An Allison V-1710 with a two-speed supercharger in 1942

[Steamed_Banana]

Am I wrong in my understanding that the Spitfire Mk VIII had all-around excellent performance, including a superb rate of climb over over 4,500 fpm, while also having 40% more fuel than the Mk IX and an equivalent increase in range?

 

[Steamed_Banana]

I think almost all later war fighters had a bit less easy handling, a bit less agility and rate of turn than the early war fighters, but for the Spitfires they were still agile (and in fact roll rate improved)

 

[Shortround6]

So redesign the wing along the lines of P-63. What's to be lost? 2,000 fewer P-39s? If you ended up with 1,000 better planes with longer range it might be worth it.

A lot this depends on timing. The P-39 was late to party compared to the P-40.
Production numbers for the P-38, P-39, P-40 and P-47
year........................P-38..................P-39.....................P-40.....................P-47
1940........................1..........................13.........................778.....................0
1941........................207.....................926......................2248...................1
1942........................1479..................1932..................3854...................532
1943........................2497..................4947....................4258.................4428
1944........................4186..................1729....................2002.................7065
A lot of times the bulk of production was in 2nd half of the year until 1944 for the P39 and P-40.
Back to your question, WHEN does the redesign and re tooling take place? When do accept the 1000 plane loss?
1941 and 1942 are out, you need every plane you can get. 1943 looks good but by then it doesn't matter. At some point in 1943 the P-39 becomes a Lend Lease special and domestic advance trainer.

They did end up using a lot of P-40s in training units, but the US had good advanced trainers in production like the AT-6, and overall I think a lot of the surviving older versions of fighters that were a little easier to handle like the Wildcat, P-40, Buffalo, P-36 etc. could have been used (and I think were).

AT-6 was a very good advanced flight trainer. It was not a combat trainer or advanced fighter trainer. It had a wing very close to a Hurricane in size, it weighed over 5,000lbs gross and used a 600hp engine that made max power under 10,000ft.
Max speed around 210mph and climb rate was around 1200fpm at best. Going from the A-6 to a combat fighter in a combat squadron was a recipe for disaster. Flying P-39s or P-40s in a training school for 15-30 hours (depending on year, school, instructors, etc.) meant the new pilots had a much better idea of what was going to happen when they did something,
Trying to practice highway driving in car that tops out at 40mph is not going to prepare you for highway driving at 70mph.
Please forget about the P-36 as a trainer, they were used but the US didn't have many to begin with and by 1942 a lot them were wrecked/worn out. Students were not easy on aircraft. Army was not going to use Wildcats, no spare parts and no trained mechanics. Buffalos were becoming hanger queens in the Navy. Maybe a squadron commander could keep one flying with a dedicated ground crew as a 'hack' but lack of parts and trained mechanics and their crappy landing gear was going thin them out pretty quickly.

The P-39s that were used in this role were simply pressed into it, I think, because there were so many of them and they had limited utility on the front line.

that pretty much covers it. Even near the Beginning of 1943 do front line generals want more P-39s or do they want P-47s for delivery 3-6 months in future.

 

[tomo pauk]

Am I wrong in my understanding that the Spitfire Mk VIII had all-around excellent performance, including a superb rate of climb over over 4,500 fpm, while also having 40% more fuel than the Mk IX and an equivalent increase in range?

120 imp gals vs. 84 imp gals on the Mk.IX, V, I and II.
Spitfires were getting about 5 mpg (Mustangs were getting 7 mpg) in cruise conditions. The 'return home fuel' - fuel left after, say, 15-20 min of combat - should be better by ~35 imp gals, IOW worth about 175 miles. So we might indeed about 40% better range/radius; we can assume that a drop tank is also used.
The missed opportunity was that each and every Spitfire starting at least with Mk.V was outfitted with rear fuselage tank of 20-30 gals, worth 100-150 miles in cruise conditions. With the 90 imp gal tank, we might've been getting, say, 500-550 mile radius for the Mk.VIII, or ~400 for the MkV and IX?
Also very useful on the Seafires and Griffon Spitfires.

