Ark Royal vs Bismark

[delcyros]

As 'completed' the USN and UK ships were only slightly above the agreed on limit of 35,000 tons, which represents to me an honest effort to enforce the spirit of the treaty. Wartime weight additions are irrelevent as at that point as the nations were at WAR, the Escalator Clause was in effect and the US and UK were fast becoming allies. In contrast the Germans (and the Italians) deliberately violated the Treaty and designed warships with a standard displacement far in excess of the 35k limit which balooned further on completion. To claim that "oh everybody cheated so its ok" is a straw man. Its akin to saying "No harm...no foul!"

Hardly "slightly above". They cheated. In fact the designed (not the completed!) displacement was already 5% over the limits imposed in the Treaties. -like everybody did. To say that they at least tried to make an honest effort to enforce the spirit of the Treaty is wrong. Everybody expected Japan not to ratify the Treaty and thus assumed orrectly that the escelator Clause takes place. You may say that the escalator Clause was in effect before the ships were advanced enough but this applies to BSIMARCK´s design as well. In fact, Germany didn´t violated the Treaty, it was not a signatory nation to it. Germany was bound to the AGNA, which didn´t qualify the limits other than very broad generalizations and opened lots of gaps to avoid limits. And the Treaty was canceled by Hitler soon after anyway.

 

[delcyros]

wrt to Campbell LÜUTZOW´s Ttorpedohit, don´t shift around the responsilities.
Your accusation of "conspiracies" is not only a factual mistake but the most unhonest way to avoid dealing the problem in indirectly accusing me to prefer strange theories.
The fact remains that the TT hit appears in both, german and british primary and contemporary sources. That You don´t read them, may have to do with Your neglect of them in favour of secondary sources. They can be found well BEFORE J. Campbells work on this topic (Hadeler, citing RMA files). If anything, he was challanging it with his rejection of events. It´s not that a conspiracy appeared and found evidence for something "new" happening out there. Rather contrary, he said something DID NOT happen, and he didn´t substantiate his case. Many other authors also have challanged details in his book (Brooks in the hit distribution, f.e.) but nobody asked why he made such a drastic reconsideration of the well established torpedohit inspite of contrary evidence.

 

[delcyros]

Per Friedman, the logic of the A/N system was that at "Very long ranges" the principle attack device would be the AP shell which could hit anywhere on a ship. HE would be useless against heavy armor (deck or belt) so only the heaviest armor was worth using. RN practice at the time, as mentioned thought HE would be extremely effective, based on part on their observations of Tsunshima and used considerable levels of medium armor as a result. This belief was not supported by the results of Jutland same as they were for the Germans. Ranges at Jutland and in other small skirmishes also confirmed the USN forward view that battle ranges were or soon would greatly expand.
[...]
The USN fielded battleships as early as 1914 with deck armor all but completely proof against any forseeable opponent. While no deck armor was penetrated at Jutland it was a very near thing on more than one occasion. Post WWI saw the victorious RN saddled with a large battlefleet that was not only worn out but now largely vulnerable.

Unconvincing. As I stated above, Jutland experiences and small skirmishes are experiences not aviable to the USN while it was developing the AoN scheme. Friedman´s logic that the principle attack device would be AP at very long range is not convincing either. Even at close range, HE will be useless against heavy (and even medium) armour. As a matter of fact, HE is useless against ANY measure of armour protection larger than splinter plating, regardless of range. RN specifications at that time in consideration asked the projectiles to inflicting wrecking effects on the ships hull plating of the waterline area, in order to increase wateringress for a more quicker sinking. This can be done easier from close range than from very long ones.
Even after ww1, practices in Navies inlcuding Germany and Japan asked to usemajor calibre HE at long range against AoN armoured ships with the specific idea to aim for the unprotected parts of the ship and wreck heavoc there.
Why You do think that the GF battleships were vulnarable 1919 to 1929? Against whom? Against the HSF, sitting around in Scapa Flow? Against the USN, which still hadn´t developed a capability for effective long range firing, let alone think of endangering the decks of the GF ships owing to low main gun elevation and defective fuses?
The vulnarability of the GF and other old ships is not a function deriving from ww1 or it´s outcome but subsequent step by step eveolution and improvements starting not before another decade passed after the end of ww1.

