Anglo-US Reciprocal lend-Lease

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bauple58

Airman
29
51
Apr 20, 2018
Nuts and bolts of the Anglo-US Reciprocal lend-Lease agreement (Lt. Col. Jerome Preston, A/g Palns & Statistics Officer, VIII Air Force HQ, Weekly Report of Policies and Activities, 16 October 1943, 214.3 Shortages, File No. 519-832-6, 9373-533, AFHRA Reel A5759).
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This also applied to clothing : notice several examples of British Made wool M-41 Field Jackets most frequently worn by Army Air Forces units in ETO, in this case a chow line from the 937th Aviation Engineers Camouflage Battalion.


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Lend Lease tried to make some sort of sense from what was not at all sensible. If you consider the massive effort behind the US bomber offensive in Europe, the USA producing bombers and escorts and training flight and ground crews while the British produced and supported airfields. Approximately a year after "Big Week" the allies were running out of strategic targets, and when those guys demobbed to go home or elsewhere they left what would look like brand new airfields and massive numbers of nearly new and very good but actually worthless aircraft.
 
All those British airfields the USAAC operated from were new made and part of the biggest ever British civil engineering programme and beyond the needs of the RAF. A huge investment provided to the USA and a significant amount of civilian staffing and critical skilled labour which was in short supply already. Bear in mind that the British army was simply running out of soldiers almost as soon as it left Normandy with 9 months of that campaign still to be fought and fought hard. Units being broken up and amalgamated to maintain fewer divisions up to strength, aircrew in training reroled into infantry and seriously considering accepting a reduced coal supply by moving conscript coal miners into military service despite the inevitable hit to production and keeping even a minimum of civilians heated. There was a huge investment made in providing support infrastructure, labour and forgoing assorted events, actions and sites that would have otherwise gone to the British war effort. There was a lot of British costs that were spent on supporting the USA forces from it's own pocket and an appreciation of this was shown in the write down of the costs to Britain of lend lease over 50 years just as the repayment of WW1 loans over nearly 100 years was made in the light of Britain having made huge war loans to support Russia which were repudiated by the Soviets. Lend lease and reverse lend lease were far more complicated than one might imagine. The OP shows us how even minor things were in the mix.
 
In 1942 US troops farmed 7,000 acres in England, 14,000 in 1943. The USAAF in England sourced 49% of its supplies from British sources until July 1943, plus obtained other British supplies through the Quartermaster system. In the period June 1942 to June 1944 the British supplied to US forces in England 63% of Quartermaster, 58% of engineer, 49% of medical, 25% of Chemical Warfare, 22% of signal corps and 21% of Air Force supplies, some 6.8 million measurement tons of supplies January 1942 to June 1944.

After an outcry the US banned shipments of alcohol to England, the British agreed to take over supply via the NAAFI, which had the bonus of taking the US Army out of the liquor business. This arrangement was changed when French liquor became available. The US banned ice cream in England until August 1944 since one was available for the civilians.

The European theatre had its own ideas about winter clothing and designed a garment based on the British Battle Dress, the Eisenhower jacket, orders for which were placed in the US in March 1944. This ran into the Army's desire to use the new model 1943 clothing. There was a debate about what items of the new 1943 uniform the theatre should use, the final orders were made on 1st June. The loose M1943 jacket became known as maternity jackets by the WACs.

A good measure of how good a particular item is can be found in how many enemy troops are captured wearing it.

The Armoured Force winter combat uniform was a prized item. The US tested new clothing designs at Anzio. Wet/cold weather clothing shipments to Italy were so delayed the 34th division did not receive any until January 1944 and resorted to taking such items from wounded sent to the rear to equip the troops. The result of the lack of clothing was a major rise in trench foot, 25% of US casualties in Italy in the 1943/44 winter. It was not widely realised that spending all day in damp shoes and socks in cool weather would cause trench foot. The ETO had its own ideas of winter clothing based on the British battle dress, the resultant garment was very highly prized but only officers received an issue before the end of the war. Nurses returning to the US had to fight to be allowed to wear their ETO uniforms, which were considered superior to home issue.
 
