Ark Royal vs Bismark

[renrich]

I too am enjoying this thread, especially because the main participants seem to be well informed. I don't claim to be well informed at all but I am looking at a 1944-45 Janes and it appears that the main armor belt of the hull of comparably sized BBs with three turrets is shorter than that of the BBs with four turrets. Obviously the main armor belt is trying to protect the magazines below the turrets and since the four turrets cover more horizontal distance than the three the armor belt has to be extended.

Could that be the reason that the BBs with three triple turrets have less total weight in armor than those with four?

 

[delcyros]

The solution to the answer is not that easy my friend.
The turret and associated equipment is heavier for a three gun turret than for a twin but the difference is a bit less than the 2/3 rule may suggest in the first place. Nevertheless, three triple turrets using the same level of protection are heavier than four twin turrets.
Your point however touches another true incident to the problem. Three triple turrets require less length of the citadell, despite larger magazines than four twin turrets. The reason is the distance between turrets, there need to be a gap for the installation. This gap is required by structural considerations of the deck stiffness. Any barbette cuts a hole in the deck, which weakens the structure. Holes are tolerable to a certain degree but need to be compensated for with reinforcements of the main structural members and frames there.
In an entirely AoN scheme, a short citadel is a desirable design feature, efficiently using weight by reduction of space requirements of the citadel and shorter coverage of the main belt and deck.
In the german case, however, things are different.
Altough triple and even quad turrets were considered by the W-Office, the discussion finally concluded on twin ones. The idea behind is explainable.
Due to the belt-slope combination, and the low placed armour deck, the protected buoyancy below it would be somehow less than other contemporary designs. On the other hand, at the expected battle distances, the slope was felt to be important in defeating enemy gunfire. It augments the protection of the citadel via the sides and reduces the possible exposure through the deck by plunging fire to only about one third of the entire beam opposed to it´s full area in conventional designs. But in order to provide the required degree of protected buoyancy, the length of the citadel needed to be increased.
Therefore from a design point of view, the designers of the BISMARCK class were not forced to adopt triple or quad turrets (they had experience with triple turrets of the PBB´s, CL´s and ´twins, so they should know about their merits and problems as well from own and recently made experience) and they had the larger space requirement anyway provided by the protective scheme to utilize twin turrets. The four twin turret layout was considered to have saved some weight as opposed to a triple turret layout (citadell reduction was considered to be undesirable with the protective scheme employed in this class)This had the benefit that larger areas of the ship were under armour in prospect of superior enemy naval forces (particularely cruisers).
Finally, W-office considered the advantages of twin turrets over triple ones and emphasize was put on the fact that hoist design would have been less complicated and rate of fire correspondingly higher than in a 38cm triple turret. Given that expected ranges were rather medium than very long in the North Atlantic environment, these ideas are reasonable.

A triple turreted ship would require an entirely different armour scheme as well to utilize any weight gain.

 

[RCAFson]

Here's the armour layout of Bismarck:

Technical Layout - Armour - Armour Layout - Bismarck (Large)

Imagine removing the after 15in turret and shortening the belt and deck armour accordingly. I used the above drawing and measured the length of the belt and the weight reduction that would result from a triple layout, based upon armour weighing 40lbs per square ft for each inch of thickness. I calculated that the belt and deck armour weight could be reduced by about 1400 tons, if the belt was shortened by 78 ft. Additionally about 300 tons would be saved by lowering the height of the remaining after turret barbette by about 12.5 ft. So a triple layout would save about 1700 tons.

Another thing to note is the very inefficient use of armour on the turret faces as the 180mm thick angled front face would be very vulnerable to almost any battleship calibre hit.

Bismarck's armour layout is very inefficient and seems to resemble a WW1 layout.

 

[Kurfürst]

So a triple layout would save about 1700 tons.

Place Littorio's very similiar triple turrets, each weighting 500 tons more than Bismarck's twin turrets and you already lost 1500 tons from that 1700 ton.. Now enlarge barbettes by 30% (Bismarck main turret diameter: 10 meter, Littorio: 13 m), and you are already in minus... and a ship with a shorter protected citadel.

A shorter ship with just three 38 cm twin turrets is much more interesting IMHO, as that 1700 tons could go, for example, into armor. You would have relatively lightely armed, but fast and very well protected ship, possibly more ideal for a typical WW2 naval operation.

 

[tail end charlie]

A shorter ship with just three 38 cm twin turrets is much more interesting IMHO, as that 1700 tons could go, for example, into armor. You would have relatively lightely armed, but fast and very well protected ship, possibly more ideal for a typical WW2 naval operation.

I am amazed at the technology and calculations that went into all these ships but I can hardly think of one successful use of a battleship. It seems to me after every engagement which resulted in any sort of hit at all they had to go into port for lengthy repairs. even in the first world war there were very few real engagements....I may be wrong becasuse I havnt studied it that much but I cant think of a real achievement by a battleship, apart from crippling another battleship.

I am surprised at Germany who revolutionised the use of aircraft in land operations didnt build carriers instead of battleships. But that is probably 20/20 hindsight.