I don´t question that the AoN armoured US standarts ended up beeing very valuable units in the mid 30´s owing to their schemes. But I don´t buy Friedman´s thesis that this was all pre planned. I rather think this happened accidently and when recognised to fit ongoing developments in guns, shell technology, armour and firecontroll, was exploited skillfully.

 

[delcyros]

Wrt to the BADEN trials conducted 1921. I can read between the lines. The material as a convolution of primary sources is aviable online, so everyone can draw his own conclusions from them.
It has been cited for evidence for superior shell technology of the GREENBOY projectiles with both, armour piercing and fusing as well as obliquity behavior greatly superior to anything else. Brown is a good example for a basic failure in understanding the problems exposed by the trials in english secondary sources (even recent articles in Warship International dealing with them).

I will adress that seperately, dealing with strikes on heavy armour first (350mm KC plate = 13.78in = 0.9187 cal. thickness for the 15in APC):

The shells among other things directly penetrated the frontal glasis of one of Baden's turret's...a clean penetration.(13 3/4 inch) True it burst while 2/3rd through the armor but the nose ended up inside the turret and considerable damage was done to the roller path as a result.

No. Here You mix up the results from two different shells. Round No. 9 hit the Barbette of turret X and round No. 14 hitting the 13.78in turret face of "B".
The shell completely made it through the plate (no burst, while 2/3 through), and was found inside turret with nose resting against left girder of right gun-slide. The center position sight and apparatus in its immediate vicinity was damaged but the shell had very little momentum after passing the plate. No damage to the roller path. Resultant netto obliquity was 16.22 deg (angle of fall: 12 deg, corresponding to a range somehow less than desired) with 1550 fps striking velocity.
The impact was very close to the joint of the frontal plate and it´s glacis with joint effects involved (effectively making the plate less capable than it would have been otherwise). The Impact obliquity was to low for the desired range but in within tolerable limits of shell and context differences.
Both imply a somehow better than usually expectable result as they tend to make penetration easier as compared to the conditions simulated with this shot.
BUT: The plate nevertheless damaged the projectile and importantly it´s fuse (blind) so that the projectile effectively became a dud.
By definition, the shell was able to completely pass the plate ballistically but not in a condition fit to burst inside (US NBL). The obliquity involved means low obliquity (at his netto obliquity even soft caps may work). GREENBOY APC has been unable to penetrate a near calibre thick plate (0.9187 cal. thick) in a fit to burst condition at low obliquity. Whether or not it would have been able to penetrate a normal 350mm KC plate completely was a very narrow thing with two critical circumstances playing in favour of the shell impact condition and against the plate.

Another cleanly penetrated the 13 3/4 barbette armor of X Turret.

No. Refferring to shell No. 9. Instead of penetration through, it burst in holing while 2/3 through the plate with parts of the projectile found inside and outside. Lesss than 1/3 of the projectile made it through (only it´s nose and shoulder, body pieces and base pieces were not found inside the barbette). Considerable damage was done to the roller path. Some damage was caused to machinery in the pocket between girders where the nose of the shell was found.
Resultant netto obliquity was 11 deg (again less than would be expected at the simulated range), striking velocity was 1,550fps.
By definition, this is no penetration. It is a burst in holing or by US definition a partial penetration. Typically followed by low order detonation or duds with most of the effects outside. While the impact obliquity was even less than for the Round No.14, the partial penetration suggests that one should be careful in counting the full penetration of No.14 as representative for it´s impact condition. The obliquity involved means low obliquity (at his netto obliquity even soft caps ALWAYS work). GREENBOY APC has been unable to completely penetrate a near calibre thick plate (0.9187 cal. thick) at low obliquity.
In addition to this, Round No.10:a 15in CPC failed to penetrate the barbette armour of "B" turret at 12 deg. netto impact obliquity.

The 14inch conning tower did resist a hit at a 30 degree angle.

Correct. Hit No. 15 failed to penetrate but burst in contact with the 13.78in armoured conning tower. GREENBOY APC has been unable to perforate (making a hole through) a near calibre thick plate (0.9187 cal. thick) at high obliquity.

