When you read about the handling problems with Fairey designs like the Barracuda, Firefly and Spearfish and the length of time taken to resolve them, you begin to wonder about the abilities of Fairey's design and engineering staff in the immediate pre-war and wartime period. It is almost as if they lost their way changing from wood and string biplanes to metal monoplanes. The Fulmar seems to be the exception but then it was derived from the Battle/P.4/34 so more time to iron out the kinks. Or maybe it was just trying to do too much on too small an industrial base.
Alternatives to the Fairey Firefly?
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Admiral Beez
Major
IDK, when I look at 1:05 onwards below the Barracuda looks like one of Britain's better handling monoplane aircraft, for drama-free carrier landings at least.
Shortround6
Major General
It was noted as fairly easy to land but the planes in the video are MK IIs, Landing the MK I also was not hard. Taking off was little harder with about 300hp less.
However, from Wiki.
"Retracting the airbrakes at high speeds whilst simultaneously applying rudder would cause a sudden change in trim, which could throw the aircraft into an inverted dive.[8][7] Incidents of this occurrence proved fatal on at least five occasions during practice torpedo runs"
Having the plane decide it wants to do an inverted dive at less than a couple hundred feet is not going to make a plane popular with the pilots/crew. The problem was sorted out with training rather than hardware. However, reading between the lines there were only 23 Barracuda Is built, Some of the Barracuda IIs were used as training and according "wiki" the problem was "solved" before the plane entered carrier service. I don't know how many were built before the planes entered carrier service (later than land service) but a minimum of 5 planes lost while practicing torpedo runs before the type is assigned to a carrier is pretty scary.
However, from Wiki.
"Retracting the airbrakes at high speeds whilst simultaneously applying rudder would cause a sudden change in trim, which could throw the aircraft into an inverted dive.[8][7] Incidents of this occurrence proved fatal on at least five occasions during practice torpedo runs"
Having the plane decide it wants to do an inverted dive at less than a couple hundred feet is not going to make a plane popular with the pilots/crew. The problem was sorted out with training rather than hardware. However, reading between the lines there were only 23 Barracuda Is built, Some of the Barracuda IIs were used as training and according "wiki" the problem was "solved" before the plane entered carrier service. I don't know how many were built before the planes entered carrier service (later than land service) but a minimum of 5 planes lost while practicing torpedo runs before the type is assigned to a carrier is pretty scary.
Agreed. But getting it to that point was the difficult bit.
The prototype had a low set tailplane when it flew in Dec 1940. Deck landing trials in May 1941 revealed that deploying the flaps caused buffeting of the tail, particularly when landing so required redesign. Fairey thought it might be a problem (!) so we're already working on a taller tail with the tailplane up high necessitating supporting struts. Longitutinal stability had to be improved. Keeping it in the dive proved a problem initially (bit of a problem for an aircraft designed as a dive bomber). And the undercart while looking as if it came off the Forth Bridge had a problem because the whole thing was held in place by a single hydraulic strut that would fail in a heavy landing.
Then when production aircraft began to come off the line more buffeting was discovered. This was eventually traced to the open cockpit hood (mandatory for carrier landings). Fixed by installing a bulkhead behind the pilot to seal the fuselage.
The Mk.I was seriously underpowered with its 1,300hp Merlin 30 and 3 bladed prop. One story I read was that someone left the trailing radio aerial out during a low pass. It got caught on some scenery and was enough to slow the aircraft just enough for it connect with terra firma. After 30 Mk.I (25 by Fairey and 5 by Boulton Paul) production switched to the Mk.II with the 1,640hp Merlin 32.
But it took all of 1941 and 1942 to iron out these problems and get production running. It was Jan 1943 before the first operational squadron received its aircraft.
Then there was the propensity that it had for killing its crews in the early days of squadron service. Torpedo attack tactics called for a steep dive, with a sharp pull-out, retraction of the flaps, drop the torpedo and escape. As Eric Brown found, a combination of flap retraction and slight application of rudder on pull-out caused it to flip on its back. At low level it gave no recovery time. Those pilots that seemed to have the greatest problems were those that transitioned from Swordfish and Albacores in 1943. They hated it. Later, as crews came out of the training system in 1944 having learned to avoid that "coffin corner" of its flight envelope there were less problems.
