American fighter ops, 1944 and beyond

[Thumpalumpacus]

So I've been thinking about it this afternoon, and something struck me that I hadn't noticed before. Right around the same timeframe, Feb of 1944, the Navy in the PTO adopts the tactic of preliminary fighter sweeps -- say, to open Hailstone with a fighter sweep -- and Doolittle releases his 8th AF fighters from close support and essentially allows his fighters to do the same thing.

My question is, was there any crossover between the two? Did someone in the ETO come upon this and the Navy says, "right, that looks great", or vice-versa? Or was this a case of convergent tactical evolution? I'm interested in learning whether the two branches discussed this anywhere along the line or not. Were they sharing info, or did they individually arrive at the same, essentially correct solution? Was this simply a matter of numbers -- "you got 'em, may as well use 'em"?

 

[EwenS]

So I've been thinking about it this afternoon, and something struck me that I hadn't noticed before. Right around the same timeframe, Feb of 1944, the Navy in the PTO adopts the tactic of preliminary fighter sweeps -- say, to open Hailstone with a fighter sweep -- and Doolittle releases his 8th AF fighters from close support and essentially allows his fighters to do the same thing.

My question is, was there any crossover between the two? Did someone in the ETO come upon this and the Navy says, "right, that looks great", or vice-versa? Or was this a case of convergent tactical evolution? I'm interested in learning whether the two branches discussed this anywhere along the line or not. Were they sharing info, or did they individually arrive at the same, essentially correct solution? Was this simply a matter of numbers -- "you got 'em, may as well use 'em"?

I think the first issue is what do we mean by "fighter sweep". In WW2 it was used to cover a whole range of activities.

RAF
It is worth noting that the RAF had been flying a number of different types of operation over Europe since 1941. Not always clear from the title of the operation as to what the intention was.

Rodeo - Fighter sweeps using wings of fighters, or multiple wings, to draw the Luftwaffe up with the intention of destroying it.
Rhubarbs - operations by flights of a few aircraft carried out under cloudy conditions to pop across the English Channel and hit either designated targets or more often targets of opportunity.
Ramrod - fighter sweep against a specific target (sometimes escorting bombers). In 1944/45 it was used by the FAA for fighter sweeps ahead of main strikes.
Circus - strike by a few bombers with heavy fighter escort to draw up the Luftwaffe to fight.
Roadstead - anti shipping raid by bombers with a fighter escort.

USN Early 1942
If you turn the USN clock back to early 1942 you will find examples of the USN employing what would become known as "fighter sweep" tactics during the various, and relatively unknown, carrier strikes that took place between Jan & April and also the diversion of escort fighters to strafe targets.

On 1st Feb 1942 TF 8, built around the carrier CV-6 Enterprise, attacked Japanese bases in the Marshall Islands. The SBD dive bombers and TBD in the bombing role were sent against targets in and around Kwajalein Atoll while 6 F4F were sent to each of Wotje and Maleolap Atolls armed with 2x100lb bombs. The remaining 6 were held for CAP purposes. From her action report for that day:-

• "About 0615 twelve VF were launched, six to attack Wotje and six to attack Maloelap. These islands were considerably closer than Kwajalein so the later launching still enabled the attack to be synchronized. The other planes carried out attacks on their respective objectives. Maloelap proved to be a formidable target. Fighters were in the air and taking off when our planes arrived. Numerous bombers were bombed and strafed on the ground. At least three enemy fighters were shot down. Our planes received numerous hits but all returned to the ship. The armor plate in Lieut. ______ plane stopped several hits which might otherwise have been fatal.
• The Wotje group did not encounter such heavy aerial opposition. They attacked shore facilities as well as several ships in the anchorage. This attack was followed up by heavy shelling from the NORTHAMPTON, SALT LAKE CITY and DUNLAP. Flames and clouds of smoke could be seen rising from the island."

