Think about the results from search engines. British production figures have a margin of error in them thanks to the way they were compiled, Spitfire V/IX figures run into the mid 1942 actions of V being flown from factory to Rolls-Royce, becoming IX then delivered.
Some production numbers here (just googling, so correct me if I'm wrong)
Hurricane Mk II production: 8,600 (451 Mk IIA, 2,948 Mk IIB, 4,711 Mk IIC, 296 Mk IID, 270 Mk IV)
How does IV = II? Most likely the mythical IIE, often seen in air displays alongside dragons for appreciative audiences of unicorns.
When the RAF fitted a power operated gun turret to the Overstrand (top speed 153 mph) it noted a 5 fold increase in gunner accuracy, as a result the RAF was confident its new generation monoplane bombers could fight their way through fighter defences.
Memories of the WWI Bristol Fighter created a view towards the two seater, the Defiant upgraded this with a turret as an unescorted bomber destroyer, to become a fighter required understanding the Bristol Fighter had forward firing armament *supplemented* by the gunner who also acted as another pair of eyes.
Defiant, 87 ordered in 1937, prototype first flight 31 August 1937, another 363 ordered in 1938, 800 more in 1939 which would be after war was declared following the dictum only what is in production can go into mass production, of these 330 later cancelled (in 1942?), 150 ordered as target tow in 1941, 10 of these cancelled. Defiant fighter production ended in May 1942, changing over to target tug, the final one of which built in March 1943.
With the near instant need for a night fighter force the Defiant filled the gap until the Beaufighter and Mosquito became available in the required numbers. It made more Hurricanes and Spitfires available for the day defences and having a second pair of eyes made it more effective in the stop gap night fighter role. Later the Germans fitted upward firing guns to their night fighters. How good it might have been when radar equipped or cat's eyes in summer is unknown as the Luftwaffe withdrew the target. Seems the modifications to add radar made it suitable for ECM work. The Defiant was misused during the day battles, rather like the Bf110 which often gets tagged as a failure (after all it was the long range escort as designed) despite successful service afterwards.
Miles Martinet production began in August 1942, ending in May 1945, Queen Martinet built April 1945 to August 1946. Queen Bee production off and on 1935 to 1944.
P-47 Thunderbolt (1942-43): ~3,000 (includes 171 B and 602 C which I don't think were combat ready)
As of 19 September 1943 the 8th Air Force P-47 groups still held 116 P-47C along side 302 D models, it was the C that entered combat, P-47 production 1942/32 was 4,960.
F4U production in 1943: ~ 1,200 (not sure how many of these were really combat ready types)
F4U were considered combat worthy from the start but not carrier worthy, 2,293 accepted in 1943.
Losses -
Luftwaffe losses in North Africa 1942-43: ~3,000 (600-700 aircraft in action or accidents, 2,400 counting aircraft left on airfields etc.)
Regia Aeronautica North Africa aircraft losses 1942-43: 400-500 aircraft + unknown (or i couldn't find data) for left behind / lost on the ground
Luftwaffe + Regia losses Sicily campaign 1943: 2,011 (320 (225 German and 95 Italian) in action or operational, 1,691 lost due to captured airfields etc.)
The MTO USAAF fighters alone claimed 1,351 enemy destroyed in the air in 1942/43, versus maybe 1,500 all cause losses according to the above, remove at least a third for accidents, then bombed on ground, AA, the RAF and other USAAF types contribution. The P-40 was clearly not very good given how much over claiming it must have been doing. Meantime the Luftwaffe quartermaster was really working for the allies and 8th Army can claim to be the most successful "Fighter Group" on the allied side. Plenty of axis aircraft left behind, how many were repairable is another matter, write offs, cannibalised airframes or ones staked out as targets do not count.
USAAF losses North Africa ~1,800 aircraft
AIR 22/401 Assuming North Africa means to end April 1943, USAAF out of Egypt 97 aircraft, NW Africa 667 aircraft lost
Combined Allied aircraft losses Sicily ~200-300 aircraft (including 140 US)
July and August 1943, RAF Desert force 40 aircraft, Malta 68 plus 1 US, NW Africa RAF 172 aircraft (1 French), USAAF 305 aircraft.
US aircraft losses CBI (through 1945): ~600-700 aircraft
The USAAF Statistical Digest gives two figures which both probably exclude the China airlift losses. Table 100 says CBI combat and accident losses were 3,289 first and second line aircraft, table 163 says losses on combat missions were 1,076.
Comments:
- I could not find the total number of Luftwaffe losses in fighting over the channel in 1942-43,
Until channel is defined no one knows, presumably the losses taking on the 8th AF over Germany do not count, even if they came from Luftflotte 3?
- Just taking a wild guess here, but I would bet a beer that about 5,000 of those 8,000 Hurricane Mk II were 'extra', as were about 3,000 of the Spitfire Mk V.