 

[renrich]

I seem to remember also that there are some advantages in the four twin turrets from a gunnery POV. Spotting salvoes and correcting aim.

 

[RCAFson]

Place Littorio's very similiar triple turrets, each weighting 500 tons more than Bismarck's twin turrets and you already lost 1500 tons from that 1700 ton.. Now enlarge barbettes by 30% (Bismarck main turret diameter: 10 meter, Littorio: 13 m), and you are already in minus... and a ship with a shorter protected citadel.

A shorter ship with just three 38 cm twin turrets is much more interesting IMHO, as that 1700 tons could go, for example, into armor. You would have relatively lightely armed, but fast and very well protected ship, possibly more ideal for a typical WW2 naval operation.

Huh?

Littorio 15in triple = 1570 tons x 3 = 4710 tons
Bismarck 15in twin = 1035 tons x 4 = 4140 ton
= + 570 tons
so a reduction of 1700 tons in armour weight and an increase of 570 tons in turret weight = a net reduction of 1130 tons in weight.
Germany 38 cm/52 (14.96") SK C/34
Italian 381 mm/50 (15") Model 1934


Also Littorio's triple turrets are quite heavy, the RN Nelson class triple 16in weighed 1480 tons while the USN triple 16in 45 calibre weighed about 1420 tons while Hood's 15in twin turrets weighed 880 tons. All of these turrets had thicker face armour than Bismarck's turrets.

British 16"/45 (40.6 cm) Mark I
USA 16"/45 (40.6 cm) Mark 6
http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNBR_15-42_mk1.htm

 

[delcyros]

Here's the armour layout of Bismarck:


Another thing to note is the very inefficient use of armour on the turret faces as the 180mm thick angled front face would be very vulnerable to almost any battleship calibre hit.

Bismarck's armour layout is very inefficient and seems to resemble a WW1 layout.

Hardly a very inefficient layout under the conditions described above. It shows drastically different thinking with regards to how to provide protection to the embedded vitals and has only superficial similarity with older schemes.
The glacis of the turrets is 180mm thick, angled back by 68 deg but that was considered to be proof against the battleships own 38cmL52 guns fired from 0 to 22,000yards distance (at ca. 0 to 10000 m the glacis has a larger target area than the 14.6in armoured turret face, decreasing with increasing angle of fall at larger distances) and correspondingly just enough to stop many major calibre guns. For example US 14/45 14/50 (altough not 16/45 used in the COLORADO class- it was not sure at design closing stage that the NC class get´s 16in guns instead of 14in ones proposed for this class in quad turrets), british 14in/45 and 15in/42 (but not british 16in/45 used in the two ships of the NELSON class) and french 13in/50 and 13.4in/45.
From that perspective the turret glacis may be considered to be a bit on the thin side but just thick enough. I attach the GKdos 100 penetration table and the striking velocity/ angle of fall chart used for the german SK 38cmL52 C/36 compared against face hardened armour KC/n and the vharts for the 38cm´s striking velocity and angle of fall (corrected for the 68 deg. angled facet).
All the aforementioned guns have slightly less powerful penetration capabilities and thus the result can be applied to them as well.

The myth that the glacis can be penetrated by almost all ww2 battleship guns at all distances stems from an older version of Nathan Okuns computational program facehd, which suggested this result. Primary sources like the one shown above decisively contradict these results, I don´t know if the problem was recitified in the version 6.1 by him.

Also it should be mentioned that test results of german KC/n captured from the construction yard and from the wreckage of TIRPITZ after the end of hostilities and forwarded to british and US services had shown a surprisingly high difference in plate quality. While other plates usually have a quality of 0.96 (N. Okuns terminology), the plates for medium thickness (180mm, not much used except for the glacis) showed in US and british ballistic tests results of slightly over 0.8 (basically ww1 quality, only from rejected plates captured at the yards) and 1.1 respectively (captured plates from TIRPITZ), this tends to indicated that the calculations of facehd with 0.96 fixed quality parameters may actually understate plate performances of this very thickness range. It may be possible, but this needs to be researched further, that Krupp´s quality controll didn´t went south as suggested by Okun (producing both, better and worse plates than normal) but that Krupp delivered plates deliberately with improved performances for this rather critical area of installation with some plates of the lot not fullfilling the requirements and falling short of it. The improved performance is explainable by the thickness of the plate. The hardeneing process of the cementated face for thicknesses in between 120mm and 180mm can be controlled more carefully with the best results typically achievable at 6in thickness (judging from earlier experiences from many manufacturer of Krupp type naval armour plates, my personal observation).