Then in 1945 it was discovered that some of the ongoing losses were due faulty hydraulic valves in the cockpit causing leaks. Crews were told to always fly on oxygen. The hydraulic fluid was supposed to contain ether!
Due to its poor performance in 1944 in the Indian Ocean the fleet carriers swapped their Barracuda squadrons for Avengers. But, had the war against Japan gone on a month longer, it would have seen service in the Pacific. As it was some strikes on suicide boats nests at Hong Kong was the limits of its activities there.
Admiral Beez
Major
Get the Sabre working reliably and somehow justify the second seat and the Typhoon or Tempest is ideal.What might be the alternatives? Requirement is still the crew of two, 4 cannons, full carrier-vessel capability (low-speed handling, visibility, folding wings, tailhook, then-current electronics, overall protection from the salt water/air environment), long range & endurance. In service by late 1943/early 1944, Made in UK.
"Clean sheet of papers" A/C encouraged, but not mandatory
Glider
Captain
A single seat version of the firefly would be a good simple place to start.
Shortround6
Major General
And then you need to persuade MAP to release the Sabre for use by the FAA.
In 1941 / 42 there was a proposal for a "Sea Typhoon". The Colossus class had to have a flight deck long enough for it to have free take offs. But The RAF had priority.
The Firebrand, which also arose from that Jan 1940 meeting that begat the Firefly, flew in prototype form the Sabre engine on 27 Feb 1942 and then as the TF.II in March 1943. But by then MAP had decided that the Typhoon for the RAF had to have priority for Sabre engine production. So the Firebrand had to be redesigned for a second time. This time to take the Centaurus engine.
There was not enough Sabre engine production to go around to supply both the RAF and the FAA. How to you persuade MAP to prioritise the FAA over the RAF at a time when it needed every Typhoon it could get to tackle the low level Luftwaffe FW190 tip and run raiders hitting the South coast? This is all before the Spitfire IX appeared on the scene.
Such are the difficulties of juggling priorities in WW2.
don4331
Senior Airman
I'm not aware of any plane that updated as well as the Spitfire did.
In Spitfire: the History, they actually have some of the requirement specification:
The desired folded width was 11! - which was supposed to fit 5 planes abreast, and the relaxed requirement was 13'6" as it would only allow 4 abreast.
Only one fold of the wing was allowed - technically, the Seafire III fails this.
Marcelle Lobelle had submit preliminary designs for one and 2 seat version of Firefly to MAP before he and Fairey parted ways. H.E. Chaplin's tossing all his work into the circular folder, certainly didn't help the Firefly's time line. Or MAP's disposition with Fairey - expecting one design and getting detailed design for something else certain wouldn't endear the company I work for to any of its customers, especially, the government ones.
There is major delay in production volumes of the Griffon, I admit there is some hindsight in knowing the Griffon I design will be trashed, and completely redone for the Griffon II. But by Dec./'39, Fairey would be aware of the delay. With war on, it doesn't take 20/20 hindsight to see that it would be mid '40 before a prototype would run, another 6 months until flight ready engines are available and another 6 months to tool up for volume produce the new RR V-12. So, MAP was being...optimistic and RR didn't really even hit Fairey's date. And even those dates get compromised by Spitfire XII requirements.
And those ignore Fairey own problems with shifting industrial base from "composite" airplane (Fulmar still had a lot of tube and fabric) to an exclusively light metal, monocoque air frame.
I actually have the drawing for the Sea Typhon somewhere. There was something unusual about the landing gear retraction...
Shortround6
Major General
There is a drawing and short description in of Tony Butler's books. The landing gear looks a bit canted but that may have been normal?
However the internal fuel was increased to 264 gallons (1200 liters) and the wingspan wound up at 50 ft 0 in and the wing area is given at 354ft so it is hardly a quick "fit a folding wing" to the Typhoon and off you go.
It was numbered P.1009 and the drawing and short list of data (no weight) are supposed to be from around Feb 1941. I don't know how many other plans there may have been.
A "Hooked" Typhoon was tried out over the winter of 1942/43 but the IB DW419 crashed on Feb 8 1943, it doesn't say how. A report by Capt. Casper John in Dec 1943 seems to have finished the idea and the test pilot, Lt. Cdr Campbell thought that the Firebrand would be a better plane to and from the deck although deck trials hadn't really started yet.