 

[Engineman]

Nightfighting was not the responsibility of Spitfires. Bristol Beaufighters and Mosquitos got the job done. The Germans continued limited bombing of Great Britain, with heavy losses. Intensive daylight bombing would have been suicide.

Hi, the Defiant nightfighter with AI radar was pivotal in the advancement of British AI nightfighting from early 1941. Progress was slow as the technology and tactics developed.
The Beaufighter nightfighter with AI radar was a good platform when it inherited the Defiant progress in mid 1941. The Mosquito nightfighter did not join the fray until 1942.

Eng

 

[Shortround6]

First radar intercept was by a Blenheim, next one was by a Beaufighter a number of months later. Blenheims had disappeared form the night fighter squadrons in the winter or spring of 1940/41and none (?) were left when the March-May Nightfighter rampage was going on.
The Defiant radar installation was not really pivotal, it showed that radar could be installed in a single engine, single seat aircraft (Pilot operated the radar, the gunner was just along for the ride) but the units went through two versions, the AI V and later the AI VI but initial units suffered from moisture and bad electrical screening (think static on a radio) and they were not cleared until Aug 1941 which was too late for the 1940/41 night blitz.
The Beaufighters had been using radar since the fall of 1940 but without much success until the March-May rampage. It seems strange that the Defiants get credit for the Beaufighters work and while they did help troubleshoot the radar they didn't do a lot for actual development of interception, tactics, advancement in ground control (harder than daylight ground control). None of the Defiant intercepts/victories in March-May was the result of radar?

 

[Engineman]

Yes, which meant degradation in performance over the Bf109F-4 and early Fw190A as weights were being added on the assumption the extra power was available, how much is not something I have seen measured.


The reports are, like the 1942/43 engines, trouble with the new supercharger meant performance was not delivered reliably.


Agreed but again in broad brush terms it was not that great an improvement, unlike the Bf109G-10 and K and the Fw190D-9. Or the Bf109F-4 versus the E or Fw190A versus the Bf109E or early F. Opinion of course.

Hi, The initial restriction of the DB 605 A engine of the new Bf 109 G in mid 1942 limited the engine to 1.3 ata MAP, about 1350 hp, similar to the full power DB 601 E of the Bf 109 F4 and gave a similar performance in the early G version. When the restrictions were lifted in Autumn 1943, the full rating of 1475 hp was restored.

I am not certain of the "trouble" you refer to in the new DB 605 AS supercharger?

MW50 was indeed a great improvement for both the DB 605 A and the DB 605 AS in the early Summer of 1944. The basic MAP level for the engines was raised to about 1.7 ata giving low to medium altitude powers of around 1700 hp and with time limits increased to 10 min. Further improvements are complicated, but by December 1944 the limits with MW50 were increased to about 1800 hp with B4 and 2000 hp with C3 fuel.

Eng

 

[MikeMeech]

Yes, some interesting material. However, if you have a working knowledge of all those examples, can you say why the Turret fighter was supported so strongly in spite of its obvious severe compromises?