There is another 15in APC hit at high obliquity. Shell No. 6 from the second series conducted in august hit the plate joint of the 350mm barbette armour of "A" turret at 32 deg. resultant obliquity and failed to make a hole (burst on impact with some local effect on the plates). GREENBOY APC has been unable to perforate (making a hole through) a near calibre thick plate (0.9187 cal. thick) at high obliquity.
It should be noted that plate edges and their joints as mentioned above are much weaker than to hit the middle of a plate.

IIRC, only 3 UK shells penetrated heavy armor at Jutland. Had they used Greenboys, they might very well have disabled and/or sunk more German captial ships.

Under the comparisons for impact as such outlined above, not a single UK (...or german for that matter...) shell penetrated heavy armour at Jutland (280mm or more, matching about 0.92 cal. thickness plates for the british 12in gun, thus beeing "near calibre thick" or heavy plates). GREENBOY shells wouldn´t have changed that to a large degree as they are unable to defeat heavy armour in a condition fit to burst or to defeat it at high obliquity which often is involved when target angles are factored in. Even had they had this ability (which evidently is not the case) there is armour behind the main belt in the german ships.
With regard to near calibre thick penetration capabilities, not a single projectile of the BADEN trials made it through the 0.92 cal. thick plates in a condition fit to burst behind, even while the involved obliquity was either very low (in whiches case the projectile may partially penetrate) or high (in whiches case not even a hole was made). The idea that these shells can penetrate near calibre thick plates at obliquity AND stay in a condition fit to burst is wrong, as these shells had a very hard time to get through the plates (never able to burst high order behind them) at low obliquities and failed to even make a hole when high obliquities are involved. It should also be stressed that Krupp KC/a is considered to be a comparably poor quality face hardened armour by the standarts of ww1 (from personal communication with Nathan Okun).

Two and maybe three UK shells penetrated medium armour (150 to 260mm) at Jutland, but more to these and the corresponding Baden trial results for medium thickness range plates later.

 

[Nikademus]

Hardly "slightly above". They cheated..

Yes, slightly above. No cheating as the 35k designed displacement was adhered to. That the ships weighed in with Standard displacement so close to the 35k limit set by the treaty was a credit to their respective services. By definition "Cheating" would qualify the German and Italian designs which even on paper in the German case, exceeded the 35k limit. The Italian design on paper specified 35,000 tons but the resultant ship flagerantly exceeded this limit. Both Friedman and Garzke concur on North Carolina and KGV's standard displacement.

 

[Nikademus]

wrt to Campbell LÜUTZOW´s Ttorpedohit, don´t shift around the responsilities.
Your accusation of "conspiracies" is not only a factual mistake but the most unhonest way to avoid dealing the problem in indirectly accusing me to prefer strange theories.
The fact remains that the TT hit appears in both, german and british primary and contemporary sources. That You don´t read them, may have to do with Your neglect of them in favour of secondary sources. .

I made no claim of any conspiracy. The suggestion of such, indirectly, was yours given that the crux of your argument against Campbell revolved around "suspicion" on why he didn't elaborate on what he labeled a claimed hit.

That Falmouth claimed a hit and a German crewer claimed there was a torpedo hit on Lutzow is to me, insufficient evidence in the face of Campbell's research, plain and simple. Research that involved the records of both navies. Call it negect if you want. I call it healthy skepticism backed by other examples of contradictory accounts such as the Canberra incident. The ironic part is that even were I to credit such a torpedo hit....it wouldn't change my viewpoint on the weak point created by underwater torpedo flats in regards to a Capital ship's underwater defense....as such I have no agenda on the matter.

 

[Nikademus]

Unconvincing. As I stated above, Jutland experiences and small skirmishes are experiences not aviable to the USN while it was developing the AoN scheme. Friedman´s logic that the principle attack device would be AP at very long range is not convincing either. Even at lose range, HE will be useless against heavy (and even medium) armour. As a matter of fact, HE is useless against ANY measure of armour protection larger than splinter plating, regardless of range.

This supports the USN viewpoint in regards A/N protection. Only AP shells are the major threat if facing heavy armor. Thus providing maximum armor to those critical areas against AP shells is the best recourse of action. Prior too and during WWI, both systems could compete somewhat (US Standards has the edge in deck armor and armament protection but belt armor was comprable) but post WWI, with imporved shells and navies dispensing with using HE against Battleships......A/N was the only cost effective means to pursue and the RN realized it and incorprated the scheme in post WWI designs.

