B-17 in ASW?

Simon Thomas said:

My grandfather's neighbour flew Liberators with the RAAF. He said that the only reason they took off was the curvature of the earth.

TAA People FJ Ball

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A matter often ignored about the take off performance of the B-24 is when and where.

The operational take off weight was steadily increased as the war went on. From 60,000lb (CC in 1943), through 63,000lb to 66,000lb and even 68,000lb.

Then there is the "hot and / or high" areas the B-24 flew in during the later war period compared to the B-17. No operational B-17 in the SEAC and Pacific areas from the latter part of 1943 to the end of the war, so no comparison is available.

Taken in combination of course there was an effect on take off performance. But look at what the Liberator V (based on the B-24D airframe) was achieving by mid-1945. Stripped of most of its heavy gun turrets, with 2 overload fuel tanks in the forward bomb bay and often another in the rear fuselage, taking off in the cool of the morning from Ceylon to drop supplies to Force 136 personnel just north of Singapore at night, on flights that regularly exceeded 20 hours and in some cases over 24 hours. A round trip distance of over 3,500 statute miles (5,500km, 2,600nm). Often encountering bad tropical weather in the monsoon season from May-Oct.

You will find a transcript of the 160 squadron ORB for 1945 here.

Many RAAF personnel flew with the SEAC based Liberator squadrons. Many more with the RAAF Liberator squadrons based in the Darwin area, some of which moved forward to Morotai (between the top of New Guinea and the Philippines) in 1944/45. 25 RAAF was based at Cunderin, Western Australia from Jan 1945 using Corunna Downs and Truscott as forward bases.

From a quick look at the USAAF cards, early B-26B, 12 reported sent to Sumac (5th AF) and 22 to Fantan/Poppy (13th AF), around the third quarter of 1942. The B-26B began production in April 1942, those sent would have been accepted in May, all 41-
Fantan 17558, 17562, 17564, 17569, 17574, 17575, 17576, 17586, 17587, 17590
Poppy 17556, 17565, 17567, 17568, 17573, 17579, 17580, 17581, 17585, 17588, 17589, 17591
Sumac 17547, 17550, 17551, 17553, 17554, 17559, 17566, 17570, 17584, 17593, 17596, 17601

nuuumannn said:

I'm not sure what you are debating here, my sources state June 1941, clearly they are out, by three months. You are arguing over three months delivery time, when you originally said Bomber Command did not have bomber Liberators until 1944. I was out by three months, you were out by three years, Geoff. To reassert, Liberator Mk.IIs entered Bomber Command service in 1941, not Coastal Command, Bomber Command in 1941.

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What are the sources and the definition of in service? So up to 4 B-24 that flew training sorties for around 2 months while assigned to a squadron that remained operational on Wellingtons is considered to be B-24 in service with Bomber Command as a bomber?

8 Group was reformed on 1 September 1941 with an intention to control B-17 and B-24 units, 90 squadron was transferred to it on 2 January 1942 but the group disbanded in 28 January 1942, 90 squadron on 10 February 1942.

Extracts from Air 22/36 and 37 War Room Daily Return Strength of Aircraft, Balloons, Searchlights and AA Guns April to September 1941, only gives strength of operational units, no B-24 in Bomber Command in the time period.

Air 27/911 120 squadron ORS, first B-24 arrived on 8 June 1941, first operational B-24 sortie on 20 September.

Air 27/1009 150 squadron ORS, 1 Group Bomber Command, first Liberator arrived 19 November 1941 as part of a planned re-equipment, training flights mentioned on 9, 10, 22, 23 December 1941, om 10 January 1942 two B-24 flown and reassigned to RAF Polebrook, which was where the air echelons of 159 and 160 squadrons were training.

AIR 14/2696 Bomber Command Orders of Battle April 1941 to December 1942, usually weekly, squadron level, including non operational and forming units, plus training units with location and authorised strength, number and type. No mention of B-24 in June and July while 90 squadron with B-17 non operational on 3 July, half operational on 12 July. The 9 October 1941 report is the first to note 150 squadron is to re-arm with Liberator, strength 16+2 aircraft, the 4 December report has the first Liberators, 3, plus 17 Wellington Ic, squadron operational on Wellingtons. On 4 December it was 3 Liberator + 21 Wellington, on 12 December it was 4+20, same on the 19th and 26th, on 5 January 1943 it was 1+21 and the note about re-arming dropped, on the 16th it was 17 Wellington, the squadron remained operational on Wellingtons throughout.

