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"Brevity is the soul of Lingerie." -- Dorothy Parker"Brevity is the soul of wit." -- Oscar Wilde
I have looked at that and similar articles and as the saying goes "There are three kinds of lies: lies, dammed lies and statistics" The claim is that the B-24 had the same loss rate as the B-17 and on the surface its seems true but the reality is that the B-24 actually didn't fly that many missions to Germany during the dark days of 1943 when the 8th Airforce suffered terribly proving that unescorted bombers were not a viable concept.Interesting article here The Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress, or the Consolidated B-24 Liberator?
That's exactly right. Best to examine paired observations, if they can be obtained and analyzed using analysis of variance.I have looked at that and similar articles and as the saying goes "There are three kinds of lies: lies, dammed lies and statistics" The claim is that the B-24 had the same loss rate as the B-17 and on the surface its seems true but the reality is that the B-24 actually didn't fly that many missions to Germany during the dark days of 1943 when the 8th Airforce suffered terribly proving that unescorted bombers were not a viable concept.
I went through the missions from January to October when the 8th AF was flying unescorted missions into Germany and found that the B-24 didn't actually fly on most of them and certainly didn't fly on the deep penetration ones. In order to compare apples to apples I took the data for the missions that both the B-17 and the B-24 flew together…
The B-24s edge in range was actually gone by the end of the war at least according to the USAAFRegarding the B-17 versus B-24 debate, I'll offer these quotes from the book The B-24 Liberator — A Pictorial History by Allan G. Blue:
There were certain other contrasts between the two aircraft which were becoming apparent to men who were acquainted with both. For example the overall impression one got from the Fortress interior was that it was, like its exterior, round and smooth — with its equipment built-in rather than added-on. Each B-17 crew member had a place to sit down and strap himself in — a small point, perhaps, but psychologically important. On the other hand the Liberator fuselage, while of larger dimensions than the Fortress, offered little in the way of comfort for the crew. There seemed to be draughts everywhere, and of such magnitude that they were far more than the troublesome spot heaters could contend with. Movement throughout the ship was awkward and difficult in full flight gear, and more often than not resulted in jarring collisions with various sharp-edged and unyielding structural members and/or installed equipment. Idle gunners sat on the floor — if they sat — and likely as not pondered possible fates for the design engineer who was responsible for a fuel-transfer system that required any prudent B-24 pilot to crack open the bomb bay doors in flight to disperse the petrol fumes. Or perhaps the ball and tail gunners thought about the greater speed with which their B-17 counterparts could exit their stations in a emergency. (p.184)
Inevitably the Liberator continued to be compared with the Flying Fortress and, as far as the later versions of the two bombers were concerned, suffered by the comparison. This was due not so much to short-comings of the Liberator — although it certainly had them — as to the fact the B-17 was in many respects an exceptional aircraft, with many of its merits having particular — and personal — appeal to the men who flew it and flew in it. From the beginning the Fortress was an honest aircraft, easy to fly in formation, with a low landing speed and with no major vices. 'A four-engined Piper Cub' was the popular and rather apt description. Most important, the Fortress retained its original characteristics throughout its development, while the Liberator did not. (p.186)
Actually the Liberator never did lose its performance edge over the B-17, as a series of tests run at Elgin Field demonstrated conclusively late in the war. Rather, the areas in which the B-24 excelled became less important in the European and Mediterranean theatres. The range of the Fortress was adequate for Europe, and individual aircraft speed became academic because of formation requirements. Altitude, however, became paramount and here, literally, the B-17 remained on top. In addition, with over 70% of Eighth Air Force mission failures being attributed to navigational errors, the superior accommodations of the B-17 nose were highly desirable. General Doolittle, in fact, considered poor visibility the number one fault of the B-24.
In the Pacific theatre there was no vocal contest between the two aircraft, for although B-24's were originally requested by Pacific theatre commanders because they felt there was a better chance of getting them than the more popular B-17, the Liberator's longer legs soon demonstrated that it was a natural choice for an air war conducted for the most part at extreme range. The European requirement for tight formation flying was not as severe, and the typical maximum-range mission allowed Pacific Liberators, when necessary, to approach the target at adequate altitude because of the large amount of fuel burned on the way. (p.186-187)
I don't think it is a candidate for "Greatest Aviation Myth". The report is dated May 1942 and is for a specific set of circumstances. But what about the fuel load? Max shown is 2,500 US gallons.Based on the chart posted above by Reluctant Poster, and the linked document below from 30 May 1942, the USAAF never considered the B-24 to have a greater range than the B-17:
"http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/B-17/B-17E_B-24D_Comparison.pdf"
I think the superior range of the B-24 over the B-17 is another candidate for the "Greatest aviation myth this site "de-bunked"" thread.
But is that correct?B-17F/G carried 1080 USgal in the 'Tokyo tanks', so a maximum of 3600 USgal.
The chart I posted clearly shows the B-17 carrying 6,000 lbs. of bombs for 1,800 miles whereas the B-24 only carries 5,000 lbs. of bombs for 1,600 miles. I have attached the study I took it from.I don't think it is a candidate for "Greatest Aviation Myth". The report is dated May 1942 and is for a specific set of circumstances. But what about the fuel load? Max shown is 2,500 US gallons.