Why You do think that the GF battleships were vulnarable 1919 to 1929? Against whom? Against the HSF, sitting around in Scapa Flow? Against the USN, which still hadn´t developed a capability for effective long range firing, let alone think of endangering the decks of the GF ships owing to low main gun elevation and defective fuses?

Post WWI, the USN passed the RN in fire control due to technological developments. Coupled with the lessons learned by the 6th BS attached the RN, USN battleships were more than capable of delivering ordinance at Jutland ranges or higher. Post WWI, the victorious naval powers continued to exist and evolve with each other victorious navy as a potential enemy as well as ally. Are you suggesting that with the end of WWI there was no need for navies to exist at all?

The vulnarability of the GF and other old ships is not a function deriving from ww1 or it´s outcome but subsequent step by step eveolution and improvements starting not before another decade passed after the end of ww1.

If i'm understanding you correctly.....i believe this is what i've been saying all along. The USN realized first that the future of naval combat (BB vs BB) would entail longer ranged combats with the resultant increase in plunging fire and that AP shells would be the primary threat to a battleship. With the max size of their battleships fixed they had to come up with an armor scheme that gave their ships the best chance to resist these AP shells...hence All or Nothing protection which gave maximum armor thickenss to the vitals while leaving non vital systems unamored. No displacement wasted on "medium" or "Light" armor as that would have either reduced heavy armor thickness or necessitated a bigger ship.

I don´t question that the AoN armoured US standarts ended up beeing very valuable units in the mid 30´s owing to their schemes. But I don´t buy Friedman´s thesis that this was all pre planned. I rather think this happened accidently.

You cannot be serious.

 

[Glider]

Its interesting stuff that is going on here. Can I ask if any copies of the Baden Trials anywhere on the Web?

Thanks again to all those participating

 

[Nikademus]

Wrt to the BADEN trials conducted 1921. I can read between the lines. The material as a convolution of primary sources is aviable online, so everyone can draw his own conclusions from them.

It has been cited for evidence for superior shell technology of the GREENBOY projectiles with both, armour piercing and fusing as well as obliquity behavior greatly superior to anything else. Brown is a good example for a basic failure in understanding the problems exposed by the trials in english secondary sources (even recent articles in Warship International dealing with them).

Its not just a citation. It's a fact...unless your suggesting that the whole thing was rigged....pictures and all. The tests proved conclusively that the British had seriously improved their AP and CPC shells in comparison the the abysmal performance of those shells at Jutland.

No. Here You mix up the results from two different shells. Round No. 9 hit the Barbette of turret X and round No. 14 hitting the 13.78in turret face of "B".

Your correct in that I did mix up the descriptions in regards to the 2/3rd through and burst. My error.....but not DK Brown's. However it doesn't disprove anything i've written in regards to the new shells greater AP effectiveness vs. their Jutland predecssors.

For the record:


From report ADM 186/251

Round 9.

Target: Barbette armour of "X" turret.
Shell: 15 in. A.P.C.
Fuze: 16 D.
Filling: 70/30 Shellite.
S.V.[striking velocity]: 1.550 fps [472 mps].
Delay: 3 ft.
Nature of burst: E.O.
Point of impact: 3 ft. 9 in. from top edge of fixed armour and 25 ft. 9 in. from midship line forward.
Angle of impact from normal: Vertical, 11 deg.; horizontal, 0 deg. Resultant from normal, 11 deg.

The [13 ¾ in.] armour was completely penetrated, a hole 17 in. diameter being made in it.
Apparently the shell burst when it was two-thirds of its way through the armour and the nose of the shell as far as the shoulder was found inside barbette 23 ft. from outer edge of entry hole.
Considerable damage was done to the roller path.
Some damage was caused to machinery in the pocket between girders where the nose of the shell was found.

Round 14.

Target: Front plate of "B" turret.
Shell: 15 in. A.P.C.
Fuze: 16 D.
Filling: 70/30 Shellite.
S.V.: 1.550 fps [472 mps].
Delay: Blind.
Nature of burst: Blind.
Point of impact: Front plate of turret midway between the guns.
Angle of impact: Vertical, 12 deg.; horizontal, 11 deg. Resultant, 18 deg. 40 min.

