Ark Royal vs Bismark

[parsifal]

The British were in a hurry to finish her off because of fuel concerns. Most of the Destroyers had already turned back, and my best guess is that the british simply did not believe they had completely overpowered her so quickly. If the heavy units left the scene, they would do so for several daysbecause of the fuel issue. So the BBs basically rolled up, emptied their magazines into the bismarck asnd then pulled back.

 

[RCAFson]

So the BBs basically rolled up, emptied their magazines into the bismarck asnd then pulled back.

AFAIK, KGV and Rodney only fired about a 1/3 of their main armament ammo at Bismarck.

 

[renrich]

The Graf Spee had only cruiser type armor and it was penetrated many times during the battle. Reportedly her boiler room was penetrated by an eight inch shell from Exeter.

 

[tail end charlie]

The Graf Spee had only cruiser type armor and it was penetrated many times during the battle. Reportedly her boiler room was penetrated by an eight inch shell from Exeter.

The Graf Spee was a pocket battleship using welded construction and diesel engines which allowed more armour and heavier guns 11 inch and 5.7inch against the exeters 8 and Ajax and Achillies 6inch. The Exeter was quickly out of the battle and the ajax and achillies were also heavily damaged.

The point I was making was that even the biggest battleship could be rendered almost useless with a few hits. For example one hit on a turret on exeters front turret didnt penetrate the turret but killed almost everyone on the bridge and rendered the turret inoperable. The basic thinking about ships didnt change substantially from Trafalgar to 1939 bigger guns more and fire power which could be rendered useless with one lucky hit from the enemy or a small advance in armour piercing (time delay) shells (like at jutland)

 

[pinsog]

pinsong

that is pretty much what happened, there has always been a discussion as to whether she was sunk or scuttled

from wiki

Bismarck continued to fly her ensign. With no sign of surrender, despite the unequal struggle, the British were loath to leave Bismarck. Their fuel and shell supplies were low, a demonstration of how difficult it was for a battleship to sink a similar unit, even in an unbalanced engagement; however, when it became obvious that their enemy could not reach port, Rodney, King George V and the destroyers were sent home. Norfolk had no torpedoes left, so Dorsetshire launched three 21-inch (533 mm) torpedoes at comparatively short range, which may have hit Bismarck. The battleship's upper works were almost completely destroyed but her engines were still functioning, although Johannes "Hans" Zimmermann, a boiler room stoker who survived, confirms that salt water had entered the boiler feed lines causing the engineers to reduce speed to seven knots, fearing an explosion,[51] and the hull appeared to be relatively sound; therefore, rather than risk her being captured, survivors have said the order to scuttle and then abandon ship was given. Many of the crew went into the water, but few sailors from the lower engine spaces survived. As Captain Lindemann was presumed killed with all officers after the bridge was hit by a 16-inch (410 mm) shell, it is unclear whether he could have given the order to scuttle.

Yes, I was aware of what happened. My question was, why would they continue to fire at Bismarck with naval cannon after they had disabled her weapons, when they could have fired torpedoes into her from point blank range. If I had been in charge, I would have ceased fire and ordered all of my destroyers to make torpedo runs from 5 or 600 yards, all on one side. Just seems to me like this would be a more effective way to sink her than naval gunfire would be.

 

[Kurfürst]

The KGV class had extensions to the belt forward and aft of the main belt, and the deck armour was also extended forward and aft of the main belt, so her protected length was greater then the length of the citadel.

Its a bit a matter of defintition, but as far as I am aware, this was only splinter protection, generally not considered protected lenght (since it doesn't really offer protection).

Obviously Bismarck's belt did not make it "completely safe from flooding from a large number of enemy guns at just about any range" since 2 of the 3 14in hits by Prince of Wales caused heavy flooding on Bismarck and left her "...listing 9 degrees to port and her bow lost 2 metres of freeboard...".

That's why I said large number of guns, and not all kind of guns.

Bismarck's inefficient use of armour left her main belt armour being too shallow and a 14in shell dived under it to cause damage to Bismarck's machinery spaces and cause a 9 degree list.

Appearantly the King George V class's use of belt armor was even more inefficient, since even though they used a very deep and thicker belt, at much greater expanse of weight, Bismarck's 15" shells was still capable of diving under it and cause similiar flooding, despite the shell not exploding properly. That's lucky because KGV's internal bulkhead was somewhat weaker than on Bismarck.

As for the 14" hitting the German ship under the belt, it didn't damage or get into the machinery rooms. The 45mm torpedo bulkhead contained the explosion, but iirc some weld seams broke and water poured in. The design itself seems quite sound to me, the workmanship on the welds less so - appearantly a common problem of the era.

As a result one of the four electric generator room was flooded, however it was of little consequence since the ship had 200% reserves in that regard (redundancy again!). IIRC after the battle water was pumped out, and the leaks contained, the generators re-started again, but later a torpedo hit the same damaged spot and tore up the welds again, and the generator room was flooded again.

 

[Kurfürst]

Part III.

As explained, belt armor alone does not equate to protected bouyancy. The longer belt represented a larger target of thinner armor that could be more easily penetrated.

So if I don't use any lenght of belt on a ship, the ship becomes invulnerable because following your logic, it can't be hit at all...? Nah!

A belt that is penetrated does not protect bouyancy of any kind.

By this logic again using an armor belt is entirely useless, since all except Yamato's could be rather easily penetrated at normal battle ranges.

If that is now your position then one can conclude that Bismarck's longer thinner belt armor was more wasteful than the stronger belts of certain other designs.

This a strange kind of logic - a belt is wasteful if it does not fullfill its function: protect the vitals and prevent flooding as much as possible. Bismarck's vertical armor scheme (belt + turtle deck) was the best of all protecting the vitals, and yes it was incapable of providing much protection against the largest hits below the waterline. This doesn't seem to have been much a problem in practice since as everyone agrees, she proved to be damn hard to sink. Appearantly the design was compensated for this weakness in other areas - sheer size, subdivision, large beam that made counterflooding easy.

In comparison the stronger belts of certain other designs were entirely incapable of preventing either flooding, or catastrophic damage to the vitals. The thickest vertical belt used on the KGV was incapble of withstanding holing out to 23 800 yards against contemporary 15" guns, and shells could enter the magazines out to 21 000 yards. Ka-boom vs a bit of seawater in the laundry room. Its an easy choice IMHO.

Bismarck's bouyancy was not threatened by the bow hit. Lutzow's situation i've gone over already.