From Joe Baugher's site, max fuel loads
B-17E normal 2490 gal
B-17F normal 2,520 gal
B-17G normal 2,520 gal
At some point in the B-17F run Tokyo Tanks began to be installed but I'm not sure how much they added. And bomb bay fuel tanks could be fitted to increase the capacity to 3,612 gals.
The B-24D began with an internal fuel capacity of 2,343 gals. But from the D-1 model introduced in mid-1942 extra auxiliary tanks were added in the outer wings with a capacity of 450 gals to take total internal capacity to 2,790 gals. On top of that 2 bomb bay tanks each with a capacity of 345 gals could be fitted in the forward bomb bay, taking the capacity to 3,483 gals. At that max fuel load the aft bomb bay was still available for weapons while the B-17 was reduced to external carriage only.
So what does that extra potential 300 gals do to the range of the B-24? In the Pacific by late 1942 B-24D aircraft were regularly flying with either one or both of the bomb bay tanks installed. What was being achieved with the B-24 in the Pacific was a different ball game from that being achieved by the 8th & 15th Air Forces in Europe.
What is not mentioned in this is the potential bomb loads of the aircraft at each weight.
We had a discussion about this last year.
W/Cdr Blackburn and very long-range Liberators
The following passages come from www.weaponsandwarfare.com, specifically an article entitled 'The Consolidated Liberator in RAF Service': ' First squadron to serve in the Burma theatre was No. 159, whose Middle East detachment was mentioned earlier. This squadron began operations in November...ww2aircraft.net
I dont have any dog in this fight. As far as I can see it they both had 4 engines with the same amunt of power, the same defensive armament, crew size and bombing design brief (give or take a little). They were very similar in performance with the differences down to minor issues of weight and aerodynamics. The stats you posted show (in my opinion) mainly the difference that use and chance make. To me it was lucky for the USA that they were different, they could be sent to where their strength were most useful. The nightmare scenario for the USAAF would be only having one or the other in bigger numbers.I have looked at that and similar articles and as the saying goes "There are three kinds of lies: lies, dammed lies and statistics" The claim is that the B-24 had the same loss rate as the B-17 and on the surface its seems true but the reality is that the B-24 actually didn't fly that many missions to Germany during the dark days of 1943 when the 8th Airforce suffered terribly proving that unescorted bombers were not a viable concept.
I went through the missions from January to October when the 8th AF was flying unescorted missions into Germany and found that the B-24 didn't actually fly on most of them and certainly didn't fly on the deep penetration ones. In order to compare apples to apples I took the data for the missions that both the B-17 and the B-24 flew together and this is the result:
View attachment 711811
If you tally up only the missions where both aircraft went to the same target, The B-24 rate increases to 12.1% whereas the B-17 rate drops to 5.3%.
Here are the missions where only B-17s flew:
View attachment 711813
One of the striking things about this data is that is shows that the B-24 barely flew any missions into Germany during this time frame. In fact the B-17 flew 98% of the missions. This obviously slews the overall statistics for the entire war which is what B-24 defenders like to quote.
While not shown in the tables the B-24 stats in this time frame are padded by the diversion missions they flew over the North Sea after they returned from Ploesti. Also note that Ploesti is included in MTO stats.
If you take the period from January 27 to October 14 when missions to Germany were unescorted the overall loss rate is 10.1% for the B17 and 10.2% for the B-24 indicating that the loss rates were virtually identical. This conveniently ignores the fact that the B-24s did not participate in any of the extremely difficult missions (Blitz Week, Schweinfurt -Regensburg, Stuttgart, Munster, second Schweinfurt) and that in general participation by the B-24s was minimal.
If you tally up only the missions where both aircraft went to the same target, The B-24 rate increases to 12.1% whereas the B-17 rate drops to 5.3%.
Interesting, where does the B-17/24 split data come from? The Richard Davis spreadsheets only have bomb tonnages.I went through the missions from January to October when the 8th AF was flying unescorted missions into Germany and found that the B-24 didn't actually fly on most of them and certainly didn't fly on the deep penetration ones
A/c | MIA | Cat E | credit sorties | effective sorties | MIA % | MIA+CAT E % | Cat E/MIA |
B-17 | 1957 | 502 | 121882 | 109736 | 1.78 | 2.24 | 0.26 |
B-24 | 858 | 346 | 66154 | 56300 | 1.52 | 2.14 | 0.40 |
Total | 2815 | 848 | 188036 | 166036 | 1.70 | 2.21 | 0.30 |
Gross Weight Pounds | 62,900 | 63,000 | 63,000 | 63,000 | 62,000 |
Fuel Gallons | 3,214 | 3,063 | 2,019 | 1,272 | 3,614 |
Bomb load No. x Pounds | 0 | 2x500 | 8x1,000 | 8x1,600 | |
Bomb Bay Tanks Droppable No. x Gallons | 1x400 | 1x400 | 0 | 0 | 2x400 |
Max Range Statute Miles | 3,440 | 3,260 | 2,065 | 1,255 | 4,190 |
Max Range Average Speed MPH | 151 | 148 | 154 | 155 | 153 |
Max Endure./Range Altitude Feet | 1,500 | 1,500 | 1,500 | 1,500 | 1,500 |
B-17F/G carried 1080 USgal in the 'Tokyo tanks', so a maximum of 3600 USgal.
I started a spreadsheet years ago. I believe the original source was Freeman, but the latest version is based on this:Interesting, where does the B-17/24 split data come from? The Richard Davis spreadsheets only have bomb tonnages.
Hey 33k in the air,
?
I know