Shell completely perforated armour, making holes of 18 in. in diameter flaked off to 36 in. by 48 in. outside and 24 in. by 36 in. inside.
Shell was found inside turret with nose resting against left girder of right gun-slide.
The center position sight and apparatus in its immediate vicinity was wrecked.
The shell was eventually exploded by a gun-cotton charge with the following result.
The sound of the burst was indistinguishable from that of the gun-cotton detonating, and degree of rapidity of burst was therefore difficult to estimate. Thick black smoke was emitted from all holes in the gun-house.
The left rammer (main cage to transport wagon) was unshipped and damaged.
The nose of the shell and a large part of the body were found lying on a platform 2 ft. below the burst, and two large fragments were lying where the shell had been. Part of the base weighting 30 lb. went through the main cage trunk and was found lying in the gun-house just near of this trunk. Other fragments were found lying about the gun-house and working chamber, but no other serious damage could be found.

More importantly:

This trial shows that A.P.C. will penetrate 13 ¾ in. [350mm] plate where C.P.C. will fail. Round 15 was fired at an angle of 60 deg. which serves to determine by comparison with round 14 the angle of impact at which perforation of 13 ¾ in. armour may be expected.
The performance of A.P.C. shell as regards penetration would appear to be satisfactory.

From DK Brown:

3 x 15in APC rounds were fired through the 7in battery armor, at least one of which hit and nearly penetrated the 7 3/8 barbette beyond. CPC shells were fired against the decks and caused very severe blast damage. It seems to have been concluded that the new generation of shells would penetrate thick armor and the new fuses would explode them about 40 feet beyond the point of impact. The filling, Shellite in the APC, Trotyl in CPC would explode violently causing severe damage. This conclusion at least contributed to the adoption of the 'all or nothing' system of protection in the new NELSON class battleships.

Under the comparisons for impact as such outlined above, not a single UK (...or german for that matter...) shell penetrated heavy armour at Jutland (280mm or more, matching about 0.92 cal. thickness plates for the british 12in gun, thus beeing "near calibre thick" or heavy plates). GREENBOY shells wouldn´t have changed that to a large degree.

Don't agree based on my reading of the original report and Brown and Campbell's comments as well as comments from Author Richard Worth on trying to compare Jutland shells to Greenboys. Fact remains that at Jutland only 1 hit cleanly penetrated "heavy armor" out of 17 hits (Campell disqualifies 4 based on 1 being HE, 3 more glancing off due to high oblicity) Minimum thickness defined as "heavy armor" was 10 inches. Of these 13 hits, more than half *7* burst outside armor without holing with the resultant energy of the shell bursts venting outside the protected area. 4 more holed the armor with the effect of shell burst venting outside. Only 2 hits that holed the armor vented part of their blast inside the target armor. Such a poor performance was as critical if not more critical than the generally heavier armor protection of the German capital ships. Replace those shells with the more effective Greenboys, its not implausible to consider that the British might have scored better in ship kills than they did. To suggest that the trials were "disapointing" is not supported by any source that i have read including D.K. Brown's "Grand Fleet"

 

[Nikademus]

Its interesting stuff that is going on here. Can I ask if any copies of the Baden Trials anywhere on the Web?

Thanks again to all those participating

There's a healthy debate and info from this site:

1921 firing trials against Baden - Naval History Forums

 

[Glider]

Many thanks, that no 14 hit looks pretty scary

 

[RCAFson]

Post WWI, the USN passed the RN in fire control due to technological developments. Coupled with the lessons learned by the 6th BS attached the RN, USN battleships were more than capable of delivering ordinance at Jutland ranges or higher. Post WWI, the victorious naval powers continued to exist and evolve with each other victorious navy as a potential enemy as well as ally. Are you suggesting that with the end of WWI there was no need for navies to exist at all?

I doubt that the USN surpassed the RN in surface fire control until well after the Tizard mission which gave the USN access to microwave radar technology, and technical assistance in producing working sets.