Eng

Hi
This reply will do an injustice to the subject as it is quite complicated and detailed, but we should all remember that the Spitfire, Hurricane and Defiant came out of RAF discussions in various committees during 1930-1936. These were reference the air defence of the UK and the problem of breaking up bomber formations (there would be no single seat fighter escorts it was believed at the time due to range) in an era where bomber performance was improving more than fighter performance to some extent, as well as being pre-radar (only sound detection systems were in place). It was thought that single seat fighters would only be able to make one pass at an enemy bomber formation, hence the adoption of multi-gun fighters (8 guns was the most powerful armament on a single-seat fighter at that time), it was even suggested that the wing guns could be slightly 'moveable' at one stage, but that was quickly rejected. There was also worries that SS fighters diving in formation against the bombers would risk collision when concentrating on trying to shoot at an enemy bomber. Another option to use alongside the SS fighter was the turreted two-seat fighter, initially it appears there was some discussion using a twin-engine twin-turret fighter (one at front and one to rear), but the single-engine single turret idea lasted longer which the Defiant became the one chosen. The idea was that the 'Defiant' type could get among the bomber force and use the concentrated fire of the four gun turret against the bombers while keeping up with those aircraft. The SS fighters would go in to undertake a 'shock' action, probably ahead of the turret fighters, but as I said it was thought at the time they would only be able to make one pass due to the expected bomber performance. Also it should be noted that pre-war the SS fighters had frontal armour protection because they were air defence fighters to be used against bombers. Nobody expected that France would collapse and that the fighter force would have to deal with SS fighter escorts flying from France. The Defiant was never designed for fighter v fighter combat, and the British were also not going to send another BEF to France but the war did not pan out that way. It is quite possible that the Defiant could have been fairly successful in its designed role, but that did not happen. The aircraft performance improvements during the 1930s was quite rapid and hard to keep up with, it should be noted that the Italian Air force was one of the most modern in 1936 but by 1940 it was basically obsolete, as I said it was hard to keep up with the technology (not to mention the ability to pay for it all). When a war starts you only have the equipment that you have and you suddenly require more of what is already being produced even if it is getting more out of date, new equipment takes time to introduce and reduces production capacity as factories change over to new designs. Doing this in a crisis situation is generally not advisable and the UK was in a crisis situation during 1940 (and even into 1941) and during this many new project were delayed so as to keep up production. Decisions in war are not easy!

Mike

 

[tomo pauk]

Nobody expected that France would collapse and that the fighter force would have to deal with SS fighter escorts flying from France.

Unfortunately, the fact that Belgium was conquered just a short time ago, and the Germans having aircraft based there, seem to have alluded to the planners. German propensity to attack the neutral countries, like Belgium and Romania back in the Great war, should've also warned that Netherlands might've also been conquered by the new Germany if Germans deem it benefitial.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

A lot this depends on timing. The P-39 was late to party compared to the P-40.
Production numbers for the P-38, P-39, P-40 and P-47
year........................P-38..................P-39.....................P-40.....................P-47
1940........................1..........................13.........................778.....................0
1941........................207.....................926......................2248...................1
1942........................1479..................1932..................3854...................532
1943........................2497..................4947....................4258.................4428
1944........................4186..................1729....................2002.................7065
A lot of times the bulk of production was in 2nd half of the year until 1944 for the P39 and P-40.
Back to your question, WHEN does the redesign and re tooling take place? When do accept the 1000 plane loss?
1941 and 1942 are out, you need every plane you can get. 1943 looks good but by then it doesn't matter. At some point in 1943 the P-39 becomes a Lend Lease special and domestic advance trainer.

AT-6 was a very good advanced flight trainer. It was not a combat trainer or advanced fighter trainer. It had a wing very close to a Hurricane in size, it weighed over 5,000lbs gross and used a 600hp engine that made max power under 10,000ft.
Max speed around 210mph and climb rate was around 1200fpm at best. Going from the A-6 to a combat fighter in a combat squadron was a recipe for disaster. Flying P-39s or P-40s in a training school for 15-30 hours (depending on year, school, instructors, etc.) meant the new pilots had a much better idea of what was going to happen when they did something,
Trying to practice highway driving in car that tops out at 40mph is not going to prepare you for highway driving at 70mph.
Please forget about the P-36 as a trainer, they were used but the US didn't have many to begin with and by 1942 a lot them were wrecked/worn out. Students were not easy on aircraft. Army was not going to use Wildcats, no spare parts and no trained mechanics. Buffalos were becoming hanger queens in the Navy. Maybe a squadron commander could keep one flying with a dedicated ground crew as a 'hack' but lack of parts and trained mechanics and their crappy landing gear was going thin them out pretty quickly.

that pretty much covers it. Even near the Beginning of 1943 do front line generals want more P-39s or do they want P-47s for delivery 3-6 months in future.