Action Report: 1 February 1942

USS Enterprise CV-6 Action Report for 1 February 1942

cns74238.hostwindsdns.com

On 10 March 1942 the air groups in TF 11 from Lexington & Yorktown, combined to strike the Lae-Salamaua area where the Japanese were landing. This was carried out with the ships in the Coral Sea and the aircraft flying over the Owen Stanley Range of mountains. 4 VF-3 F4Fs of the 18 F4F employed were used to strafe the beaches at Lae, destroying 2xE8N floatplanes.

The rest of 1942 was taken up with the big carrier battles of Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz while also supporting the Guadalcanal campaign. By early 1943 only the Saratoga was operational in the Pacific, being joined by HMS Victorious mid-year for operations against New Georgia. These however were mostly defensive in nature.

Numbers of available fighters.
In Dec 1941 each carrier had an air group that included just 18 fighters. By Midway that had grown to 27 and by Guadalcanal to 36, made easier by the increasing availibility of the folding wing F4F-4 variant of the Wildcat. That was then doubled again from Dec 1944 to combat the Kamikaze menace. With more fighters available the opportunity for fighter sweeps increased.

1943
The first thing of note in 1943 is the increase in the number of carriers available. There was also a change of tactics. The entire rule book for carrier operations was rewritten and published on 10 June - Pacific Fleet Tactical Orders and Doctrine (PAC-10). This emphasised the use of multi carrier Task Groups. And the first such operations took place on 31 Aug 1943 with raids on Marcus Island and then Baker Island two days later. So more fighters becoming available for offensive missions than CAP over the Task Group.

The very first strike on Marcus Island by aircraft from Yorktown, Essex & Independence saw some of the fighters going down to strafe AA positions on the island and parked aircraft between the waves of TBF and SBD, there being no aerial opposition.

One thing that was becoming apparant by late 1943 was that where the Japanese had radar, it gave them time to launch a fighter defence, if fighters were available in the target area, and meet the incoming USN strike at altitude. So any element of surprise that had existed in 1942 was then gone.

Operation Hailstone Feb 1944 strikes on Truk
The historian Samuel Elliot Morrison credits the newly appointed TF 58 commander Rear Admiral Marc A Mitscher with the development of the fighter sweep ahead of this operation. The main objective was to clear the air of Japanese fighters to give the bombers a clear run. And its secondary objective was to give the fighters the opportunity to attack targets of opportunity through strafing aircraft still on the ground if aerial opposition was not significant.

On 17 Feb 1944 the first attack of the day was a fighter sweep of 72 F6F-3 (12 each from Enterprise & Yorktown at 6-8,000ft; 12 from each of Essex & Intrepid at 10-15,000ft and 24 from Bunker Hill at over 25,000ft. They launched about 1 hour before dawn (0440-0454) and approached Truk from the north at about 1,000ft, only climbing to their patrol heights when about 15mins out from Truk, arriving overhead the lagoon at 0600. Finding no aerial opposition, some of the low flights went down to strafe the airfields.

The first strike took off from the carriers immediately following the fighter sweep aircraft. Yorktown for example launched 15 SBD, 9 TBF with 8 F6F as escort. Each air group also had a target co-ordinator to direct strike aircraft where to bomb.

Japanese radar had detected the incoming aircraft at 0520 but misinterpreted the nature and size of the strike and then had communication problems getting the message out to the various airfields. So a large number of aircraft were caught on the ground by strafing F6F. Fighters that did get up were rapidly intercepted by the low level F6Fs. Once that sweep and initial following strikes had concluded their business, TF58 had achieved air superiority which they were then able to maintain for the rest of the day, allowing later strikes to bomb almost at will. A fighter sweep opened proceedings the next day but met only AA fire.


Conclusion
I've not read of any cross feeding of ideas between the ETO & the PTO on this subject. But both nations did work together to exchange ideas exchnaging liasion officers from 1940 onwards. But as you can see from the above the "fighter sweep" was not a new idea in early 1944.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I think the first issue is what do we mean by "fighter sweep". In WW2 it was used to cover a whole range of activities.

