Army's views on dive bombers

[Shortround6]

A-26 was in development to replace A-20.
B-25 and B-26 were mediums with completely different design limitations.

This is true but the initial post says.

So it's interesting to read that a year and a half later, 22 March 1943, a board of officers was convened "for the purpose of evaluating current dive bombers now in production; namely, the A-35, the A-24, and the A-25." They compared the 3 types in 4 areas: Provision for forward gun fire, ability to place a bomb on the target from a dive, ease of maintenance, and high speed at low altitudes.

The specific evaluation factors were: Vulnerability to hostile fighters; ability to take evasive action, including high speed; accuracy at the target compared to the fighter bomber types (A-36, P-51, and P-39) equipped with N-3A modified gunsight; ditto compared to the light bomber types (A-26, A-20) equipped with the same gunsight;

There were no production A-26 aircraft in exitance in during the spring and summer of 1943 to be tested or evaluated by the board.
There were a number of B-25s and B-26s that were converted/modified to ground strafers/low level bombers that were available during that time to supplement the A-20s.

There were 3 A-26 Prototypes.
The first flew on July 10, 1942. but was not turned over to the Army until Feb. 21, 1944

The 2nd prototype was built as a nightfighter with radar in the nose and ventral gun tub with four 20mm guns.
I don't have a first flight at the factory but the plane was not handed over to the Army during Sept 27th 1943.
Trying evaluate a nightfighter as a low level attack bomber seems a little strange.

The 3rd prototype had a solid nose with a 75mm cannon for strafing. It was handed over to the Army on June 30 1943.

The timing doesn't look right unless they were anticipating similar results (flying characteristics ) to the A-20??

 

[Greg Boeser]

B-25 and B-26 were considered medium bombers. A-20 and A-26 were designed as light bombers. So I believe the evaluation of the A-26 was based on its projected performance envelope.

 

[MIflyer]

B-25 and B-26 were mediums with completely different design limitations.

By the end of the war the USAAF planned to replace both the B-25 and B-26 as well as the A-20 with the A-26. A-20 units in the ETO were reequipped with A-26 and their A-20's mainly destroyed. Some B-26 units in the ETO were also reequipped with A-26, although at least one former B-26 unit retained one B-26 because it made a much better hack transport than the A-26.

Postwar the Martin B-26 disappeared very quickly and the B-25 was moved to training, starting before the end of the war and continuing until at least 1955 and in some cases even the 1960's.

 

[MikeMeech]

And unfortunately not as good at battlefield communications. The German ground forces could communicate with their air force to requires CAS. At various times both the USAAF and the RAF had people who were horrified at the idea of the ground forces interfering in their properly staffed and carefully planned air attacks. Even in the WoT in Afghanistan we heard complaints from staffs about B-52's talking directly to the troops in contact and thus not allowing the staffs to do their jobs. Careerism is the most devastating force in the military.

Hi
However, the Germans did have problems with their communications between air and ground especially in the first part of the war (although it never totally solved, as in other countries). Also the Luftwaffe did not class the Ju 87 formations as "ground attack units" during the early stages of the war (see translation of Luftwaffe document 'Development of the German Ground Attack Arm and Principles Governing its Operations up to the end of 1944', this is available as Appendix 14 of 'Air Support, Air Publication 3235' on the British Air Historical Branch website). Some of the communication problems arising in the Luftwaffe can be found in 'Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support' edited by Benjamin Franklin Cooling, USAAF 1990, Chapter 2, 'The Luftwaffe Experience, 1939-1941' by Williamson Murray, extract below:

Having air superiority has its advantages, as does being better at this task than the opposition, but the Luftwaffe/Heer certainly had comms problems.

Mike

 

[OldGeezer]

This is true but the initial post says.



There were no production A-26 aircraft in exitance in during the spring and summer of 1943 to be tested or evaluated by the board.
There were a number of B-25s and B-26s that were converted/modified to ground strafers/low level bombers that were available during that time to supplement the A-20s.

There were 3 A-26 Prototypes.
The first flew on July 10, 1942. but was not turned over to the Army until Feb. 21, 1944

The 2nd prototype was built as a nightfighter with radar in the nose and ventral gun tub with four 20mm guns.
I don't have a first flight at the factory but the plane was not handed over to the Army during Sept 27th 1943.
Trying evaluate a nightfighter as a low level attack bomber seems a little strange.

The 3rd prototype had a solid nose with a 75mm cannon for strafing. It was handed over to the Army on June 30 1943.

The timing doesn't look right unless they were anticipating similar results (flying characteristics ) to the A-20??

