Anglo-French bomber offensive 1939-40: good or bad idea?

yulzari said:

The French and British air forces had bombers and could carry significant loads from France into western Germany so yes they could have chosen to work up a bomber offensive.

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.. as Marcel suggested in post #5 the French bomber force can essentially be discounted - prior to May 1940 it comprised -among others - some 300 Amiot 143 and Bloch 200/210s - these types were some 220 km/h slower than the equivalent Luftwaffe bombers..and basically useless. Chief of Air Staff General Joseph Vuillemin said in September 1939 ;

" the poor performance of our bombers will necessitate very prudent operations during the first months of the war.."

He went further; of the-then 399 bombers in service only five - LeO 451s - could be counted as 'modern'. The French had precisely THREE four-engine machines, the civil Farman 223s that were handed over to the Armée de l'Air . They had to be based though at the other end of the country from the German border (Bordeaux) because that was where the only suitable runway was for takeoffs with a sensible bomb load...on the night of 7/8 June a single machine bombed the Siemens factory in Berlin and then bombed Heinkel factories in Rostock on 11 June. Prior to that the Farmans had bombed rail hubs at Aix and Dutch dykes, but the French then turned their attentions to Italy (Venice and Rome)...

Of course at the end of the campaign in the West the Armée de l'Air possessed MORE aircraft than on May 10, and still had a decent medium bomber force of some 700 aircraft including high-performance Amiot 354s, but while 60 of these types were service by May 1940 they didn't fly their first ops until 22 or 23 May 1940..

It is probably also worth mentioning that whilst in September 1939 Air Chief Marshall Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt had 43 squadrons under his command,an oft quoted figure for RAF bomber strength. In fact only 23 of these were "operationally proficient". The rest were effectively restricted to a training role.
There was a wholescale reshuffle in April 1940 leading to the establishment of various OTUs from many of these squadrons.

Anyone imagining that a bomber offensive was not launched in May 1940 should take a look at the exploits of 2 Group and particularly 82 Squadron who flew on an almost daily basis against targets in Europe throughout the summer of 1940,suffering the most apalling casualties.

As an example,on 17th may a dozen Blenheims of 82 Squadron set off from Watton with orders to bomb enemy formations that had broken through near the Belgian town of Gembloux. Their escort never materialised. The formation was broken up by ground fire and pounced on by the Luftwaffe's Bf 109s. 11 of the 12 were shot down and one badly damaged survivor limped back to base. Within two hours of setting off the fate of 36 airmen was settled. 22 were dead,3 were PoWs,and the rest were either in allied hands or on the run,soon to be PoWs.

The Squadron would be rebuilt and on 13 August would raid Aalborg airfield in Denmark. This time one aircraft would return early with technical problems and the remaining eleven would all be shot down. 20 men died this time,the rest became PoWs.

That combined with the political and military reasons I already posted is why the sort of offensive originally envisioned did not take place,at least on the part of the RAF. Attempts were made,as above,to implement the "Air Plans" but with limited success and heavy casualties.
Luckily Falke Eins has explained the French situation about which I know little .

As of the 9th May 1940,around the end of the phoney war,Bomber Command had already lost 619 airmen to all causes. This total does NOT include losses suffered by units serving with the AASF or ACBEF in France.By the end of 1940 it would be many more.

Cheers

Steve

France had no good excuse not to have such weapons.

West Wall was built within spitting distance of French border and directly in the path of projected French invasion route. What was the plan for defeating German bunkers which protected their minefields?

davebender said:

France had no good excuse not to have such weapons.

West Wall was built within spitting distance of French border and directly in the path of projected French invasion route. What was the plan for defeating German bunkers which protected their minefields?

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The Limes Programme began as a result of an order by Hitler to strengthen fortifications on the western German border. Bunkers built in this phase, starting in 1938, were more strongly constructed than the earlier border fortifications. I dont see how the french could have reacted in time to counter that initiative, given that the bombers available to the french at that time were largely incapable of carrying such heavy ordinance. The french ioncorrectly neglected their bomber forces through the 1930s, and took a long time to recover from the rationalisation programs of the late 1930s. Its not a matter of "no excuse".....the French aircraft industry was highly innefficient in the 1930s. It undertook remedial structuring, but this took time. Arcraft development, included ordinance development. air , of that time were not

The bunkers of the Siegfried line were built more or less to a standard design, and had a ceiling and walls 1.5 m (4 ft 11 in) thick. A total of 3,471 Type 10 bunkers were built along the entire length of the Siegfried Line. The bunkers had a central room or shelter for 10-12 men with a stepped embrasures facing backwards and a combat section 50 cm (20 in) higher. This section had embrasures at the front and sides for machine guns. More embrasures were provided for carbines and the entire structure was constructed so as to be safe against poison gas. The bunker systems were impressive, until compared with the defences built by the french in the opposing Maginot line

The German bunkers were heated with a safety oven, and the chimney was covered with a thick grating. Every soldier was given a sleeping-place and a stool; the commanding officer had a chair. There was very little space: each soldier had about 1 m2 (11 sq ft) of space, which meant that the rooms were packed full.

The westwall defences were a bit of a sham, except for the dense minefields and the terrain picked for defence, which increased their defencability. if the French had somehow survived to 1941, it is likley that most fighting would have been through the Saar gap. There seems little doubt that such fighting would have been tough for the french, due to the terrain mostly, but on the other hand, the huge siege trains of the French Army would have been well up to the task of demolishing these defences. If there was one area that the French did well in WWII, it was on the few occasion that they had to assault defended positions. The french had learnt their trade well from Verdun, and had a long history of siege warfare. The psyche of the French army, and their whole military system really, was geared to static p[ositional warfare, in particular bringing huge amounts of firepower to bear to reduce and eliminate key defensive positions. The problem for them was that their system of warfare was just too inflexible to cope with the modern tactical concepts that the germans had developed after the war.