All 4 Hurricane lines shut down in March 1942, all 3 Spitfire V lines in May.
- If we can assume that something better in terms of performance and range could have been possible in time to be fielded in 1942-43. If not I'd say swap Hurricane production for Spitfire as we already discussed.
Rather it can be noted despite all the objections to the idea of one type in and another out the idea will be repeated, magnanimously waving away problems.
- The reason being that both Hurricane and Spit V were extremely limited in both range and endurance. This was a big problem for both in North Africa, and in Burma and India, and for the Spit V in Australia. It basically prevented it's active use in the South Pacific Island campaigns which could have been a very helpful contribution.
Again what targets were regularly outside Spitfire V range in North Africa? The Australians received more than the number of Spitfires needed for the commitment to defend Darwin, since you must have read the online history of 79 RAAF squadron what does basically prevented mean? Darwin to Timor is over 400 miles, requiring a similar combat radius.
The RAAF history devotes around 3 pages to the 2 May 1943 combat over Darwin. In the actual air combat the allied pilots claimed 6 kills and, by the end of the fighting, had lost 5 aircraft. A further 5 aircraft force landed due to lack of fuel, 1 a write off, 3 others had engine failure and 1 of these was a write off. So all up 8 Spitfires lost.
Also the history notes the Spitfires were told not to dogfight the Zeros, and bounced the fighters from above, but, as it turned out, in too steep a dive, 70 degrees from 10,000 feet higher. Which shows the instructions to avoid a turning fight and a lack of practice in the tactic. The 10,000 feet extra height was due to the fact the bombers attacked from around 27,000 feet with the escort as much as 4,000 feet higher feet then began a steady dive away while the Spitfires had climbed to 32,000 feet to be above the escorts.
The Spitfires arrived in Darwin in January 1943, first combat on 6 February. The first big fight, against an estimated 45 Japanese aircraft saw the allied pilots claimed 7 kills for 4 Spitfires lost. As of the start of the deployment, there were 6 fully experienced pilots and 37 who had some fighter combat experience, out of the 95 pilots.
All from Air War Against Japan, 1943-1945 by George Odgers, Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 1957.
- I will also guess that 4,000 of the 8,000 Airacobras produced could have been skipped. The ones that were built should have been sent to the Soviets.
P-39 line shut in March 1943.
- Probably half of the P-40E, K, M and N could have been better replaced by F/L types. The F/L was viable in the MTO through early 1944 and would have been useful in the South Pacific and China / Burma / India through the end of the war.
General Kenny preferred the P-38 to the P-47, also in a supply constrained position (B-26 and B-17 removed to ease things), having an all Allison fighter force had appeal. Merlin meant dealing with the RAAF and RNZAF for the support facilities.
- There was a shortage of the best US and British fighter aircraft through the end of 1943 - especially the Spitfire Mk VIII, P-38, F4U, and P-40F/L.
Given the P-47 and in particular the reported low axis losses in the air in the MTO the P-40F/L does not qualify for "best"
- I was quite surprised by the large number of F6F produced (if that number is correct) but if it is correct, it seems like more of these could have been deployed by the USN sooner
Grumman managed to turn out 10 F6F in 1942, then 12 in January 1943, rising to 458 in December, the final quarter figures really making the yearly ones look good. Things like the laws of production to mass production, remaining F4F production and the need for TBF meant trade offs over what to produce during 1943. Also RN carrier practice was significantly behind USN, making allocation to the RN less efficient, first allocations in March 1943. Meantime in the Pacific for most of 1943 the carriers and battleships on both sides became quite shy, the USN added 7 Essex and 9 Independence class December 1942 to December 1943. Each requiring an air group plus reserves.
I do think that the Luftwaffe Fighter performance actually changed a lot from early 1942 to Q4/44.
To clarify I was thinking day fighters and the sorts of things that kept you out of enemy fighter gun sights, speed, roll, climb etc. And yes it is an opinion on how much change makes for improvement. The night fighter force had a big upgrade starting in early 1944 as the Ju88G arrived.
Very broad-brush, the German fighters had many problems with engines in mid 1942.
Yes, which meant degradation in performance over the Bf109F-4 and early Fw190A as weights were being added on the assumption the extra power was available, how much is not something I have seen measured.
Late Spring 1944 saw the introduction of the DB 605 AS high altitude engine into variations of the High Altitude Bf 109
The reports are, like the 1942/43 engines, trouble with the new supercharger meant performance was not delivered reliably.
and by June 1944, the general introduction of MW50 power boosting made big improvements of the low/middle power ratings of many German Aero-engines.
Agreed but again in broad brush terms it was not that great an improvement, unlike the Bf109G-10 and K and the Fw190D-9. Or the Bf109F-4 versus the E or Fw190A versus the Bf109E or early F. Opinion of course.
None of your trollish questions are sincere, and most of your claims of alleged facts are clearly baseless and demonstrably false.
