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Well like it or not, that was the way it worked and in many respects it's still the same way. You just don't start pumping out aircraft at the snap of one's fingers, especially something state of the art and with the main customer requiring changes along the way. BUT look at the P-38 delivery numbers once the design was basically frozen and full scale production began. This is from the Christy and Ethell book "P-38 Lightning at War"
$$$ in hand!!! Oh - and people and facilities.
During the mid-late 1930s Lockheed was not a big company, things started to change when they got for first large orders for the Hudson. At the end of 1937, the company employed fewer than 2,000 people and had produced only a few hundred planes during its entire corporate lifetime. On March 31, 1940, its workforce stood at about 7,000 employees.
Exactly - and to support that you have to incorporate design changes, build production tooling, have all that approved, build the aircraft almost by hand and get it ready for test flight. Considering the time period and other government commitments Lockheed had, I see no foot dragging here.
Now with all this said, can you show anywhere or document any case where the AAC was upset with Lockheed for the time it took to get the YP-38 into the air after the crash of the XP-38???
Oh and one last thing to consider - rates of production (then and now) are also part of the contract. A customer may order 1,000 aircraft but may only want to take delivery of 200 of them per fiscal year, this based on available funding and logistics. Look at the production rates before and after Pearl Harbor.
It is for the time period. There was no real urgency to push developmentThanks for the tables.
Making a YP-38 is not a case of 'pumping out aircraft at the snap of the finger'.
In depression and isolationist era 1930s, they sure didI'm not sure that US government ever shelled the money 1st for hundred of aircraft, and then waited for aircraft many months when ordering stuff from their usual sources.
149 Electra Model 10s. Hundreds? Boeing was twice the size of 1937 Lockheed and produced many more aircraftLockheed made all-metal monoplanes by hundreds before they did the XP-38, let alone the YP-38. Boeing made dozens before the B-17.
Supporting the Lockheed Hudson/ Ventura production line, opening up Vega Aircraft and building the facility (that eventually supported B-17 production) and eventually building the facilities to produce the P-38 in large quantities once contracts were actually let.No, I don't have any AAC docs to show them as being upset by the time the YP-38 is finally airborne.
What were the 'other government commitments' for Lockheed bar P-38 series in 1940?
Well if this is what "the customer" wanted (the US government) so be it. This was mentioned on here previously but you'll find many id not most aircraft manufacturers only move as fast as a customer pays for their products. Producing aircraft "at risk" is not a good idea (IIRC this is one of the reasons Alexander Seversky was kicked out of his own company) and again a customer may also set the production pace - all this has to be considered when one asks "why did this take so long." You see how things changed after December, 1941.They (customer) just might do that. Lockheed had 3 of them by Spring of 1940, later two. One (erstwhile two) of them will pay, in gold, for hundreds of aircraft if they can have them yesterday.
I mentioned on another thread of a WW2 pilot, stateside instructor, who told of having a few very early P-38s on base and how he hated to fly the only YP-38 of the bunch as it was not like the others and the switches in the cockpit were simple toggle switches and he had to be careful he had the correct one.AFAIK - one. It was after the XP-38 was built (and destroyed) where the AAF ordered additional aircraft, I think the first buy were for 13 aircraft. After that another 60+ were ordered. Talking to many of the folks who were working at Lockheed during the late 1930s, it seems these initial aircraft were just about hand built.
And that goes back to how this aircraft aircraft was continually modified until there was some standardization with production units, I don't believe this happened until the P-38D/FI mentioned on another thread of a WW2 pilot, stateside instructor, who told of having a few very early P-38s on base and how he hated to fly the only YP-38 of the bunch as it was not like the others and the switches in the cockpit were simple toggle switches and he had to be careful he had the correct one.
In my last job before complete retirement, the boss' brother was vertically challenged (about 5ft tall) and told me of his time in Hawaii as a Huey mechanic when he was thin enough to get into the tail and prevent removal of the tail for some of the maintenance. He told of being rented out to other units for said maintenance.I'd agree with that. I was told that "little people" were sought as assemblers to put the tail together as they were able to fit inside the aft tail booms. I don't know how true this is but I was told some of these folks were previously employed by MGM (located about 20 miles south of Burbank) during the filming of "The Wizard of Oz"! The P-38 was not an easy aircraft to build!
Johnson was almost clairvoyant in telling the customer (the AAC, AAF and later USAF) what they 'really' wanted, this was documented in Ben Rich's book "Skunk Works." Also consider that during this period, Johnson WAS NOT the head of Lockheed Engineering, Hal Hibbard was, so there might have been some input from him, but it seems after the XP-38 was built, Johnson was just about given a free reign. I think the P-38 development might have been somewhat hampered by the choice of powerplants available and by the influence of the AAC. I don't know how much Lt. Kelsey pushed for the V-1710C on the XP-38 but I think at the end of the day Johnson/Hibbard felt it was the only solution to meet the original design spec.To move on from the whys of P-38 production discussion.
