MiTasol
Major
Effect of humidity is on pdf p7&8.
Thank you.
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Effect of humidity is on pdf p7&8.
Liquid after/intercooling wasn't a new idea. The coolant weight (40lbs) alone is about the weight of a complete air-to-air intercooler installation. Add in the weight of piping, coolant tank, pump, and the heat exchangers the installed weight will be about three times that of an air-to-air type.In any case Sir Stanley Hooker's solution for the two stage Merlin had to be exceptionally brilliant because Nobody Else seems to have thought of it.
And as for octane ratings, note that 73 octane was the "normal" aircraft engine fuel in the late 1930's. P&W built the R-2000 version of the R-1830 to ensure equal performance even when using lower octane gasoline.
I hardly think so. The big trade off, especially for a fighter, was DRAG. Think about what it took to get air through that air-to-air intercooler. The liquid intercooler/aftercooler just had to be smaller than the air-to-air one. The other big and largely underappreciated factor was temperature control. Very easy to do with liquid cooling. Challenging with air-to-air. Undercooling was the problem with the P-38's up through the H model, which used leading edge intercoolers, which were great for drag but a challenge for manufacture and inadequate for cooling. The H used the same engines as the J but had less power available. Then with the beard type intercoolers on the J and L overcooling was the major problem, especially in the ETO.In short weight was a major trade-off.
Thank you, that is about the best photo of a B-24 intercooler that I have seen.I hardly think so. The big trade off, especially for a fighter, was DRAG. Think about what it took to get air through that air-to-air intercooler. The liquid intercooler/aftercooler just had to be smaller than the air-to-air one. The other big and largely underappreciated factor was temperature control. Very easy to do with liquid cooling. Challenging with air-to-air. Undercooling was the problem with the P-38's up through the H model, which used leading edge intercoolers, which were great for drag but a challenge for manufacture and inadequate for cooling. The H used the same engines as the J but had less power available. Then with the beard type intercoolers on the J and L overcooling was the major problem, especially in the ETO.
View attachment 872950
Allison figures for the 8.80 gears are for 11,700 or 12,000ft without backfire screens. With 9.60 gears they were claiming 15,500ft but 25hp less.The 9.60:1 supercharger on the 1710, starting with the V-1710-81, had a critical altitude about 4,000 ft higher. The -39 and -73 had a critical altitude of about 12,000 ft. The -81 was at 16,000 or a bit more.
The British adopted 87 octane as standard in 1932 and rated all subsequent engine development using this fuel, while the US adopted 87 octane as standard about a year later. France was using 87 octane as standard from about 1935(I think), as were Japan and Italy. Germany was using 87 octane s standard by the Spanish Civil War for sure, maybe sooner.And as for octane ratings, note that 73 octane was the "normal" aircraft engine fuel in the late 1930's.
The P-51A was a 'placeholder' for the P-51B-1 and B-5 while awaiting the Flight Test results of both the Rolls-Royce/RAF and the XP-51B. The P-51A didn't introduce the new aileron developed in parallel with the XP-51 #1 flight tests at Langley in summer 1942 simply because the production material orders and designs and tooling for the P-51A were already well advanced.It's a bit of a mystery to me why the P-51A didn't do better than it did. I've learned about roll rate being an issue which was fixed in the B/C/D, but why didn't they go back and fix it in the A as well? I also don't think the Americans flying them in Burma and a bit in the Med were pushing the engines as hard as the British were, in spite of this guy's memo. It seemed like a type which had more potential than it reached, and it could have been flying in improved form and in some numbers far earlier. An 'improved' P-51A NA-73 type could have been very helpful in the South Pacific in 1942 and probably into 1943. The P-40s were contributing a lot, the P-51A was faster, climbed better and had better range. So potentially could have been a better escort fighter and a better interceptor.
It's almost worth another thread of it's own...
Hi,Let's be fair to Allison here:
Then in '38, they get an order for 59 V-1710s! (RR is making more Kestrels per month, and they're building Merlins, Griffons and Vultures in addition).
Being fair it GE, the compressor of the Kestrel has peak efficiency of 37% at this point. Then, as note earlier, RR tasks Ellor with improving that and he does - to 70%!
Again being fair to both Allison and GE, a 1710 in^3 with 6.5:1 compression only need 4" (2 psi) of boost (33" manifold pressure) @ 2,600 rpm to achieve the 1k hp which the USAAF specification requires. The difference between a 40% and 70% efficient supercharger is minimal.
The P-51A was a 'placeholder' for the P-51B-1 and B-5 while awaiting the Flight Test results of both the Rolls-Royce/RAF and the XP-51B. The P-51A didn't introduce the new aileron developed in parallel with the XP-51 #1 flight tests at Langley in summer 1942 simply because the production material orders and designs and tooling for the P-51A were already well advanced.