We agree tha the ship was not endangered directly due to bow hits, however flooding in the bow from a passing shell (which you consider ideal) caused temporary loss of speed and bow-down. Its not an imminent danger, but can be a problem in a long-run battle.

Lutzow sank as a result of hits to the bow causing flooding, I think we can agree on that. Yes there were other factors contributing to the loss.

However the idea that the ends of the ships are sacrificial in their nature and need no protection at all does not seem to have been much accepted with designers

that is incorrect.

I am afraid you are the one being incorrect here. Okun:

"The bow of the BISMARCK was essentially unarmored except for very thin 0.787" (20 mm) Wh deck plating at the fourth deck level below the waterline extending about a third of the way toward the bow from the forward armored transverse bulkhead of the Citadel and light belt plating at the waterline to reduce the chance of fragments causing leaks. This level of protection of the bow was normal for ships of that period - some had no reinforcement at all of the bow area."

I never said there was a middle belt on Bismarck. Hood was used as an example demonstrating the weight penalties of having multiple belt's of varying thicknesses and the restrictions it imposes on primary belt armor depth and thickness, as well as demonstrating the added vulnerability to modern heavy shellfire.

Agreed, but I think the analouge between Hood and Bismarck is a bit far fetched - Hood was simply underarmored, Bismarck wasn't.

The designer's insistance on provisioning an upper belt of 145mm cost weight and took away displacement that might have been used to thicken the primary belt.

Yes it might have been used to thicken the primary belt, of course! But then the same if not more armor weight would have to be added to the barbettes, the secondary turrets barbettes, and the main armored deck to compensate for it. As it already explained, the use of the high 145mm belt was more weight efficient in the overall protection scheme of the ship.

This belt would be of no use against heavy shellfire and as mentioned the upper belt's function in keeping out medium caliber shellfire proved to be an overestimation as well.

As noted the 145mm rendered the barbettes below the oberdeck virtually immune to the largest shells calibers, and it was also immune to the secondary guns of British battleships and the main armament of British vessels up to cruisers, while still providing adequate protection against 8" calibres.

Reducing barbette thickness behind such a belt does not compensate for a singular thicker layer of armor.

The Italians politely disagree - the use of seperate 70mm decapping belt with a 280mm belt behind it proved to offer considerably higher ballistic protection than equivalent weight and thickness found on certain other designs of the era.

The French also seem to disagree here as they used a - albeit much thinner - turtle deck behind their belt armor to provide additional protection, much like Bismarck did.

Seperate layers of armor thicknesses are weaker balistically than one single thickness. The same principle applies to deck armor. A single homogenous layer of deck armor is stronger than either two seperate decks who's thickness equals that of the single deck that consists of two layers of armor sandwiched together.

Its true for homogenous armor, ie. the type used on the decks. But only for them, and without considering other factors - yawing induced by penetrating several layers of armor etc.

Vertical armor used on naval vessels was face hardened however, with the surface of the armor hardened to extreme levels, designed to shatter projectiles nose on impact, grossly reducing penetration capabilities or even breaking up the projectile and rendering it inert. For this reason projectiles were built with a sacrificable armor piercing cap, designed to be shattered by the face hardened top layers of armor, so the actual nose of the AP projectile can do the penetration.

As an anti-anti solution, the Italians started using seperated decapping plates (70mm seperate plates outside the main armor belt) on the 1930s VV battleships. It was designed to strip the AP projectile from is armor piercing cap, so when it actually hit the main armor (280mm thickness), it would shatter on impact.
Bismarck's 145mm when hit would perform the same function, it would certainly strip the AP projectile of its AP and ballistic cap, and slow it down a bit, and the round would shatter on impact when actually hitting the barbette - down to ranges of 5000 yards or so as per Okun's FACEHARD program.

This is an equivalent of the protection offered by single 30" face hardened plate, but using much less weight.

This is not supported by any research I have read including Garzke and Dunn's extensive study of the class (Axis Battleships of WWII) I would be interested in seeing evidence to support this declaration.

I suggest then to turn to George Elder, he lurks on several naval boards.

In any case, the theory that Germans would only use a 145mm belt because of their fear of destroyer attacks distressingly lacks evidence. The Scharnhorst class was already adequately protected against such threats with a 50mm top belt, and there wasnt any serious need to triple its ballistic protection, if destroyers were a concern.

Compared to the Scharnhorsts, the Germans added 95mm thickness to the top belt (50 -> 145mm) on one deck level height, and then shaved off some 120mm from four barbettes (from 340mm down to 220mm below the oberdeck) on two deck levels height, and yet got much better barbette protection, apart from the other benefits.

Now assuming one deck on the Bismarck was 2 meter (somewhat irrelevant as the same is assumed for the barbettes), the math goes as follows:

Added armor weight of upper side belt: 170 m (citadel lenght) x 2 m (assumed height of one deck) x 2 (as they are on both sides) x .095 = 64 m3.
This is the volume. To get the added weight, multiply with 7.8 (density of steel, ton per cubic meter for those metrically challanged : ca. 500 tons added.

Now, 120 mm was shaved off from four barbettes, each 10 meter in diameter.

Volume is roughly 2rPhi x 4 (number of barbettes) x 4m (decks) x 0.120 = 3.14 x 10 x 4 x 4 x .120 = 60 m3. To get the weight reduction, as above, 60m3 x 7.8 t = 470 tons.

So balance sheet:
+ 500 tons added to the top belt
- 470 tons shaved off from the barbettes
- and unknown amount but probably quite substantial amount that didn't need to be added to the main armor deck, the secondary barbettes.

Result: barbettes below the Oberdeck are now completely safe from even the largerst caliber shells due to decapping effects (tell the Italian designers they weren't), the protection offered by the main armored deck is boosted, the whole citadel is completely immune up to 6" as has reasonable protection against 8" shellfire up to around 15-16 000 feet (a small window, as only the top belt becomes vulnerable, but the top deck and the main belt is still safe).

Of course it can be suggested that the guy who designed both Scharnhorst and Bismarck simply didn't thought of this and randomly drew lines, took away armor and put it elsewhere at Wilhelmshaven or whereever but I simply do not buy it.

 

[Kurfürst]

Part II.

any hit on the main belt would be rejected into the upper works, as you are well aware, and make mess of the laundry room but at least the ship doesn't go kaboom or to a full stop.

Where data and power transmission systems are located as well.

If you mean fire control data, the forward communications tube was behind a 220 mm thick armored barbette of 1 meter in diameter, running from the station down to the main armored deck. Good luck with that after going through the belt, bouncing back from the main armored deck. The FC rooms (two of them, one aft, one fore) were under the main under deck.