I've read that Johnson for the future high-performance fighter calculated that he'd need an engine of 1500 HP, or, if that is not available, two x 1000 HP engines (both set-ups requiring the turbochargers). He might've gone with a 1500 HP engine, namely the R-2600 (eg. in a non-turbo installation it powered the Boeing 314 flying boat from 1938). Something of a 'rough Thundrebolt' fighter. Move on 1600 HP engine models by 1940 (1700 HP models by 1941), while eyeing the R-2800 once available.
AAC wants 37mm cannons, so have two of them under each wing (AAC will change their mind in due course).
To move on from the whys of P-38 production discussion.
I've read that Johnson for the future high-performance fighter calculated that he'd need an engine of 1500 HP, or, if that is not available, two x 1000 HP engines (both set-ups requiring the turbochargers). He might've gone with a 1500 HP engine, namely the R-2600 (eg. in a non-turbo installation it powered the Boeing 314 flying boat from 1938). Something of a 'rough Thundrebolt' fighter. Move on 1600 HP engine models by 1940 (1700 HP models by 1941), while eyeing the R-2800 once available.
AAC wants 37mm cannons, so have two of them under each wing (AAC will change their mind in due course).
For the time period, absolutelyI've read as well that the spec the -38 was designed to fulfill was pretty demanding.
It took Boeing to fly the Model 299 (future B-17) less than 12 months. No sight of war in 1935.
The twin boom configuration offered a good solution to the X-608 specification. Now considering this thread is about alternatives, one thing I see IMO is there is little room aerodynamically for a radial engine. Unless Packard secured a license to produce the Merlin earlier, it seems propulsion-wise the only game in town is Allison.
I think the X-608 was too early for, say, the R-2800, especially a turbocharged R-2800, but it still runs into the problem of where do you put the bulky things. I don't think the twin-boom configuration is a good one, but it was really one of the only two viable configurations for this aircraft, with the other being the twin-fuselage design.
Radiators can be housed within the wing after the spar as it was the case with Bf 110 with DB engines, or in chin position like on the P-40, or in front of the inner wing perhaps. 'Classic' configuration also allows for fuel to be carried in the fuselage.
I like your thinking, Tomo, you always know how to construct a thoughtful what-if. The radiators could also be put in the leading edge a la de Havilland Mosquito or Hawker Tempest to lower drag.
R-2600 flew operationally before the V-1710. One engine will require only one turbo set-up.
A 2-engined job can be a 'classic' twin. Radiators can be housed within the wing after the spar as it was the case with Bf 110 with DB engines, or in chin position like on the P-40, or in front of the inner wing perhaps. 'Classic' configuration also allows for fuel to be carried in the fuselage.
I like your thinking, Tomo, you always know how to construct a thoughtful what-if. The radiators could also be put in the leading edge a la de Havilland Mosquito or Hawker Tempest to lower drag.
View attachment 6578980507 de Havilland Aviation Heritage Mosquito prototype
(as an aside, one wonders how the RAF managed with the complex Whirlwind)
OK - here we go again (I'll show my bit of P-38 fanboy side). Poor cockpit heat - accepted by the customer!!! Early Bf 110s didn't even have cockpit heat! One generator - accepted by the customer but rectified later. Mach limit?!?! In 1938 not one aircraft was even coming close to approaching this phenomena let alone dealing with it! Unless some one was clairvoyant, there was no way you were very going to address these issues, especially during the time the P-38 was developed. I'd bet dollars to donuts that a good fix "could have" been developed for the cockpit heating issues but was never undertaken because no one wanted to interfere with the production line once it was in full swing. To once again repeat myself, many of these issues and fixes had to be approved by the customer!I'm not going to argue with either of you gentlemen because you are, of course, making entirely valid and sensible points. The P-38, itself, had a lot of issues with detail design, all of which should have been sorted out by a better development program. These included the poor cockpit heating system, the decision to install only one generator (in an aircraft with constant speed propellers that required electrical power to function), a Mach limit that was easily reached during operations, and (doubtless) others.
Agree but then again, this was the first high performance twin the AAC ever had to deal with coming into service when the P-26 was still in service! However, by 1942 this should have been recognized by AAC brass.The USAAC/USAAF also handled the aircraft's introduction to service poorly, in that they did not adequately plan training for an aircraft that was more complex than any single seat fighter the US had to date.
The Whirlwind was not a high altitude performer, was designed as a fighter bomber and was not "over powered" like the P-38. From what I understand the pilots who flew it liked it. There was nothing "complex" about the Whirlwind (or any other high performance twin) that adequate training couldn't take care of, just two of everything.(as an aside, one wonders how the RAF managed with the complex Whirlwind).