I am not sure about other BB´s turret vulnarability but KGV´s vertical turret faces appear to be optimized for long to very long ranges, as they are rather thin and only 12.75in thick. Since the turret face is always directed to the enemy ship and target angles are neglectable, this appears to be a serious defect to me. It can be penetrated by BISMARCKS guns out to nearly 28,000 yards with italien 38cm guns beeing able to effectively penetrate the turret face out to 34,000 yards (both well beyond typical ww2 fighting ranges) and even SCHARNHORST´s rather light guns (the lightest of all ww2 major calibre guns) has a reasonable chance to defeat the turrets out to 16,000 yards (which, according to the experiences drawn fromt the conflict in the North Atlantic theatre must be considered in within typical fighting range).
The french quad turret was armoured up to 16.9 in thick. This is massive armour in comparison to british or the german examples, still the german gun should be able to defeat the turret face out to 20,000 yards and Hoyers contemporary comments about french thick face hardened armour plates reflect disappointing resistence when hit by german major calibre projectiles in ballistic tests carried out after material for the ALSACE was captured by the germans in 1940.
US BB´s of the period used very thick homogenious armour made by thick chunks of class B homogenious armour laminated over a second plate made of STS full armour grade construction material. The single layer aequivalent is less than a single plate of class B from the same thickness but not by much. The faces were leaning back about 40 degrees in order to give generally improved resistance to major calibre impacts. The level of protection is difficult to assess but it should be substantial. Homogenious armour penetration with armour piercing capped projectiles is a difficult problem to predict and no generalizations are possible at the moment. For uncapped projectiles one might use M79APCLC for projectiles with similar properties. This program suggest a very good protection based upon projectiles striking it without caps (which never is the case).
The real world performane of their turret faceplates may or may not fit these computations. Originally, the NORTH CAROLINA WASHINGTON should receive 16in class A turret faces but when plates were delivered BuOrd rejected them on base of samples of the lot repeatedly failing proof tests. Class B plates were substituted for them before construction had to be delayed but these ultra thick homogenious plates also fall short of expectations (striking velocities always have been less than expected for major calibre ballistic tests, indicating some kind of scaling problem) and reportedly have been more brittle than other applications of US class B homogenious armour. Anyway, in direct comparison to US class A they appeared to be ballistically better in this thickness range and were used anyway for them and the successive US fast BB´s.

 

[delcyros]

Lutzow's condition was caused by a number of factors. The progressive flooding was a result both of shell damage and due to many piercings of critical bulkheads which negated somewhat the otherwise very good sub-division of the ship and exacerbated damage control efforts. Another factor in Lutzow's loss was the large bow torpedo flat, a typical feature of WWI era German capital ships. This large space, if compromised would reduced bouyancy reserves in the bow area. Lutzow eventually was scuttled because the ship's trim had been so radically altered by the forward flooding that movement was next to impossible but she was not in danger of actual sinking up to that point. This decision to scuttle is questioned in some quarters as the ship's buoyancy reserves were far from exhausted and the ship (arguably) could have been saved. Had Lutzow's bow area been unprotected, the shells would have had a greater chance of passing through the narrow hull section without detonation. Instead, the medium/light armors ensured detonation increasing structural damage and contributing to the loss of the ship. This makes Lutzow a case demonstrating how medium and light armors can be detrimental to a warship when struck by heavy shells.

These ideas can be challanged from very many perspectives.
[A] ammo tactics:
By the time of her demise, in summer of 1916, practice in naval engagement still asked for using common or even HE ammo instead of AP (LÜTZOW on her own basically depleted her base fused HE ammo outfit in the battle of Jutland against enemy ACR, BC and BB´s). Using medium levels of armour protection effectively
removed this thread.
shell technology
In 1916, only Germany and Austro-Hungary used reliable delay fused, had capped armour piercing projectiles. The british along most navies were using soft capped armour piercing projectiles with instantious fuse delay. The delay action was unpredictable and passing htrough the rigid structure of a ship or even the watersurface may trigger the fuse in british APC. The all-or-nothing scheme doesn´t work in this environment when You cannot count on the inert fuse action. Rather contrary, an armour thickness of at least 0.25 cal thickness was considered necessary to reduce penetrations by major calibre projectiles to the size of the shell (instead of large chunks of metal cut out and displaced with very large wateringress following), which translates to around 80 to 100mm against 13.5 and 15in rounds. A discussion can be found in many contemporary primary sources. To armour the bow accordingly meant a reduction of vulnarability to flooding.
[C] torpedo damage
In addition to serious shell damage, LÜTZOW received a torpedohit in the bow by HMS FALMOUTH 18:25 from 5,500 yards which compromised the watertight integrity of the adjacent sections. Altough J. Campbell refuses this hit (without discussing it or citing evidence against it) in his outstanding book, it was claimed by both, FALMOUTH and surviving crewmembers of SMS LÜTZOW to have struck the bow. Correspondingly, it appears in the german post Jutland discussion of the damage received by LÜTZOW.
[D] damage distribution
The damage distribution of the ship greatly enhances flooding of the bow. Successive damage to the principal holding bulkhead was caused by an attempt to flee the area of fighting with a speed faster than was advisable after the flooding had been brought under controll already.
[E] large torpedo flat
The large torpedo flat actually saved SEYDLITZ. It didn´t doomed LÜTZOW but worked against it but when undamaged as in case of SEYDLITZ, it provided enough buoyancy reserve to keep the bow aflot, while the rest of it is already subject to flooding. This design feature is common to all period BB´s and BC´s, not just german ones.