Admiral Beez
Major
I'm not convinced that the blame for that can be laid at the door of Fairey or its two designers.
Late 1939 was a period when the Admiralty was beginning to change its mind about what kind of fighter it wanted. Lobelle designed 2 aircraft around N.8/39 (2 seat fighter) and N.9/39 (turret fighter) which Fairey tendered (note not a single seater at this stage). Then this from Harrison:-
"...By early December 1939 word had leaked out that the Admiralty were in favour of dropping the N.9/39 turret fighter, and going for (a) N.8/39 as a two-seat naval fighter, and (b) a single-seat fixed-gun naval fighter - both to be derived from the same basic airframe. These new requirements were circulated to those firms that had tendered to the N.9/39 specification. This led to some confusion, but when it was realised the aim was to gain two aeroplanes from one design, firms tendered for both, increasing the confusion. At any rate, the Admiralty stated in late December 1939 that after giving further consideration to the tendered designs to N.8/39 they were not satisfactory. As a result, the requirements were modified and proposals for the two revised designs circulated. This cleared the confusion but meant everyone going back to the drawing board. The performance requirements for the single-seat fighter specified a maximum speed at 15,000 ft of not less than 330 knots (385 mph) with the figure for the two-seater being 300 knots (350 mph).
Fairey's new designs showed a marked improvement over the earlier ones. This was due to Fairey appointing a new chief designer - H E Chaplin. ...."
The original 1939 specs called for a speed in the region of 275 knots at 15,000ft for both the two seater and theturret fighter.
Fairey submitted new designs by Chaplin for both a single seater and a two seater based on the one airframe. The two seater was selected for development under spec N.5/40F and became the Firefly in due course.
The Admiralty chose the Blackburn single engined submission which went on to be developed further under spec N.11/40 into the Firebrand.
As I noted before there was a very compressed timetable for this process. The Admiralty only approved the two 1939 specs in June 1939 and issued an invitation to tender in Aug. Given that they changed their mind in Dec and selected the designs for development in Jan 1940, there can't have been a lot of detailed design work done by anyone. Given that the Admiralty had rejected Lobelle's N.8/39 design, and that the ground rules had changed, I don't think Chaplin had a lot of choice other than to start again with a fresh sheet of paper.
The Air Ministry's propensity to cram too many things into one airframe, a hangover from the RAF FAA days, unfortunately. The Barracuda for example was built to a 1937 issued spec.
Chosen because the Blackburn submission to N.9/39 was deemed the best aerodynamically. The Firebrand, Blackburn B-37 was selected because of fears Fairey had too much work and the belief that Blackburn would have their fighter ready for service by 1942 - odd how that turned out. Following delays to the Firebrand, in early 1941 Hawker offered the Sea Typhoon (Hawker P.1009), but the dawning realisation by Hawker that modifying the Typhoon design for carrier service was going to take a long time and would end up with around 25% of original Typhoon components meant that the hoped for production of a prototype by early 1942 was hopeful at best and wildly optimistic at worst. Besides, Blackburn assured the Admiralty that the Firebrand would be ready by 1942...
Then we come back to the relationship of a carrier, it's role, and it's aircraft. With a ship of Treaty limited size and, until 31/12/36 a limit on total carrier tonnage, you have a finite number of aircraft on a ship to perform a varied selection of tasks. Ark Royal III had the largest pre war air group, being designed for 60 aircraft, but Hermes by WW2 only a dozen or so. And new ships designed around 36-48. This is not the RAF that could pool the resources of a significant number of airfields to put 1,000 bombers over Cologne in May 1942.
The Barracuda combination actually makes some sense. TBR. Torpedo, seen as the main capital ship killer pre war. Dive bomber to put enemy carriers out of action. Recce to find the enemy in the first place and track him. Same with the Swordfish and Albacore.
With the torpedo dropping technique the RN developed involving a dive to sea level, it fits quite well with the dive bomb technique. That leaves recce, the requirements of which drove aspects of both the Barracuda and the competitor, the Supermarine Type 322 "Dumbo".
What makes much less sense is the requirement for a Fighter/Dive bomber that was the Skua. But then the expectation was that the opposition attacking the fleet would be medium bombers without single engined fighter protection. And the US also went this route, just with different emphasis on which aspect had priority.