RAF
It is worth noting that the RAF had been flying a number of different types of operation over Europe since 1941. Not always clear from the title of the operation as to what the intention was.

Rodeo - Fighter sweeps using wings of fighters, or multiple wings, to draw the Luftwaffe up with the intention of destroying it.
Rhubarbs - operations by flights of a few aircraft carried out under cloudy conditions to pop across the English Channel and hit either designated targets or more often targets of opportunity.
Ramrod - fighter sweep against a specific target (sometimes escorting bombers). In 1944/45 it was used by the FAA for fighter sweeps ahead of main strikes.
Circus - strike by a few bombers with heavy fighter escort to draw up the Luftwaffe to fight.
Roadstead - anti shipping raid by bombers with a fighter escort.

USN Early 1942
If you turn the USN clock back to early 1942 you will find examples of the USN employing what would become known as "fighter sweep" tactics during the various, and relatively unknown, carrier strikes that took place between Jan & April and also the diversion of escort fighters to strafe targets.

On 1st Feb 1942 TF 8, built around the carrier CV-6 Enterprise, attacked Japanese bases in the Marshall Islands. The SBD dive bombers and TBD in the bombing role were sent against targets in and around Kwajalein Atoll while 6 F4F were sent to each of Wotje and Maleolap Atolls armed with 2x100lb bombs. The remaining 6 were held for CAP purposes. From her action report for that day:-

• "About 0615 twelve VF were launched, six to attack Wotje and six to attack Maloelap. These islands were considerably closer than Kwajalein so the later launching still enabled the attack to be synchronized. The other planes carried out attacks on their respective objectives. Maloelap proved to be a formidable target. Fighters were in the air and taking off when our planes arrived. Numerous bombers were bombed and strafed on the ground. At least three enemy fighters were shot down. Our planes received numerous hits but all returned to the ship. The armor plate in Lieut. ______ plane stopped several hits which might otherwise have been fatal.
• The Wotje group did not encounter such heavy aerial opposition. They attacked shore facilities as well as several ships in the anchorage. This attack was followed up by heavy shelling from the NORTHAMPTON, SALT LAKE CITY and DUNLAP. Flames and clouds of smoke could be seen rising from the island."

Action Report: 1 February 1942

USS Enterprise CV-6 Action Report for 1 February 1942

cns74238.hostwindsdns.com

On 10 March 1942 the air groups in TF 11 from Lexington & Yorktown, combined to strike the Lae-Salamaua area where the Japanese were landing. This was carried out with the ships in the Coral Sea and the aircraft flying over the Owen Stanley Range of mountains. 4 VF-3 F4Fs of the 18 F4F employed were used to strafe the beaches at Lae, destroying 2xE8N floatplanes.

The rest of 1942 was taken up with the big carrier battles of Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz while also supporting the Guadalcanal campaign. By early 1943 only the Saratoga was operational in the Pacific, being joined by HMS Victorious mid-year for operations against New Georgia. These however were mostly defensive in nature.

Numbers of available fighters.
In Dec 1941 each carrier had an air group that included just 18 fighters. By Midway that had grown to 27 and by Guadalcanal to 36, made easier by the increasing availibility of the folding wing F4F-4 variant of the Wildcat. That was then doubled again from Dec 1944 to combat the Kamikaze menace. With more fighters available the opportunity for fighter sweeps increased.

1943
The first thing of note in 1943 is the increase in the number of carriers available. There was also a change of tactics. The entire rule book for carrier operations was rewritten and published on 10 June - Pacific Fleet Tactical Orders and Doctrine (PAC-10). This emphasised the use of multi carrier Task Groups. And the first such operations took place on 31 Aug 1943 with raids on Marcus Island and then Baker Island two days later. So more fighters becoming available for offensive missions than CAP over the Task Group.

The very first strike on Marcus Island by aircraft from Yorktown, Essex & Independence saw some of the fighters going down to strafe AA positions on the island and parked aircraft between the waves of TBF and SBD, there being no aerial opposition.