The rear one was the same, but of 50mm thickness, certainly enough to keep fragments out, and keep it safe - an issue only if the forward FC post already fallen out (in practice, neither of the three FC stations were lost to this, but to direct hits on the FC towers).

I am cuirous about what kind power transmission systems were located there, and were vulnerable. I doubt power for the main turrets were exposed in this manner - they had local, electrically driven hydraulics. I absolutely doubt anyone would have designed the electric lines in the most complicated manner, to run above the main armor deck, when it could be lead simply and perfectly safe under the Panzerdeck and through the barbettes. It would seem like a major design failure, especially from a Navy that was there at the largest dreadnaught battle ever at Jutland.

Placing the deck armor on top of the primarry belt increases the area of protected bouyancy against heavy shellfire. A splinter deck underneath the primary armor deck (as provisioned on USN battleships) was an integral part of the A/N system as it was meant to catch any fragments resulting from shell impacts on the primary armor deck...either shell fragments and/or deck armor fragments keeping the below spaces intact.

Yes but to stop shell fragments you need to spread additional 20-30mm worth of armor over a very large area (as decks are far larger in area than belts). Essentially wasted weight as it performs no other function.. And there's still the kaboom problem when something big hits the main belt at normal battle ranges, say, near the magazines..?

What is there between the top and bottom of the main belt that's worth protecting from plunging fire?

Don't be silly, a 145 mm armor plate is was certainly proof against UK (or anyone else's) 152mm shellfire.

See Garzke and Dunn (Axis Battleship of WWII) for more information.[/quote]

Please see Okun for more information.

"This armor is proof against all fragments and all nose-fuzed high explosive projectiles, even if they make a direct hit in most cases. At longer ranges it was proof against most cruiser guns, especially those firing large-cavity base-fuzed Common or Semi-Armor-Piercing (SAP) projectiles without armor-piercing caps, as did a great many cruiser guns at the time. Note that the British used such an uncapped Common projectile (CPBC) in their 6" (152 mm) cruiser guns, but they also used an unusual compromise 8" (203 mm) projectile that was an SAP design with an armor-piercing cap added (SAPC), which gave a rather good capability against medium-thickness face-hardened armor such as the BISMARCK's upper side hull at near right-angle impact, though it broke up against heavier armor or at high obliquity."

The following tables based on Okun's ballistic model show that the German 15cm naval gun mounted on the Bismarck, of roughly comparable ballistic performance to the British one, but firing uncompromised AP shells, had a capabilty to pierce Bismarck upper side belt at below 8000 yards distance. But it just does not occur to me economical to get within 8000 yards near a 50 000 ton battleship in a cruiser, hoping to get some lucky hits on the upper side belt with 6" guns...

So kindly show me a 6" gun that could be expected to penetrate a 145 mm face hardened plate at any reasonable range.

I disagree on that, it did not impose any weight penalty worth speaking of - [3 tripple vs 4 twin]

That is incorrect. See Garzke Dunn, Friedman, D.K Brown. for more details.

I am afraid you are incorrect here - see Jack Brower for more details. Triple three gun turrets were considered for Bismarck at around March-April 1935. They were dismissed on the basis of additional weight.

Also look up the weight of the barbettes and turrets of Vittorio Veneto (3x3) vs Bismarck (4x2). You will be surprised. For example Littorio's barbettes were 13 m wide - vs 10 meter for Bismarck - to accomodate the larger triple turrets (1595 t each ) with similiar protection as Bismarck's turrets (1052 t).

That's 3 x 1595 = 4785 t vs 4208 t for turrets alone, so Bismarcks four turrets actually weight less than Littorio's three. Of course there is an extra gun - for 500 tons extra (ie. the whole weight of the damned upper side belt of Bismarck), in an by all likelihood more cramped turret with lower rate of fire.

As for the barbettes - we talk about 1/4 fewer barbettes of some 1/3 greater diameter. When you consider citadel lenght - again 3x13m long barbettes vs. 4x10 meter long barbettes. Nothing's for free, and the math goes deeper than 3 turrets < 4 turrets.

PS: I promise this is my last wall o text in this thread. I guess we covered it very well already.

 

[delcyros]

Was BISMARCK´s armour protection system based on an older ww1 scheme? Superficially, one may get the impression, there is a comparably thick upper side belt (not as thick as ww1 grosse Kreuzer or Linienschiffe), a main armour deck with slopes and a comparably thick armoured weatherdeck. But the similarities are ending here. By intention, the ww1 german armour scheme tried to keep the projectile out of the entire hull (hence an up to 250mm thick upper side belt on BAYERN, which would be impenetrable unless suicidal close ranges are established or more modern shells are introduced, which was the case in german and austro-hungarian navies since 1912, in the RN during 1918 but not in the USN or RM or FN until the 20´s). The main armour deck in the BAYERN´s is only 30 to 50mm thick and not able to deflect major calibre projectiles striking at an angle less than 70 deg. It was meant as splinter protection, only.
In the BISMARCK class -on the other hand- deliberate studies of the all-or-nothing armour scheme (known since 1914 in the department K of the german navy) and the abilities of modern penetrators showed that "no amount of side amrour is powerful enough to stop modern APC unless it is enforced by a slope behind" (HOYER 1940). The main armour deck and the slopes were thicker, made from full grade armour material (and both, the slopes and main deck was made a bit harder than other Wh applications, ca. 250 BHN instead of 225 BHN) and deliberately in order to break uncapped projectiles when striking it. This makes penetration in an fit to burst condition less likely when penetration is possible. A great departure from ideas formulated in ww1. The less height of protection due to the lower placed armour deck is compensated by a minutelike subdivision of the spaces above and a larger extension of the protected area, called citadell towards both, bow stern. In addition to this protection against major calibre HE and medium calibre APC is given to the citadells upper part with the 50 to 80mm thick armoured weatherdeck and the 145mm KC/n face hardened upper side belt (contured 0 to 35 degrees, vertical midships, inclined at the ends of the citadell, where the main turrets are), followed by a 30 to 75mm thick splinter bulkhead behind.
A case could be made that this scheme may trigger the fuze of a major calibre APC, which otherwise would went out of the ship unexploded. But this depends on the exact nature of the fuze. In case of US and british fuzes, which deleted the double plate sensitivity and required a single, thick plate to trigger the fuze this may be the case. With german fuzes it´s not. They had single double plate sensitivity with graze function, meaning that any projectile striking a deck (even unarmoured) would usually trigger the fuze of an APC and many cases when two plates in short succession (even unarmoured) are penetrated would trigger the fuze as well. From that perspective, they expected enemy shells to behave like their own ones. AoN does depend on the fuze action, not on the strength of the own protective system. And in many cases the protection is not maximazed against major calibre impacts. The Immune Zone for the emebedded vitals (machinery spaces, ship centrals and magazines) of BISMARCK is much larger correspondingly and interestingly extends from very short range to medium range. AoN scheme´s provide protection for comparably long ranges, only. The experience of BISMARCK with the engagements at Denmark Street and her final battle proove that the designers choice to protect the mebedded vitals between 5000 yards and ~28000 yards* was a correct one, a protection in between 20000 and 30000 yards could have been made possible with AoN but decisive engagements happened at closer range. It may be possible to disable her with gunfire on the exposed vitals (turrets, CT) but this applies to basically every battleship. Even non penetrating hits may disable turrets.