Thing is, you are overstating how quickly the P-39 was taken out of combat.

• 347th FG, 35th, 18th, and 8th FG still were at least partly still equipped with P-39s in the New Guinea / Solomons area through most of 1943 and some squadrons into 1944.
• There was still a whole Tactical Reconnaissance group (71st TRG) flying P-39s in New Guinea and the Bismarck islands in 1944, and several individual squadrons of mixed fighter groups were still using P39s, like the 72nd FS / 318 FG on Makin island 1944.
• The 343rd FG was flying P-39s in the Alaska / Aleutians zone.
• In the Med 81st, and 350th FG were flying P-39s in a host of oddball missions into 1944, which ended up being used in Italy with some success as fighter bombers.
• And of course, they were spoffing them off on our Allies like the Free French and Italians, resulting in the deaths of many of their notable pilots in accidents.

All in all something like 12-20 P-39 squadrons still flying for most of 1943 and maybe 6-10 still in early 1944.

As for when to do it, of course that's where it gets hard, but I'd say an optimal moment might be Q3 or Q4 1942. By then a lot more P-40s are available, P-38s and P-47s are starting to come out, and there are plenty of F4Fs around from the Marines and Navy in the Pacific to help take up the slack. If you came out of it with some 'improved' P-39s in say mid 1943 that might actually be helpful.

 

[MiTasol]

Hi
It is not difficult to trace the decisions on British aircraft design and production, here are just a few of the sources as examples:
View attachment 880039
View attachment 880040

View attachment 880041
View attachment 880042
View attachment 880043
View attachment 880044
View attachment 880045
View attachment 880046
Mike

I will have to find a copy of that Shadow factories book.

Devon's book is excellent and his boss Alec Cairncross wrote How British Aircraft Production was Planned in the Second World War.

EDIT

Shadow Factories was easy to find.

 

[MiTasol]

It is this 'white washing' of the Defiant that I find objectionable.
The H-P Heyford did some work as both a radar target in early experiments and a part of an airborne radar system. Transmitter was on the ground, the receiver was in the aircraft with the antennae was strung between the landing gear.
Doesn't mean they should have restarted Heyford production
Operational Defiants didn't get radar until fall of 1941, over 1 year after the Blenhiems and just under 1 year after the Beaufighters went into service with it. Yes they made up a large part of the British nightfighters in the winter of 1941/42. Now we have to ask is if they should have. Actual kills by Defiant IIs with radar in the fall/winter of 1941/42 were..............one? I have no idea of the operational losses. Claim to fame is that showed how to fit radar into a single engine aircraft?
Yes, the Defiants were used for ECM. They had them, they used them, the ECM gear worked. Would the ECM gear have worked in other airframes?
The Defiant airframes worked, that is not the problem, the problem is the concept was a failure and it was adopted without adequate testing of the concept.
British were trying to solve a problem with air to air gunnery that didn't exist.

Like the US did with the Bell Airacuda - an even bigger waste of design and tooling resources. They did abort production but the time and money and other resources were still massive.

The Defiant was a waste but at least did shoot down some Germans. That cannot be said of the Airacuda.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Like the US did with the Bell Airacuda - an even bigger waste of design and tooling resources. They did abort production but the time and money and other resources were still massive.

The Defiant was a waste but at least did shoot down some Germans. That cannot be said of the Airacuda.

Or the P-46, or the P-60, or the XP-55 etc.

 

[Shortround6]

Like the US did with the Bell Airacuda - an even bigger waste of design and tooling resources. They did abort production but the time and money and other resources were still massive.

The Defiant was a waste but at least did shoot down some Germans. That cannot be said of the Airacuda.

Or the P-46, or the P-60, or the XP-55 etc.

The US just didn't build enough of them
It took 1064 Defiants to shoot down about 40 German planes (at best). About 1 enemy plane for every 26 Defiants built.

