Soviet purchase programs, logistics and everything, alternatives and realities 1937-43

[TM06]

The KV-3 would likely run into the very same issues as Soviet heavy tanks beyond 50 tonnes, so not a practical proposition.

Oh come now, when did a silly and unimportant little thing like "practicality" ever stop anyone?

 

[tomo pauk]

Why not have both? I do guess that presumably Polikovskiy's work might have been hoarded by one engine manufacturer and not spread beyond the "Hispano-like engines".

To further illustrate my point in the post #40. Here is the power graph for the VK-107 (similar power graph is for the VK-108 and AM-39):



Black lines is from the original .
Blue lines should've been for the operation in case there is no swirl throttle, under the rated height , and the S/C still the same, along with the 2-speed drive etc. All for 3200 rpm. Power above the rated altitudes remains the same, swirl throttle does not anything there. Obviously, no-one will push the 2-speed engine with the S/C in second gear while at low heights.
Red line is just for the operation in the high gear (sorta like what the AM-35A or -37 had - all with 1-speed S/C), where the swirl throttle adds up to perhaps 100 HP?

 

[Dimlee]

@ everyone - how high should we rate the Il-2? Both the armored attacker idea, and it's materialization? Make more of them, or less, or keep at historical level?

Armored attacker idea - leave it for someone else to develop, not for Ilyishin. Let him do other things.
Il-2 as it was in 1941 - to cancel. Build more Su-2 until its replacement (Su-6 or similar) is ready for production.
Request P-47 if Americans can supply.

 

[tomo pauk]

Armored attacker idea - leave it for someone else to develop, not for Ilyishin.

Why not Ilyushin?

 

[SaparotRob]

Why not Ilyushin?

Hard to spell.

 

[bf109xxl]

Tough question. The IL-2 is in its own weird little limbo since there really wasn't anything like it elsewhere. Closest comparison was the Ju 87 but that was a dive bomber.

Rather Hs 129.

The armoured attacker concept was not an entirely flawed one, but the heavy weight of said armour combined with the heavy armament and the bomb load requirement did make the aircraft very slow and sluggish. On the flipside, the Sturmovik was very hard to take down and was highly effective as a demoralization tool against the Germans.
The IL-2 itself was largely fine, I'd argue it was the poor training, vulnerable gunner position and lack of proper escorts were the biggest issues.
And crucially, Russia didn't have any fighter-bombers that could adequately pick up the slack the way the P-47, Fw 190 or Tempest could.

It might be less of a headache to leave the IL-2 in its corner since it did what it needed to relatively adequately. The improved Mikulins discussed here would help, but that's about it.
However I do think the IL-10 could've entered service earlier and fully replaced the IL-2 earlier than it did historically.

In fact, the Il-10 efficiency was LOWER than that of the Il-2 because of its higher speed when attacking a target, and its vulnerability due to its "fighter" airfoil was HIGHER. With the same wing damage the Il-2 could fly to its airfield or make an emergency landing, while Il-10 simply crashed. On the Il-10M, the airfoil was changed.
The whole concept of a heavy armored attack aircraft was completely pointless. Maneuverable and high-speed biplanes had lower losses during ground attacks. It was necessary to make I-207 with M-62/-63, which could fly on low-octane B-70. And trying to create a FB with the M-71. The I-185 could carry a 500 kg bomb load.
The one who should have been arrested and imprisoned for two years to work in the prison design bureau was the totally arrogant Mikulin. However, after reading about Tupolev's pre-war intrigues as chief engineer of the Main Directorate of the People's Commissariat for Defense Industry, it sometimes seems to me that his imprisonment did him good.
A prophet was needed to order Shvetsov in 1940-1941 to put all his efforts into refining the M-71 and not the M-81, as both engines were at about the same stage of readiness. The problem with the M-71 was not the long piston stroke, but the fact that it was simply NOBODY SERIOUSLY WORKED on it - according to the recollections of L. Berne. The design bureau simply had not enough engineers to finalize two engines at once. The less powerful one was chosen in the hope that it would be more likely to be completed. But in reality this probability was approximately the same.

 

[bf109xxl]

Armored attacker idea - leave it for someone else to develop, not for Ilyishin. Let him do other things.

In my humble opinion, the only completely successful (or even outstanding) military airplane that Ilyushin made was the Il-28. But Tupolev, for all his talents, sometimes managed to do even worse (see the history of the DB-2/DB-3).

Il-2 as it was in 1941 - to cancel. Build more Su-2 until its replacement (Su-6 or similar) is ready for production.

Even when I harshly criticize the Il-2 I'm not sure that replacing it during the war with a more efficient aircraft would have been a more reasonable decision considering the inertia of the aircraft industry, problems with pilot training, etc. It would have been reasonable not to put it into production, but non-technical factors interfered.

Request P-47 if Americans can supply.

American pilots and instructors would then be needed - the Soviets did not understand the concept of using the P-47 and could not appreciate all the advantages of this aircraft.