In 1942 US troops farmed 7,000 acres in England, 14,000 in 1943. The USAAF in England sourced 49% of its supplies from British sources until July 1943, plus obtained other British supplies through the Quartermaster system. In the period June 1942 to June 1944 the British supplied to US forces in England 63% of Quartermaster, 58% of engineer, 49% of medical, 25% of Chemical Warfare, 22% of signal corps and 21% of Air Force supplies, some 6.8 million measurement tons of supplies January 1942 to June 1944.

After an outcry the US banned shipments of alcohol to England, the British agreed to take over supply via the NAAFI, which had the bonus of taking the US Army out of the liquor business. This arrangement was changed when French liquor became available. The US banned ice cream in England until August 1944 since one was available for the civilians.

The European theatre had its own ideas about winter clothing and designed a garment based on the British Battle Dress, the Eisenhower jacket, orders for which were placed in the US in March 1944. This ran into the Army's desire to use the new model 1943 clothing. There was a debate about what items of the new 1943 uniform the theatre should use, the final orders were made on 1st June. The loose M1943 jacket became known as maternity jackets by the WACs.

A good measure of how good a particular item is can be found in how many enemy troops are captured wearing it.

The Armoured Force winter combat uniform was a prized item. The US tested new clothing designs at Anzio. Wet/cold weather clothing shipments to Italy were so delayed the 34th division did not receive any until January 1944 and resorted to taking such items from wounded sent to the rear to equip the troops. The result of the lack of clothing was a major rise in trench foot, 25% of US casualties in Italy in the 1943/44 winter. It was not widely realised that spending all day in damp shoes and socks in cool weather would cause trench foot. The ETO had its own ideas of winter clothing based on the British battle dress, the resultant garment was very highly prized but only officers received an issue before the end of the war. Nurses returning to the US had to fight to be allowed to wear their ETO uniforms, which were considered superior to home issue.

Great post, Geoffrey. Do you have sources for these figures? I'd love to learn more about how much the UK contributed to the Arsenal of Democracy.
 
Great post, Geoffrey. Do you have sources for these figures? I'd love to learn more about how much the UK contributed to the Arsenal of Democracy.
How does anyone put a value on things? If the UK was an uninhabited piece of rock in 1941, how long would it take to construct an air defence system to protect its assets, and how much would it cost and divert people and fighters away from the offensive effort. This wasnt just a UK effort, thousands of Canadian technicians came to UK to help operate Chain Home and other systems.
 
Hi
The book 'Air Arsenal North America' by Butler and Hagedorn, has a brief section on 'Reverse Lend-Lease' in Chapter Thirteen. It appears this was about one third of the costs of US LL to UK.
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Mike
 
Great post, Geoffrey. Do you have sources for these figures? I'd love to learn more about how much the UK contributed to the Arsenal of Democracy.
I do not have a lot from the British side ready to go.

The notes are mainly taken from the Green Wall, the US Army Histories, from a few weeks being able to skim them (far too much to read) things like the Transport, Medical and Quartermaster Corps and the two devoted entirely to the European Theatre of Operations supply situation, Logistical Support of the Armies Volume I and II. Others like Global Logistics and Strategy 1940-1943 and 1943-1945, Strategic Planning for Coalition warfare 1941-1942 and 1943-1944. Many had clearly never been opened. Trying for a more detailed look at the US supply system.

It was originally aimed at putting facts to the various claims about what supplies there were in France in 1944, when and where did they go. Plenty of people are sure allied commander A stole/misused/etc. them and so stopped commander B from winning the European war in May 1944. About 60,000 words sorted by date rather than source, mostly the US reporting on the US, but for example,

The monster liners, (Queens etc), could make three round trips per month across the Atlantic carrying 15,000 men at a time and ultimately carried 24% of the US troops shipped to Europe. The average US troop transport was taking 33.7 days for a round trip January to October 1943 and 55.6 days January to June 1944 as port congestion rose in England. The earlier figures probably include some voyages by the "Queens" which make them look better than they should be. Some 21% of all US troops sent overseas were moved by British Ministry of War Transport Ships.
 

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