 

[delcyros]

You have read the account on the BADEN trials, Nikedamius, so why You are unable to understand them needs explenation. They perfectly fit the problems I outlined above.
The trials are the data, the interpretation is what can be questioned in Your part.
I consider terminology a very important thing. If a projectile can pass a plate without beeing able to detonate in proper distance and reliably behind it, it´s not of much use in achieving decisisve results against enemy battleships. In case of the barbette hit, it did not completely penetrate as You imply. It gives contrary evidence, I quote from the report:

Apparently the shell burst when it was two-thirds of its way through the armour and the nose of the shell as far as the shoulder was found inside barbette 23 ft. from outer edge of entry hole.

By any naval teminology standarts, this must be considered a PARTIAL PENETRATION instead of a COMPLETE PENETRATION You, Brown and even the author of the report likes the projectile to be. It did not completely penentrate but burst in holing. A complete penetration requires 100% of the projectile to pass the plate (US naval nallistic limit, german Grenzdurschschlag, the british have a similar definition with 3 out of 5 shells in a row making it 100% through), otherwise it´s only partial. You have to be careful in choosing the right definition.

And You can repeat bolding up that the shell that indeed completely penetrated the turret face (100% of it came through but in a blind condition, as I said) was eventually blown up by a guncotton charge, but this has nothing to do with the shell striking this armour. It was blown up later on after the projectile was found blind resting there as a seperate event in order to assess what a high order burst could have done in regards of damage to the interior of the turret. The shell itselve penetrated not in a condition fit to burst, it´s fuse broke.
And then You have to consider opbliquities for these impacts, which are very low for the two cases cited. At obliquity, they failed to even hole the armour. Would an older type of shell have been able to reach these results? Considering that these two tests against heavy armour were carried out such low obliquities when both, the new hard AP-caps and the old soft ones usually work, they probably would have done the same to it, with a higher likelyhood of burst in holing or burst on impact. Neither shell is able to penetrate heavy armour and burst reliably behind. THE BADEN TRIALS DO NOT SUGGEST SUCH AN ABILITY TO THE GREENBOY SHELL.

3 x 15in APC rounds were fired through the 7in battery armor, at least one of which hit and nearly penetrated the 7 3/8 barbette beyond. CPC shells were fired against the decks and caused very severe blast damage. It seems to have been concluded that the new generation of shells would penetrate thick armor and the new fuses would explode them about 40 feet beyond the point of impact. The filling, Shellite in the APC, Trotyl in CPC would explode violently causing severe damage

Ever checked the fuse delay actions of the BADEN trials for APC striking medium armour (this is armour in the thickness range of 0.472 cal. to ~2/3 cal thickness)? They are unpredictable. While the new shell is able to penetrate medium armour in a condition fit to burst reliably, the fuse delay is way to unpredictable and the official report mentions this.

nominal fuse delay for the projectiles with 16D fuse was 0.025 sec.

against 7in:
Round No. 4 (APC) was a 22 deg impact, burst 38 ft. implying 0.025 sec. delay
Round No 11 (SAPC) was 28 deg impact, burst 20 ft, implaying 0.013 sec. delay
Round No.12 (APC light) was 27 deg impact, followed by a low order burst 30 ft. later, implying 0.021sec delay
Round No. 16 (APC) was 18 deg impact, burst 53 ft. behind, implying 0.037 sec delay.
Round No. 2 of 2nd series (SAPC) was 5 deg. to normal, burst 7 ft., implying 0.005 sec. delay

Thus instead of the desired reliable fuse delay, half cal. thickness armour could be reliably penetrated but the fuse delay varied from nearly instantious (Type 16ND non delay fuse action also showed 6 to 10ft delay, implying a minimum delay time of 0.005 to 0.006 sec.) to ultra long 0.037 sec. and the impact condition does not explain for this variance.

Now look for impacts on 10in armour:

You quoted:
Round No. 15, striking it at 14 deg and burst 38ft. behind, implying 0.035 sec delay
but why don´t You also consider this one as well?
Round No. 8, striking it at 18 deg and burst 7ft behind, implying 0.006 sec delay