Finally, the idea to provide armour protection to the bow as well is a rather good idea by ww2 standarts. Altough no BB scale protection has been applied. The example of BISMARK at Denmark Street when hit by a british 14in APC in the bow demonstrates that the projectile went through the 60mm Wh inclined armoured plating, through 20mm deck and exited the other side through the Wh armour plating without detonating.
Either this hit was a dud (60mm ALWAYS ensure triggering the fuse, regardless of obliquity in the band between 0 and 70 deg) or the fuse delay meant that the projectile exploded after passing through the whole bow. With 0.035 sec. nominal fuse delay this indeed may have happened and in this case -despite the damage associated with the event- demonstrates that armour triggering the fuse does not always means that the projectile detonates inside the ship rather thin bow and stern area. The level of armour protection applied to it´s bow just provides protection of the bow versus near misses, blast and splinters and a wide range of light guns (including CL fire) from aceptable distances while it is not thick enough to slow down the projectile enough that it bursts inside the hull.
-Note: Nathan Okuns article on the armour protection of BISMARCK was written long ago. I know that Mr. Okun is well aware of the mistakes he made in his article (SD´s decapping plate, f.e. or the failing to mention BISMARCK´s 60mm armoured belt of the bow, or the 30 to 75mm armoured splinterbelts and so on) and wouldn´t repeat them. He unfortunately has little time to his disposal but will continue to work on a revised version.

 

[delcyros]

Another note on layered armour protection.
It appears that yawing of the projectile was also been considered to be a factor of importance. This was studied by italiens and germans in the early 30´s and it appeared that both made a habit out of it.
Even the US considered these effects in 1940 and found that the 1.5in armoured weatherdeck in top of the main armour deck of their BB´s induce yawing on the test projectiles which increased the striking velocity necessary to defeat the main armour deck well beyond the level necessary to defeat it without passing through the bomb deck (despite the projectile loosing it´s cap and weight in the process). Whether or not this equates the striking velocity required for a single deck with an additional 1.5in thickness or not, I don´t know.
Anyway it was found that harder armour (at best face hardened US class A) worked best against these yawed projectiles.

It´s also definetely not the case that layered armour layouts provide less protection than a single layer one. In addition to possible damage received by penetration through the first armour plate, slowing down noticably, maybe induce yawing and loosing any covers, other effects also apply to the projectile if it hits face hardened armour behind. Once uncapped, a projectile striking face hardened armour behind will always be shattered, resulting in nose damage, making penetration more difficult (resulting to a mere 1/3 increase in relative thickness of the next plate) and inert cavity (at best a low order detonation which is about one third as powerful as normal detonations). Thus effect of the projctile is greatly reduced.
This seems to have been the case for german Panzerdeck armour as well, which was harder than normal Wh applications (250 HN instead of 225 HN) at the expanse of reduced ductability. It was expected that only uncapped projectiles would be able to strike the Panzerdeck or it´s slopes and the harder armour greatly increased the damage to the projectile, making intact penetration (in a condition fit to burst) less likely when penetration becomes possible.
These ideas were unknown in ww1 and reflect a departure from older armour philosophies.

 

[parsifal]

IMHO the armouring schemes of German ships were very good, and made the right choices as to what compromises needed to be made as far as the individual ships are concerned. Engagements beyond about 20000 yds against moving targets were next to unknown....the record is either the Scharnhorst or the Warspite, at around 27000 yds. Armouring for protection beyond these ranges was pretty much a waste of time. OTOH plunging fire was far more dangerous than hits onto the side, which invariably brought the round up against the main belt, and hence the thickest, most well protected parts of the ship. German steel treatments were also very good.

However, these technical advantages did not make up for poor handling of the German (and Italian) ships. Because of her numerical inferiority, the Germans were always very wary about engaging in stand up fights with the Allies. Some of this caution came from Hitlers interference, some from an inate conservatism within the KM leadership itself. The Germans convinced themselves from before the war that they could not win, evidently not paying a great deal of attention to the inherent advatages of concentration, surprise and initiative that is more or less conferred onto a nation with the luxury of a sea denial strategy at its fingertips, as opposed to sea control, (a wholly far more difficult and resource hungry excerceise)....and then proceeded to follow a strategy that ensured that outcome for failure. Bismarks experience refelected that sad situation perfectly. Deciding correctly to concentrate on mercantile warfare, the Germans failed to realize prewar that an all battleship force was the wrong force to undertake such a strategy optimally. They failed to appreciate the possibilities of carrier borne mercantile warfare, so successfully undertaken by Ryujo in the Indian ocean in 1942, They failed to appreciate the vulnerability of capital ships to carrier borne attack, lagging badly when compared to such countries as Britain, or even France. And despite all the grandiose claims being made here about the relative invulnerability of German heavy ships, one should not forget that it was a lowly obsolete biplane aircraft, that sank, or disabled no less than 5 Axis battleships that I can think of off the top of my head, and didnt seem to have too much difficulty in overcoming these uber armour schemes with a lowly 18 in torpedo, carrying a 388 lb TNT warhead

 

[delcyros]

I agree. Tactically, the RN utilized it´s potential in a very aggressive and effective manner. Able to risk and exploit tactical situations. This shouldn´t be underestimated. Having a superior quantity is one thing but to use the right part of it at the right time and the perfect place in the right way is a quality of it´s own and deserves our credit.