One thing that was becoming apparant by late 1943 was that where the Japanese had radar, it gave them time to launch a fighter defence, if fighters were available in the target area, and meet the incoming USN strike at altitude. So any element of surprise that had existed in 1942 was then gone.

Operation Hailstone Feb 1944 strikes on Truk
The historian Samuel Elliot Morrison credits the newly appointed TF 58 commander Rear Admiral Marc A Mitscher with the development of the fighter sweep ahead of this operation. The main objective was to clear the air of Japanese fighters to give the bombers a clear run. And its secondary objective was to give the fighters the opportunity to attack targets of opportunity through strafing aircraft still on the ground if aerial opposition was not significant.

On 17 Feb 1944 the first attack of the day was a fighter sweep of 72 F6F-3 (12 each from Enterprise & Yorktown at 6-8,000ft; 12 from each of Essex & Intrepid at 10-15,000ft and 24 from Bunker Hill at over 25,000ft. They launched about 1 hour before dawn (0440-0454) and approached Truk from the north at about 1,000ft, only climbing to their patrol heights when about 15mins out from Truk, arriving overhead the lagoon at 0600. Finding no aerial opposition, some of the low flights went down to strafe the airfields.

The first strike took off from the carriers immediately following the fighter sweep aircraft. Yorktown for example launched 15 SBD, 9 TBF with 8 F6F as escort. Each air group also had a target co-ordinator to direct strike aircraft where to bomb.

Japanese radar had detected the incoming aircraft at 0520 but misinterpreted the nature and size of the strike and then had communication problems getting the message out to the various airfields. So a large number of aircraft were caught on the ground by strafing F6F. Fighters that did get up were rapidly intercepted by the low level F6Fs. Once that sweep and initial following strikes had concluded their business, TF58 had achieved air superiority which they were then able to maintain for the rest of the day, allowing later strikes to bomb almost at will. A fighter sweep opened proceedings the next day but met only AA fire.


Conclusion
I've not read of any cross feeding of ideas between the ETO & the PTO on this subject. But both nations did work together to exchange ideas exchnaging liasion officers from 1940 onwards. But as you can see from the above the "fighter sweep" was not a new idea in early 1944.

Right, I wasn't saying it was a new idea. I was asking if it was a coincidence that both the USN/USMC and USAAF both began emphasizing it around the same time.

What I mean by fighter sweep is the active suppression of enemy aerial defenses by fighters in conjunction with but unencumbered by the bombers they're coordinating with.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

The choice of January/February 1944 as the start of the defined preliminary sweep idea by the US in Europe and Pacific thanks to some form of information exchange is making a connection I do not think exists. As Ewen pointed out fighter sweeps were around well before 1944, the Luftwaffe did some in the Battle of Britain, and also used advanced escorts, fighter units well ahead of the bombers to try and clear the way, plus close escorts. If it worked the non close escort fighters were free to engage. The Luftwaffe learnt enough to largely avoid the allied sweeps, the Japanese on Truk had no such experience.

The USN Official History for Operation Hailstone (17 and 18 February 1944) says refer to operations Flintlock and Catchpole (29 January to 23 February 1944) for Order of battle, except for the new night fighter units.

carrier	F6F	F6F-N	F4U-N	SBD	SB2C	TBF	Total
Enterprise	32​		4​	30​		16​	82​
Yorktown	37​	4​		37​		18​	96​
Belleau Wood	24​					8​	32​
Essex	36​			34​		19​	89​
Intrepid	37​		4​	36​		19​	96​
Cabot	24​					9​	33​
Bunker Hill	38​	4​			31​	20​	93​
Monterey	25​					9​	34​
Cowpens	24​					9​	33​
Total	277​	8​	8​	137​	31​	127​	588​

The F6F day fighters made up around 47% of total strength, allocating a quarter to defence, a quarter to a sweep would leave 1 fighter per 2 strike aircraft. The carriers had a built in handicap, only able to spot around half or so of the air group on the flight deck for a strike and recovery was slower, so there was a preference for part air group missions, which helps explain some of the Operation Hailstone raid sizes and timings. If the sweep F6F launched with drop tanks fitted they could have loitered until after the first strike went in, the start of the big blue blanket, smothering the area with continual fighter cover, something similar happened over Normandy.