Again the variance ranges from instantious delay action to longer than desired delay action at almost identic conditions of impact. That Brown states that the new GREENBOY shell would detonate 40ft from impact is an error, which can be disprooved by the analysis of the trials conducted on SMS BADEN (Round No. 2, No. 8, No. 11, No. 12 No.16). Fuse delay action of the 16D fuse used in these rounds was far from statisfying and unpredictable in it´s length. It may have been basically non-delay in one case and to long in the next.
How does the medium thickness armour tests compare with Jutland?
The old shells judging from Jutland´s experience showed at least 2 similar events: a 15in APC defeating the barbette armour of DERFFLINGER and burst directly behind, which was 2/3 cal. thickness (10.23in). The condition of impact and result are similar to the Round No. 8 from the BADEN trial. And another 15in APC defeating the upper side belt of VON DER TANN and bursting a distance behind, which was about half cal. thick plate -most of the time, however, older shells burst on impacting medium armour thickness ranges.
So if there is an improvement of the new shell, it does not necessarely mean that the armed GREENBOY APC had the capability to go up high order behind heavy armour, even striking at low obliquities. Against medium armour, the new APC can penetrate at medium and low obliquities but the variance in delay action is larger than desired, one third of the projectiles had to short fuse delay, one third had to long a delay.
Thus the real improvement of the new APC was in the medium thickness armour range, some area when older shells from time to time also achieved good results. Fuse delay, however remained to be unpredictable until the late 20´s. Older shells burst on armoru because of rapid compression of the charge, though, before punching through it even if penetration would have been possible for a dud.


Addendum:
I must add that my term "disappointing" with regards to the result is not meant to be a recapture of the contemporary views on the matter. I use it on my own, after reading so much of this projectile and it´s super-abilities (even Nathan Okun stated informally that GREENBOY APC have the ability to defeat near calibre thick armour and burst reliably behind at high obliquity according to those trials) that I found the results as reported in ADM 186/251 disappointing. The contemporary view was that the fuses were working with disappointing reliability but that the projectile had progressed far enough not to burst on impact as was the case earlier (caused by a wrong british specification what the projectiles had to fullfill, not because Britain was unable to produce better shells).

 

[Nikademus]

Addendum:
I must add that my term "disappointing" with regards to the result is not meant to be a recapture of the contemporary views on the matter. I use it on my own, after reading so much of this projectile and it´s super-abilities (even Nathan Okun stated informally that GREENBOY APC have the ability to defeat near calibre thick armour and burst reliably behind at high obliquity according to those trials) that I found the results as reported in ADM 186/251 disappointing. The contemporary view was that the fuses were working with disappointing reliability but that the projectile had progressed far enough not to burst on impact as was the case earlier (caused by a wrong british specification what the projectiles had to fullfill, not because Britain was unable to produce better shells).

Rather than waste time with a lengthy reply regarding the selective interpretations you are using re: the test itself as well as the actual Jutland results, I think what you wrote here pretty much sums up the difference of opinion. While you consider the results "disapointing", I view the results as a substantial improvement over the performance of the heavy shells hitting heavy armor at Jutland (and medium armor too for that matter) I doubt anyone, Nathan Okun included ever ascribed "super-abilities" to the GB shells. That they behaved like true APC shells vs. HE shells as was the case at Jutland seemed clear to the Admiralty and to subsequent authors, the persons studying the report over at KM Bismarck site, and Nathan Okun. More importantly, not to be lost amidst this quibbling over what makes a penetration a penetration, and which round was more relevent vs. another, is the salient fact that the tests were instrumental in the RN's decision to adopt A/N as it's future protection scheme as the newer quality shells clearly demonstrated that medium armor types were of little value vs. heavy shells.

The lengthy thread on the trials over at KMBismarck has been posted for those who are interested in it and the below links to a copy of the actual 1921 report. Readers can make their own judgements.


Warship - Google Books

 

[Kurfürst]

As 'completed' the USN and UK ships were only slightly above the agreed on limit of 35,000 tons, which represents to me an honest effort to enforce the spirit of the treaty.

Wartime weight additions are irrelevent as at that point as the nations were at WAR, the Escalator Clause was in effect and the US and UK were fast becoming allies. In contrast the Germans (and the Italians) deliberately violated the Treaty and designed warships with a standard displacement far in excess of the 35k limit which balooned further on completion.

This needs some correction from the legal POV.

Germany was a non-signatory state for the Washington Treaty. Neither she was signatory of the Second London Naval Treaty which was signed on 25 March 1936 - and neither were Japan or Italy. Therefore the limitations did not apply to her.