 

[Nikademus]

]Its not a fact, but repeating a the simple nonsense - otherwise you would be saying that armor designers are simply out of their minds when they use spaced, sandwiched armor etc. I don't think they are aiming at creating less effective systems.

A good example of nonsense would be your last sentence as well as your continued intentional jumbling of two different armor concepts.

That's seems like a rubber argument to dismiss the whole idea of shattering projectile - ironically all ships vertical armor still used face hardened armor just to promote this silly idea..!

This seems like verbal wordplay.

In any case, the crux of the arguement wheater the use of the upper side belt was weight efficient.

Actually the crux of the argument is that the Germans spent displacement on a belt of medium armor that helped bloat the classes design weight and limited the main belt's thickness.

However as you noted Italian tests showed that in two out of three cases, the 70 mm outer plate distanced 250mm from the main face hardened plate succeeded in stripping the projectile of its AP cap, which subsequently shatter on impact on the main face hardened plate.

You continue to use an example of layered armor to prove the alleged effectiveness level of two separate and independent armor thicknesses. Two entirely different situations.

Well its a way of saying they were some 50 years behind the Germans and Italians in that regard.

Considering the US and UK designers managed to largely adhere to a 35,000 ton imposed tonnage limit yet field battleships with equal or more guns and equal to heavier armor (part of which was due to the weight savings incurred by using triple and quadrupple turret designs), i'd say it was the UK/US designers who were ahead.

I think delycrios already addressed this. In any case, neither US or UK vertical protection systems could not provide adequate protection for the vitals, so arguing about the details is a bit moot.

So you claim. The UK adopted to a degree the US "immunity zone" concept but in Tennant's book on the KGV class it goes on to explain that the British perceived the role of the main armor belt to be the breaking up of heavy shells on impact and/or penetration reducing the level of overall damage. This was a continuation of their design philosophy dating back to before WWI

Here you seem to be arguing that stopping shell fragments or armor spalling from plunging fire is more important than stopping entire shells effectively entering into the machinery or magazine spaces through the belt. I

Actually i was correcting your misperception on the role of the splinter deck in the USN version of the All or Nothing system.

You seem to have been stating that the upper side belt was supposedly vulnerable to 6" cruiser fire, now you switched the arguement that it was vulnerable to 8" guns

Show me where i "switched" the argument.

Sorry but there's no point of arguing any further -

Then don't.

Of course it does. It very much reads to me that three triple turrets were considered for Bismarck vs four twin turrets, and eventually they choose the same because four twin turrets were weighting less.

wrong. Per your online source, they were discounted because with the extra gun worked into the design it would have meant (allegedly) that the overall displacement of the ship would have to be expanded....an ongoing issue with the Scharnhorst and Bismarck classes.

You claimed they weighted more. Which has been proven incorrect.

Again you misquote me. I relayed Garzke, a naval architect by profession, who stated that a 3 x triple arrangement costs less weight to the overall design vs. a four x twin gun design. The online source you goggled does not refute this.

Where on Earth you get they were more heavily armored than on Bismarck. Ie.

Simply what you claim that they were "more heavily armored"

Bismarck turret:

Face plate 14.17in
Sides 8.66in
back plates 12.76
Roof Plates (fore/aft) 7.09/5.12

Littorio turret:

Face plate 14.96
Sides fore/aft 7.87/5.12
Back plates 14.96 - 11.81
Roof plates 7.87

They were heavier because they had to be 30% larger to accomodate a single gun.

And because they had thicker armor. As already mentioned by RCAFson, Littorio's turrets were rather on the heavy side, a symptom of that nation's issue with weight creep in the overall design. US triple turrets were lighter, yet sported bigger guns. Individually they were also heavier than Bismarck's twin but also carried much thicker armor, made possible by use of triples in the overall design, which on the whole was also less bloated than Bismarck.

As proven above, the notion that using three triple turrets vs four twin turrets would be more weight efficient has no merit, in effect the opposite is true. At this point You would need to support your statement with something more substantial than simply repeating it I believe.

At this point you would need keep isolating the individual turret weights of the Littorio vs. Bismarck and continue ignoring that a four twin vs. 3 triple in terms of weight involves more than just the sum of the turret weights.

 

[delcyros]

Garzke and Dunn re-analyzed Bismarck and her loss after the ship was found and filmed. This analysis does take into account the recent expeditions to Bismarck on the ocean floor. They also take into account crew survivor stories. . You continue to emphasis "wreckage analysis" (i.e. video documentation) to prove that Bismarck's TDS was never penetrated. Examining a wreck under the ocean is what a former associate of mine (Author Richard Worth) once likened to navigating a funhouse with a little flashlight. Yes, the entire wreck is "visible" however much of the hull is not open to detailed inspection. Despite this, you continue to claim that "wreckage analysis" shows that none of the torpedo hits penetrated the TDS and that "crew accounts" refute Garzke and Dunn's analysis. Both counts are wrong. But's its clear to me that your not going to take my word for this so rather than waste more time on it, I'll just quote Mr. Worth's post from 4 years back regarding Cameron's expedition, wrecks on the ocean floor in general and such with. He worded it better than I've come up with thus far and I grow weary of having "CAMERON" pushed into my face, so henceforth I will not comment in detail on his "wreckage analysis" further.