 

[bf109xxl]

I think that it is pretty clear that I was pointing out towards the Mikulin engines as the ones that were more powerful.

There were three problems with Mikulin's engines: they were too heavy for a fighter (power/weight ratio was insufficient), did not allow installation of a motor-gun and - most importantly - suffered from a large number of flaws that precluded their serial production (we are talking about the descendants of the AM-35, excluding the AM-38/F). During the war Mikulin managed to bring to serial production only one engine - AM-42 (and that is the merit of his deputy Flissky, not Mikulin himself, who almost did not participate in the development of this engine). Mikulin's high-altitude piston engine could go into production no earlier than 1946.
And about the MiG-3. The Soviets were not all idiots, of course the idea of additional armament was considered, but because of the heavy weight of the engine NO armament could be placed in the front of the fuselage without radical redesign of the entire structure, only in the wing. And as soon as the armament was increased, the already mediocre performance of the MiG became unacceptably low. Although some particularly experienced pilots preferred the more heavily armed MiG despite its poor performance....

 

[bf109xxl]

The M-71 had a lot of teething troubles. 18 cylinder engines had a lot of vibration problems.

The M-71 had about the same problems as the M-81/-82. Perhaps even less so. For example, I have not come across any mention of the M-71 being unstable due to carburetors, while the carburetor problem was never solved on the M-82 before the direct injection system was installed. The M-71 successfully passed the 100h state tests in 1942 and could be mass-produced.

 

[Dimlee]

Why not Ilyushin?

I came to conclusion that in wartime he was more effective in internal politics and intrigues then in contribution to the defence. He was a talented apparatchik who skilfully manipulated the system to get access to limited resources and to push his inferior products into the pilpeline.
My humble opinion.

 

[bf109xxl]

I do have to wonder about the test.
I also wonder what they were comparing the I-185 to. A prototype Yak or Lagg or service versions?

4 I-185s were tested at the Kalinin front. ALL pilots wrote the same in their test reports: the I-185 with both M-71 and M-82A was MUCH superior to all other Soviet fighters. Undoubtedly, the tests were conducted too cautiously and no real victories were recorded for the I-185, nevertheless, the opinion of four frontline pilots is a very serious argument.

 

[bf109xxl]

Agree on the early Tu-2. The prototype was flown in January 1941. Do not arrest Tupolev (and many others) and the prototype would probably be ready earlier. Can we equip the Tu-2 with US radial engines and improve it?
Also, accept Ar-2 as a stopgap and mass produce them before Tu-2 appears in numbers.

Taking into account the fact that the Pe-2 practically did not bombed from dive during the first two years of the war, and the experience of bombing from dive on the Pe-2 demonstrated their great vulnerability when pulling up after dropping bombs, the Ar-2 seems to be a good alternative even with a lower maximum speed (note: the Pe-2 in the series they were much lower than the prototype). And the transition to the Tu-2 would be much easier.
After reading various sources including memoirs of Pe-2 pilots I came to the conclusion that the twin-engine dive bomber is another ineffective solution. A single-engine dive bomber was much more optimal. And a level bomber with a higher bomb load (Tu-2) was required.

 

[bf109xxl]

To start the ball rolling - don't go from the high level of ballistics from the 76.2mm Model 1936 (F-22) to the moderate on the USv, ZiS-3 and F-34, but keep it up.

The Soviets did not need the high ballistics of the F-22 - neither as a divisional gun, nor as a tank gun, nor even as an anti-tank gun. What the Soviets needed was a quality armor-piercing shell in large quantities. Ballistics only weakly improved armor penetration with a poor quality shell at a much higher cost of the gun barrel.
Since the fall of 1943, the Soviets had more effective 85mm guns for self-propelled units. The Soviets needed a high efficiency HE shell - 85mm cumulatively was a much more reasonable solution for the Soviets than the 76mm of high ballistics.
The Germans had a completely different situation, and for them the use of the 76mm high ballistics gun as an anti-tank gun was justified from all aspects - unlike the Soviets.

 

[TM06]

The Soviets did not need the high ballistics of the F-22 - neither as a divisional gun, nor as a tank gun, nor even as an anti-tank gun. What the Soviets needed was a quality armor-piercing shell in large quantities. Ballistics only weakly improved armor penetration with a poor quality shell at a much higher cost of the gun barrel.
Since the fall of 1943, the Soviets had more effective 85mm guns for self-propelled units. The Soviets needed a high efficiency HE shell - 85mm cumulatively was a much more reasonable solution for the Soviets than the 76mm of high ballistics.
The Germans had a completely different situation, and for them the use of the 76mm high ballistics gun as an anti-tank gun was justified from all aspects - unlike the Soviets.

I suspect that the Soviets would have a hard time improving the anti-armour capability of their shells given their poor metallurgy and extremely bad quality control. The 85 mm for example was quite underpowered for its size almost entirely due to its shells, being more comparable in penetration and muzzle velocity to the German KwK 40, American 76 mm M1 and Japanese prototype Type 5 75 mm. As far as I know, they only solved this problem post-war with the introduction of the BR-367 APCBC-HE shell.
From what I can see, basically every Soviet piece suffered from these problems as well, from the 45 mm all the way to the 152 mm.