Other navies organised themselves differently. The Japanese moved the recce function off to floatplanes on their cruisers, culminating in the Tone class with their aft end given over to facilities for 6. But that concept didn't work so well so they used the Judy carrier dive bomber for recce and then developed a dedicated carrier recce aircraft for use on their larger carriers with larger aircraft capacity.
The US with its larger air groups used a multitude of aircraft but roles were still combined. Dive bomber and Scouting squadrons generally used the same aircraft types, culminating in the Vindicator and Dauntless. But they did without the Observer in the crew. But then navigation was easier in their more benign Pacific operating environment. In fact their dive bombers grew out putting bombs on their fighters from the mid/late 1920s. Even the tubby F3F biplane fighter had provision for 2x116lb bombs which it was meant to use against enemy carrier decks.
So combining roles is not of itself the issue. The problem is the emphasis given to each element in a design and the environment that they will operate in.
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don4331
Senior Airman
When the only propeller is a FP one, there isn't a disadvantage to float plane, in fact the fastest planes in the world are the Schneider Cup racer. Heck, there isn't serious disadvantage to biplane. So, when Tone class is designed, the idea of offloading the recon role to cruisers was a brilliant use of the aft deck space. (If you're going to cluster all the turrets forward, reinforce the hull so it doesn't flex and ruin the concentration of firepower that you are seeking to achieve). The correct answer for IJN, with 20/20 hindsight, would have been to make Tone class more like the USN hybrid cruiser carrier proposal - then they could have operated competitive recon planes much later into war*. (Some of that is for naval forum not this on though)
*IJN hybrid cruiser carriers would probably get flight decks extended but that is separate what-if.
Aerial torpedoes were not seen as capital ship killers (I'll include cruisers in this as well); they were only expected to slow down the enemy to the point where RN capital ships could engage and complete the job - see sinking of Bismarck and Battle of Cape Matapan where the plan worked according to design.
I know the RN developed the dive to sea level, pull out to bleed off speed, short run to stabilize, drop and evade. But was that because a. because if you performed a slow, stable run in you would be shot down and b. planes could take that punishment. And the better solution would have been to make a torpedo that was drop-able from higher speed (drogue chute/plywood casings, etc), and faster plane to drop them from which didn't need the dive maneuver.
I know USN successfully used DBs to put enemy carriers out of action, but was it RN inter-war policy? KM and RM don't have CVs, Japan and UK aren't on that bad of terms & USN was friend.
I would put DB against DD and lighter craft, which are too maneuverable for torpedoes, yet susceptible to small bombs. 100lb is equivalent to 6" shell - having your DD hit by shell of that size makes for bad day at the office; worse for anything smaller.
Structurally, both fighters and DB need to be able to sustain high g's. Adding an additional 5-10% to the fighter to make it a fighter bomber capable of delivering, say up to 500lb seems like the prudent thing to do. Increasing strength of TB capable of lifting >1,500lbs of ordinance and then asking it to perform as a DB while restricting it to FP propeller, seems to make requirements in same league as those for He.177.
And sometimes, you need to ignore what the customer is requesting to deliver what the customer wants: See delivery of Bf.110 for the Kampfzerstörer specification - there is little debate that Messerschmidt's heavy fighter was better airplane than Focke-Wulf's multi-role fighter/bomber which met the specification.
Given the specification for Skua requests an air cooled engine, design the plane around the Taurus - if Bristol's engine isn't ready/making 1,200hp yet, temporarily substitute a R-1830 Twin Wasp. Cozy up the pilot and navigator/radio operator and streamline greenhouse ala Henley*. And lastly reduce wing area by installing modern flaps - at least slotted, if not Fowler.
*Pilots are going to need to adapt to lower visibility. Part of what kills Fulmar perform, is the wing incidence was rotated 4*, so the pilot has good view of the CV when landing. The draw back is at high speed, the tail is higher and instead of just punching a hole the size of the Merlin and pilot's head from nose up, you are dragging the 40' x 3' fuselage area (It's not at rectangle but not insignificant). And the increased wing incidence has the knock on effect that you want a long fuselage so it nicely stall in 3 point stance. Drop the wing incidence, and you can shorten the fuselage 5-6'; between the 2, it will significantly clean up the aerodynamics. The Seafires and Sea Hurricanes won't have any better visibility, so FAA pilots need to adapt.