8th Air Force

20th December The first freelance fighter mission is flown when the bombers turn up 30 minutes late and the 55th fighter group "puts into action a plan much discussed by fighter pilots - ranging ahead of the bombers as they converge on the bomber path. The 55th fighter group scores no victories on this day, but its new tactic gets the attention of VIII fighter command and there ensures a healthy debate that, in the end, will free the fighters from the outmoded close-escort doctrine of the day." Window is first used on this day as well. Some 491 fighters were used as escorts for 546 bombers, 12 of which were pathfinders.

6th January Doolittle gains command

7th January Phased escort tactics used, fighters fly to rendezvous points to relieve other fighters rather than a formation of fighters stays with a formation of bombers for the entire mission, 571 fighters for 502 bombers.

11th January the first officially sanctioned test of freelance fighter tactics, where fighter formations range ahead and to the side of the bomber formation hoping to catch Luftwaffe fighters as they are forming up, 592 fighters for 663 bombers. The USAAF mounts 2 raids that day, the one with the freelance experiment, to Oschersleben and Halberstadt, has the Oschersleben bomber formation hit hard by fighters and flak, losing 34 from 177 bombers despatched, the Halberstadt formation loses 8 from 114 despatched. The 221 escorting fighters for these two formations claim 29 kills for 3 fighters lost, 11 of the kills by the freelance fighters. Only the 56th fighter group freelances, with two formations of 36 and 48 fighters respectively. All the bombers were B-17s.

The second raid that day, to Brunswick, was largely reduced to targets of opportunity and lost 16 B-17s and 2 B-24s. Of the 58 to 62 B-17s lost that day (sources vary again), including write offs, some 44 were lost to enemy fighters, 8 to flak, 2 to "battle damage" and 5 "operational" losses, according to my counts.

So the initial experiment would have a mixed report, the freelance fighters did above average but the bombers were clearly exposed to significant fighter attack.

21st January 56th fighter group turn in the first strafing kill claims, it is not until late March that strafing becomes a significant source of kill claims.

24th January the first attempt at having fighters patrol an area for a time, not stick with a particular bomber formation, abandoned due to weather problems.

As far as I am aware the escort tactics ended up as a mixture of phased, freelance, patrol and close escorts, the mixture varying according to perceived needs. Doolittle and Spaatz were not operating in a vacuum, they had their experience in the Mediterranean and decided to try new tactics various lower HQs had been discussing. It was not all their idea, equally it was their responsibility if things worked or failed.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The choice of January/February 1944 as the start of the defined preliminary sweep idea by the US in Europe and Pacific thanks to some form of information exchange is making a connection I do not think exists. As Ewen pointed out fighter sweeps were around well before 1944, the Luftwaffe did some in the Battle of Britain, and also used advanced escorts, fighter units well ahead of the bombers to try and clear the way, plus close escorts. If it worked the non close escort fighters were free to engage. The Luftwaffe learnt enough to largely avoid the allied sweeps, the Japanese on Truk had no such experience.

The USN Official History for Operation Hailstone (17 and 18 February 1944) says refer to operations Flintlock and Catchpole (29 January to 23 February 1944) for Order of battle, except for the new night fighter units.

carrier	F6F	F6F-N	F4U-N	SBD	SB2C	TBF	Total
Enterprise	32​		4​	30​		16​	82​
Yorktown	37​	4​		37​		18​	96​
Belleau Wood	24​					8​	32​
Essex	36​			34​		19​	89​
Intrepid	37​		4​	36​		19​	96​
Cabot	24​					9​	33​
Bunker Hill	38​	4​			31​	20​	93​
Monterey	25​					9​	34​
Cowpens	24​					9​	33​
Total	277​	8​	8​	137​	31​	127​	588​