*) based upon cassion tests carried out 1935 with a 1:1 installation of the ships armour protective system onboard former Pre Dreadnought SMS HESSEN. The ship was fired upon with the old 38cmL45 SK C/13 and the new 38cmL52 SK C/36 using APC L4,4 at distances between 1000m and 25000m. Neither via the deck nor via the sides could major calibre gunfire reach the vitals. The details to these tests are missing, from original documentation I only know the results but we would like to see shell by shell details as well.

 

[renrich]

My sources say that the Graf Spee's maximum armor thickness was around 3-3.5 inches. The 5.9 inch guns she carried had only splinter shields and could easily be put out of action by six inch guns or even smaller. My sources say that the engine room spaces of GS were penetrated by an 8 inch shell from Exeter and that was how the fuel and lubricant filtering system was badly damaged.

 

[Nikademus]

Hi,

I seriously doubt that the example of VITTORIO VENETO at MATAPAN from an British aerial torpedo is comparable to the experience of BISMARCK.

The stern area represents the Achilles Heel of a warship in general. Designers can only do so much in this area and there efforts therein and the difference in performance makes VV and Bismarck's experience very comparable. To say they hit in a different location is a straw man as few if any warships suffer hits in the exact same location as one another. Bismarck's stern proved more vulnerable given she contained a design flaw in the stern, one that impacted German warships of that period in general. The close proximity of her rudders to each other provided little redundancy and the triple screw arrangement which made steering efforts either bereft of the main rudders or with the rudders damaged practically impossible. (i.e. the ship had problems with directional stability unless it had a fully functional rudder) The similarity of Bismarck's stern damage to torpedo hits that struck Prinz Eugen and Lutzow supports the contention that part of the stern itself collapsed onto the rudders.

VV, also struck in the stern area makes for a valid comparison. The ship' designers stressed longitudinal separation of the props and rudder and also provided redundancy in the form of two aux rudders. So right off the bat, the situation would have been different even had a torpedo struck in the same spot as Bismarck (the aux rudders and four prop arrangement would have allowed a much better chance for aux steering) That VV suffered more flood damage was a natural consequence of the fact that the hull in the stern area containing the props was larger in comparison to the small lateral area of Bismarck's stem (where that ship's torpedo hit occurred) and is ultimately irrelevant. Neither ship's safety in terms of sinking was threatened. GM had nothing to do with a need or no need for counter flooding The critical factor in both cases was mobility. Bismarck was made immobile and would most likely have remained so even had Luthjens agreed to try to blow off the damaged equipment illregardless of the sea state. The calmer sea state was a helpful factor for VV but the greater redunancy and lateral seperation of her props and primary rudders with provision for aux steering also factored.

I would also liek to refer once more to the 2nd torpedhit sustained by the BISMARCK in this event. NIKEDAMIUS mentioned that according to W. Garzke, the hit resulted in tearing damage to the TB´s welding seams, resulting in minor progressive flooding beyond it.
I challange Garzke and his interpretation. It is wrong from two points: At first, when he wrote this, there was no wreckage analysis aviable, which could support his speculation and survicors testimony point to different behavior of the TB (which again later was confirmed by wreckage analysis conducted with video documentation of the torpedo bulkhead)

Garzke and Dunn re-analyzed Bismarck and her loss after the ship was found and filmed. This analysis does take into account the recent expeditions to Bismarck on the ocean floor. They also take into account crew survivor stories. . You continue to emphasis "wreckage analysis" (i.e. video documentation) to prove that Bismarck's TDS was never penetrated. Examining a wreck under the ocean is what a former associate of mine (Author Richard Worth) once likened to navigating a funhouse with a little flashlight. Yes, the entire wreck is "visible" however much of the hull is not open to detailed inspection. Despite this, you continue to claim that "wreckage analysis" shows that none of the torpedo hits penetrated the TDS and that "crew accounts" refute Garzke and Dunn's analysis. Both counts are wrong. But's its clear to me that your not going to take my word for this so rather than waste more time on it, I'll just quote Mr. Worth's post from 4 years back regarding Cameron's expedition, wrecks on the ocean floor in general and such with. He worded it better than I've come up with thus far and I grow weary of having "CAMERON" pushed into my face, so henceforth I will not comment in detail on his "wreckage analysis" further.


I'm sure there are any number of war wrecks on the ocean floor without any obvious fatal damage. As I pointed out previously, Bismarck's scuttling damage is not visible either.
In the Bismarck photo thread, someone recently posted a nice picture showing the wreck with an ROV hovering over it. The entire wreck is clearly visible. If only that were a realistic depiction! In reality, inspection of the wreck is somewhat akin to navigating a fun house with only an Itty Bitty Booklight to see by. What little is visible tends to be disorienting. And as mentioned already, much of the hull is not open to inspection anyway. A portion of the starboard (?) side below the waterline is visible, with the outer plating missing. This in itself caused some debate as there was difficulty in determining exactly what was visible beyond the missing hull shell--was it the torpedo bulkhead or the bulkhead for the fuel blister? I believe they decided it was the torpedo bulkhead.

[author Richard Worth -aka "Tiornu"] commenting on Bismarck's discovery and war wrecks in general in 2006.

. Secondly, BISMARCK´s torpedo bulkhead was not welded. According to the BAUBESCHREIBUNG SCHLACHTSCHIFF F the torpedobulkhead of BISMARCK (and TIRPITZ for that matter) was rivetted and not welded, because it was feared that seams of welds may fail under
stress. The HINDENBURG class was scheduled to have welded torpedobulkheads, not the BISMARCK class. W. Garzke made a mistake.