The Anglo Japanese Alliance was ended in 1921 in favour of closer relations with the USA. The construction of the naval base at Singapore was authorised in 1923 and its construction went on at varying rates through to Dec 1941. Its sole reason for existing was to provide a base for a British fleet to be sent east to protect British interests in the event of a war with Japan, who was then seen as the main threat in the Far East. By the early 1930s this fleet was envisaged as including four carriers. Of course at that time no one was contemplating war with both Germany and Japan at the same time. Until 1935 and the Abyssinian Crisis Italy was not seen as that much of a threat to British interests, and it was one that could be matched by a French fleet.
By the early 1930s the chief opponent for the RN carrier fleet was seen to be the Japanese navy. One of the scenarios considered was a British fleet opposed by carrier based aircraft. In that case the best form of defence was seen as taking out the enemy carriers first, using dive bombers. But, as this couldn't be guaranteed to be successful, there had to be a defensive fighter backup. That seems to be where the fighter dive bomber concept, exemplified by the Skua, came from. That hit first philosophy became enshrined in the official Admiralty tactical instructions issued in July 1933.
In the early 1930s Britain began practicing multi-carrier operations to allow this scenario to be played out successfully, something that Japan didn't get round to until April 1941 and the US until 1942.
Shortround6
Major General
There may be a difference in timing?
There was certainly a difference in carriers.
You are correct in that the British, aside from the Japanese had no carrier enemies (French Bearn doesn't really count). Skua's maybe useful against raiders (Graff Spee)? Or Italian cruisers in the Med.
With the longer flight decks American dive bombers may have been able to get a bigger bomb off the deck? Some of the late 30's DB were rated for carrying a 1000lb bomb but I don't know if a 500lb bomb was much more likely over longer ranges. The SBDs of Midway fame didn't exist until late 1940.
This is a common misconception. the 6in shell did weigh about 100lbs (give or take) but the 6 in shell was lucky it contained even 10lbs of explosives. Even a bad 100HE bomb had about 3 times as much explosive.
timing again. The British were not going to buy/specify/substitute any American engine until they were absolutely forced to do so in 1938.
They bought the first 200 Lockheed Hudsons on June 28th 1938. These were powered by Wright R-1820s that offered 1100hp for take-off but only 900hp at 6700ft. To be fair I think there is a difference between take-off power and the 900hp rating used by commercial engines in the 1930s. The P & W R-1830 of 1938-39 was lower powered than the 1940-41 engines.
The Taurus was not an earlier engine than the Hercules. It may have been announced in 1938 or before but the first production planes that used it weren't delivered until 1940.
Yup, you have just jutified why the Air Ministry acted the way it did in ordering such a specification, but it doesn't make it less ungainly. I don't agree with your proposition that these roles are not disparate. The torpedo (level) bomber recon is easily combined into one airframe, but add dive bomber and you run into structural and aerodynamic issues the rest of the roles don't require. Dive bombers need to be structurally stronger to withstand g-forces and they need dive brakes, which add complexity, but they don't need to be big.
Looking at the Barracuda, it was a big aeroplane, akin to making the Grumman Avenger a dive bomber. You put a Dauntless next to an Avenger and you'll see what I mean. A Dauntless is around the size of a Harvard; there's quite a big disparity in size and conversely slinging a torpedo under a Dauntless is simply not going to happen. Dive bombers don't need to be great hulking things, but combining them with other offensive roles isn't a good match.
The Barracuda had aerodynamic issues surrounding the Youngman flaps, not to mention the "observer's lounge" that dictated the location of everything else around it, the shoulder mounted wings, which induced issues with the original low set tailplane etc. No, it wasn't the best design, but combining the different roles was not the best strategy. I agree with you about the fighter dive bomber, too; again, combining dive bomber with fighter cancels out the advantages a fighter must possess, lightness, lithe of foot etc.
With hindsight of course, I also don't completely buy that British carriers necessitated the combination of disparate combat roles. Until the early 1930s when the decision was made by Air Ministry officials to combine roles owing to space aboard the carriers, yet previously separate roles had been the norm. The FAA had separate aircraft to do its bidding, although there were no dedicated dive bombers, but torpedo bomber reconnaissance was the first compromise as the first RNAS and FAA torpedo droppers were single-seaters, both the Cuckoo and Dart had one occupant and no defensive armament, relying on manoeuvrability to evade predators. Adding dive bombing to the mix adds structural weight and complexity that nullifies the ability to manoeuvre that a torpedo bomber requires once it's dropped its torpedo.
