Alternative attacks on Ploesti oil fields?

[wuzak]

Inspired by the discussion about which aircraft could have been used instead of the B-25 for the Doolittle Raid, I wondered if a similar raid could have been launched against the Ploesti oil refineries.

Specifically, could Mosquitoes have been launched from a carrier, or carriers, attack the oil fields and return to a land base? My thought is for follow up raids to the August 1943 Tidal Wave raids, rather than a replacement for them.

As the USAAF would find out in 1944, oil facilities needed to be bombed frequently to have any sort of lasting effect on oil production.

If not Mosquitoes, could B-25s have been used?

What carriers were in the Med during this period that could have been used for this?

Would they land back on Malta? North Africa?

 

[SaparotRob]

I was really hoping you guys would dive in on this topic. Me, I got nuthin'.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Inspired by the discussion about which aircraft could have been used instead of the B-25 for the Doolittle Raid, I wondered if a similar raid could have been launched against the Ploesti oil refineries.

Specifically, could Mosquitoes have been launched from a carrier, or carriers, attack the oil fields and return to a land base? My thought is for follow up raids to the August 1943 Tidal Wave raids, rather than a replacement for them.

As the USAAF would find out in 1944, oil facilities needed to be bombed frequently to have any sort of lasting effect on oil production.

If not Mosquitoes, could B-25s have been used?

What carriers were in the Med during this period that could have been used for this?

Would they land back on Malta? North Africa?

The problem is bomb load. The Doolittle raid did very little actual damage. If you read the USSBS report on oil it is clear that it takes a lot of bombs, and the bigger the better, to take out an oil plant. A few dozen 500 lb bombs wouldn't accomplish anything. The other problem is that small groups get overwhelmed by defenses.
A case in point is the ill fated P-38 raid of June 10, 1944, which goes down in history as the blackest day in the combat history of the P-38 Lightning; the 31-percent loss rate represented the worst losses suffered during a single mission by American fighters in WW II. 23 P-38s failed to return to their bases around Foggia. 93 aircraft took off (48 with a single 1,000 lb bomb and 45 escorts), 21 aborted ( A very high rate). 23 were shot down; a loss rate as bad as the infamous B-24 raid. Most important, despite all the sacrifice, the Romano-Americano refinery hadn't been seriously damaged. Supposedly the P-38s destroyed a 50,000 gallon oil tank. The irony of that is that if you calculate the amount of fuel used by the P-38s in this mission it comes out to about 50,000 gallons

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

After the Italian surrender, you could maybe get closer by a little, but you still have the problem of destroying these very large facilities with what is essentially a pinprick -- if they can even get there.

Foggia to Ploesti is 580 mi one way, so you won't be saving many miles sailing up the Adriatic, and sixteen medium bombers will still be limited to small loads and extra bomb-bay tanks. Better to launch heavies from Foggia.

Before the Italian surrender, it's not going to happen at all.

 

[GrauGeist]

Ploesti was well defended by the Romanian and Bulgarian air forces as well as Luftwaffe.

There really wasn't any way to surprise the defense network, especially if approaching from the south-west, as it put the bombers right over Sofia and the Royal Bulgarian air force had several bases in the area that included to fighter bases plus a radar station. Trying to come up from the south would put bombers right in line with Plovdiv, which had a Luftwaffe base.
Above Plovdiv, was a fighter base at Karlovo which also had a radar station.
North of Karlovo was a radar station at Lovech and beyond, near the Romanian border, was a fighter base at Pleven.

So any inbound bombers, regardless of type would (and were) detected long before reaching Ploesti and it's defenses.

 

[Stosser]

Not to talk about AA which was expecting anything at every level, especially around Ploiesti. The starting base was not a problem in itself.
Later in the war the alies used the so caled "shuttle bombing", taking off from Foggia, bombing Bucharest and Ploiesti and then continuing to an airfield in Ukraine. And the following mission, back.
Please excuse my english errors!