Maybe if Bell had built 26 planes instead of 13
Think of the Airacuda as an apprentice program for Bell workers in aircraft construction. The Bell company had never built an airplane before, let alone an advanced one like the Airacuda (in construction technology. Less said about concept and actual design the better).

Prototype and trials aircraft were and are always going to be expensive. Problem with the Defiant is that they about 450 on order well before the 1st production plane (2nd prototype?) ever flew.

 

[Shortround6]

Thing is, you are overstating how quickly the P-39 was taken out of combat.

I don't think I ever stated when the P-39 came out combat. Taking out of production is very different than being taken out of combat.

As for when to do it, of course that's where it gets hard, but I'd say an optimal moment might be Q3 or Q4 1942. By then a lot more P-40s are available, P-38s and P-47s are starting to come out, and there are plenty of F4Fs around from the Marines and Navy in the Pacific to help take up the slack.

Again timing. 1/2 way through the 4th Q of 1942 is operation Torch and nobody knows how that will come out. El Alamein was Oct/Nov 1942, well into Q4.
P-39s are in the early fighting in the Pacific but the first tiny handfuls don't get to Guadalcanal until the last week in Aug. Hundreds of fighters in transit (2 to 4 months, maybe longer) do no good to the squadrons doing the fighting. Usefulness of P-39 is questionable, good at somethings, not so good at others but a squadron of P-39s in hand is worth a lot more than a promise of better fighters a number of months away.
Oct 26th 1942. shows the Cactus Airforce with 3 P-39s and 3 P-400s operational. and 13 F4Fs. The next day they have got 6 of each operational. There are 46 P-39s at New Caledonia and 12 of them are going to Guadalcanal. Nov 20th 1942 there are 16 P-39s and one P-400 operational on Guadalcanal. Nov 1942 sees 268 P-39s rolled out the door of the Factory.

If you came out of it with some 'improved' P-39s in say mid 1943 that might actually be helpful.

Mid 1943 is the Invasion of Sicily. Yes improved P-39s might be useful, having P-39s of any type might be better than no P-39s, same for the Pacific. In May of 1943 the Russians request 500 P-39s a month. Bell is only able to deliver over 400 P-39s a month in 5 of the months for the rest of year to be divided to all theaters.
The US forces don't want P-39s, P-39s are what they can get.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

The US just didn't build enough of them
It took 1064 Defiants to shoot down about 40 German planes (at best). About 1 enemy plane for every 26 Defiants built.

Maybe if Bell had built 26 planes instead of 13
Think of the Airacuda as an apprentice program for Bell workers in aircraft construction. The Bell company had never built an airplane before, let alone an advanced one like the Airacuda (in construction technology. Less said about concept and actual design the better).

Prototype and trials aircraft were and are always going to be expensive. Problem with the Defiant is that they about 450 on order well before the 1st production plane (2nd prototype?) ever flew.

You yourself have pointed out that they wasted a lot of resources on the P-46 and especially P-60 programs. I agree it's not as severe as building 1,000 Defiants but it was certainly wasted effort and maybe one of the fatal injuries that Curtiss inflicted on themselves.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

I don't think I ever stated when the P-39 came out combat. Taking out of production is very different than being taken out of combat.

Again timing. 1/2 way through the 4th Q of 1942 is operation Torch and nobody knows how that will come out. El Alamein was Oct/Nov 1942, well into Q4.
P-39s are in the early fighting in the Pacific but the first tiny handfuls don't get to Guadalcanal until the last week in Aug. Hundreds of fighters in transit (2 to 4 months, maybe longer) do no good to the squadrons doing the fighting. Usefulness of P-39 is questionable, good at somethings, not so good at others but a squadron of P-39s in hand is worth a lot more than a promise of better fighters a number of months away.
Oct 26th 1942. shows the Cactus Airforce with 3 P-39s and 3 P-400s operational. and 13 F4Fs. The next day they have got 6 of each operational. There are 46 P-39s at New Caledonia and 12 of them are going to Guadalcanal. Nov 20th 1942 there are 16 P-39s and one P-400 operational on Guadalcanal. Nov 1942 sees 268 P-39s rolled out the door of the Factory.

