RAF's alternative doctrine and procurement between 1934 and 1940

[tomo pauk]

ower is the problem.

What is the "heavy fighter" going to do that a Beaufighter won't, or more importantly, a Mosquito?
The Beaufighter starts to show up the fall of 1940, by April 1941 it is shooting down dozens of Germans a month at the end of the night blitz. Starting over with a clean sheet plane will not be ready in time.

Without Beaufort, Bristol has enough of time and manpower to come out with a proper heavy fighter, not something that shares aerodynamics with a bomber.
Glad you like the Mosquito for this time frame

How about a fast 1-engined 2-seat bomber by Bristol, powered by Hercules?

When? The Hercules III engines were only good for about 1400hp at low level. about 1250hp at 15,000ft. give or take.
No exhaust thrust, High drag.

and you have to do something with air intake, not saying it can't be done but you can't take a Hercules power egg and throw it on a single engine airframe. Which means a delay.

Exhausts were ejected backwards, so there is some exhaust thrust, not just none of it. Drag - same as other radial engines, but far less than what two 9 cylinder radials mounted on the wings will be making. 1400 HP at low level is 50% more than what Merlin III was making. Shift the air intake into the 10 or 2 o'clock position.
Don't use huge and thick wings like the Battle and Henley used, copy the Spitfire or the DH.88 instead (but bigger, 270-280 sq ft).

 

[nuuumannn]

Blackburns themselves did a good job under the ever changing circumstances and the Firebrand went on to serve for six years as the principal anti shipping resource of the Home fleet tasked with sinking the major Soviet naval vessels.

I'm sorry, I don't buy it. I've read about attempts to justify the Firebrand's existence by saying it was a good torpedo bomber, but it doesn't add up when it was supposed to be a fleet defence fighter. In its first incarnations it was wholly unsuitable for carrier operations, let alone as a fighter. Blaming the admiralty for the Firebrand is a copout simply because the admiralty did not change its specification for the Firebrand at all, except after it was proven to be a bad fighter. It was ordered to N.11/40 and was promised for an in-service date of 1942. Blackburn kept revising this because of delay in design and manufacture - it was also affected by the decision to fit the Napier Sabre to it, but even the Centaurus, its eventual engine was delayed, which didn't help matters. The admiralty had nothing to do with its failure as a deck landing fighter.

To get round the fact that the Firebrand was late and the FAA's need for aircraft, specification S.8/43 was written in 1943 for the Torpedo-Bomber fighter Firebrand Mk.III, which still suffered the bad handling characteristics of the type and did not enter squadron service. The Mk.IV was the first to see frontline service (earlier marks had seen service in secondary units) with 813 Sqn in September 1945! The war was over in Europe before the first example got to a frontline squadron! For a design ordered in 1940 and first flying in February 1942, that smacks of trouble beyond admiralty interference, particularly when you consider the time period within which Supermarine was able to turn Spitfires into deck landing fighters.

 

[nuuumannn]

just try to figure out if your bombs are actually hitting the city you are trying to hit.

This is a vital problem that didn't really get solved until a couple of years into WW2 and the introduction of radio navaids into the RAF based on similar equipment being used by the Luftwaffe. The warning signs were therebefore the war, too, in what I mentioned earlier about Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt. Nevertheless, the RAf was not unique in this. The USAAC decided on a day bombing option, which avoided the issue altogether. Before the war only the Germans had a satisfactory answer to bombing accuracy at night.

Merlin powered Beaufighters saw service as nightfighters

Yup, the Mk.II was extensively used as a night fighter, which wasn't the smartest decision as it was a real handful to operate on the ground and it had a few bad handling characteristics that its Hercules-engined brethren didn't have. Lots were lost in night training accidents.