As far as I understand, Garzke, Jurens et al. attended the ITN expedition to BISMARCK HOOD in 2001. Their "Marine Forensic Analysis of HMS HOOD and DKM BISMARCK" article does not take into account any of the findings of the recent Cameron expedition but include material from the older Ballard expedition.
The article is a nice scientific product but not a scientific ANALYSIS by the standarts of science it meants to be. No primary source material was proposed in the article and conclusions are written without discussion. It´s a brief scientific article but no analysis. I am sure that the material to proof exists in form of video documentation but it is not as complete or exhaustive as You think.
In fact, Garzke and Jurens themselve admitted that the documentation of CAMERON on the site is "MUCH more reliable", I quote on Mr. Jurens:

1) Someone suggested that Mr. Cameron's presentation was more reliable than that of the previous 2001 ITN expeditions. This is not true. Mr. Cameron's credentials regarding analysis are, if not impeccable, very good indeed. He is bright, knowlegeable, and a very keen observer. His observations are MUCH more reliable and extensive than those presented via the 2001 ITN expedition. He had much better equipment, spent much more time on the wreck, and -- in contrase to some of those on the 2001 expedition -- is really quite technically competent and knowledgeable. Sadly, the results of the 2001 ITN expedition to Hood and Bismarck were severely compromised by post-expedition censorship accompanied by the imposition of imaginative "conclusions" regarding the evidence actually observed, especially regarding Hood. One must, however, remember that the Cameron television productions are not intended to present a highly rigorous scientific analysis. Rather than speculate, Mr. Cameron has sought out (and attended to) the opinions of experts in the marine forensics field.

In fact, Mr. Cameron sought out for the advise of experts in marine forensics for the interpretation of the material examinied. His documentation brought to public the video documentation of the wreckage in better detail than any expedition so far. Not surprisingly given the fact that he had more money to start with, resulting in much better equipment (such as ROV´s going INSIDE the ship via holes on the lower hull to document damage to the main bulkhead, something which never has been done before), more time on the wreckage site, more exhaustive documentation of the damage with video (including hit by hit documentation for the first time), a larger crew including naval marine forensic experts. And his findings weren´t compromised by post expedition censorship.

 

[delcyros]

A note on the displacement of the battleships considered.
Off all BB´s laid down after the end ww1, only the NELSON-class, the SHARNHORST-class and the DUNKERQUE-class adhered to the 35,000 ts stand. limit.
All other BB´s did not.
You may quibble about the margin but there is little difference how LITTORIO, RICHELIEU and BISMARCK ended up with (in within about 1,000 ts to each other) and the difference to KING GEORGE V as completed in standart tonnes is in within only 3,650 ts.(38,030 ts stand. as opposed to 41,673 ts stand.) The two US fast BB´s fall in between them but more closer to the first group than to the british BB, this means that the distance in displacement towards BISMARCK is in all but the case of KING GEORGE V much narrower than to the official limit of 35,000 ts stand, which was not adhered by them except for the classes mentioned above.

 

[Kurfürst]

Dear Nik,

your last reply has little merit, as you seem to have reserved to repeating in an increasingly aggressive but overall, unconvincing manner what you posted earlier.

Actually the crux of the argument is that the Germans spent displacement on a belt of medium armor that helped bloat the classes design weight and limited the main belt's thickness.

Appearantly you have trouble seeing the forest from a tree - the belt, viewed as a whole sysem, already provided better protection to the ship vitals than any other. In sharp contrast the KGV, even when wasting abhorrent amounts on armor a thicker belt, achieved nada by doing so.
Its a bit like the joke that the surgery went very well, though the patient died.

You continue to use an example of layered armor prove the alleged effectiveness level of two separate and independent armor thicknesses. Two entirely different situations.

At least according to you it seems, but you seem to be rather alone with this notion.

Considering the US and UK designers managed to largely adhere to a 35,000 ton imposed tonnage limit yet field battleships with equal or more guns and equal to heavier armor (part of which was due to the weight savings incurred by using triple and quadrupple turret designs), i'd say it was the UK/US designers who were ahead.

Well US designers did pretty well in designing a bit more compromised ships that were inferior in some aspects but with overall with a very good blend of characteristics, especially considering the different operational enviromen.
The UK designers on the other hand succeed in building ships which had but half the operational range of the Bismarck they couldn't keep up anyway, and in battles usually lost some 40% of their "weight saver" quadrupple turrets that were so overcomplicated in order to save weight and were offered such low level of protection that actually raises the question why were they protected at all..? Getting six guns for the price of ten doesn't quite seem to me as deal of century to me, rather then a case when someone wants to get so much and gets nothing in the end.
Funniest part of all, the UK designers eventually reverted to a similiar 4x2 layout on their next battleship class as on the Bismarck's.

