Here in St Louis, Curtiss-Wright built a lot of A-25 dive bombers for the Army that just didn't get used in combat. The Army had been very "hot" on the idea of dive bombers in general at the very beginning of the war. At a top-level staff meeting on December 19th, 1941, it was noted in Gen Spaatz's section that "importance of Dive Bombers was stressed" to the extent that it was felt the Army "must develop and conduct research on possibility of converting light bombers...into dive bombers" much like what Germany had been doing all along, with less than positive results. So it's interesting to read that a year and a half later, 22 March 1943, a board of officers was convened "for the purpose of evaluating current dive bombers now in production; namely, the A-35, the A-24, and the A-25." They compared the 3 types in 4 areas: Provision for forward gun fire, ability to place a bomb on the target from a dive, ease of maintenance, and high speed at low altitudes. Then they described a process to decide about "future production of these types of aircraft (A-24, A-25, and A-35) for active theaters and recommendations as to types of aircraft to be used by dive bomber groups contemplated in the present program," under the umbrella of "tactical suitability in an active theater." The specific evaluation factors were: Vulnerability to hostile fighters; ability to take evasive action, including high speed; accuracy at the target compared to the fighter bomber types (A-36, P-51, and P-39) equipped with N-3A modified gunsight; ditto compared to the light bomber types (A-26, A-20) equipped with the same gunsight; and (no surprise here) Navy needs for a dive bomber type as opposed to Army needs for a dive bomber type or a fighter bomber type.
They put the 3 aircraft in the following "order of worth" based on flying characteristics, maintenance, and high speed: (1) A-25; (2) A-35; and (3) A-24. But then they immediately noted that "the three types are not tactically suitable in an active theater. They are extremely vulnerable to hostile fighter action and need close fighter support at all times, especially at the time of the individual dive, pull out, and reforming." They also found that none were fast enough to evade enemy fighters or even limit the number of their attacks on the dive bombers themselves.
But what surprised me was this: "The accuracy of these types at the target will not be equal to that of the fighter bomber type (A-36, P-51, P-39)." They naturally noted that these aircraft had better speed "and other fighter characteristics" for self-defense. They similarly remark that the A-26 and A-20 are also more accurate than dive bombers "against most targets." And they make the crucial point that "the Navy's need for a dive bomber does not indicate an Army need for a dive bomber" because of a very questionable assumption, that "hostile navies or task forces clash and the issue is quickly decided" thus limiting the scope, duration, and target types for Navy dive bombers that wouldn't apply to Army scenarios. But this in fact doesn't describe the lion's share of Navy attack missions, most of which aren't aimed at enemy fleets but at "power projection" type targets ashore. Carrier aircraft did to Japanese land forces in the Pacific what Army aircraft did to German land forces in Europe; most of the SBD and SB2C sorties were against land installations. The Navy had fighter-bombers too, of course; but they lacked carrier-borne equivalents to the Havoc and Invader and (surprisingly unmentioned by the Army) Marauder, so there was little choice but to use their Dauntlesses and Helldivers in ground attack roles as well. Still, the Army study does seem to be as much an attempt to justify an already-decided course of action than an attempt to map out such a course.
Anyway the Board recommended that Materiel Command "cease the procurement of dive bomber types...as soon as practicable" noting that "the flow of aircraft necessary during the cessation can be used in certain relatively inactive theaters and in the training of units being activated." They further recommended "that all manufacturing facilities released be made available for increased production of light bomber types (A-26, A-20) and fighter bomber types (A-36, P-51, P-39)" and "that fighter bomber types...be the types of aircraft used by dive bomber groups contemplated in the present program." The conversion of dive bomber factories to other types was only partially accomplished; delivery of A-24s ended that December, while A-25s took another few months to completely wind down. Certainly no P-51s or P-39s or any other fighter-bombers were manufactured in the massive Curtiss-Wright plant in St Louis where A-25s had been pouring out, so that part of the plan didn't materialize. In any event, I've often read that the Army decided it didn't need dive bombers, but this is the first time I've understood exactly what their reasoning was. Hope others find this as interesting as I did.
They put the 3 aircraft in the following "order of worth" based on flying characteristics, maintenance, and high speed: (1) A-25; (2) A-35; and (3) A-24. But then they immediately noted that "the three types are not tactically suitable in an active theater. They are extremely vulnerable to hostile fighter action and need close fighter support at all times, especially at the time of the individual dive, pull out, and reforming." They also found that none were fast enough to evade enemy fighters or even limit the number of their attacks on the dive bombers themselves.
But what surprised me was this: "The accuracy of these types at the target will not be equal to that of the fighter bomber type (A-36, P-51, P-39)." They naturally noted that these aircraft had better speed "and other fighter characteristics" for self-defense. They similarly remark that the A-26 and A-20 are also more accurate than dive bombers "against most targets." And they make the crucial point that "the Navy's need for a dive bomber does not indicate an Army need for a dive bomber" because of a very questionable assumption, that "hostile navies or task forces clash and the issue is quickly decided" thus limiting the scope, duration, and target types for Navy dive bombers that wouldn't apply to Army scenarios. But this in fact doesn't describe the lion's share of Navy attack missions, most of which aren't aimed at enemy fleets but at "power projection" type targets ashore. Carrier aircraft did to Japanese land forces in the Pacific what Army aircraft did to German land forces in Europe; most of the SBD and SB2C sorties were against land installations. The Navy had fighter-bombers too, of course; but they lacked carrier-borne equivalents to the Havoc and Invader and (surprisingly unmentioned by the Army) Marauder, so there was little choice but to use their Dauntlesses and Helldivers in ground attack roles as well. Still, the Army study does seem to be as much an attempt to justify an already-decided course of action than an attempt to map out such a course.
Anyway the Board recommended that Materiel Command "cease the procurement of dive bomber types...as soon as practicable" noting that "the flow of aircraft necessary during the cessation can be used in certain relatively inactive theaters and in the training of units being activated." They further recommended "that all manufacturing facilities released be made available for increased production of light bomber types (A-26, A-20) and fighter bomber types (A-36, P-51, P-39)" and "that fighter bomber types...be the types of aircraft used by dive bomber groups contemplated in the present program." The conversion of dive bomber factories to other types was only partially accomplished; delivery of A-24s ended that December, while A-25s took another few months to completely wind down. Certainly no P-51s or P-39s or any other fighter-bombers were manufactured in the massive Curtiss-Wright plant in St Louis where A-25s had been pouring out, so that part of the plan didn't materialize. In any event, I've often read that the Army decided it didn't need dive bombers, but this is the first time I've understood exactly what their reasoning was. Hope others find this as interesting as I did.
