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The problem is bomb load. The Doolittle raid did very little actual damage. If you read the USSBS report on oil it is clear that it takes a lot of bombs, and the bigger the better, to take out an oil plant. A few dozen 500 lb bombs wouldn't accomplish anything. The other problem is that small groups get overwhelmed by defenses.Inspired by the discussion about which aircraft could have been used instead of the B-25 for the Doolittle Raid, I wondered if a similar raid could have been launched against the Ploesti oil refineries.
Specifically, could Mosquitoes have been launched from a carrier, or carriers, attack the oil fields and return to a land base? My thought is for follow up raids to the August 1943 Tidal Wave raids, rather than a replacement for them.
As the USAAF would find out in 1944, oil facilities needed to be bombed frequently to have any sort of lasting effect on oil production.
If not Mosquitoes, could B-25s have been used?
What carriers were in the Med during this period that could have been used for this?
Would they land back on Malta? North Africa?
How about the La-5 as an escort?Probably, if Allied/Soviet cooperation was more "smart" and less influenced by the politics, raids to Ploesti from the Soviet territories would be more successful than from Lybia. Shorter distances, the possibility of the fighter escort (were drop tanks available to P-47s in summer 1943?).
In real WWII, however, it was a non-starter.
I think about summer 1943, , since it was when operation Tidal Wave was prepared. The shortest distance to Ploesti from the Soviet-controlled areas (somewhere between Krasnodar and Stavropol) is 1100-1200 km. La-5 can be useful in the first 200-300 km as Germans are still in Novorossiysk and Kuban/Taman area.How about the La-5 as an escort?
I know it had a rather short range but I don't recall if it was plumbed for drop tanks or not.
I know the La-5 was a very capable type, so then it could have participated in an escort strategy much like how the USAAF provided bomber escort teams for ingress and egress during their German proper bombing campaign.I think about summer 1943, , since it was when operation Tidal Wave was prepared. The shortest distance to Ploesti from the Soviet-controlled areas (somewhere between Krasnodar and Stavropol) is 1100-1200 km. La-5 can be useful in the first 200-300 km as Germans are still in Novorossiysk and Kuban/Taman area.
La-5 was plumbed for drop tanks but probably later when Red Army began to advance rapidly and the range became a very serious issue.
So, in my scenario, 8th and 9th sent their B-24s in August 1943 from the USSR across the Black Sea escorted by VVS while over land and by P-47 over the sea. I assume that P-47C with a 75 gal tank can not make it to Ploesti, so bombers are still exposed near the target.
Would the Russian radios and navigation equipment be compatible however?I know the La-5 was a very capable type, so then it could have participated in an escort strategy much like how the USAAF provided bomber escort teams for ingress and egress during their German proper bombing campaign.
It would have been a great idea, to be honest.
The shuttle bombing missions ( Operation Frantic) were not a success. The Russian infrastructure was inadequate, the level of cooperation was abysmal and, most importantly, relying on the Soviets for protection was a flop.Well, I guess if you are looking for ways to affect German oil production in 1943 one option would be to construct a US air base in Soviet Georgia that was supported by a spur off of the US southern lend-lease railroad. An air campaign for across the Black Sea would have much less time over anti-aircraft fire or within the combat radii of axis fighters. The Ploesti oil production facilities are vast and after a few raids I imagine the US would adjust to attack the transportation network instead with greater success. Its a long haul though, same as flying from Libya.
Ideology was the main problem. Bureaucracy and mistrust were the consequences and such stupidness as the lack of effective air defence of the airbase (and the rejection of US proposal to assist) was the direct result.The shuttle bombing missions ( Operation Frantic) were not a success. The Russian infrastructure was inadequate, the level of cooperation was abysmal and, most importantly, relying on the Soviets for protection was a flop.
The infamous bombing of shuttle mission after it landed in Poltava resulted in the loss of 47 B-17s out of 73 and most of the rest were severely damaged. This occured on June 21, 1944. It's hard to imagine it working any better a year before.
Thank you for your reply, Reluctant Poster.The shuttle bombing missions ( Operation Frantic) were not a success. The Russian infrastructure was inadequate, the level of cooperation was abysmal and, most importantly, relying on the Soviets for protection was a flop.
The infamous bombing of shuttle mission after it landed in Poltava resulted in the loss of 47 B-17s out of 73 and most of the rest were severely damaged. This occured on June 21, 1944. It's hard to imagine it working any better a year before.
Poti, Georgia is a good place for such a base. It is protected in the north by the mountains so German advance is possible only along the coastline which is easier to defend. Far enough from the Turkish border. Port and railway are in place. Can be supplied directly from Iran, indeed.Thank you for your reply, Reluctant Poster.
My proposal is that the US would build and operate its own base on the shore of the Black Sea and not rely on the Soviets for support. Unlike the China forward air bases, this base or bases would be supplied by rail line from a spur off of the line the US built to supply lend lease materials through Iran. Its still a long haul, but, the majority is over water with the last 100 miles over land. Still not ideal and without a proper escort would be costly, but less so than any other route. Its a what if, but completely achievable in 1943.