The aileron for the P-51B-1 hinged on two points as the P-51A, but had a beefed up aft spar to absorb the loads of the 5 degree increase in throw angle. All subsequent P-51B/D models had a three point suspension. I have never seen the structural analysis for the aft spar for either the P-51A or P-51B-1 but suspect there was a torsion issue introduced into the aft spar to obviate a kit release to simply introduce the new aileron into the P-51A. By the time the P-51A was introduced in CBI in October 1943 the last production item had been delivered months prior and both the P-51B-1, P-51B-5 and P-51C were in full production.
The very first Mustang article with +/- 15 degree ailerons was P-51B-1 #1 completed save engine on March 30, 1943.
As to being useful in SWPA - yes simply because the P-51A wing was very similar to the A-36 save the dive brake related features, including both bomb and wing fuel tank mount and fuel feed. Its range would have been very similar to the P-38. As a practical matter, no version of the Mustang could have been introduced anywhere into US service as early as summer 1942 unless General Echols had ordered purchases in early 1941 before the first Mustang I production version first flight. The A-36, then the P-51A had been shoved down Materiel Command (Echols) throat by Plans Division AAF-HQ. The Dallas facility was not operational, and Inglewood was fully applied to B-25, AT-6 and Mustang I production.
To your earlier question about the Allison two speed/two stage engine introduced much earlier into the Mustang line, it was impossible to replace the Merlin type integral two speed/two stage supercharger engine design because the Allison auxiliary supercharger design was too long, altered forward CG too much and required a major redesign of the airframe to move the wing forward. Only the XP-51J and later the P-82E airframe accommodated the Allison V-1710-119 and -143 engines. in 1945 the engine performed inconsistently for the XP-51J at NAA and they gave it to Allison for further development. The -143 never performed well above Military Power and effectively emasculated the F-82 performance compared to Merlin powered P-82B.
My point was when the Kestrel V / Allison V-1710 in XP-38 / XP-39 were only making 1.5 / 2 psi boost respectively, the difference between 40% and 70% wasn't significant (<4%) as per my chart There were lots of other issues with the engines that RR and Allison needed to focus on that provided more results.Hi,
Just to note that "in '38, RR were mainly building late Kestrels, new Peregrine, new Vulture and the Merlin II. Griffon production began in '42 with the Griffon II.
Regarding supercharger efficiency. Usually, quoted efficiency will be the best achieved and relates to the total percentage of energy used by the supercharger compared to the amount of energy actually converted into the pressure rise. The difference is the energy lost, mostly to unwanted extra heating the compressed air through inefficiency.
In '38 the RR Kestrel supercharger was the 60% efficient, having been improved from the early 37% version since '35.
Hooker wrote that the Merlin III supercharger was 65% efficient when he examined it in '38. He improved this value by changes he designed to 75% and those improvements appeared
in the production Merlin XX in '40 and the Merlin 45 in '41.
As I explained above, supercharger inefficiency usually results in excessive charge heating, so the difference between a 40% and 70% efficiency is important.
Cheers
Eng
I can't find my picture of the intercooler up inside the wing of a B-17. Air came in through the leading edge of the wing and seems to have exited through slots on the rear upper surface of the wing.Thank you, that is about the best photo of a B-24 intercooler that I have seen.
Hi,My point was when the Kestrel V / Allison V-1710 in XP-38 / XP-39 were only making 1.5 / 2 psi boost respectively, the difference between 40% and 70% wasn't significant (<4%) as per my chart There were lots of other issues with the engines that RR and Allison needed to focus on that provided more results.
When RR /Allison get into the 10psi range, the difference become significant: Not just the 10% increase in Density ratio, but the fact that the nearly 50°R temperature increase makes mixture more susceptible to pre-ignition, and the power losses driving the compressor.
And things get really significant when you get into the 20psi (70" Hg) range.
Hi,
Yes, you are correct that at low powers and low supercharge, the actual losses are low, but the implications of inefficiency are there and failing to make the process efficient will
have grave implications for your technological capability in future development. Hooker (and others) saw this in 1938 as soon as he moved into supercharger work. Fortunately,
for RR and the Allies, Hooker made great strides forward with this.
Of course, RR were working with 20psi Boost in 1929 and had an inside appreciation of the problems from an early stage.
Cheers
Eng
And do you have a sense of where Pratt and Whitney / GE fit into this?
Hi,
As a casual observer, I would say that GE did very well in the development and mass-production of their turbochargers, for a wide range of American combat aircraft and their
engines. Some comments are made about the complexity of installation and in-combat operation of the earlier units. However, I do not know enough to make further points myself.
Calum Douglas does touch on these units in his books TSHR and TSCT.
Cheers,
Eng
Stunning to think that following the completion of the A-36A production run they built all 500 of the P-51A's in just one month. On reason for building them was replacing the P-51-1 aircraft that had been "stolen" from the RAF Mustang Mk IA order.The P-51A was a 'placeholder' for the P-51B-1 and B-5
The Vees for Victory book says that the USAAF told Allison that type of gearing had never worked before and there was no reason to expect that it would.For the "C" series Allison, they were having issues with the reduction gearing - because of the internal/external gear setup, the crankshaft gear was overhung.