The F6F day fighters made up around 47% of total strength, allocating a quarter to defence, a quarter to a sweep would leave 1 fighter per 2 strike aircraft. The carriers had a built in handicap, only able to spot around half or so of the air group on the flight deck for a strike and recovery was slower, so there was a preference for part air group missions, which helps explain some of the Operation Hailstone raid sizes and timings. If the sweep F6F launched with drop tanks fitted they could have loitered until after the first strike went in, the start of the big blue blanket, smothering the area with continual fighter cover, something similar happened over Normandy.

8th Air Force

20th December The first freelance fighter mission is flown when the bombers turn up 30 minutes late and the 55th fighter group "puts into action a plan much discussed by fighter pilots - ranging ahead of the bombers as they converge on the bomber path. The 55th fighter group scores no victories on this day, but its new tactic gets the attention of VIII fighter command and there ensures a healthy debate that, in the end, will free the fighters from the outmoded close-escort doctrine of the day." Window is first used on this day as well. Some 491 fighters were used as escorts for 546 bombers, 12 of which were pathfinders.

6th January Doolittle gains command

7th January Phased escort tactics used, fighters fly to rendezvous points to relieve other fighters rather than a formation of fighters stays with a formation of bombers for the entire mission, 571 fighters for 502 bombers.

11th January the first officially sanctioned test of freelance fighter tactics, where fighter formations range ahead and to the side of the bomber formation hoping to catch Luftwaffe fighters as they are forming up, 592 fighters for 663 bombers. The USAAF mounts 2 raids that day, the one with the freelance experiment, to Oschersleben and Halberstadt, has the Oschersleben bomber formation hit hard by fighters and flak, losing 34 from 177 bombers despatched, the Halberstadt formation loses 8 from 114 despatched. The 221 escorting fighters for these two formations claim 29 kills for 3 fighters lost, 11 of the kills by the freelance fighters. Only the 56th fighter group freelances, with two formations of 36 and 48 fighters respectively. All the bombers were B-17s.

The second raid that day, to Brunswick, was largely reduced to targets of opportunity and lost 16 B-17s and 2 B-24s. Of the 58 to 62 B-17s lost that day (sources vary again), including write offs, some 44 were lost to enemy fighters, 8 to flak, 2 to "battle damage" and 5 "operational" losses, according to my counts.

So the initial experiment would have a mixed report, the freelance fighters did above average but the bombers were clearly exposed to significant fighter attack.

21st January 56th fighter group turn in the first strafing kill claims, it is not until late March that strafing becomes a significant source of kill claims.

24th January the first attempt at having fighters patrol an area for a time, not stick with a particular bomber formation, abandoned due to weather problems.

As far as I am aware the escort tactics ended up as a mixture of phased, freelance, patrol and close escorts, the mixture varying according to perceived needs. Doolittle and Spaatz were not operating in a vacuum, they had their experience in the Mediterranean and decided to try new tactics various lower HQs had been discussing. It was not all their idea, equally it was their responsibility if things worked or failed.

Hey Geoff, thanks for the thoughtful post. Exactly the sort of info I was asking for, much appreciated.

 

[Barrett]

Ewen & Geoffrey cover the subject well.

I'll just add that the Imperial Navy often sent fighters ahead of bombers in "air control" missions, starting at least with Pearl Harbor.
Dolfo Galland advocated Frei Jagd ("free hunt") to engage RAF fighters in the BoB but the Luftwaffe bombers and Goering objected--wanted the bombers to see the 109s and even 110s. Which of course deprived the Jagdfliegern of the initiative. Similar situation existed for while in 8AF and somewhat longer in the 15th. (I'll skip my usual rant about the Tuskegees' mythical 100 percent escort record.) In writing the 15th AF history I consulted pilots from the 8th and 15th and found that often fighter group COs chose their own methods with close or roving escort, depending on whether they were assigned penetration, target or withdrawal support.