 

[Dimlee]

Probably, if Allied/Soviet cooperation was more "smart" and less influenced by the politics, raids to Ploesti from the Soviet territories would be more successful than from Lybia. Shorter distances, the possibility of the fighter escort (were drop tanks available to P-47s in summer 1943?).
In real WWII, however, it was a non-starter.

 

[GrauGeist]

Probably, if Allied/Soviet cooperation was more "smart" and less influenced by the politics, raids to Ploesti from the Soviet territories would be more successful than from Lybia. Shorter distances, the possibility of the fighter escort (were drop tanks available to P-47s in summer 1943?).
In real WWII, however, it was a non-starter.

How about the La-5 as an escort?
I know it had a rather short range but I don't recall if it was plumbed for drop tanks or not.

 

[Dimlee]

How about the La-5 as an escort?
I know it had a rather short range but I don't recall if it was plumbed for drop tanks or not.

I think about summer 1943, , since it was when operation Tidal Wave was prepared. The shortest distance to Ploesti from the Soviet-controlled areas (somewhere between Krasnodar and Stavropol) is 1100-1200 km. La-5 can be useful in the first 200-300 km as Germans are still in Novorossiysk and Kuban/Taman area.
La-5 was plumbed for drop tanks but probably later when Red Army began to advance rapidly and the range became a very serious issue.
So, in my scenario, 8th and 9th sent their B-24s in August 1943 from the USSR across the Black Sea escorted by VVS while over land and by P-47 over the sea. I assume that P-47C with a 75 gal tank can not make it to Ploesti, so bombers are still exposed near the target.

 

[GrauGeist]

I think about summer 1943, , since it was when operation Tidal Wave was prepared. The shortest distance to Ploesti from the Soviet-controlled areas (somewhere between Krasnodar and Stavropol) is 1100-1200 km. La-5 can be useful in the first 200-300 km as Germans are still in Novorossiysk and Kuban/Taman area.
La-5 was plumbed for drop tanks but probably later when Red Army began to advance rapidly and the range became a very serious issue.
So, in my scenario, 8th and 9th sent their B-24s in August 1943 from the USSR across the Black Sea escorted by VVS while over land and by P-47 over the sea. I assume that P-47C with a 75 gal tank can not make it to Ploesti, so bombers are still exposed near the target.

I know the La-5 was a very capable type, so then it could have participated in an escort strategy much like how the USAAF provided bomber escort teams for ingress and egress during their German proper bombing campaign.

It would have been a great idea, to be honest.

 

[tonycat77]

I know the La-5 was a very capable type, so then it could have participated in an escort strategy much like how the USAAF provided bomber escort teams for ingress and egress during their German proper bombing campaign.

It would have been a great idea, to be honest.

Would the Russian radios and navigation equipment be compatible however?
Also pilot fatigue would be a problem, La-5s had notorious problems with exhausts leaking into the cockpit.
Probably they would use western lend lease aircraft for the escort, Spitfires, P-40s, etc (not the p-39 though, did they ever use drop tanks in soviet service?).

 

[GrauGeist]

P-40s and P-39s would not be suitable for bomber escort and the Soviets had less than 1,400 Spitfires Lend-Leased to them between 1943 and 1945, 1943 seeing less than 200 delivered by year's end.

 

[NevadaK]

Well, I guess if you are looking for ways to affect German oil production in 1943 one option would be to construct a US air base in Soviet Georgia that was supported by a spur off of the US southern lend-lease railroad. An air campaign for across the Black Sea would have much less time over anti-aircraft fire or within the combat radii of axis fighters. The Ploesti oil production facilities are vast and after a few raids I imagine the US would adjust to attack the transportation network instead with greater success. Its a long haul though, same as flying from Libya.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Well, I guess if you are looking for ways to affect German oil production in 1943 one option would be to construct a US air base in Soviet Georgia that was supported by a spur off of the US southern lend-lease railroad. An air campaign for across the Black Sea would have much less time over anti-aircraft fire or within the combat radii of axis fighters. The Ploesti oil production facilities are vast and after a few raids I imagine the US would adjust to attack the transportation network instead with greater success. Its a long haul though, same as flying from Libya.