Only a very mild inclination was laid down about 'favouring' such naval limitation systems in the 1935 Anglo-German Naval agreement (whearas other articles were clear about 'strictly adhering to' to 35:100 ratio with the British in total naval tonnage), without giving any exact definition of tonnage or armament allowed for each class of vessel.

Thirdly Japan was withdrawing from the Washington Naval Treaty in January 1936, permitting even signatory powers to invoke the escalator clause of the Treaty, permitting 45 000 ton standard displacement and 16" main guns. Italy also refused to sign it, and the beginning of a new naval arms race was obvious.

Bismarck was not laid down until 1 July 1936. Even if Germany would have been a signatory power to these Naval Treaties, the tonnage and caliber of the Bismarcks were well under the maximum. They were a counter to new French Richies, not British or American BBs anyway..

To claim that "oh everybody cheated so its ok" is a straw man.

And to claim that Germany deliberately violated a Treaty it didn't sign in the first place is a lie. Germany could, legally, build any size of Battleship, the reasons she didn't were a, technical limitations imposed by German ports b, political unwillingness to enter into a naval arms race with Britain, which was basically seen as unneccessary confrontation in a field where Germany had no vital interests. In short, German foreign policy was to make the British stay out, so Germany could concentrate on the actual enemy, the French.

As for "oh everybody cheated so its ok", it was exactly what was de facto the meaning of the escalator clause provided.. which for example the US was taking advantage of when they went - after much political debate - for 16" guns on the North Carolinas, but the British ultimately stuck with 14" guns.

 

[Milosh]

Germany ignored the Versailles Treaty which limited its naval force to:

German naval forces will be limited to 15,000 men,
6 battleships (no more than 10,000 tons displacement each),
6 cruisers (no more than 6,000 tons displacement each),
6 destroyers (no more than 800 tons displacement each)
12 torpedo boats (no more than 200 tons displacement each).
No submarines are to be included.

Germany was never affected by the Washington or London treaties; its naval construction was limited under the Treaty of Versailles, the peace treaty that ended World War I.

 

[Nikademus]

And to claim that Germany deliberately violated a Treaty it didn't sign in the first place is a lie. Germany could, legally, build any size of Battleship

Per the terms of the Anglo-German Treaty of 1935, Germany agreed to limit maximum size of new battleship construction to 35,000 tons.

 

[RCAFson]

This needs some correction from the legal POV.

Germany was a non-signatory state for the Washington Treaty. Neither she was signatory of the Second London Naval Treaty which was signed on 25 March 1936 - and neither were Japan or Italy. Therefore the limitations did not apply to her.

1. In the Agreement of 1937 both contracting Governments were bound to a mutual exchange of information, which was to take place annually, within the first four months of every calendar year, and was to contain details of the building programme. According to Document 23-C, the Navy violated this obligation in so far as it gave the figures for the displacement and the draught of the battleships Bismarck and Tirpitz, which were being built at the beginning of 1938, as too low, namely as 35,000 tons instead of 41,700 tons. That this violation of the treaty occurred is openly admitted by Raeder, but again it is not such a serious violation as the prosecution contends, that is, it is not a violation which shows proof of a criminal intention. This is clear from the detailed evidence I have presented and from the testimonies of witnesses which I need not repeat here; it will be sufficient if I refer to the absolutely convincing expert testimony of shipbuilding director Dr. Suechting, which I have submitted as Raeder Exhibit No. 15. According

Trials of German Major War Criminals: Volume 19

Germany did commit treaty violations and Raeder admitted it. Germany also violated the Versailles 10,000 ton limitaion to build the pocket battleships.

 

[delcyros]

the definition of displacement was not specified in the Versailles Treaty. the fist PBB, at least way designed accordingly (and in agreement with both, france and britain) and does not represent a treaty violation. before B was completed, the Treaty was already canceled.

 

[parsifal]

the definition of displacement was not specified in the Versailles Treaty. the fist PBB, at least way designed accordingly (and in agreement with both, france and britain) and does not represent a treaty violation. before B was completed, the Treaty was already canceled.

Illegally. The German Navies violations of its treaty was proven to the best standards of International law at nurnberg. This subsequent denial of german war guilt (with respect to exceeding tonnage limits) is simply eroding your credibility in an otherwise highly engaging debate

Whether or not the allies also exceeded their treaty limits is open to question, and debate, because it has never been proven one way or another