Garzke and Dunn "Axis Battleships of WWII"

With the progressive increase in the use of electric arc welding in German warship construction, the Bismarck and Tirpitz were 90-95% welded. Welding was used in some connections in the non-heat-treated armor plate, since a special electrode for this type of armor steel had been perfected. In both ships, the entire hull and all the non-face-hardened armor plate, with the exception of the torpedo bulkhead and the lower armor deck, were welded. The structure the principle decks was also welded. Seams and butts were welded.

It would appear the authors made no error after all. You are correct in that the "H" class battleships were to have fully welded torpedo bulkheads as part of their design.

Garzke and Dunn also made a mistake in considering the effects of the final torpedoattack to be substantial in the sinking. This was in part driven by an attempt to proove that the measures of the german crew to scuttle the ship had little to do with the sinking and only hastened the event.
Subsequent research on the other hand indicated that the ship had enough buoyoncy reserve to stay afloat for at least two days when the torpedoing was carried out by RODNEY and DORSETSHIRE, assuming progressive cumulative flooding takes place.

I don't think they made a mistake at all. The crux of your argument continually orbits around the original two 18in torpedo hits before the crippling third 18in hit. The authors concluded based on crew interviews, design study and other evidence (including the expeditions) that the Bismarck's SPS was "adequate" against these weapons with minor leakage reported after the torps struck, aided in part by the armor belt. They go on to conclude that the SPS was inadequate vs. the 21 inch torpedoes and that they made substantial contributions to the ship's sinking. In these instances you claim that "wreckage analysis" proves that none of these hits did much either which is baloney as is the accusation that the authors are trying to play up "Scuttled" vs. sunk.
(continued)

 

[Nikademus]

CAMERON is no naval architect, but so is GARZKE.

James Cameron is an accomplished film director and producer. His documentary on Bismarck is an excellent piece of work. Mr. Cameron however, as stated, is not a naval architect nor professional historian. His examination of Bismarck is NOT the all encompassing analysis that you continually repute it to be.

William Garzke Jr. graduated with a degree in Naval architecture and Marine engineering. He further gained a Masters in applied mathematics and was indeed employed as a naval architect.

Robert Dulin is a US naval academy graduate and has won honors for his detailed study of the Yamato class battleships. Both Mr. Dulin and Professor Garzke have studied battleship design , construction and these ship's operational careers for over three decades. Yes, I do place them in high regard. That's why I made the investment to obtain their works.

Another point of discussion refers to the YAMATO´s TDS. As I said,
ANY main bulkhead beeing of dissimilar material is a cause of errors and failures

The defect in Yamato's TDS was not due to two different materials being in close approximation to each other. It was defective because of the joint itself, the design of which permitted the armor belt above it to rotate under explosive loads, driving the supporting structure through at the joint through the longitudinal bulkhead inboard of the armor belts. This defect was not present in SoDak or Iowa.

The relevant document is
US technical mission to Japan
No. S-06-2
Reports of damage to japanese warships, artcile 2 (42p.)
YAMATO(BB), MUSASHI(BB),
SHINANO (CV), TAIHO (CV).
Issued january 6th, 1946.

Thx for the document. I went back and checked Garzke/Dunn who's analysis post dates this report. I'll reiterate that Mr. Dunn graduated from the US naval academy and did an extensive study of the Yamato class. In researching for their book I'm sure historical documents like the one you cited were factored into it, particularily those created by prior USN investigators.

It appears too that I made an error in a previous post. The number of hits from torpedoes, based on Garzke and Dunn's work appears to be 20 vs. Musashi, not 10.

1027 - Frame 130 starboard
1138 - Frame 85/102/140 port
1217 - Frame 60 starboard
1253 - Frame 70/70 (port/starboard)/110/138 starboard /40 port
1445 - Frame 60/75/125/140x3/145/165 port /80/105 starboard

total 20. In addition there were 18 near misses from bomb hits, some of which added to the hull damage/flooding.
Yamato suffered 13 hits (11 certain, 2 probable) and at least 8 bomb hits.
1245 Frame 8 port
1259 Frame 123/150/192(probable) port
1342 Frame 123/131/142/148(probable) port/ 0125 starboard
1359 - 1402
133/153/211 port/150 starboard

Note the placement of the torpedo hits on Yamato. All but 2 to port. This is a direct reflection of the prior experience the USN had with Musashi which absorbed twice the amount of ordinance over an extended period of time before succumbing to progressive flooding. By concentrating on one side of the ship they were able to nearly halve the amount of ordinance needed in a shorter period of time. The above experience also meshes with Russell Spur's account of Yamato's last sortie in comparison and relation to Musashi.

To state that MUSASHI was the ship with most damage received by underwater damage ever is therefore grossly incorrect, when no more than a total of 6,000 lbs TORPEX was involved in the sinking of the ship (evenly placed starboard and port).
Considering the example of SCHARNHORST returns an equal number of torpedo hits sustained by the ship, but these were generally DD or CL based weapons and correspondingly had in between 750 and 805 lbs TORPEX each instead of 600lbs. It should also be noted that the YAMATO class is roughly twice the size of SCHARNHORST.

***
Scharnhorst was struck by 340kg warheads. About 749LB of TORPEX. However before the coup de'grace being administered by cruiser and destroyer attack, the Scharnhorst, mostly disabled and wrecked at this point and moving at only 5 knots had only been struck by 4 confirmed torpedoes. 2 more may have occurred as observed by the DD's during the coup de' grace period which would most likely have struck the armor belt directly given how low in the water the ship was sitting. She may have been struck by more as she was foundering but it can't be confirmed. I don't see how this concentrated pulse of damage against a crippled ship hardly puts her in the same league as Yamato.

 

[Nikademus]

I am afraid you are the one being incorrect here. Okun:

You said: "However the idea that the ends of the ships are sacrificial in their nature and need no protection at all does not seem to have been much accepted with designers "

Taken as a whole, yes your statement is incorrect. In an All or Nothing design (which Bismarck was not) the ends are considered sacrificial as they do not threaten the primary function and safety of the ship (Steering gear an exception of course) The armor deck in some A/N designs covers the ship beyond the citidel to some degree, for example the KGV class primary deck armor terminates at the forward armored bulkhead in front of A turret. Two decks down there is seperate section of deck armor to frame 65 (100mm) from Frame 65 yo 41 it thins to 62mm stretching to 9 providing light protection from bombs. Others, like Yamato had no deck armor forward of the citidel. Richelleu's primary deck armor terminates at Frame185 where it completes the roof to the forward primary armored bulkhead. Like KGV, the ship has a light 40mm stretch of deck armor from Frame 185 to 233 offering a small degree of protection from any exploding HE ordiance from above. Dunkerque's primary armor deck terminates at Frame 165 in front of A turret over the primary forward armored bulkhead. There is no armor protection from there to the bow. Littorio's deck armor thins to 70mm in front of A turret and terminates at Frame 199. From Frame 199 to 230(bow) there is no armor. Common factor in all these examples....the primary (main) armor deck thicknesses begin at the forward armored bulkhead representing the forpart of the armored citidel, completing the armored box meant to defend the ship against it's primary advesary type. (another BB's primary armament)

The Italians politely disagree - the use of separate 70mm decapping belt with a 280mm belt behind it proved to offer considerably higher ballistic protection than equivalent weight and thickness found on certain other designs of the era.