P-39s were at Cactus and they did prove of some value there, mainly in close air support roles, but the issue here is whether they were necessary there or in New Guinea. There were some (US) P-40s in Theater, some were being used to refit existing units which were rotated out of the front lines for a rest, others were in rear area bases on the Pacific Islands like Espiritu Santo and the Hawaiian islands. There was also an RNZAF squadron forming up. I believe they (USAAF brass) were trying to see if the P-39s could settle-in and turn out to be effective during late 1942 and early 1943, even though they had a very rough run in New Guinea during the spring and summer of 1942.

It's one of those things we can see in hindsight was probably a mistake, though how the brass at the time could be sure about it is another matter. They knew the War Dept had bought a lot of these aircraft. They may have wanted to give them a really good test before writing them off.

Mid 1943 is the Invasion of Sicily. Yes improved P-39s might be useful, having P-39s of any type might be better than no P-39s, same for the Pacific.

I would go so far as to say that 500 P-39s with medium range and some enhanced altitude capacity would be better than 1,500 without.

In May of 1943 the Russians request 500 P-39s a month. Bell is only able to deliver over 400 P-39s a month in 5 of the months for the rest of year to be divided to all theaters.
The US forces don't want P-39s, P-39s are what they can get.

I don't think the US forces actually needed them. They were there at a crucial stage of the battle in New Guinea, by late 1942 they had already been largely replaced by the 49th FG flying P-40s and 35th FG was already switching over from P-39s to P-38s in late 1942. I'm not certain but I suspect they could have deployed P-40s to Guadalcanal at this time instead of the P-39s / P-400s (P-40s did in fact come later). For that matter they could have even sent a few of those Spit Vs from Australia, they would have been more useful than the P-400s for sure.

The Soviets were able to get quite a bit of value from them, every P-39 produced should have gone to them. It was the Soviets, after all, who really defeated the Nazi land armies.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

The first P-40Fs of 44th FS were deployed at Guadalcanal on Dec 1942, they made their first claim in January 1943.

 

[ColFord]

A suggestion for those who want to get more of an idea as to the reasoning behind a broad range of decisions made by the UK Government, Air Ministry, AIr Staff and various layers of RAF and other Commander and Command Organisations.

Go and have a look at the Royal AIr Force Air Historical Branch Second World War Campaign Narratives.

The Second World War: Campaign Narratives

The Second World War: Campaign Narratives

www.raf.mod.uk

These were researched and written to capture the learnings of the RAF's various air campaigns during the War and as such drew on a very wide range of at the time highly classified - including MOST SECRET and SECRET documents - held in official files in the UK, along with captured German documentation from the various Luftwaffe commands and intelligence organisations. In a couple of places the narratives do skirt around particular issues, that were still at the time even more highly classified than MOST SECRET or that still held some political at the time sensitivity. But in a number of the narratives, the lessons of aftersight, the understanding of what the real position at the time was, versus what they knew at the time decisions were made are identified and discussed. In particular, the balance between decisions made on operational grounds versus decisions made based on political or geopolitical influences do get a fair degree of analysis and coverage.

Following is an example of the types of sources used in just one of the volumes - in this case Air Defence of Great Britain, Volume V, The Struggle for Air Supremacy Jan 1942 - May 1945.

They also have available for download in addition to the Narratives, a series of Thematic Studies on particular aspects of the RAF's activities in WW2, translations of German documents (including some of those prepared post war by senior Luftwaffe personnel), as well as Depatches and Reports written during the War by Senior RAF Commanders regarding specific operations or campaigns.

AHB Narratives and Translations

Index of official histories, written by Air Historical Branch (RAF) .

www.raf.mod.uk

Well worth the effort to download, read and understand more about various aspects of the RAF's WW2 experiences, including aircraft choices and the like.