As for the use of "heavier" armor, IMHO it speaks volumes about the ineffiency of its use on UK and US battlships, since at practical battle ranges, Bismarck was better protected (actually immune for vitals), whereas US or UK battleships were vulnerable to enemy guns at most ranges.

Again you misquote me. I relayed Garzke, a naval architect by profession, who stated that a 3 x triple arrangement costs less weight to the overall design vs. a four x twin gun design. The online source you goggled does not refute this.

I don't recall quiting an online source. I have quoted Brower's book, in addition I have shown and proved that the Germans decided against triple turrets because they would add to the weight of the ship, and not decrease it, as you suggest. The figures for turret weights and dimensions came from Campbell, again not an online source.

And because they had thicker armor.

Nope, Littorio as has been shown had entirely compareable armor protection as Bismarck's turret.
That's why I used it as a comparison in the first place - similar guns in a similarly protected turret.
The reason why Littorio's turrets are heavier is simple because they have to be much larger to mount three guns instead of two. Littorio's triple turret's had a barbette diameter was 13.19 meter vs 10 meters on Bismarck twin 38cm and 11 meters on the H-classes twin 16" guns.
Its a simple fact that to armor larger surfaces, you will need more armor, which is making it heavy.

You simply keep repeating something you can't prove.

As already mentioned by RCAFson, Littorio's turrets were rather on the heavy side, a symptom of that nation's issue with weight creep in the overall design.

Unfortunately turret weight has little to do with chauvinism but the type and number of guns used.

US triple turrets were lighter, yet sported bigger guns.

Bigger guns, huh? Oh, well, let's take a lookie via Campbell:

US 16"/45, 1430 tons triple turrets, gun being 18.694 m long, 97 tons each (without breech), muzzle velocity a modest 701 mps
Italian 15"/50, 1595 tons triple turrets, gun being 20.720 m long, 111 tons each, muzzle velocity - 850 mps

German 38 cm/52, 1050 ton twin turrets, gun being 19.630 m long, 111 tons each, muzzle velocity a 820 mps
German 40.6 cm/52 (16"),1452 ton twin turrets. Guns being 21.130 m long, 160 tons each, muzzle velocity a 810 mps

The pattern is clear. Powerful guns of high ballistic performance (such as the Italian or German high velocity guns) are heavier, longer, and as a result require a larger dimensioned turret (the gun needs to be balanced, recoil issues etc.). More guns in a turret require a larger turret of course, and a larger turret is heavier, all things equal.

It is obvious that the US main turret designs saved weight by compromising the guns ballistic performance. Therefore, its a silly example to compare the Italian 15" with the highest muzzle velocity of them all, vs. the US 16" which is a howitzer by comparison.

Unlike you claim that they mounted 'bigger guns', the US 16" is actually the smallest and lightest of all of them. Of course this is not news - howitzers require lighter, smaller carriage than field guns, too.

Individually they were also heavier than Bismarck's twin but also carried much thicker armor, made possible by use of triples in the overall design, which on the whole was also less bloated than Bismarck.

Well I guess "less bloated" is a PC word in your vocabulary for a "compromised" design. The Bismarck class was, of course, much less compromised than US Battleships, which had to sacrifice several good aspects that the Bismarcks or Vittorio Venetos possesed in one package - speed, high velocity guns etc.

Your argument about is a bit like when an ugly girl boasts about being virtuous, even if its out of necessity.

At this point you would need keep isolating the individual turret weights of the Littorio vs. Bismarck and continue ignoring that a four twin vs. 3 triple in terms of weight involves more than just the sum of the turret weights.

Now, THAT would be a complete misrepresentation of what I have been saying. My analysis was NOT, repeat, NOT limited to the consideration of the turret weights. I have already shown, with a practical example, I have taken into total
- turret weights
- barbette weights, and
- neccessary citadel lenght (ie. lenght belt and armor deck).

These show convincingly that four triple turrets have no advantage over four twin turrets, in fact the opposite seems to be true. The advantage of having one less turret seems to have been more than outweighted by the fact that larger dimensioned turrets are required, with larger diameter barbettes.

As opposed to this, you have been unable to present any evidence at all, apart from keeping repeating the same. It makes a very unconvincing argument, and a case closed as far as I am concerned.

 

[Kurfürst]

To give some idea of the relative size of turret and barbette size of Littorio's tripe and Bismarck's twin 38 cm turrets:

 

[Nikademus]

As for the use of "heavier" armor, IMHO it speaks volumes about the ineffiency of its use on UK and US battlships, since at practical battle ranges, Bismarck was better protected (actually immune for vitals), whereas US or UK battleships were vulnerable to enemy guns at most ranges.

Sure she was.

I don't recall quiting an online source. I have quoted Brower's book, in addition I have shown and proved that the Germans decided against triple turrets because they would add to the weight of the ship, and not decrease it, as you suggest. The figures for turret weights and dimensions came from Campbell, again not an online source.