The Italian layered belt was an interesting experiment, one they placed great faith in. Tests against the system were mixed. 2 heavy shells were stopped, the third passed through. However this 'layered' belt still represents a single armor system comprising mulitple armor layers in contact with each other (also descried as a 'sandwich' armor combo) which is a different proposition vs. a shell passing through one seperate and independant layer of armor and then facing another seperate and independant layer a set distance away with no contact or mutual support. You quoted "Okun" multiple times so I know your aware of his views on this.

The Italian solution of multiple layers within a single armor system touches upon two imposing theories on armor resistance when the layers are in contact with each other (as was the case with the Italian layered belt, designed to encourage decapping). Theory 1 is negative - that with when you have a total thickness made up of two separate layers in contact, that as the projectile penetrates the outer plate, armor is pushed away with less sheer resistance opposing motion along the contact area. Theory 2 is positive - that the projectile must break two plates, where the initial energy may significant, and the back-up plate (or plates) support resistance of the first plate against plugging. British tests suggested that "layered" armor might prove stronger vs. a single layer armor of equal thickness. USN tests against layered deck armor suggested the opposite. According to Lorin Bird and Robert Livingston, combining the two theories layered armor (or sandwhich armor, however you want to term it), offers armor resistance from equal to near equal thickness should equal or slightly exceed total thickness, whereas resistance from unequal plates in contact would be based on 50% to 70% of the thinner plate plus greater thickness. Of additional note, British tests suggested an 11% increase (vs. panzer layered armor) while USN tests indicated resistance was 7.5 to 12.5% less than the total combined thickness. The prewar Italian test for what would become Littorio's layered armor belt as mentioned, returned mixed results.

The French also seem to disagree here as they used a - albeit much thinner - turtle deck behind their belt armor to provide additional protection, much like Bismarck did.

The French primary armor deck was placed on top of the belt. A lower armor deck was fitted in order to provide an additional layer of protection and to reinforce/buttress the armor belt. A teritary purpose was also to cover the steering gear. The French were most concerned circa 1935 about the threat of high level bombs and this influenced their design decisions. It was a good system but proved vulnerable to 16inch plunging fire which was able to more easily defeat the two seperate and unsupported armor thicknesses more easily vs. had they had a primary armor deck of one single thickness.

Vertical armor used on naval vessels was face hardened however, with the surface of the armor hardened to extreme levels, designed to shatter projectiles nose on impact, grossly reducing penetration capabilities or even breaking up the projectile and rendering it inert. For this reason projectiles were built with a sacrificable armor piercing cap, designed to be shattered by the face hardened top layers of armor, so the actual nose of the AP projectile can do the penetration.

None of which changes the fact that a single layer of armor is provides more resistance vs. seperate multiple layers. The italian example represents a single belt of armor which happenes to be made up of different materials in order to promote the idea of de-capping, which is not an exact science. They did not place a single thinner belt on the outer hull, followed by one or more "belts" internally to promote the shattering and breaking up of the shell. As mentioned their solution had merit but did not prove 100% effective in tests nor was the system tested in battle. The US and UK took a more conventional approach to 'decapping' with face hardened armor. The latter in particular approached the issue from a quality persective and worked to increase the effectiveness of their Cemented Armor (CA) for the KGV class. It's been estimated that this armor, vs. heavy caliber shells was 25% more effective than it's contemporaries. The USN developed heavy FH armor that proved best against medium caliber shellfire but suffered scalability issues against larger shells making it less effective than desired

If you mean fire control data, the forward communications tube was behind a 220 mm thick armored barbette of 1 meter in diameter, running from the station down to the main armored deck. Good luck with that after going through the belt, bouncing back from the main armored deck. The FC rooms (two of them, one aft, one fore) were under the main under deck.

The slope created by the low armor turtleback will help direct shells up into upper decks and superstructure. A battleship's systems are not all located under the primary armor deck. It is true that these systems (including radar and optical fire control systems) can't be fully protected on any battleship and soft kill/disablement is a viable alternative to outright sinking via catastrophic damage. The low slung armor belt also reduced, as mentioned the actual protected bouyancy of the ship.

Yes but to stop shell fragments you need to spread additional 20-30mm worth of armor over a very large area (as decks are far larger in area than belts). Essentially wasted weight as it performs no other function.. And there's still the kaboom problem when something big hits the main belt at normal battle ranges, say, near the magazines..?

Stopping shell fragments is an important consideration independent of how high or low the deck is placed. The Americans introduced this feature into their battleships on the correct acknowledgement that plunging shellfire is not a simple matter of rejection or penetration. Often armor spalling occurs even in situations where the shell itself is rejected. In other situations a partial penetration might be effected. Placing the armor deck higher, in addition to increasing the area of protected buoyancy also allows more solid protection of critical spaces from plunging fire. The lower splinter deck of SPS (Special Treatment Steel) thus enhances the protective effect provided by the primary armor deck.

So kindly show me a 6" gun that could be expected to penetrate a 145 mm face hardened plate at any reasonable range.

The ranges in which the British cruisers defeated it was apparently considered reasonable.

I am afraid you are incorrect here - see Jack Brower for more details. Triple three gun turrets were considered for Bismarck at around March-April 1935. They were dismissed on the basis of additional weight.

I did.....per Brower's text; "Nine 380mm guns in triple turrets were also considered because it would have meant an increase over the desired set displacement." This sentence does not refute Garzke's design commentary.

Also look up the weight of the barbettes and turrets of Vittorio Veneto (3x3) vs. Bismarck (4x2). You will be surprised

No, not surprised because the weight savings issue is not a simple matter of comparing turret weights. A 3 turret design allows weight savings overall when all factors are considered, and allows armor to be increased. Littorio's turrets to use one example were more heavily armored than Bismarck's and contained an additional gun barrel. Naturally they were heavier one for one vs. one of Bismarck's, hence your simple math exercise.