Edit: Theoretically speaking, they might be able to do what Italy did in order to compensate for their poor shells by investing in HEAT? The EP shell that Italy designed for the 90/42 (modified 90/53 for the P.43Bis) was good for 230 mm of pen, so perhaps the Soviets could do something similar?

 

[bf109xxl]

I suspect that the Soviets would have a hard time improving the anti-armour capability of their shells given their poor metallurgy and extremely bad quality control. The 85 mm for example was quite underpowered for its size almost entirely due to its shells, being more comparable in penetration and muzzle velocity to the German KwK 40, American 76 mm M1 and Japanese prototype Type 5 75 mm. As far as I know, they only solved this problem post-war with the introduction of the BR-367 APCBC-HE shell.
From what I can see, basically every Soviet piece suffered from these problems as well, from the 45 mm all the way to the 152 mm.

Yes, the Soviet material science was at a low level and the production of tungsten carbide cores based on the German projectiles was late - the work was carried out only from the beginning of 1942, and even after the adoption of the projectile into service it took almost a year to perfect the technology. But it should be taken into account that the Soviets had prototypes of 85-mm guns with good prospects for adoption (their design began before the war - Grabin's F-30, U-10 of Uralmash design bureau) and 57-mm ZIS-2/-4 with good armor penetration. In addition, the Soviets were always anxious to provide sufficient high-explosive rounds for division and tank guns - German tanks were a rarer target than fortifications on the battlefield or infantry in the trenches. Therefore, the larger caliber was preferred for the Soviets because of its greater versatility. And for the Germans, anti-tank defense was much more important, so returning the F-22 to its original form (the first models had a muzzle brake and enlarged chamber for the new cartridge) was a reasonable decision.

 

[Shortround6]

Soviets needed to fix the ergonomics of their tanks (and vision and communications) more than they needed to play with different guns.
They had decent if not great guns but a great gun doesn't do a lot of good if the commander cannot spot the enemy and direct his gunner onto the target/s.
Lack of radios was was a real problem, Trying to use signal flags to command the platoon members was obviously a force divider rather than force multiplier.
Rate of fire has to be seen as a platoon/company level thing. Rate of fire/rate of engagement was poor in Soviet tanks so they needed to outnumber the Germans in order to have similar firepower.

 

[tomo pauk]

Would it be bad for the Soviets to have a higher-powered 76.2mm gun on their tanks and artillery units between 1941 and 1944?

 

[bf109xxl]

Would it be bad for the Soviets to have a higher-powered 76.2mm gun on their tanks and artillery units between 1941 and 1944?

Most likely, yes. With the existing armor-piercing shell, the gain in armor penetration will be minimal, and resource costs will be significant. The Soviets had a large number of much more important problems - for example, they brought the V-2 to more or less acceptable reliability only by 1943. The problems with tanker training and communications are described above.

 

[Shortround6]

Would it be bad for the Soviets to have a higher-powered 76.2mm gun on their tanks and artillery units between 1941 and 1944?

It is not bad, it is just that with crappy sights and poor vision for the commander you don't get the same benefit that the Germans or British/Americans would get.
Problem with comparison is that nobody had really identical guns and/or turrets.
The British Firefly had great gun, problems include about 1/2 the rate of fire compared to an American 76mm Sherman. Commanders hatch/cupola had limited vision (one periscope was not good.)
It did take the Germans quite a while to get to this.

7 (?) periscopes for all-round vision. Hatch rises to allow overhead protection while commander peers between raised hatch and cupola.
British took until the Comet to get anything close (or better?) The Cromwell's had rather poor vision, like the vast majority of British tanks.

It was the commander's job to to fight his tank (and/or his platoon) and if he could not see the enemy things were not going to go well. He needs to direct both the gunner and the driver. He needs to correct for range and he needs to be spotting the next target to traverse onto when the target being engaged is visibly damaged (starts smoking?) As a platoon commander he needs to direct his tanks to maneuver into position and to turn away or back up when needed.
Many commanders operated with head out of the turret for better vision but they lost a lot of commanders doing that. This was also the problem with 2 man turrets. If the commander was the gunner he was not commanding the tank. Depending on the commander to be the loader might have been slightly better, a quick glance between shots? But perhaps a lower rate of fire?
Tank engagements were seldom tank on tank duels. A company that can engage/destroy more enemy tanks per minute can often overcome initial odds.

 

[tomo pauk]

It is not bad, it is just that with crappy sights and poor vision for the commander you don't get the same benefit that the Germans or British/Americans would get.

A better gun does not stand in the way of improving other things on a tank.
Plus, artillery units were rarely impacted by poor vision as it was the case with the tanks.

The British Firefly had great gun, problems include about 1/2 the rate of fire compared to an American 76mm Sherman.

You do know that F-34 and F-22 used the ammo with same outward dimensions, right?