928 aircraft lost on operations and 19,600 damaged from 362,940 credit sorties for the main types. A-26 flew 75 credit sorties in September 1944 then from November onwards.

A-20 lost 0.45% to flak, 0.82% to all causes. Damaged 13.26% to flak, 13.52% to all causes. Total lost+damaged 14.34%. Ratio of damaged to lost 16.41
A-26 lost 0.3% to flak, 0.63% to all causes. Damaged 7.84% to flak, 8.13% to all causes. Total lost+damaged 8.76%. Ratio of damaged to lost 12.92
B-26 lost 0.41% to flak, 0.74% to all causes. Damaged 11.82% to flak, 12.15% to all causes. Total lost+damaged 12.89%. Ratio of damaged to lost 16.5
P-38 lost 0.45% to flak, 1.2% to all causes. Damaged 2.14% to flak, 2.45% to all causes. Total lost+damaged 3.65%. Ratio of damaged to lost 2.05
P-47 lost 0.38% to flak, 0.74% to all causes. Damaged 2.47% to flak, 2.75% to all causes. Total lost+damaged 3.49%. Ratio of damaged to lost 3.72
P-51 lost 0.34% to flak, 1.11% to all causes. Damaged 1.12% to flak, 1.33% to all causes. Total lost+damaged 2.44%. Ratio of damaged to lost 1.2
All Above Types lost 0.39% to flak, 0.81% to all causes. Damaged 5.11% to flak, 5.4% to all causes. Total lost+damaged 6.21%. Ratio of damaged to lost 6.69

While the percentages lost to flak are remarkably consistent, medium altitude level bombing clearly exposed the aircraft to more ground fire, but if you were hit be in a bomber, much better chance of returning. The effect probably due to hits by shrapnel from the heavier flak guns versus hit or total miss from the light guns.

Report Notes: The trend of loss rates shows a decided peak for both bombers and fighters in December 1944 and January 1945, resulting from the enemy's abortive attempt to regain air superiority in the Ardennes. Only in December was a considerable proportion of bomber losses due directly to enemy aircraft action. Loss rates for bombers and fighters declined steadily from January 1945 to V-E Day, and were below the 20-month average in March 1945 through May for bombers and in February through May for fighters.

What happened in 1944 was that Allied radio comms were so much better that cab-ranks actually meant something. But comparing what good work DAF was doing in 1942 to what 2nd/9th TAFs were doing in 1944 is not really apt. DAF certainly built an outline for close-air support, but by 1944, with better airplanes, better comms, and better ops, just not the same.

It should be pointed out a lack of training and experience did hamper early Overlord air/ground operations, lots of people had learnt the theory but had not done it for real. There were problems arranging exercises in Britain to develop the teamwork between the actual units involved. The US Army built up to 16 divisions in Britain by end February 1944, then 3 divisions arriving in April were all in France by end June.

I would add more aircraft in absolute numbers and for at least most of the 1944 fighting more aircraft per ground unit. The ETO air forces ceased growing in June 1944, apart from some MTO units that arrived as part of Operation Dragoon, the US Army had 13 divisions in France end June, 32 end September, 46 end December and peaked at 61 end March 1945. The British had 11 divisions in France end June, 13 end September, and usually 12 thereafter, then come the Canadians, French, Poles etc.

The Empire army at Alamein had 3 Armoured and 7 Infantry divisions (1 Australian, 1 Indian, 1 New Zealand, 1 South African, 1 Home Counties, 1 Northumberland, 1 Highland), there was another nominal armoured division whose units were split up amongst the army.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

I think the idea that low-level attacks over Europe were abandoned is nonsense.

What happened in 1944 was that Allied radio comms were so much better that cab-ranks actually meant something. But comparing what good work DAF was doing in 1942 to what 2nd/9th TAFs were doing in 1944 is not really apt.

DAF certainly built an outline for close-air support, but by 1944, with better airplanes, better comms, and better ops, just not the same.