 

[RCAFson]

Its a bit a matter of defintition, but as far as I am aware, this was only splinter protection, generally not considered protected lenght (since it doesn't really offer protection).



That's why I said large number of guns, and not all kind of guns.



Appearantly the King George V class's use of belt armor was even more inefficient, since even though they used a very deep and thicker belt, at much greater expanse of weight, Bismarck's 15" shells was still capable of diving under it and cause similiar flooding, despite the shell not exploding properly. That's lucky because KGV's internal bulkhead was somewhat weaker than on Bismarck.

As for the 14" hitting the German ship under the belt, it didn't damage or get into the machinery rooms. The 45mm torpedo bulkhead contained the explosion, but iirc some weld seams broke and water poured in. The design itself seems quite sound to me, the workmanship on the welds less so - appearantly a common problem of the era.

As a result one of the four electric generator room was flooded, however it was of little consequence since the ship had 200% reserves in that regard (redundancy again!). IIRC after the battle water was pumped out, and the leaks contained, the generators re-started again, but later a torpedo hit the same damaged spot and tore up the welds again, and the generator room was flooded again.

The belt extensions on the KGV class ran along the waterline and tapered from full belt thickness 4.5 to 5.5in thick, so this was more than splinter protection.

The German 15in shell that dived under Prince of Wales belt was a dud, and if the fuse had functioned properly as Delcyros states:

In case of US and british fuzes, which deleted the double plate sensitivity and required a single, thick plate to trigger the fuze this may be the case. With german fuzes it´s not. They had single double plate sensitivity with graze function, meaning that any projectile striking a deck (even unarmoured) would usually trigger the fuze of an APC and many cases when two plates in short succession (even unarmoured) are penetrated would trigger the fuze as well.

it would have had it's fuse triggered upon hitting the water and exploded long before it got to PoW's hull. As it was the shell was had very little remaining momentum and caused very little flooding on PoW.

It is pretty obvious that flooding machinery spaces on ships damages them and Bismarck suffered flooding into her main machinery spaces, and this was because a 14in shell dived under Bismarck's shallow belt. The hit caused a generator room to flood completely and caused flooding into a boiler room, which later flooded completely:

The second shell struck the port side of Bismarck somewhere below the 320-mm main side belt in compartment XIV (in way of the fore bridge tower). This shell defeated the side protective system and exploded against the 45mm torpedo bulkhead. Fragments from the explosion penetrated the bounding bulkhead of the portside cable ways and the main transverse bulkhead between the forward port turbo-generator compartment and the port boiler room. The turbo-generator room quickly filled with water. The boiler room flooded at a much slower rate through tears in welded seams in the main subdivision bulkhead. These leaks were controlled by plugging the torn welds with canvas hammocks.7

Bismarck's Final Battle - Part 1

However, despite their supposedly superior fuses many of the 8 and 15in hits on Prince of Wales were duds.

 

[delcyros]

I don't consider german fuses to be superior, neither do I treat aon schemes beeing superior. in fact, additional splinter protection to the ship ends was refitted in many newer design ( VANGUARD). to be fair, grace funtions on fuses rarely statisfied designers expectations at obliquities ranging from 70 to 80 deg. the diving hit was no dud either, the projectiles fuse acted like designed. which hit on POW with 15 or 8in ones stroke enough armour to trigger the fuze else and making a path wnding in the ship without projectile damage involved? when you dig deeper, you loose argumentative ground in explaining non detonative impacts as duds in this case.
with regards to the 145mm upper side belt and it's effectiveness against cruiser fire, it's absolutely safe against british 8in and 6in projectiles. these were either common (6in) or soft capped SAP (8in). KC/n would always shatter the projectiles nose unless a hard cap is employed against it, resulting in inert charges and a ca. 1/3 increase in relative plate thickness. At any but very close distance, projectiles don't come through and if they do, the nose of the projectile will be shattered, the body broken in parts to be contained by the splinter bulkhead behind. for me at least, this is a very efficient protection.
what are Garzke's sources for MUSASHI's case beeing subject to 20 tt hits? He needs to dig out sources and a profound discussion to reject primary source evidence such as cited above. particularely because the source points in itselve to wrongly circulated damage conditions of this ship. I am interested to see his evidence.

 

[delcyros]

Splinter plates and their effect on major calibre projectiles lateral fragmentation (except the heaviest nose and base pieces) have been studied by Nathan Okun in his misc. armour article. therfore, against small filler (2-3,5%) APC, a splinterproof plate of at least 0,0805 cal thickness is required when the projectile detonates in 5 cal distance to the plate. this ramps up linearely to 0,12 cal thickness at contact. judgimg from his results, i consider the so called "splinterdeck" employed in US fast BB's with only 0.5 to 0.75 in thickness STS totally inadaequate in stopping major calibre projectile lateral fragmentation. At least 1.25 in and better 2.0 in STS are required to provide splinterprotection.

 

[delcyros]

Face hardened plate qualities differed considerably with the nations. US class A used a ver deep ultra hard face, which was made in an attempt to damage US projectiles, which by the standarts of this time were vietually indestructable. unfortunately, this created a fracture zone with the ductile back layer with correspondingly large scaling effects. against major calibre (11in and larger) shells this meant that the effective stopping power was lower than most other nations face hardened armour. The british CA had a very thin facelayer and against major calibre impacts it had very good stopping power, but not as good as is suggested here(25%), the advantage over us class A is more like 10% for 14 in projectiles. German KC/n was in the middle of both but closer to british CA than to US class A. tests against captured plates from TIRPITZ showed very good plate resistence to british 15in APC, with one plate having a very similar but lower resistance compared to british CA and four plates having a slightly better resistence. Italien Terni CA finally had the best 35% deep face layer and superior resistence to major calibre impacts. the difference acc to Nathan Okuns misc. armour properties is about 5 to 8% better than british CA or german KC/n.
it should be therefore correct to say that the italiens had an qualitative approach as well in top of their unique plate arrangement.

 

[Kurfürst]

None of which changes the fact that a single layer of armor is provides more resistance vs. seperate multiple layers.

Its not a fact, but repeating a the simple nonsense - otherwise you would be saying that armor designers are simply out of their minds when they use spaced, sandwiched armor etc. I don't think they are aiming at creating less effective systems.