The shuttle bombing missions ( Operation Frantic) were not a success. The Russian infrastructure was inadequate, the level of cooperation was abysmal and, most importantly, relying on the Soviets for protection was a flop.
The infamous bombing of shuttle mission after it landed in Poltava resulted in the loss of 47 B-17s out of 73 and most of the rest were severely damaged. This occured on June 21, 1944. It's hard to imagine it working any better a year before.

 

[Dimlee]

The shuttle bombing missions ( Operation Frantic) were not a success. The Russian infrastructure was inadequate, the level of cooperation was abysmal and, most importantly, relying on the Soviets for protection was a flop.
The infamous bombing of shuttle mission after it landed in Poltava resulted in the loss of 47 B-17s out of 73 and most of the rest were severely damaged. This occured on June 21, 1944. It's hard to imagine it working any better a year before.

Ideology was the main problem. Bureaucracy and mistrust were the consequences and such stupidness as the lack of effective air defence of the airbase (and the rejection of US proposal to assist) was the direct result.
But this is a "what if" thread, so we can dream about another scenario.

 

[herman1rg]

Ok so it's a What If.

The USAAF start developing the B-29 two years earlier with a more stable engine platform, as a result they come on stream as operational sooner.

The USAAF then decides to allocate some of the aircraft to the European theatre with an operational directive for long range operations....

 

[NevadaK]

The shuttle bombing missions ( Operation Frantic) were not a success. The Russian infrastructure was inadequate, the level of cooperation was abysmal and, most importantly, relying on the Soviets for protection was a flop.
The infamous bombing of shuttle mission after it landed in Poltava resulted in the loss of 47 B-17s out of 73 and most of the rest were severely damaged. This occured on June 21, 1944. It's hard to imagine it working any better a year before.

Thank you for your reply, Reluctant Poster.

My proposal is that the US would build and operate its own base on the shore of the Black Sea and not rely on the Soviets for support. Unlike the China forward air bases, this base or bases would be supplied by rail line from a spur off of the line the US built to supply lend lease materials through Iran. Its still a long haul, but, the majority is over water with the last 100 miles over land. Still not ideal and without a proper escort would be costly, but less so than any other route. Its a what if, but completely achievable in 1943.

 

[GrauGeist]

The Black Sea was encompased by the Soviet Union except for Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey.

Not likely you're going to get Bulgaria or Romania to cooperate since they're Axis nations and Turkey was committed to being Neutral.

 

[Dimlee]

Thank you for your reply, Reluctant Poster.

My proposal is that the US would build and operate its own base on the shore of the Black Sea and not rely on the Soviets for support. Unlike the China forward air bases, this base or bases would be supplied by rail line from a spur off of the line the US built to supply lend lease materials through Iran. Its still a long haul, but, the majority is over water with the last 100 miles over land. Still not ideal and without a proper escort would be costly, but less so than any other route. Its a what if, but completely achievable in 1943.

Poti, Georgia is a good place for such a base. It is protected in the north by the mountains so German advance is possible only along the coastline which is easier to defend. Far enough from the Turkish border. Port and railway are in place. Can be supplied directly from Iran, indeed.
Historically, a large part of the Soviet Navy and fleet aviation was based there in 1942-1944.

https://waralbum.ru/photocache/12/19/0/12190-files/12190-main.jpg

https://ships-not-tanks.ru/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/KrL-Krasnyj-Krym-1943-Poti.jpg

Distance to Ploesti is longer than in my earlier Stavropol scenario but still shorter compared to Lybia.
Solid anti-air defence is a must. Luftwaffe harassed the coastal shipping and scored some victories there in summer 1942, including destroyer and cruiser.

LW recon photos of the area:

Intelligence Images from the Eastern Front

Despite the Luftwaffe being ordered to destroy millions of aerial photos in 1945, the Allies found no less than twenty tons of photos in eleven locations, including a hoard in a Bavarian barn. These together with vast numbers of photographs taken by German soldiers used for Intelligence...

bit.ly

 

[GrauGeist]

The question is, would the Soviets allow a US military base in their territory?