The only thing you said was "see Brower" whose commentary regarding triples vs twins consisted of one sentence and did not say what you claimed it to say, nor did it refute Garzke's design commentary.

Nope, Littorio as has been shown had entirely compareable armor protection as Bismarck's turret.

If you can't read english.

Bigger guns, huh? Oh, well, let's take a lookie via Campbell:

US 16"/45, 1430 tons triple turrets, gun being 18.694 m long, 97 tons each (without breech), muzzle velocity a modest 701 mps
Italian 15"/50, 1595 tons triple turrets, gun being 20.720 m long, 111 tons each, muzzle velocity - 850 mps

German 38 cm/52, 1050 ton twin turrets, gun being 19.630 m long, 111 tons each, muzzle velocity a 820 mps
German 40.6 cm/52 (16"),1452 ton twin turrets. Guns being 21.130 m long, 160 tons each, muzzle velocity a 810 mps

The pattern is clear. Powerful guns of high ballistic performance (such as the Italian or German high velocity guns) are heavier, longer, and as a result require a larger dimensioned turret (the gun needs to be balanced, recoil issues etc.). More guns in a turret require a larger turret of course, and a larger turret is heavier, all things equal.

I believe i said "bigger", not heavier. The USN 16in Mk6 was a special lightened version of the older 16in Mk 5/8 gun, the latter which weighed in at 117 tons. Despite the lighter weight, this gun still fired a bigger shell than Bismarck with a bigger chambric volume vs. the German weapon. Shells fired were either a 2700lb or 2240lb shell. Lighter gun weight per barrel + additional weight savings for the overall BB design by use of triples allows for equal or more armor and firepower on a smaller displacement. If it makes you feel better the 16in weapons of the Iowa class weighed in at 133 tons, heavier than Bismarck's.

It is obvious that the US main turret designs saved weight by compromising the guns ballistic performance. Therefore, its a silly example to compare the Italian 15" with the highest muzzle velocity of them all, vs. the US 16" which is a howitzer by comparison.

Indeed. a chamber life of 395 rounds vs. 180-210 rounds for the German weapon and a whopping 90 for the Italian. All this with excellent vertical penetrative capabilities and much superior horizontal penetrative capability in comparison to the German and Italian weapons. Thats some compromising on the ballistic performance.

Well I guess "less bloated" is a PC word in your vocabulary for a "compromised" design.

Nope. Boated means bloated.

Now, THAT would be a complete misrepresentation of what I have been saying. My analysis was NOT, repeat, NOT limited to the consideration of the turret weights. I have already shown, with a practical example, I have taken into total
- turret weights
- barbette weights, and
- neccessary citadel lenght (ie. lenght belt and armor deck).

All you've given is turret weight on the Littorio. You threw in vague assumptions regarding the weight of the barbettes.

As opposed to this, you have been unable to present any evidence at all, apart from keeping repeating the same. It makes a very unconvincing argument, and a case closed as far as I am concerned.

Why do you keep coming back then?

 

[parsifal]

Guys

This is a very good discussion so far, but i fear it is beginning to lose some objectivity, as people allow thei emotions to take over. We are all entitles to opinions. We are not re-fighting the war here.

I tend to approach these discussions from an operational results point of view rather than fropm a pure technical srgument. Operational results cannot be easily refuted, and are obvious to even the most casual observer. These are some of the observations I think worth stopping and thinking about.

There is is no doubt the Royal Navy feared the potential of the Bismarks as a battleship. The ship must herefore be considered as a very powerful battle unit. If it was any sort of paper dragon, the British would not have expended so much energy hunting her down and sinking her. And denigrating her capabilities in the end also denigrates the capabilities of those ships that faced her.

I think it also true that when the test came she showed a number of nearly contradictory qualities. On the one hand she proved very difficult to sink, and may in fact have been scuttled rather than sunk. I think this demonstrates very clearly her protection insofar as hull intergrity was concerned.

However, and on the other hand, her main armement and ability to retaliate was short lived. She ceased resistance with her main guns after only 35 minutes from memeory, and even though she may have been a sitting duck at the time of her demise, this only serves to clarify that her protection of her upper works, and her combat systems was prone to failure due to damage. She might be unsinkable, but she was certainly very stoppable, as the initial torpedo hits on her demonstrate, and the gunnery action further shows.

Similarly Scharnhorst showed that her biggest asset was her speed, once this was removed, she was fairly easily disabled. Again it took a while to sink her, but as an offensive unit she was defeated in fairly short order.

Whether British modern Battleships would fare any better, its hard to say. The older battlewagons fared quite well against the Italian battleships, including the new ones, so I find it a little strange that we are now saaying British Battleships are outclassed. The Brit heavies did quite well at North Cape, deid well enough agaiunst the Bismark, and generally were able to intimidate the Italians at will after taranto, at least whilst they BBs and carriers in the Med.

So INO it is neither true to say she was a dud, or a paper tiger, nor is true to claim she was unstoppable, or vastly superior to her allied contemporaries. She was a great ship, with great power, but she had weaknesses just like any other ship...

 

[Glider]

Nicely put.