The italian example represents a single belt of armor which happenes to be made up of different materials in order to promote the idea of de-capping, which is not an exact science. They did not place a single thinner belt on the outer hull, followed by one or more "belts" internally to promote the shattering and breaking up of the shell. As mentioned their solution had merit but did not prove 100% effective in tests nor was the system tested in battle.

That's seems like a rubber argument to dismiss the whole idea of shattering projectile - ironically all ships vertical armor still used face hardened armor just to promote this silly idea..!

In any case, the crux of the arguement wheater the use of the upper side belt was weight efficient.

Now, you cannot really argue it added weight because it just didn't - as seen before, the tons that went into allowed the same weight shaved off from the main barbettes. It came at no extra weight and presented many benefits in armor deck, scondary and main batterie barbette protection, plus effective protection against medium calibre shells.

Now if I understand correctly, you are arguing that the use of a 145 mm KC plate on the upper side belt and the use of a 220mm KC NA on the barbette (365 mm in total) was, as opposed to Okun's calculations, less effective in ballistic protection than a single 340 mm thick barbette? (In addition there seem to be a 30 mm splinter belt too near the magazines).

It would seem to me that in the worst case scenario, its at least as effective, given the weight speed and stability penalties imposed by the upper side belt would more than just compensate for the penalties of a multiple armor layers vs a single one.

However as you noted Italian tests showed that in two out of three cases, the 70 mm outer plate distanced 250mm from the main face hardened plate succeeded in stripping the projectile of its AP cap, which subsequently shatter on impact on the main face hardened plate. Now Bismarck's outer plating was double the thickness, and there were much more space between it and the barbette plus another 30 mm splinter belt. Given that all factors are much more beneficial for decapping the projectile, I'd say it would work even better than the Italian system and the projectile would simply shatter on impact.

The US and UK took a more conventional approach to 'decapping' with face hardened armor.

Well its a way of saying they were some 50 years behind the Germans and Italians in that regard.

The latter in particular approached the issue from a quality persective and worked to increase the effectiveness of their Cemented Armor (CA) for the KGV class. It's been estimated that this armor, vs. heavy caliber shells was 25% more effective than it's contemporaries.

I think delycrios already addressed this. In any case, neither US or UK vertical protection systems could not provide adequate protection for the vitals, so arguing about the details is a bit moot.

The slope created by the low armor turtleback will help direct shells up into upper decks and superstructure. A battleship's systems are not all located under the primary armor deck. It is true that these systems (including radar and optical fire control systems) can't be fully protected on any battleship and soft kill/disablement is a viable alternative to outright sinking via catastrophic damage. The low slung armor belt also reduced, as mentioned the actual protected bouyancy of the ship.

Let's make it clear what situation we are talking about - rounds that successfully penetrate the main belt near the waterline - otherwise they simply can't hit the turtleback slope located behind the belt, and the shell still has considerable energy to be bounced towards the superstructure before the fuse sets it off, ie. short range hits.

In this case, what do you think is the preferable end results?

a) The shell is directed up into upper decks and superstructure by the turtledeck present, and possibly ruining some of the non-vital systems of the ship
b) The shell happily continues straightly into the machinery or magazines and then it explodes there, as there's no silly turtle deck to stand in its path and deflect it upwards in a most stupid manner

You seem to be arguing that b) is preferable to a)..

Stopping shell fragments is an important consideration independent of how high or low the deck is placed. The Americans introduced this feature into their battleships on the correct acknowledgement that plunging shellfire is not a simple matter of rejection or penetration. Often armor spalling occurs even in situations where the shell itself is rejected. In other situations a partial penetration might be effected. Placing the armor deck higher, in addition to increasing the area of protected buoyancy also allows more solid protection of critical spaces from plunging fire. The lower splinter deck of SPS (Special Treatment Steel) thus enhances the protective effect provided by the primary armor deck.

Here you seem to be arguing that stopping shell fragments or armor spalling from plunging fire is more important than stopping entire shells effectively entering into the machinery or magazine spaces through the belt. I tend to disagree with your priorities. Yes splintering and spalling can be an issue, but its minor one compared to full sized shells going off effectively inside the ship, plus there is no reason why low mounted decks could not mount splinter protection below, too, if someone is very concerned with that issue.

The ranges in which the British cruisers defeated it was apparently considered reasonable.

You seem to have been stating that the upper side belt was supposedly vulnerable to 6" cruiser fire, now you switched the arguement that it was vulnerable to 8" guns, which is supposed to

Sorry but there's no point of arguing any further - despite asked several to support the notion you presented with something, you could not deliver anything.

The upper side belt was safe from 6" cruiser fire, as per Okun and the physical realities of this world.

I did.....per Brower's text; "Nine 380mm guns in triple turrets were also considered because it would have meant an increase over the desired set displacement." This sentence does not refute Garzke's design commentary.

Of course it does. It very much reads to me that three triple turrets were considered for Bismarck vs four twin turrets, and eventually they choose the same because four twin turrets were weighting less.
You claimed they weighted more. Which has been proven incorrect.

Littorio's turrets to use one example were more heavily armored than Bismarck's and contained an additional gun barrel.

Where on Earth you get they were more heavily armored than on Bismarck. Ie.

Littorio vs Bismarck turret thicknesses:

350mm / 360 millimetres (14 in) HG turret faces
200mm / 220 millimetres turret sides
200 / 180 (forward) or 150 vs 130-150 mm (aft) roofs

Simply what you claim that they were "more heavily armored" is completely incorrect - especially considering things like the many gun openings of the closely packed guns weakening ballistic resistance.

Naturally they were heavier one for one vs. one of Bismarck's, hence your simple math exercise.

They were heavier because they had to be 30% larger to accomodate a single gun. Each turret of Littorio weight some 500 tons more, and its not due to the extra gun per turret, which weighted about 100-120 tons at best. Each barbette of Littorio had to be 30% larger on the same account, and thus was 30% heavier and longer as well.

No, not surprised because the weight savings issue is not a simple matter of comparing turret weights. A 3 turret design allows weight savings overall when all factors are considered, and allows armor to be increased.

As proven above, the notion that using three triple turrets vs four twin turrets would be more weight efficient has no merit, in effect the opposite is true. At this point You would need to support your statement with something more substantial than simply repeating it I believe.

 

[Njaco]

Some really great info here - makes a great thread. And I have to give kudos to you guys for keeping it civil. Great stuff!!

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Some really great info here - makes a great thread. And I have to give kudos to you guys for keeping it civil. Great stuff!!

I agree Chris. As someone who has great interest in Naval topics, but no great knowledge to go along with it, I am thoroughly enjoying this thread. I just hope it stays civil.