Air 19/549, Air 22/214 Strength of Metropolitan Air Force Weekly returns, squadron level again, includes non operational and forming units, has notes on changes, as of 31 May B-24 in Coastal Command, 1 squadron, no aircraft, 3 B-24, as of 13 June then 4 aircraft, 3 serviceable, 4 crews as of 20 June and so on, showing the figures include non operational units. As of 21 November 1941, 150 squadron re-arming to Liberator, with 1 on strength along with Wellingtons, same on 28 November, 5 December had 3 Liberator plus Wellingtons, on 12 December similar, 19 December it was 4 Liberator plus Wellingtons, on 26 December similar, on 17 January 1942 it was a Wellington squadron.

Air 20/2022 as of 3 September 1941 the RAF had 18 Liberator Bombers in the UK.

AIR 20/1857 Metropolitan Air Force Aircraft Strength fortnightly report, all squadrons and relevant flights individually listed with type and version of aircraft, B-24 appear in Coastal Command on 1 July 1941. On 30 November 150 squadron appears as a Liberator squadron, with 1 Liberator and 19 Wellington Ic, on 31 December it is back to listed as a Wellington squadron with 19 Ic, 1 Ia and 3 Liberator, on 31 January 1942 it had 1 Ia and 17 Ic Wellingtons.

Air 20/2026, quarterly home air force strength returns, including non operational units, no B-24 in Bomber Command until 1 October 1944, Coastal Command had B-24 on 1 July 1941.

Secondary references, RAF Squadrons by Jefford,
Liberator I with 120 (Jun 41 to Dec 43), 231 (Sep 44 to Jan 46) and 511 (Oct 42 to Mar 44) squadrons,
Liberator II with 108 (Nov 41 to Jun 42 plus Nov/Dec 42 as special operations flight), 120 (Nov 41 to Oct 42), 148 (Mar 43 to Feb 44, Special Liberator Flight redesignated), 159 (May 42 to Aug 43), 160 (May 42 to Jan 43), 178 (Jan to Dec 43), 224 (Nov 43 to Apr 43), 231 (Sep 44 to Jan 46) and 511 (Oct 42 to May 44) squadrons

As Ewen has pointed out 159 and 160 formed in Britain in early 1942 but were not part of Bomber Command, 108 squadron was operating Wellington IC Aug 41 to Nov 42, as well as the Liberators mentioned above.

LB-30A AM258 to 263, Liberator I AM910 to 927, Liberator II AL503, Air Britain has a list of RAF controlled trans Atlantic flights, B-24 (USAAF) and Liberator (RAF) March to September 1941,

The B-24 Liberator by Alan G Blue, Appendix O, performance table, range at maximum cruise power in statute miles with payload of 5,000 pounds unless indicated
XB-24 2,850 miles (2,500 pounds) ferry range 4,700 miles
B-24A 2,200 miles (4,800 pounds) ferry range 4,000 miles
B-24C 2,100 miles, ferry range 3,650 miles
B-24D 1,800 miles, ferry range 3,500 miles
B-24E 2,500 miles, ferry range 4,100 miles
B-24G,H,J,L,M 1,700 miles, ferry range 3,300 miles
PB4Y-2 2,630 miles (4,000 pounds) ferry range 3,800 miles
RY-3 3,700 miles (6,200 pounds)

Harking back to the original post Robert Stitt's "Boeing B17 Fortress in RAF Coastal Command Service" is a relevant read.

SaparotRob said:

A bit of a thread jack. Are there anecdotal reports of Commonwealth pilots' opinions on flying the Liberators? I'm not talking about in combat but rather pilot impressions of the machine. Was it pleasant to fly? I'd also love anything on my all time favorite, the Fortress, if ya' got 'em.

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My favourite account with lots of detail on pilot experience is Jack Colman's "Liberators over the Atlantic". Gives a real sense on the mental and physical stress on a pilot flying a Lib. His follow-up book on Beaufighters and Mossies in the Far East is also very good. His views on the relative merits of the two are insightful.

Hi Geoffrey:

Re the RCAF B-17s (Post #13) , I don't believe they were regarded as Fortress IIs and IIAs which I think only applied to aircraft delivered to the UK and modified for ASW operations at RAF Burtonwood following initial modifications at the Cheyenne Modification Center. I think the six RCAF B-17Es and Fs would be regarded as a separate group from those destined for RAF Coastal Command in terms of accounting.