Those between-the-wars biplanes were big (the piccie I took at North Weald around 25 years ago is a good illustrator of the size of the Swordfish) and the argument that because the complexity of all-metal aircraft might render space an issue doesn't fit in hindsight, not when the Dauntless is smaller than a Swordfish. Comparing the Dauntless with the Barracuda makes an interesting exercise in comparison of what's required, the Dauntless is naturally smaller, having a wingspan eight feet less than the Barra, with 80 sq ft less wing area and crucially, its loaded weight is just over the Barra's empty weight. Why is it that the US could build an exceptional dive bomber like the Dauntless (and Japan the D3A) and Britain had an overweight pig like the Barracuda? Combining combat roles. Compare the Dauntless and Skua and the two are more evenly matched in size and weight, which reinforces my point.
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In fact, they most certainly were. The first aircraft carrier torpedo droppers were designed to attack the German High Seas Fleet in their own anchorage -the "Copenhagen", a naval term harking back to Nelson in 1801 that means a surprise attack on an enemy fleet in its home anchorage. The concern back in 1917 when the first carrier-based torpedo droppers flew was that conventional air launched torpedoes, the 14-in variety were insufficient to penetrate armour plating of capital ships. The RNAS standardised on 18-inch torpedoes modified from ship launched variants to enable them to be carried by the Sopwith Cuckoo. Between the wars the FAA regularly practised torpedo exercises with the Home Fleet's battleships, so battleships were very much the targets of British torpedo droppers.
Doesn't appear to be, diving bombing attacks were certainly practised, but not dive bombing per se, the FAA didn't have a dedicated dive bomber before the Skua, which was a good dive bomber (but a lousy fighter).
Sounds like a good idea. The Skua could have shed some physical bulk, but weight wise it comes under the SBD although performance wise the Dauntless had more power under the hood. That Taurus just isn't powerful enough.
Yup, good analysis, but the Fulmar was a good compromise on what the FAA wanted - it was intended as a stop-gap catapult fighter and basing it on the P.4/34 was sensible to get it into service as swiftly as it did at that time, but it was never going to be able to mix it equally with enemy single-seaters, simply because, as you pointed out, there were no enemies (apart from Japan as it turned out, but that wasn't exactly thought about when the Fulmar was designed) with carriers that could carry single-seaters. It did have an impressive range for a fighter, though, unequalled in the European theatre.
Shortround6
Major General
Well, one of my favorite "what ifs" is putting a Pegasus on the Skua
Won't be a lot of extra speed but it should result in plane similar to the SBD. 1000lb bomb? (assuming the British had one) more range?
Not what you want to fight a 109 close to shore but it should have been able to deal with Do 18 flying boats in 1938-40 or whatever the Germans/Italians were using for over water recon.
And has been mentioned by others, Sticking a better Merlin into the Fulmar for a MK version should have been fast and easy. Maybe use four .50 cal guns like the last Fumar IIs used? Might have been able to split the difference in speed between the Fulmar II and the Firefly I, but since it could show up in 1942 (take over some of the last Fulmar II production slots) the opposition wasn't what it would be in 1944. Having another 200-300hp for take-off might mean being able to lift a single 1000lb bomb which will do the trick for all but a handful of Axis ships.
Won't be a lot of extra speed but it should result in plane similar to the SBD. 1000lb bomb? (assuming the British had one) more range?
Not what you want to fight a 109 close to shore but it should have been able to deal with Do 18 flying boats in 1938-40 or whatever the Germans/Italians were using for over water recon.
And has been mentioned by others, Sticking a better Merlin into the Fulmar for a MK version should have been fast and easy. Maybe use four .50 cal guns like the last Fumar IIs used? Might have been able to split the difference in speed between the Fulmar II and the Firefly I, but since it could show up in 1942 (take over some of the last Fulmar II production slots) the opposition wasn't what it would be in 1944. Having another 200-300hp for take-off might mean being able to lift a single 1000lb bomb which will do the trick for all but a handful of Axis ships.