DAF created the cab ranks system (through a long and sometimes painful process, but certainly by Second El Alamein Cab Ranks definitely did mean something, and by Torch and the final stages of the Tunisian campaign it was a well oiled machine. It's also debatable how much better the 1944 aircraft were for ground attack, though they were using more rockets. Better, but mainly a matter of incremental improvements. I think the key bit was having aircraft that could do well over 300 mph at Sea Level and could dive bomb.

Rommel wrote quite similar comments to the ones just above in 1942 and 43 about the (to him) disastrous impact of Allied air forces toward the end of the North African campaign.

Fine tuning was done in Sicily and Italy as the Italians were defeated and after the Germans were driven out of North Africa. A big part of this was training the Americans to use the system, and more incrementally, adapting new types of aircraft to it, like P-51s (and A-36), P-47s, P-38s, P-39s and yes even Spitfires, as well as later model A-20s, B-26s and B-25s. But they were still also using Kittyhawks right to the end in Italy. And it is also true that both communications technology and management of it improved, but a lot of that had been figured out in the Western Desert.

Part of the process wasn't just in training the pilots and air units, but it was also integrating air force personnel with the ground units (i.e. as spotters) and training them to work with the system.

I'm not sure that local German flak played big restrictions on wider Allied application of tactical airpower. Didn't seem to keep those bridges up or rail-nets usable.

Very true though a lot of aircraft were lost in this process. German light, medium and heavy AAA was no joke. Attacking strong points took planning and missions with multiple elements and phases as ColFord noted.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

DAF created the cab ranks system (through a long and sometimes painful process, but certainly by Second El Alamein Cab Ranks definitely did mean something, and by Torch and the final stages of the Tunisian campaign it was a well oiled machine. It's also debatable how much better the 1944 aircraft were for ground attack, though they were using more rockets. Better, but mainly a matter of incremental improvements. I think the key bit was having aircraft that could do well over 300 mph at Sea Level and could dive bomb.

It's true that airpower in the desert was a significant and probably vital component of our victory there, but I'd disparage the notion that it was of equal quality to the CAS we see in 1944. Not only were the methods and communications much more refined by 1944, but the aircraft were indeed much better. Show me a 1942 desert equivalent of a ground-attack Typhoon or P-47 carrying 2,000 lbs of stores. P-40? Hurricane IId? I'm not buying it.

Rommel was rightly worried about Allied airpower directly as a result of his desert experiences -- no argument here. But that doesn't mean that there wasn't a qualitative leap in the intervening two years. The system improved, the comms improved, and the aircraft improved.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

It's true that airpower in the desert was a significant and probably vital component of our victory there, but I'd disparage the notion that it was of equal quality to the CAS we see in 1944.

I do think Allied air power was better in 1944, partly because they had air superiority due to the P-51s and longer ranged Spitfires etc., partly because they just had so many more planes flying, partly because the Luftwaffe was heavily damaged by then. But what I'm saying is that the system was already in place, and by late 1942 they had aircraft that were fast down low (A-20s, Beaufighters, P-40K and etc.)

Not only were the methods and communications much more refined by 1944, but the aircraft were indeed much better. Show me a 1942 desert equivalent of a ground-attack Typhoon or P-47 carrying 2,000 lbs of stores. P-40? Hurricane IId? I'm not buying it.

Typhoons had a lot of drawbacks, I'm not sure I'd rather be in a Typhoon than an A-36 or a P-40F, L or K. They did carry more ordinance including rockets, and they were faster down low, but for pilot survival I don't know if it's a big step up. P-47s were active in Italy and in fact replaced the P-40s in most of the American units. They were better in most respects but also had some drawbacks (like being a bigger target and not that agile down low).

I agree with you I'd prefer not to fly any mark of Hurricane in any part of Axis air space in 1944, Europe or Pacific / China / India.

Tempests on the other hand, definitely a big improvement across the board for low altitude air combat and FB missions.

A-20G and A-26 were also improvements over the A-20A/B/C and Baltimores they were mainly relying on in the Desert.

Rommel was rightly worried about Allied airpower directly as a result of his desert experiences -- no argument here. But that doesn't mean that there wasn't a qualitative leap in the intervening two years. The system improved, the comms improved, and the aircraft improved.

Qualitative improvement, but I'd argue more incremental. Big jump in quantity though.