On the broader topic of 'Fortress-versus-Liberator' with RAF Coastal Command during the Battle of the Atlantic, the importance of the Fortress in terms of availability and effectiveness has nearly always been under-represented in historical accounts. During the critical period from September 1942 to March 1943 there were simply not enough Liberators to go around. From my book on RAF Coastal Command Fortresses:

"The following day [January 14, 1942], the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, AM Ralph S Sorley, convened a pivotal meeting to discuss 'the allocation of Liberator or Fortress aircraft to Coastal Command'. The Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, AVM Bottomley, opened the meeting with an announcement that, following the reduction in the program to allocate Liberator IIs to Britain, the use of the mark by Coastal Command had become impracticable. However, B-17Es were now available and thought to be suitable for the anti-submarine role. AOC-in-C Coastal Command, ACM Sir Philip Bennet Joubert de la Ferté, responded that he was anxious to 'arrive at finality on the type of aircraft to be allotted to his command' and that he wanted to be sure that the type would not be changed again at short notice to meet the requirements of another command.

Suitably reassured, Joubert agreed that the Fortress could be accepted for Coastal Command and that only the minimum number of essential modifications should be carried out before the aircraft were issued for squadron use."

That situation later changed as Liberator production ramped up but the Fortress proved to be a highly capable and dependable aircraft at a critical time.

Regards:

Robert

robstitt said:

Hi Geoffrey:

Re the RCAF B-17s (Post #13) , I don't believe they were regarded as Fortress IIs and IIAs which I think only applied to aircraft delivered to the UK and modified for ASW operations at RAF Burtonwood following initial modifications at the Cheyenne Modification Center. I think the six RCAF B-17Es and Fs would be regarded as a separate group from those destined for RAF Coastal Command in terms of accounting.

On the broader topic of 'Fortress-versus-Liberator' with RAF Coastal Command during the Battle of the Atlantic, the importance of the Fortress in terms of availability and effectiveness has nearly always been under-represented in historical accounts. During the critical period from September 1942 to March 1943 there were simply not enough Liberators to go around. From my book on RAF Coastal Command Fortresses:

"The following day [January 14, 1942], the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, AM Ralph S Sorley, convened a pivotal meeting to discuss 'the allocation of Liberator or Fortress aircraft to Coastal Command'. The Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, AVM Bottomley, opened the meeting with an announcement that, following the reduction in the program to allocate Liberator IIs to Britain, the use of the mark by Coastal Command had become impracticable. However, B-17Es were now available and thought to be suitable for the anti-submarine role. AOC-in-C Coastal Command, ACM Sir Philip Bennet Joubert de la Ferté, responded that he was anxious to 'arrive at finality on the type of aircraft to be allotted to his command' and that he wanted to be sure that the type would not be changed again at short notice to meet the requirements of another command.

Suitably reassured, Joubert agreed that the Fortress could be accepted for Coastal Command and that only the minimum number of essential modifications should be carried out before the aircraft were issued for squadron use."

That situation later changed as Liberator production ramped up but the Fortress proved to be a highly capable and dependable aircraft at a critical time.

Regards:

Robert

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Hi
According to John Buckley's 'The RAF and Trade Defence 1919-1945, Constant Endeavour', p.133:
"In a note to Churchill on 29 March, Portal advised most strongly against giving Lancasters to Coastal Command. He also pointed out that the Americans were not happy about Fortresses being used for maritime operations and that, if Liberators were diverted to Coastal Command as well, there would be 'serious trouble' with General Arnold, head of the US Army Air Force."

It should also be noted that Bomber Command "on 23rd February, 1942, out of a total 378 serviceable aircraft with crews (excluding "Freshmen" not yet fit for operations) only 69 were heavy bombers." (Page 8 of Harris's 'Despatch on War Operations'), meanwhile all types operational aircraft in CC on 15 June 1942, was 388 serviceable (included one Fortress and one Liberator Sqn., 220 and 120 Sqn. respectively).

The First Sea Lord, Alexander, wrote to the PM on 1st May "requesting the transfer of two squadrons of Lancasters, Liberators, Stirlings or Warwicks until the Fortresses arrived from the USA." Immediately the Warwicks could be ruled out as they only came into production in July 1942, there were no squadron available in May (or until 1943)? The Lancaster had only gone into action in March 1942, probably only two squadrons operational at that time (44 and 97) others would have been just working up. It sometimes appears that aircraft were being demanded before they even existed!

Mike

MikeMeech said:

Hi
According to John Buckley's 'The RAF and Trade Defence 1919-1945, Constant Endeavour', p.133:
"In a note to Churchill on 29 March, Portal advised most strongly against giving Lancasters to Coastal Command. He also pointed out that the Americans were not happy about Fortresses being used for maritime operations and that, if Liberators were diverted to Coastal Command as well, there would be 'serious trouble' with General Arnold, head of the US Army Air Force."