 

[Engineman]

Hi
This reply will do an injustice to the subject as it is quite complicated and detailed, but we should all remember that the Spitfire, Hurricane and Defiant came out of RAF discussions in various committees during 1930-1936. These were reference the air defence of the UK and the problem of breaking up bomber formations (there would be no single seat fighter escorts it was believed at the time due to range) in an era where bomber performance was improving more than fighter performance to some extent, as well as being pre-radar (only sound detection systems were in place). It was thought that single seat fighters would only be able to make one pass at an enemy bomber formation, hence the adoption of multi-gun fighters (8 guns was the most powerful armament on a single-seat fighter at that time), it was even suggested that the wing guns could be slightly 'moveable' at one stage, but that was quickly rejected. There was also worries that SS fighters diving in formation against the bombers would risk collision when concentrating on trying to shoot at an enemy bomber. Another option to use alongside the SS fighter was the turreted two-seat fighter, initially it appears there was some discussion using a twin-engine twin-turret fighter (one at front and one to rear), but the single-engine single turret idea lasted longer which the Defiant became the one chosen. The idea was that the 'Defiant' type could get among the bomber force and use the concentrated fire of the four gun turret against the bombers while keeping up with those aircraft. The SS fighters would go in to undertake a 'shock' action, probably ahead of the turret fighters, but as I said it was thought at the time they would only be able to make one pass due to the expected bomber performance. Also it should be noted that pre-war the SS fighters had frontal armour protection because they were air defence fighters to be used against bombers. Nobody expected that France would collapse and that the fighter force would have to deal with SS fighter escorts flying from France. The Defiant was never designed for fighter v fighter combat, and the British were also not going to send another BEF to France but the war did not pan out that way. It is quite possible that the Defiant could have been fairly successful in its designed role, but that did not happen. The aircraft performance improvements during the 1930s was quite rapid and hard to keep up with, it should be noted that the Italian Air force was one of the most modern in 1936 but by 1940 it was basically obsolete, as I said it was hard to keep up with the technology (not to mention the ability to pay for it all). When a war starts you only have the equipment that you have and you suddenly require more of what is already being produced even if it is getting more out of date, new equipment takes time to introduce and reduces production capacity as factories change over to new designs. Doing this in a crisis situation is generally not advisable and the UK was in a crisis situation during 1940 (and even into 1941) and during this many new project were delayed so as to keep up production. Decisions in war are not easy!

Mike

Thanks for that Mike.
Your summary pretty much reflects the general situation I have read about. I feel that the RAF Top-Brass supported opinions were very much a driving force in most developments that found Ministerial support. Of course, the "RAF opinion" was in itself a distillation of experiences (both individual and as a fighting Force), results from investigations by specialist units and from the great undercurrents of promotional-ladder rivalry, the latter being a very strong force within the Service on which senior careers rose or fell.
The air-battle exercises did show that the biplane fighters had difficulty in intercepting incoming raids, they were slow to be alerted (by visual and sound observation), had relatively little speed overtake for manoeuvre into attack and used cumbersome formation attacks that were slow and unwieldy, no surprise that they were ineffective and might only make one pass, if they were lucky (many mock attacking formations were never intercepted)!
The concept of a Turret-Fighter being able to fly with the bombers and shoot at them with the same guns the bombers had was really nonsensical from the start.
The only bonus of the single seat fighter from that time was that it should have 8 guns to make a single pass effective. The lack of frontal armour was a weak point, but armour generally was minimal.

Of course, if the Turret Fighter concept had been successful, it would have been a good job that we had them! But here is the nub of the problem, it was obvious that the turret fighter was a bad joke, right from the start, its concept it was deeply flawed. That it was promoted to such a degree was a serious failure that should have been forseen. If anyone had seriously considered the engagement of bomber formations (with their own similar defence) in this way they would have realised the stupidity. The problem was not the Defiant aeroplane, it was those who promoted the turret fighter concept.

Eng