Don't know, but that's what they said in their top-level conference. Here's the entire memo that summarizes their studies, findings, and recommendations. Interesting reading!

 

[Shortround6]

I thank you for that.
But for me it still does not resolve the A-26 issue as in March 1943 there was only one A-26 flying and it had several problems.

The spinners and cowls caused cooling problems but were still being used on on the next two prototypes.

 

[MikeMeech]

Hi
The 'Air Support', AP 3235, document also has the British response on air support after the Fall of France. This was the trials undertaken in Northern Ireland during the Autumn of 1940:

The main text of 'Air Support' also has discussion on the British Army demands, as have 'The Development of British Tactical Air Power 1940-1943 - A History of Army Co-operation Command' by Matthew Powell, and 'Strategy for Victory - The Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1919-1943' by David Ian Hall (IIRC both these books were based on PhDs so still could be available online in that form).
For extracts on German Documents relating to the subject there is 'The Luftwaffe's Way of War - German Air Force Doctrine 1911-1945' by James S. Corum and Richard R. Muller. also Corum's 'The Luftwaffe - Creating the Operational Air War, 1918-1940'.
Looking at the contents in these and other books on WW2 air support for ground forces, the same arguments/discussions on how/when to use aircraft or artillery, how to recognise own and enemy forces, communication between air and ground forces etc., are basically the same as made during WW1, technology may have changed (although not a lot with some methods, especially recognition of forces on the ground). In allied (particularly ground) forces after 1940 defeats, the 'dive bomber' became a solution to/excuse for that defeat, it wasn't, and became even less so at least in the ETO as the war progressed.

Mike

 

[OldGeezer]

I thank you for that.
But for me it still does not resolve the A-26 issue as in March 1943 there was only one A-26 flying and it had several problems.
View attachment 833550
The spinners and cowls caused cooling problems but were still being used on on the next two prototypes.

They seemed to be including it as a member of the "type" class of "low altitude bomber" and drawing general conclusions about the "type" based, presumably, on what had been observed with the A-20 as far as bombing accuracy. It was a short 3-day meeting involving pilots who had actually flown the 3 dive bombers being evaluated, so there couldn't have been much if any quantitative analysis done on details. It sounds like it was more of a qualitative evaluation based on general feedback from test and combat units. Here's the first page of the message, I should have included it along with the other 2 for clarity. I'm not aware of any reaction to their recommendations or follow-up investigation, but who knows what lurks in the microfilm records libraries?

 

[Onslow]

Hi
The 'Air Support', AP 3235, document also has the British response on air support after the Fall of France. This was the trials undertaken in Northern Ireland during the Autumn of 1940:
View attachment 833547
View attachment 833548
View attachment 833549
The main text of 'Air Support' also has discussion on the British Army demands, as have 'The Development of British Tactical Air Power 1940-1943 - A History of Army Co-operation Command' by Matthew Powell, and 'Strategy for Victory - The Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1919-1943' by David Ian Hall (IIRC both these books were based on PhDs so still could be available online in that form).
For extracts on German Documents relating to the subject there is 'The Luftwaffe's Way of War - German Air Force Doctrine 1911-1945' by James S. Corum and Richard R. Muller. also Corum's 'The Luftwaffe - Creating the Operational Air War, 1918-1940'.
Looking at the contents in these and other books on WW2 air support for ground forces, the same arguments/discussions on how/when to use aircraft or artillery, how to recognise own and enemy forces, communication between air and ground forces etc., are basically the same as made during WW1, technology may have changed (although not a lot with some methods, especially recognition of forces on the ground). In allied (particularly ground) forces after 1940 defeats, the 'dive bomber' became a solution to/excuse for that defeat, it wasn't, and became even less so at least in the ETO as the war progressed.

Mike

Fascinating information - many thanks for sharing it.

 

[MIflyer]

However, the Germans did have problems with their communications between air and ground especially in the first part of the war (although it never totally solved, as in other countries).

Yes, in the BoB the German fighters were not on the same frequency as the German bombers, leading to them sending a fighter to buzz the bomber airfields so to indicate they were ready - but on some occasions the fighters WERE on the same frequency as the defending RAF fighters.

I think it was Richard Townsend who described how one day his Hurricane squadron was sent to attack BF-110's that where getting ready to attack a coastal convoy and when they got there found the German commander was directing his 110's while singing "September in the Rain" over the comm frequency. When the Hurricanes popped out of the extensive cloud cover and gave the 110's a squirt the singing stopped and unpleasant remarks were heard.