It should also be noted that Bomber Command "on 23rd February, 1942, out of a total 378 serviceable aircraft with crews (excluding "Freshmen" not yet fit for operations) only 69 were heavy bombers." (Page 8 of Harris's 'Despatch on War Operations'), meanwhile all types operational aircraft in CC on 15 June 1942, was 388 serviceable (included one Fortress and one Liberator Sqn., 220 and 120 Sqn. respectively).

The First Sea Lord, Alexander, wrote to the PM on 1st May "requesting the transfer of two squadrons of Lancasters, Liberators, Stirlings or Warwicks until the Fortresses arrived from the USA." Immediately the Warwicks could be ruled out as they only came into production in July 1942, there were no squadron available in May (or until 1943)? The Lancaster had only gone into action in March 1942, probably only two squadrons operational at that time (44 and 97) others would have been just working up. It sometimes appears that aircraft were being demanded before they even existed!

Mike

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Hi Mike:

Thanks - will look out for that book.

Robert

The RAF received 20 B-17-C/Fortress I in 1941, 19 B-17F/Fortress II and 45 B-17E/Fortress IIA in 1942/43. When the RAF reports where the aircraft were end February 1943 it says 2 mark II and 1 IIA were in Canada, along with 4 Liberator II, 2 III and 15 V. Then comes the arrangements between the RAF And RCAF about who had charge, as another example of the 37 Catalina the RAF says it had in Canada.

Separately Canada received 3 B-17F and 3 B-17E from the USAAF (5 in December 1943 and a B-17E in February 1944), RCAF serials 9202 to 04 B-17F. 9205 to 07 B-17E. The RCAF Aircraft book notes them as Model 299-O mark IIA and model 299-P mark IIA.

The US exported the first of the 45 B-17E in March 1942, with 29 sent June/July 1942. To end November 1941 a total of 77 Liberator II had been accepted, 73 delivered, 56 exported, another 8 exported in December 1941, then none until March 1942. Both orders clearly suffered delivery delays as far as the RAF was concerned. The British B-24D order exports started in February 1942, with 74 sent by end August.

If you take the B-17E and Liberator II as the first combat worthy versions then there are more B-24 around pre Pearl Harbor, then B-24 numbers spend 1942 about a month behind B-17 numbers. What people in early 1942 thought production would be is another matter and plenty of delivery promises were broken.

British imports

British possible GR types in production in 1941, performance

Whitley VII, in production in August 1941, reported to be able to carry 1,100 gallons of fuel. Halifax I early fuel tank capacity of 1,552 gallons later became 1,636 gallons as part of all up weight rising from 55 to 60,000 pounds, early mark II had the same capacity, then it was raised to 1,882 gallons. A Lancaster appears to have been about 10% more fuel efficient than a Halifax and had permanent tankage for 2,154 gallons, with up to 800 gallons extra in fuselage tanks. Given the space inside the Halifax and Lancaster crew efficiency would be an issue.

Not sure about page 8 of the Harris Despatch. Table 2 says on average in February 1942, aircraft with crews was 55 light, 275 medium, 44 heavy, total 374. On 23 February 1942 Bomber Command reported 518 aircraft serviceable, 518 crews available, 428 aircraft with crews.

Harris says for most of 1942 Bomber Command averaged around 400 crews and aircraft available, the mix changed by December to 46 light, 111 medium, 262 heavy, total 419

Bomber Command Operational Squadrons 1 May 1942, Authorised Strength = Initial Equipment + Initial Reserve = Unit Equipment

Lancaster 44 squadron operational/first mission, 3 March 1942, 97 squadron 20 March, 207 squadron 24 April.

On 31 December 1942 Bomber Command had 63 squadrons of which 47 were operational, 3/3 Boston, 11/10 Halifax, 17/14 Lancaster, 2/0 Mitchell, 2.5/2 Mosquito, 8/5 Stirling, 3/3 Ventura, 16.5/10 Wellington.

Bomber Command started anti submarine sorties on 17 July 1942, most using OTU Whitley, ending on 19 July 1943, with 365 Halifax, 116 Lancaster and 1,848 Whitley sorties sent, including a few on anti shipping sorties when a blockade runner was spotted.

1 May 1942 Coastal Command aircraft holdings
Includes the anti shipping forces

re

EwenS said:

Then there is the "hot and / or high" areas the B-24 flew in during the later war period compared to the B-17. No operational B-17 in the SEAC and Pacific areas from the latter part of 1943 to the end of the war, so no comparison is available.

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Possibly of interest,

I went through all the sources I have for data on the TO and landing performance for the B-17 and B-24 and wrote up my findings. I am attaching a .jpg of my Word document below. I think I got it right but let me know if you see something off.

The information in my write-up does not directly address the "hot and / or high" aspect of EwenS's question in his post I quoted above, but unless the atmospherics in the PTO affected the R-1820 based powerplants in the B-17 in a more adverse manner than the R-1830 based powerplants in the B-24, I think the relative performance of the two aircraft should remain ~proportional.

As such, the B-17 appears to have a very significant advantage in TO distances - particularly at higher TOGWs - while the B-24 has a significant advantage in landing distances.

Somethings not adding up. Those figures for the B-24 are way off of the values given in the "take-off, Climb and landing chart"
Actually the TOCL chats for both aircraft don't match the TO control charts.

U.S. Navy Service Airplane Characteristics and Performance and Data Sheets, PB4Y-1 As of 1 November 1944, Engine Rating at Take-Off 1,200 BHP at 2,700 RPM , PB4Y-2 As of 1 July 1944, Engine Rating at Take-Off 1,350 BHP at 2,800 RPM

This is the main B-17F TO Control Chart I used, followed by the B-17F TOCL Chart. They are consistent from the earliest B-17E manual I have to the latest B-17G manual that I have, and are compatible with the post-war B-17G SAC numbers.

This is the main B-17F TOCL Chart I used. TO from & Landing on Hard Surface Runways, No Wind.


This is the main B-24D TO Control Chart I used, followed by the B-24G/H TOCL Chart. As already mentioned in my post up-thread, these and the post-war PB4Y-1 ACPs are not as consistent as the B-17 manuals. NOTE that the TO Distance to 50 ft is different between the B-24D TO Control Chart and the B-24G/H TOCL Chart - ie 2050 ft vs 2300 ft.

This is the main B-24G/H TOCL Chart I used. TO from & Landing on Hard Surface Runways, No Wind.



Am I reading the Charts correctly?

ThomasP said:

View attachment 821230

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Right near the bottom, "Remarks". Is this the actual nomenclature for "paddle bladed" props?

I think so, but the reference I ran across was from a PB4Y-1 ACP. It stated that use of 6477A-0 blades reduced the TO Distance (to 50 ft) by 200 ft vs the earlier 6353A-18 blades. The 6477A-0 were later-war wide blades (or "paddle" blades) used on various models of the B-24 and PB4Y.

see "Need Drawings For Hamilton Standard 6353A18 & 6477A0 Props"

Jugman said:

Somethings not adding up. Those figures for the B-24 are way off of the values given in the "take-off, Climb and landing chart"
Actually the TOCL chats for both aircraft don't match the TO control charts.

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Hey Dumbass, read the chart correctly and maybe, just maybe you won't confuse yourself.

I did find one minor error. The B-24 at 50,000lb should be 1800ft and not 1900ft.

Hey Jugman,

I cannot find the 1800 ft for 50,000 lbs you are referring to. I can see the 1800-1850 ft TO Distance to Clear 50ft on the Control Chart for the B-24 at 40,000 lbs, but not for 50,000 lbs. Can you explain where this is indicated?

The B-24 Pilot I knew(since passed on) noted that the B-24 flew like a truck, a real workout on the controls when not on autopilot, to the point, some used to joke that you could always tell who was the pilot/co-pilot on a B-24 crew, as they had deformed muscles like Popeye.
The other was that no matter what B-24 he flew, each one leaked gas from that tanks, one of them to the point they flew with the bay doors slightly rolled back, to keep fumes from building up.
And that was with ground crew trying everything they could to fix.

ThomasP said:

Hey Jugman,

I cannot find the 1800 ft for 50,000 lbs you are referring to. I can see the 1800-1850 ft TO Distance to Clear 50ft on the Control Chart for the B-24 at 40,000 lbs, but not for 50,000 lbs. Can you explain where this is indicated?

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you list the ground run at 50,000ft as 1900ft it should be 1800ft

Sorry, I meant I cannot find the 1800 ft value at 50,000 lbs on the TO Control or TOCL charts I posted above. Do you have a different chart available you can post?

This is the only TO Ground Roll Chart I could find. It is from the B-24G/H & PB4Y-1 PFOI Manual dated Nov'44. As far as I can tell the line for the 50,000 lb TOGW is at the 1875 ft mark, so rounding to the nearest 50 ft it goes up to 1900 ft.

Previous data:
PB4Y-1 with Hamilton Standard 3 blade, 11 foot 7 inch, Blade Design Number 6477A-O, Note: Installation of 6353A-18 blades increases take off distance over 50 foot obstacle by 300 feet but has negligible effect on range and V max.

PB4Y-2 with Hamilton Standard 3 blade, 11 foot 7 inch, Blade Design Number 6353A-18